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EXTRACT DECLARATION OF TRUST.

March 1, 1862.

I, William Binny Webster, late Surgeon in the H.E.I.C.S., presently residing in Edinburgh,—Considering that I feel deeply interested in the success of the Free Church College, Edinburgh, and am desirous of advancing the Theological Literature of Scotland, and for this end to establish a Lectureship similar to those of a like kind connected with the Church of England and the Congregational body in England, and that I have made over to the General Trustees of the Free Church of Scotland the sum of £2000 sterling, in trust, for the purpose of founding a Lectureship in memory of the late Reverend William Cunningham, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Edinburgh, and Professor of Divinity and Church History therein, and under the following conditions, namely,—*First*, The Lectureship shall bear the name, and be called, 'The Cunningham Lectureship.' *Second*, The Lecturer shall be a Minister or Professor of the Free Church of Scotland, and shall hold the appointment for not less than two years, nor more than three years, and be entitled for the period of his holding the appointment to the income of the endowment as declared by the General Trustees, it being understood that the Council after referred to may occasionally appoint a Minister or Professor from other denominations, provided this be approved of by not fewer than Eight Members of the Council, and it being further understood that the Council are to regulate the terms of payment of the Lecturer. *Third*, The Lecturer shall be at liberty to choose his own subject within the range of Apologetical, Doctrinal, Controversial, Exegetical, Pastoral, or Historical Theology, including what bears on Missions, Home and Foreign, subject to the consent of the Council. *Fourth*, The Lecturer shall be bound to deliver publicly at Edinburgh a Course of Lectures on the subjects thus chosen at some time immediately preceding the expiry of his appointment, and during the Session of the New College, Edinburgh; the Lectures to be not fewer than six in number, and to be delivered in presence of the Professors and Students under such arrangements as the Council may appoint; the Lecturer shall be bound also to print and publish, at his own risk, not fewer than 750 copies of the Lectures within a year after their delivery, and to deposit three copies of the same in the Library of the New College; the form of the publication shall be regulated by the Council. *Fifth*, A Council shall be constituted, consisting of (first) Two Members of their own body, to be chosen annually in the month of March, by the Senatus of the New College, other than the Principal; (second) Five Members to be chosen annually by the General Assembly, in addition to the Moderator of the said Free Church of Scotland; together with (third) the Principal of the said New College for the time being, the Moderator of the said General Assembly for the time being, the Procurator or Law Adviser of the Church, and myself the said William Binny Webster, or such person as I may nominate to be my successor: the Principal of the said College to be Convener of the Council, and any Five Members duly convened to be entitled to act notwithstanding the non-election of others. *Sixth*, The duties of the Council shall be the following:—(first), To appoint the Lecturer and determine the period of his holding the appointment, the appointment to be made before the close of the Session of College immediately preceding the termination of the previous Lecturer's engagement; (second), To arrange details as to the delivery of the Lectures, and to take charge of any additional income and expenditure of an incidental kind that may be connected therewith, it being understood that the obligation upon the Lecturer is simply to deliver the Course of Lectures free of expense to himself. *Seventh*, The Council shall be at liberty, on the expiry of five years, to make any alteration that experience may suggest as desirable in the details of this plan, provided such alterations shall be approved of by not fewer than Eight Members of the Council.

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THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

OF

IMMORTALITY

BY

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EDINBURGH
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PREFACE

THE eye of man looks wistfully to the end. Life, like love, believes in its own immortality. Heart and mind cry for light upon what is beyond the grave. Nor do they cry in vain. They have their answer in themselves. They have it in highest measure in those words of the Lord Jesus, into whose clear depths men have never ceased to look since they were first spoken, and from which they have never turned unsatisfied.

It is the primary object of this book to ascertain what these words disclose of man's future. It does not undertake to examine the belief in immortality in its relations either to science or to speculation. The rational proofs which have been elaborated in support of the hope of a future existence have their own interest, although it does not lie in the logic of the case. The heart has reasons of its own better than those of the understanding for its assurance of immortality. It has also its own presages of what that immortality will be. So far as these have any place in Scripture, they come within the scope of this book. But no attempt is made to follow out the philosophy of the subject.

Nor is it proposed to prosecute the inquiry beyond the teaching of the Bible. It is of interest to notice the results reached by students of Scripture who examine its words in a frank and unbiassed spirit, while they do not accept its conclusions as final. But it is not the purpose of this book to go into any examination of the reasons which such students

give for preferring other views of man's future to those which they confess to be found in Scripture. The present inquiry limits itself to the question, What is the witness of Scripture on the subject? The words of Christ are to me the highest authority, beyond which I seek no other.

Even thus limited the inquiry is one of utmost difficulty. The questions at issue are so grave, and the field into which they lead one is so extensive. All the progress which this century has seen in the historical interpretation of Scripture has only made it the clearer how much we require before we can be sure that we have got to the very heart of Christ's teaching, and understand His words precisely as He meant them, neither more nor less.

For convenience' sake the subject of the book is described as the Christian Doctrine of *Immortality*. But it will be seen that the word "Immortality" is used in the large sense which Paul gives it when he speaks of "this mortal" putting on "immortality." Life, eternal life, the immortality of the man, not the immortality of the soul, is the message of the Bible, alike in Old Testament and in New, in Christ and in apostle, in John and in Paul.

The book is the outcome of a course of Lectures delivered in Edinburgh, the thirteenth series of the Cunningham Lectures connected with the Free Church of Scotland. In preparing the matter for the press I found it necessary in some respects to change the form and arrangement, and to go into a more extended investigation of certain questions than was at first contemplated. But the Six Books of which the volume consists correspond generally with the six original Lectures.

I have to thank the members of the Cunningham Council for the honour done me in appointing me to the Lectureship. They have placed me under a double debt of gratitude by their forbearance with me in the unusual delay in publication, a delay due to circumstances which it is needless to explain.

I could wish that now, at the end, the book were worthier of their considerate kindness.

I am indebted for much to some whose teaching I enjoyed in earlier days, and to many whose writings I have read with profit. To all my benefactors, known and unknown, I express my cordial thanks. On the Old Testament side of the inquiry I owe more probably than I am quite conscious of to my dear and valued friend, Professor A. B. Davidson, of the New College, Edinburgh, whose rare insight into Scripture has been an education to so many.

The questions with which this book deals are not questions to be taken up lightly or disposed of easily. No one who understands their seriousness will be in haste to write of them. The sense of their gravity and difficulty has deepened as the work has proceeded. Even now it is with hesitation that the volume is issued. The studies which its preparation have occasioned have been at times a severe and anxious discipline. The result has been to confirm me in the conviction that the teaching of Christ and the whole burden of the Christian Revelation make the present life decisive for the future. But this result has not been reached without an acute sense of the attractiveness of other views of man's destiny which are held by many earnest men, and of the limitations which the God of Revelation has placed upon our knowledge of the future life.

S. D. F. SALMOND.

ABERDEEN, *October* 1895.

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BOOK FIRST

The Ethnic Preparation

Ut deos esse natura opinamur, qualesque sint ratione cognoscimus, sic permanere animos arbitramur consensu omnium nationum.—Cicero.

Le Christianisme n'est que la rectitude de toutes les croyances universelles, l'axe central qui fixe le sens de toutes les deviations.—Sainte Beuve.

Truth, which only doth judge itself, teacheth that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it—the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it—and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it—is the sovereign good of human nature. The first creature of God in the work of the days was the light of the sense, the last was the light of the reason, and his Sabbath-work ever since is the illumination of His Spirit.—Bacon.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

BY the Christian doctrine of Immortality we understand the doctrine of the future life taught by Christ and His apostles, and deposited in the records of the Christian revelation. In these records it is given, not in continuous, but in occasional statement; not in scientific, but in popular form. The language in which it is conveyed is not that of dogma or the schools, but that of common life and familiar intercourse. In the method, too, in which it is delivered, and in the terms in which it is expressed, it has the impress of ancient times and Eastern ways. It has never been easy, therefore, for minds of later date and different habit to construe it with certainty in all its parts; neither has any interpretation of it ever secured unqualified acceptance among Christians themselves. In its broad outlines it has been found sufficiently definite and distinct. But in some of its elements, and these not the least important, it has been felt to be less obvious. In these it has always been in some measure the subject of debate and the occasion of marked differences of opinion, even within the Church itself.

Upon the doctrine, as given in these records, there has grown up a great theology, and that theology has

not been altogether the same from age to age. In its central affirmations it has been, on the whole, a uniform theology. But it has not been exempt from change. It has had its history, and that history is now one of the tests of its truth. It has varied to some extent in its averments. It has varied also in its centre of gravity. That was placed first in the Millenarian doctrine. The belief in Christ's Second Advent has been called the oldest of all Christian dogmas. The hope of His return, which fills so large a space in the New Testament, took a like commanding position in the earliest Christian thought. The whole conception of the Last Things revolved round the Person of the Christ who was to come. The whole theology of the Future was in this sense Christological. The literature of the first two centuries is so charged with Millenarian ideas as to prompt the conclusion that they formed part of the common faith of the sub-Apostolic Church.[1]

But as the years grew, and the idea arose that the kingdom of God might realise itself in a Christianised State, the Millenarian doctrine, with its related dogma of the two resurrections, fell away to the rank of individual Christian opinion, and the interest passed elsewhere. The eschatology lost its Christological character; and in the later Patristic period, one of the ruling ideas came to be that of an intermediate state, in which righteous souls of pre-Christian times waited for their deliverance. The Scholastic era, again, engaged itself to an inordinate extent with the circumstances of this

[1] Gieseler, *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 233, etc. See also Hagenbach, *History of Christian Doctrines*, vol. i. p. 303, Clark's translation.

intermediate state, its distinct divisions for different orders of the dead, its purgatorial fires, and the fates of souls in their places of waiting. Then came the theology of the Reformation, sweeping away with the blast of its vigorous breath the accumulations of enslaving dogma and vain definition which had long held the human mind with their terror. It shifted the interest from the middle condition, and fixed it on the final states of heaven and hell. In our own time attention has become concentrated on the ultimate problems of the future life,—the finality of the offer of grace, the extension of opportunity into the other world, the question between annihilation, restoration, and eternal retribution.

To determine how much of this theology of the ages is entitled to acceptance, and what the Christian doctrine itself is, we must go back to the deposit of truth in the New Testament. In this, our first object must be to ascertain what Christ's own teaching on the subject was. We have therefore to examine the testimony of the Gospels, and we must do this in a way to meet the demands of a just criticism. We shall then have to investigate the doctrines taught in the apostolic writings, particularly in those ascribed to Paul and John, and the conceptions underlying these writings. We shall do this with the view of discovering what are the points of contact between their teaching and that of Christ Himself; whether they add aught to His words, or simply reproduce and expand what was given seminally in these words; whether the statements of each group of writings are the same throughout; whether those of all combined amount to a definite and self-consistent doctrine.

But it is obvious that there are questions of vast importance which are preliminary to all this. The Christian doctrine can be rightly interpreted only when it is read in the light of the ideas of the time and the land in which it was given to the world. Hence it becomes necessary to know the beliefs, opinions, and methods of expression, whether native or acquired, which were current in the Judaism of the period. The Christian doctrine, too, can be understood only when it is looked at in relation to other doctrines of the future life which preceded or accompanied it. It makes no claim to be an absolutely new doctrine. Christ was not the first "to stamp the ideas of immortality on the minds of men under the forms of heaven and hell."[1] He nowhere asserts, neither is it asserted for Him by those whom He commissioned to speak in His name, that the truth which He inculcated was something wholly novel and without antecedents. What is claimed for Him is, that He "brought life and immortality *to light* through the gospel" (2 Tim. i. 10); and this He did by giving lucidity to what was obscure, completeness to what was fragmentary, certainty to what was but possible or probable. Hence we must ask what was the teaching of the Old Testament on the subject of a future life; for it was on the soil of the Old Testament revelation that the New Testament revelation rose, and it was to the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms that Christ and His apostles appealed.

Nor is this by any means all. Behind the question of the relation of the New Testament doctrine to that

[1] See Mr. Fowle's paper on "Christianity and Immortality," in the *Contemporary Review*, May 1872, p. 723.

of the Old Testament, there is the question of the relation of both to the conceptions which prevailed among the nations. For if there was a special preparation for the Christian doctrine in Israel, there was also a preparation for it in the Gentile world. "The history of Christianity," says the late Dr. Döllinger, speaking of the plan of one of his most elaborate works, "necessarily presumes, for the bare understanding of it, an acquaintance with the history of the pagan and the Jew. The question, What soil did Christianity find to build on? To what doctrines and systems of thought could it attach itself? What circumstances paved the way for it, and forwarded and facilitated its expansion? What obstacles, prejudices, and errors had it to overcome? What adversaries had it to encounter? What evils to remedy? How did paganism reach after Christ?—all these questions, on the importance of which it were superfluous to waste a word here, admit, as it appears to me, of a satisfactory solution only through an exposition penetrating as deeply beneath the surface, and of as wide a horizon as the present."[1] What Dr. Döllinger says of Christianity in general is emphatically true of its doctrine of immortality, and that for more reasons than one.

Some of those peoples of the old world who possessed a large and comparatively mature doctrine of the future, were in contact with Christianity, either directly or through Judaism. The influence of Greek thought and language upon Christian thought and expression, is a subject which is only beginning to be

[1] *The Gentile and the Jew in the Court of the Temple of Christ*, Darnell's translation, vol. i. p. iii.

investigated with any adequacy. But that Græco-Roman ideas told from the first in some degree upon Christian theology, is indisputable; and it is one of the great questions for the present day whether, or to what extent, the Hellenic spirit made a contribution to the substance or to the form of the truth which is enshrined in the New Testament. Nations like the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Phœnicians, had associations with the Hebrews, which at times were both intimate and influential, and it is natural to conclude (though the conclusion must be carefully verified in each case) that they left the stamp of their minds and words upon Hebrew thought and Hebrew language. It is necessary, therefore, to study their religious notions, beliefs, and phraseologies, if we would interpret the operation of the Spirit of revelation in Hebraism, and through it in Christianity. Apart, too, from the influence which may have been exerted by the outside nations upon the forms of Hebrew and Christian faith, it is only by examining the beliefs of these nations that we shall see how far the mind of man advanced on the way to a doctrine of immortality; at what point Christianity took up the ethnic theory; how and in what sense it gave clearness to what had been indistinct, adequacy to what had been partial, certainty to what had remained doubtful, and practical efficiency to what had been morally inoperative.

CHAPTER II

IDEAS OF THE LOWER RACES

THE *Ethnic Preparation*, therefore, must be our first subject of inquiry.

The field which opens for us here is immense. It is also one beset with difficulty. A rapid review is all that can be attempted. There is much in it that must be passed by, or barely mentioned. It abounds in questions of the deepest interest and the utmost difficulty, for which answers are being strenuously sought. Some of them are purely historical, and in these it is reasonable to hope for more light and greater certainty than we possess at present. Others are more speculative and of a nature that gives us small encouragement to expect clear and definite solutions. The latter, nevertheless, are the questions on which the most positive opinions are apt to be formed; and the more hypothetical such opinions are, the greater is the tenacity with which they are held.

How did the idea of a future life originate? Was it a divine gift bestowed upon primitive man by his Creator, which, as it travelled down the ages, became broken up, perverted, or lost in some races, while in others it was retained in comparative purity, and with all the capacities of growth? Or did it only emerge in

course of time, as was the case with the ideas of art and science? Did it appear first in a rudimentary form, and then gradually unfold, and take shape, and gather precision? Was it the product of man's gifts of reflection and imagination? Did it rise in the incapacity of primitive man to think of one who had been living as having utterly ceased to live? Or in his thoughts on the mystery of sleep? Or in what is its *genesis* to be sought? How did man come to think of a soul, and to ascribe to it a continuance which failed the body? Did he begin by imagining himself to have a "double," or to be possessed by a ghost tenanting his body, yet distinct from it, and making itself visible at times? Or by fancying the forms which he saw in dream or vision to be the dead themselves in surviving, shadowy figure?[1] And are our present ideas of the soul, its nature and its destiny, but the slow natural result of a process which started at that point, and in course of time dropped the notion of the material structure of the ghost-spirit, and otherwise purified the conception? Is it the case, again, that wherever the idea of an after-life is discovered, the idea of a retributive future also appears? Or is it rather the case that the conception of rewards for virtue and penalties for vice in the other world was a later development of the belief?

[1] Count D'Alviella makes much of the "assimilation of dreams to reality," and of the idea of the "double." "The only possible explanation," he says, "an explanation which must present itself spontaneously to the mind of the savage as soon as he endeavours to remember his dreams and to give himself some account of them,—is that man is composed of two parts, one in some way enclosed in the other—one external, formed of the body which remains stationary during sleep; the other internal, which could cast the body like a garment and go its way, as the Greenlander expressed it, 'to hunt, dance, and pay calls.'"—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 77.

These are but some of the problems which are in debate, and for which a variety of solutions are proposed. The solutions naturally differ, according as the problems are approached by students from the different sides of history, philosophy, language, and anthropology.

Of these questions we shall only say that hasty generalisation mars much that is written upon them, and that, as regards some of them, we are not yet in a position, if indeed we ever shall be, to venture upon positive conclusions. The reports of travellers and the researches of inquirers have to be much more rigorously sifted ; the dates of documents, inscriptions, and historical remains have to be much more exactly determined ; the testimony of language has to be much more carefully estimated. Happily it is not necessary for our present purpose to find answers to all these questions. We are concerned not with speculation, but with the interpretation of historical testimony. To the student of religious ideas the temptation is ever at hand to try to go behind the available material. It is a temptation which few are able to resist. It plays into the hands of those, of however different tendencies, whose ambition it is to get at the primitive religion of humanity. It is the object of one important school to establish the dogma of a primitive Fetichism, gradually developing into a rude Polytheism, and refining or condensing into Monotheism. It is the object of a very different school to establish, largely by an analysis of language, the dogma of a primitive Monotheism, or something approaching that, of which Polytheism is a degradation. But both almost equally push beyond the mark. Savage races have no history ; and language, however

far it may take us, does not carry us to the very beginnings of things.

So it is with the belief in immortality. The data at our disposal lead us a long way, but they do not help us to ascend to the origins. They make it possible for us to say what ideas prevailed at the earliest historical point among the races which have had a history, and to trace the changes in these ideas along the course of history. Where history fails us, we gain something from language and custom. But we have not enough to place the absolutely primitive within our grasp.

Looking, however, to the testimony of history, archæology, and language, we seem justified in saying that certain broad facts appear. *First*, there is the fact that, so far as investigation has gone, belief in some sort of existence after death is found to be a catholic belief of humanity. To some this seems too large an assertion to make. A mass of evidence has been collected which is supposed to disprove the universality of religion, and to show that even at present tribes exist that are entirely destitute of religious ideas.[1] It is even maintained with great display of learning that religion, so far from being a primitive and universal characteristic of man, is only a comparatively recent element in his life,—an acquired social habit, a kind of "paradox," as Professor Max Müller expresses it, which "only once, or possibly twice . . . did enter into his heart," the birthplace of which may

[1] See, especially, Sir John Lubbock's *Prehistoric Times, as illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages*, and his *Origin of Civilisation*.

have been Phœnicia, or perhaps India.[1] Mr. Doughty tells us that even now it is with great difficulty that the nomad Bedouins can conceive of any existence beyond the grave.[2] Wellhausen[3] affirms that the heathen Arabians previous to Mohammed's time had no idea of a future. Dr. O. Schrader does not admit that there is sufficient evidence to show that the Teutonic branch of the Aryan race in prehistoric times had any definite belief in a future existence, or even paid any religious honour to departed ancestors. He questions whether we are entitled to speak of an "original Indo-European belief in immortality," or of a primeval Indo-European ancestor-worship.[4] And it has been no

[1] See Gruppe's *Die Griechischen Culte und Mythen*, and the criticisms in Max Müller's *Natural Religion*, p. 74, etc.

[2] *Arabia Deserta*, i. p. 240 and p. 445, etc.

[3] *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, iii. p. 164.

[4] "As for the Teutons," he says, "the question as to their belief in a life after death, and the worship of the spirits of the departed among them, deserves fresh critical investigation. The main point to be determined, is the extent of the influence exercised on the Teutonic world in this matter by Græco-Roman or Christian views. Then, and not till then, it might be possible to decide whether such conceptions as that of the Norse Valhalla, of elfs and dwarfs,—in which Kuhn indeed (*K. Z.* iv. 100) would see spirits of tribal-heroes,—of the Wild Hunter, All Souls' Feast, Hel, the goddess of the dead, etc.—can be considered as belonging to the primeval Teutonic period."

Then, speaking of the larger question and of the historical conclusions deducible from the facts, he remarks that "the first thing we have to insist upon once more is, that all linguistic evidence which has been brought forward in support of an original Indo-European belief in immortality . . . is either so demonstrably false, or at least so unsafe, that it cannot be expected to throw any light on the question here under discussion."

"The cardinal point," he continues, "seems to me to be whether the belief in the continued existence of departed ancestors, and the duty of continuing to honour them by means of offerings to the dead, which we have encountered in several quarters of Indo-European territory, are so firmly rooted there from the beginning of all tradition that we are compelled, on the ground of the resemblances to be found in the modes of

uncommon thing for travellers to imagine that they had discovered communities destitute of the idea or instinct of another life.

But the evidence on which writers like Sir John Lubbock rely has been very differently handled by others.[1] The circumstance of a people or community seeming to lack this conception at some point of their history, does not warrant us to say that they have never had it. There may have been degradation and loss as well as purification and gain. The negative reports of travellers have in many cases been found to have been hasty and mistaken. Once and again they have been retracted by their authors themselves. Philosophers like Darwin, explorers like Sir Samuel Baker, historians like Niebuhr, missionaries like Moffat, have gone conspicuously astray in their observations, and have shown us how easy it is to err in this matter.[2] Nearer acquaintance with suspected tribes, and the reports of the most recent inquirers,—in many instances men who have spent years among savage or barbarous communities,—tend rather to prove, not only that these tribes and communities have their own ideas of a prolongation of existence after death, but that

conceiving and practising ancestor-worship, to regard them as primeval, *i.e.* Indo-European."

"I am of opinion," he adds, "that this is not the case, at anyrate not so long as no satisfactory explanation of Greek ancestor-worship, quite apart from that of the Indians, is forthcoming."—*Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan People*, Eng. trans. pp. 424, 425.

[1] Quatrefages, *L'espèce humaine*; Roskoff, *Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*; Max Müller, *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, p. 277, and *Natural Religion*, p. 81, etc.; Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, i. p. 422; Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, i. p. 323.

[2] Max Müller's *Natural Religion*, p. 82; Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, i. pp. 418, 423.

their ideas are richer than one might venture to surmise. Thus it has been with many of the ruder peoples in Africa, South America, and the remote islands, and even in races so low in the scale as the aborigines of Australia and Tasmania.

In some cases misconception has arisen by applying modern standards where they are not in place. The Bechuanas were at first described as never having heard of the immortality of man ; and no doubt that was true enough of an immortality after our ideas. But it by no means followed that these Africans had no idea of a future existence. On the contrary, they believed that the dead existed as shades. In other cases a certain peculiar reticence on the part of the savage has occasioned serious misunderstanding. A curious example of this, referred to by Dr. Tylor, is the experience of Mr. Sproat, who spent two years in Vancouver's Island, in familiar intercourse with the Ahts, studying their minds and ways of living, before he became aware that they had any notion of a future existence. Then he discovered that they had been concealing from him "a whole characteristic system of religious doctrines, as to souls and their migrations, the spirits who do good and evil to men, and the great gods above all." [1]

[1] See Moffat's *South Africa*, p. 261 ; Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, i. 419-423. "It is true also, and, I believe, it has never been contested," says Professor Max Müller, "that even the lowest savages now living possess words for body and soul. If we take the Tasmanians, a recently extinct race of savages, we find that, however much different observers may contradict each other as to their intellectual faculties and acquirements, they all agree that they have names for soul and souls, nay, that they all believe in the immortality of the soul."—*Anthropological Religion*, pp. 187, 433, 434. For the case of the Australian blacks, see the same, pp. 423,

In short, so many cases of seeming exception have broken down under rigorous scrutiny, that we are safe to conclude that there has been no people without this belief.[1] Belief in some sort of existence continued after death is something far short of belief in a real and positive immortality. But all evidence goes to show that the former at least is normal to the human mind; that practically it is as universal as religion itself; that even in the case of the rudest races it must be regarded as one of their most general mental possessions. Witness is borne to this not only by express statement, oral and written, but by the general prevalence of such ideas as that of the lingering or return of the ghosts of the departed, and by widely-extended, persistent custom—the honours paid to the dead; the placing of food near them; the burial of

etc. For the races of the Western Pacific, see Dr. Codrington's volume, *The Melanesians: Studies in their Anthropology and Folk-lore*. He deals specially with the Solomon Islands, the Santa Cruz group, the Banks and New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the Loyalty Islands. He brings out the prevalence of the belief in the *tindalo*, or ghosts of the deceased, in the power of these ghosts, and in the necessity of making offerings to them. For the ideas of the pre-Christian Teutons on the underworld and the state after death, Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie* (chaps. xxv.–xxvii.) and W. Müller's *Geschichte und System der altdeutschen Religion* (pp. 385, etc.) may be consulted. Some curious things bearing on the belief of the ancient Germans in a future life and on the existence of a form of the doctrine of transmigration among them, are given in Sepp's *Die Religion der alten Deutschen*, pp. 394, etc.

[1] "A belief in the persistence of life after death," says M. Renouff, "and the observation of religious practices founded upon the belief, may be discovered in every part of the world, in every age, and among men representing every degree and variety of culture."—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 124. In his *Gifford Lectures*, delivered in Aberdeen, Dr. E. B. Tylor, than whom we have no more cautious student, stated that after examining very many of the passages in books of travel and the like, in which it was asserted that tribes existed who had no notion that a man survived death, and always finding that the bottom dropped out of them, he had given up the idea of discovering any such people.

weapons and attire with them; the sacrifice of wives, slaves, subjects, and prisoners, with the view of conveying intelligence to the deceased, or of securing for them continued attendance and service.[1]

But a *second* fact presents itself, which so far qualifies the first. The practical universality of the belief in some sort of a life after death does not exclude belief in an absolute cessation of being for some. Not all who have believed in a continuance of life have allowed all and sundry to be heirs of it. Many tribes have limited it to the men of rank among them, and have held that the souls of the common people become extinct on the death of the body. Others have regarded

[1] The custom of laying the dead in a uniform direction, east and west, in their graves, which was carefully observed by the Australian tribes and others, may also belong to the same order of things. It is supposed to have originated in the belief that at death the soul went to a new abode, which was imagined to be in the west, in the way of the setting sun. It may also be noticed that in Uganda, while the bodies of the common people are cast out unburied, those of the great are mummified in a rude way and interred. A house is then built over the place, and certain of the wives of the deceased, taking up their residence in huts near it, remain there "all their days to watch the departed spirit." "These women," it is added, "are supposed to hold converse with, and also to be possessed of, the spirit of their late husband."—A. M. Mackay, *Pioneer Missionary of the C. M. S. in Uganda*, pp. 196–197.

Count D'Alviella, speaking of the remains found in the cave of Spy, ascribes a belief in an after-existence even to the men of the mammoth age. "These contemporaries of the mammoth and the cave-bear," he says, "whose energies one would have thought would have been wholly absorbed in the struggle for existence, still found time to attend to their dead, to prepare them for their future life, and to offer them objects which they might have used for themselves, but which they preferred to bestow on the dead for their use in another life. The custom of placing arms, implements, and ornaments in the tombs may be regarded as general among the ancient cave-dwellers, as it still is among all savages who bury their dead. It implies the belief in the survival of the personality after death, and the idea that the future life will be a repetition of the present; or, at anyrate, that the same wants will be experienced, the same dangers incurred, and the same enjoyments tasted there as here." —*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 16.

life as reserved for the good, and absolute cessation of being as the destiny of the evil. Yet another class have supposed the soul to survive the event of death, but to be liable, on its way to the other world, or in that world, to be overtaken by a second death, which is its end. The Tongans furnish an instance of the first phase of belief, the Nicaraguans of the second, the negroes of Guinea, the Greenlanders, and others of the third. The aristocratic feeling and the sense of caste have told upon the belief, even among the lowest races, and have occasioned the coexistence of the idea of extinction with that of survival.[1]

A *third* fact which appears is, that this belief has been shaped and coloured by the climate, geographical position, and circumstances of different races, but that in most cases it has taken the form of a belief in an under-world and a shadowy existence there. The home of the departed has been placed by some on earth itself, and by some in the skies. As a general rule, savage races have thought of it as some deep or distant part of earth. Races in the stage of barbarism, as well as the races of culture, have conceived of it as apart from the scene of their present existence. To the Baperi of South Africa, the place to which souls return after death was a cavern, that of Marimatle. Maori legend figured it as at the base of a great precipice. Australians on the one side of the world, and Finns on the other, have thought of it as an island; in the one case an island beyond the sea, in the far West; in the other case, as we find it

[1] Waitz, *Anthropologie*, ii. 191, etc.; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. p. 22, etc., and the authorities referred to there.

in the *Kalevala*, their national Epic, the island of Tuoni beyond the river Tuonela. In the religious systems of the Mexicans and Peruvians, again, and in the ruder ideas of the lower American races, the sun has been thought of as the future abode of the distinguished; while among tribes like the Polynesians of Tokelau and the Guaycurus the moon has been similarly regarded.[1]

But the idea which has prevailed far beyond all others is, that the abode of the departed is a Hades or subterranean receptacle. This is the idea that would most naturally suggest itself to men as they gazed down into the grave which wrapped their dead from their vision. It is a conception which in point of fact has been found to extend all the world over. It is common to the hardy German tribes, the savages of North and South America, the Zulus of Africa, the Italmen of Kamtschatka, the Samoan islander, the Asiatic Karen, the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Roman.

A *fourth* fact is that the purity of this belief has been in proportion to the purity of the idea of God and the standard of moral feeling. That the belief in a future life and the faith in God should move together, and that the one should become richer and more definite as the other grows in strength and elevation, is what we should naturally expect, and it is what is borne

[1] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. p. 70, 71. He compares the description in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunæ* of the "virtuous souls who after purification in the middle space gain their footing on the moon, and there are crowned as victors." An analogy to this curious belief is also found in the Manichean speculations on the purification of souls as effected by their being taken up first into the sun, then into the moon, and finally into the perfect air, which is a pillar of light. See the *Disputation of Archelaus with Manes*. Clark's Ante-Nicene Library, xx. 284, 285.

out in the main by the witness of history. We should also naturally anticipate that as the moral life rises, and a people's ideas of virtue and goodness become more and more distinctly ethical, the conception of the future life will become in like manner ethical, and the idea of a retributive future assert itself. And this has undoubtedly been in general the case.

The question, however, of the extent to which the belief in the future life as a life of moral issues and judicial compensation or award has prevailed, at what point it has originated, and how it has advanced, is one of the greatest intricacy and difficulty. It is by no means easy to get, in each case, at the real original belief, and disengage it from modifications due to foreign sources. In not a few instances things which have appeared to belong to the pristine form of a faith have become suspected. Christian or Mohammedan influence has been found to have acted where at first it was not supposed to be an element in the case. Lower races have sometimes taken over the beliefs of higher races, and have retained them perhaps in corrupt form. In the case of the Karens, for example, we have the notion of the shadowy dead in an under-world, and alongside that the notion of a judge of the dead, Tha-ma, who sends the meritorious to heaven and the evil to hell. The former is, with reason, taken to be the native belief, while the latter is supposed to have been borrowed from the Hindu doctrine of Yama.[1] Different students, again, have applied very different ideas of morality to the problem. So it has happened that very different

[1] Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. pp. 91–93, and the authorities cited there; Waitz, *Anthropologie*, ii. pp. 171, 191, iii. pp. 197, 345, etc.

verdicts have been pronounced upon a people's beliefs, and scholars of deserved repute have committed themselves to positive denials of the existence of any moral quality in conceptions of the future life where the evidence, more justly estimated, points the other way.

The case appears to stand thus: It is certain that the higher races have had a distinct doctrine of a retributive future along the line of their history. In some it has been a singularly high and pure doctrine; in others it has been less so; in others still it has been strangely rudimentary and imperfect. In various instances there has been a period of confusion and decline in the ethical sentiment, when earlier and better views of the future have become dissipated and degraded. But the belief in a retributive future has by no means been limited to these races. It has taken hold of barbarous peoples, and it has not been foreign even to savage life. It may be too much to claim for it that it has existed in some form wherever the belief in a future life at all has appeared. Not a few races have been declared destitute of it by competent authorities. It is said to be absent, for the most part, if not wholly, from the South American religions. The world of the dead, as imagined by the Basutos, the Dahomans, the Hurons, and other tribes of similar rank, seems to be a world in which no account is taken of the conduct or character by which its denizens were known in the world of the living. In many cases the conception of the other life seems scarcely to have risen above that of a perpetuation or reflection of this life, sometimes an idealised edition of it, and sometimes a wasted and gloomy copy of it. The Zulu looked

simply for a repetition of the existence he had led here, with all its familiar ways, its cattle and its kraals. The African of the South-West thought of the unseen land as like the present world, yet a dreamland with perpetual day. The Dahoman fancied it like the earth that now is, yet a shadow-land, a veritable deadman's land.[1]

But, on the other hand, there are many cases in which the idea of a connection between man's life here and his position there, if not definite and precise, discovers itself at least in incipient form. It also takes different shapes. Occasionally, though very exceptionally, it appears as a belief in a simple reversal of things, the rich here becoming the poor there, and *vice versâ*.[2] Oftener it becomes the belief, however rude and undeveloped, that man's life there shall be the result of his life here. But more frequently it is discovered in the process of disengaging itself from lower ideas, and adapting itself to distinctions which seem non-moral when measured by later standards, but which, looked at historically, are relatively moral, or contain the promise of morality. Even among the lower tribes we find the conception, that man's place in the other world is affected by his deeds in this world. The deeds in question may be, as in the case of certain Indian tribes, only those of skill and enterprise in hunting; or, as among the Greenlanders, those of bravery and distinction in the fight with the whale; or, as in other instances, deeds of valour and patriotism. But when courage, exertion, and endurance come to be distinguished as praise-

[1] Tylor, *ut sup.* p 80. [2] As in Kamtschatka. *Ibid.* p. 83.

worthy, and their opposites—cowardice, effeminacy, idleness, and the like as unworthy, and when it is believed that one's condition in the other world will be determined by the part he plays in these things on earth, we are entitled to say that there the idea of a retributive future is present, in however inchoate a form.

It may be too much, therefore, to affirm that this belief is a universal belief, or an original element in the idea of a future life. It may be that some races have never risen to this moral conception, and that in the lower stages of the life of many a people, conduct here and condition there may not have been definitely associated. It is possible that in cases not a few, among which the Khonds of Orissa and the old Norsemen may perhaps be placed, the idea of a future of just awards has not been a native idea, but one acquired by contact with higher civilisations—Egyptian, Indian, Babylonian, or Christian. But, on the whole, we have reason to say that its rudiments are discovered at times among the ideas of savage tribes ; that in many nations it shows itself at a comparatively early period, though in an elementary and fitful form ; that it is doubtful how far back it can be traced ; and that when it appears in anything like its proper purity, definiteness, and continuity, it is as an expansion or differentiation of an earlier and less distinct belief.

It would be much to know the date at which it emerged and the way by which it came in upon the consciousness of humanity. It may be, as some think, that it does not appear definitely until we reach Egypt. And it may be that the advance from the simple idea

of a future existence to the higher faith in a moral Hereafter, was made through the intermediate stage of the belief that the things which bring weal or woe in the life before death would also bring weal or woe in the life after death. But this is all uncertain. To fix the point at which this faith was reached or recovered, in the case of any particular race, is a task well-nigh beyond us. To fix the point at which it becomes visible in the general history of humanity is something still more difficult. We are far, as yet, from being in a position to say, with any measure of certainty, whether the different forms in which it shows itself among the various races of mankind can be carried back to a single source, or are to be regarded as the independent results of the reflection and experience of the several peoples. But in whatever way it came about, and at whatever date, the rise of this faith upon the mind of any people was an event of almost matchless moment in their history.

CHAPTER III

INDIAN BELIEFS

PASSING, however, from the ideas of the lower races, which our limits do not permit us further to investigate, we shall look at the beliefs of those higher races which are of most interest to the present inquiry. In some cases it is the nature of the beliefs that creates the special interest. In other cases it is not only the nature, but the *connections* of the beliefs. The latter question, that of the points of contact between the ideas of different peoples, is one of the utmost importance. It is also one which demands for its proper statement greater caution than it often receives. Observed similarities of belief do not necessarily imply the derivation of belief. We must be able to trace a distinct line of historical transmission before we are entitled to say that the ideas of one people are derived from those of another, or influenced by them. Even when the line of transmission is made clear enough, we have still to ask *how much* has been derived—whether the substance of the belief, or only its *form*. Anthropologists have often fallen into error by hastily inferring that the deities of one country have been borrowed from those of another, while all that they had warrant to say was, that certain

attributes of deity have been transmitted. But the same applies to the present question. The contact of nations, in certain cases, may have influenced the form in which the belief has been expressed, without affecting the substance of the belief, or being its efficient cause.[1]

We take first, then, the case of *Indian* thought. The relevance of Indian belief in such inquiries, it is true, is questioned. Dr Döllinger, for instance, allowed it no place in his review of the Gentile preparation for the Jew and the Christian. His reason was that the religious thought of India, whether Brahmanic or Buddhistic, had always been aloof, and continued to stand aloof, from Christian thought. But apart from the question whether any influence of Indian thought is traceable in Hebrew, Greek, or Christian thought,[2]

[1] See T. W. Rhys Davids, *The Hibbert Lectures*, 1881, pp. 3, 4.

[2] Burnouf's theory, put forth in his *Science of Religion*, that the distinctive doctrines and practices of Chistianity can be traced back to a primitive Aryan religion through Mazdaism and the Vedic books, scarce calls for mention. Recently, however, Mr. Arthur Lillie, in his *Influence of Buddhism on Primitive Christianity*, has made a bold venture in the same direction, attempting to show that Christianity was originally Essenism, and so essentially influenced by Buddhism. A more reasonable discussion of the alleged influence of Buddhism on Christianity is given by Professor Paul Carus in the *Monist* for October 1894. He points to the general resemblances between certain parts of Christ's teaching and parts of Buddha's, between incidents in the life of the One and incidents in that of the other, and between the general ethical spirit of Buddhism and that of Christianity. He is of opinion also that there were various channels by which Buddhism might have penetrated into Palestine—lines of old commercial connections, official legations of a missionary nature which Ashoka's rock-inscriptions show to have been sent from India into Western Asia, and the like. But he recognises the differences between the two religions in all that relates to immortality, to God, to a Divine Fatherhood, and related doctrines. He notices, also, the fact that there are remarkable resemblances between Buddhism and the philosophy of Lao-tse, which cannot be said to be dependent the one on the other. He admits, therefore, that the theory of the indebtedness of Christianity to Buddhism is a mere hypothesis. See also the summary in Berry's *Christianity and Buddhism*, Appendix II.

on which there has been much extravagant speculation, those Indian beliefs are of so peculiar an order, of such interest both in their minor resemblances and in their larger contrasts to Christian beliefs, and of such importance as the faith of vast millions of men, that it is impossible to pass them by. In them we see what the mind of a singularly acute and speculative race achieved, and how far short it came of the Christian doctrine. In them, too, we have the great advantage of being able to follow with remarkable certainty the course of a great system of thought in its development from simpler to more complex forms; in the changes which it underwent; in its advance and in its decline; in its purity and in its debasement; in its hold or lack of hold upon the life of the people.

As far back, then, as our records carry us, the Hindu is seen to be a believer in an after-existence. Whether he had this belief, or what his belief was, in the long ages which lay behind these records, it is impossible to say. It is supposed that his primitive faith was a system of Animism, which had gradually developed into Polytheism by the time to which the Vedic hymns belong.[1] But this is matter of conjecture. The one certain fact is, that from ten to fifteen centuries before Christ (a date which, early as it is, indicates a comparatively advanced stage in Indian civilisation and religion) the Hindu looked for a future existence. The Rig-Veda, which takes us back all that distance of time, makes this clear. There are passages, indeed, in which the future looked for may be only a future to

[1] So, for example, Rhys Davids; see his *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 13.

be realised on earth, in the continuance of offspring.[1] But there is more than this. There is distinct evidence of a belief in a real existence in an after-world,—a belief which may have been stimulated by the inability of the primitive mind to think of non-existence, by the special inability of the son to think of the father as annihilated by the stroke of death, and by the respect and awe, resulting in worship, with which dead ancestors were regarded.

Much is uncertain about this belief. We cannot tell whether, in the earliest historical stage, the after-existence was definitely conceived of as an *endless* existence; neither can we say whether from the first there was a clear moral distinction between the life of the good and the life of the bad. It is difficult to judge how far the belief penetrated the mass of the people; although it appears that, at a later stage at least, the eschatology took a greater hold of the people than the theology. It is doubtful, too, what conceptions prevailed on the nature of the existence, particularly as regards the bodily form—whether that was thought of as something into which the soul developed, or something which the soul entered as an occupant.

The Vedic literature is not easy to deal with, including as it does so large a number of hymns, and these extending over so long a space of time. The Rig-Veda alone is made up of over a thousand hymns, and these of different dates ranging over hundreds of years. We may discount for the present the conclusions sought to be established by the new criticism which is represented by Professor T. Regnaud's *Le Rig-Véda et les Origines*

[1] Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, v. p. 285, note.

de la Mythologie indo-européenne This criticism would change the sense of many of the most important terms, making them express only ritualistic ideas and emptying them of all moral or mystical applications. But the oldest of these Vedic hymns, few as the notices in them are, make it plain that the Hindu of those ancient times, living in a comparatively simple condition of society and looking at things with the open eye of the childhood of of his race, held firmly by the faith of an after-existence or immortality, into which he conceived the fathers to have passed; which he had learned to ask from the gods as a boon for himself; which he believed to be obtainable by certain performances, ceremonial and other,—by drinking the Soma drink, by offering sacrifice, by observing rites, by liberality to the priest; which, also, he identified in some way with the divine life, so that he thought of it as a going to the gods, a companionship with the gods, an entrance into light, a passing into "that everlasting and imperishable world where there is eternal light and glory."

In the later Vedic hymns it is more variously expressed. It begins to assume at once a more speculative and a more sacerdotal form. It shows elements which by and by developed into the pantheistic idea, with its abstract theory of the future, its elimination of the personal existence in that future, and its gloomy view of life. In these hymns, however, we have the distinct conception of a realm or society of the dead, with its own king, Yama, who dwells, and the fathers with him, in "the highest heaven" and grants "long life among the gods." Here, too, expression is given to the idea of a retributive future.

There is a life of happiness, a realm of light, in the presence of the gods for the good; and there is an "abyss," a "nethermost darkness," for the evil. The rewards and punishments of the future are, for the most part, described in unspiritual terms, and are conditioned by ceremonial rather than moral performance on earth. But there are occasional utterances which go far beyond this; and the most notable fact of all, perhaps, is that, in its earliest form, the belief in the future is a cheerful and hopeful belief, expressive of a joy in life and a desire for life. There is no hint of the wish to be rid of the burden of existence; no suggestion of a previous life of the soul, or of the rebirth of the soul in the body of man or beast. The Vedic hymns have nothing to say of transmigration, or any dread cycle of births and deaths.[1]

But Indian thought did not pause at this point. Rather from this point it began to run a course which ultimately brought it almost to the opposite pole. The Brahmanas show us the first steps. Certain ideas, which exist, indeed, in the Vedic literature, but are only nascent there, assume distinct form in these books. The power of the priest, the virtue of sacrifice, the whole sacerdotal element, begin to bulk largely. Sacrifice commands the other world; it makes the gods themselves immortal. The life in the after-world becomes more definitely a life determined by the present. It has its certain rewards and punishments. These are spoken of in two ways, which, however, come to be one. They are the natural results of the acts of

[1] Rig-Veda, i. 31. 7, v. 4, 10, vii. 57. 6, ix. 113. 7, etc., x. 14. 8, and similar passages. See also Muir's *Sanskrit Texts*, v. pp. 226, 284, 285, 306.

this life, of the same nature, whether for good or for evil, as these acts; and they are decided, both in kind and in degree, by these acts. But the acts in question are the sacrifices which are performed here. So the man is said to enter at death a world which he has made for himself, and he is said to be born after death with the sacrifices which he has offered.

These sacrifices are the determining powers. They can deliver the man from the earthly body, and obtain for him a new body of spiritual quality commensurate with their worth. The boon of the future is still regarded as personal existence, the continuance of the individual; and the afer-life still seems to be thought of as one life. But other ideas now begin to emerge, which must soon prove fatal to these. Man's future is made dependent on knowledge or on works. He who satisfies the requirement, possessing the knowledge or performing the ceremonial works, is born again after death, and attains to immortality. He who fails to satisfy the requirement is born again, but only to die again. The highest reward, too, is connected with union with Brahma or some other deity. The man who attains to this union, and only he, becomes exempt from deaths beyond death, and reaches a final state. "He who sacrifices with a burnt-offering arrives by Agni as the door to Brahma; and having so arrived, he attains to a union with Brahma, and abides in the same sphere with him."[1]

These ideas had a natural development, and one that took different directions—theosophical, sacerdotal, metaphysical. We see it in the Upanishads,—those

[1] S'atāpatha Brahmana, xi. 4. 4. 1.

later products of the Vedic thought, so congenial to certain moods even of the modern Western mind,—books of which Schopenhauer declared that they had been the solace of his life, and would be the solace of his death.[1] We see it also in the Laws of Manu, and in the philosophical systems. All became dominated by the belief in transmigration, and all followed the pantheistic solution of the universe. The latter became the refuge of thought from the terrors involved in the former. The appearance of the doctrine of transmigration revolutionised the older Hindu view of life, both present and future, and it did this in the way of weariness and despair. How it came into Hinduism, or at what precise time, we know not. Some look upon it as a form of belief natural to the human mind, which has shown itself in all races at one stage or other of their history, and had been held by the Aryans before their dispersion. Others see no ground for the supposition that the Aryans brought it with them when they entered India, and question whether it was an original Aryan belief at all.[2] What is historically certain is, that it had possession of the Indian mind by the time to which the Upanishads belong. In all probability it is of much older date. For when it appears, as it does in some of the earlier Upanishad books, it is in almost perfect form.

So congenial, too, was it to the Indian mind, that when once it was accepted, it seems never to have been

[1] *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. i. p. lxi., and Max Müller's *Natural Religion*, p. 18.

[2] Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, ii. pp. 1–10; Rhys Davids' *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 73, 74; Fairbairn's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, p. 140; De la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, i. p. 375.

questioned. The various systems of philosophy occupied themselves with it. They taught that men's deeds lived after them and bore fruit, and, therefore, that a succession of births must be. But they claimed at the same time to open up ways of deliverance. The Vedantist sages professed that by the wisdom which they had to impart a man's "works" could be neutralised or destroyed, so that nothing should remain to make a rebirth necessary, or to preclude the final happiness which had to wait for the exhaustion of these "works." And the masses of the people were under the spell of the same doctrine, finding in it, perhaps, some explanation of the inequalities of life, perhaps at times even a measure of solace in the miseries of life, but for the most part oppressed by its terror.

In a way, therefore, which we can at the best but dimly surmise, the Hindu came to think of his soul as in a sense eternal as well as immortal. Its existence in any particular man in any particular generation of earth, was but an incident in its history. It had existed previously, and it would exist afterwards in some other man, some god, some animal, or some inanimate thing. It was so associated with the ideas of form and occupancy, that the thought of a disembodied existence for it was scarcely entertained. In the multitude of bodies through which it was to pass, each successive form of existence, whether it was to be high or low, of greater or less degree of trial and misery, was determined by its deeds in the preceding; and any unworthy thing to which the soul might commit itself in any one of these interminable passing modes of existence, brought it down from any

height of attainment to which it might have painfully struggled.

It would have been strange indeed if so heavy a view of existence had been simply accepted or finally acquiesced in. Something was needed to mitigate it. Relief was found in the thought of the loss or absorption of the individual life. The idea of union with Brahma becomes more definite and more extended in the Upanishads. Brahma is now the only Reality, the One Being, the World-Soul, the only Soul; and individual existence is a semblance or an evil. To become one with Brahma is to attain to blessedness, and oneness with Brahma is realised by knowledge. Men incapable of this knowledge fall back on works of sacrifice. By these they obtain reward, but not such as can endure. The performers of works, the mass of men, become repeated food for death. They cannot extricate themselves from the weary chain of existence. This comes, and rest with it, only to the select few who rise to science or the highest knowledge of Brahma. In the theosophy of the Upanishads, therefore, the idea of eternity is added to that of immortality. The soul is eternal, but only as a part of deity or the universal soul; and personal existence is a delusion to be mastered, a burden to be got rid of. The individual soul emanates from the World-Soul; its doom is to pass through unnumbered changes of form; its blessedness is to be reabsorbed by science into the great bosom from which it came.[1]

The ideas which are expressed on the theosophical

[1] See the dialogue translated in Max Müller's *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 22–25.

side in the Upanishads, present themselves also in the Laws of Manu on the ceremonial side. In these the sacerdotalism of the Brahmanas exhibits itself full grown, and rules the future world. In these we come upon a large and intense doctrine of recompense and retribution. There are rewards and punishments for all acts, and these rewards and punishments are determined by the priest on the ground of sacrificial service. There are heavens for the reward of merit, and hells for the punishment of demerit; and there is the succession of births following on the processes by which, in these heavens and hells, the good and the evil belonging to each previous existence are exhausted. The Hindu philosophies took up the same ideas, and did not soften them. With all their differences in other respects, they taught the same doctrine of the prior and after-existence of souls, the subjection of souls to countless births and deaths, the misery of individual existence, the blessedness of the loss of conscious, personal life, the dependence of the final beatitude on science or knowledge.

This is the general strain of Indian belief. This also is substantially its final position. It was a belief with a pantheistic background, with a tremendous social order,—the system of caste,—and with a no less tremendous imagination of the grasp of the retributive principle on human life. There were two later developments of it. But they did not change it either materially or permanently. Buddhism was one of these. It was an attempt to establish a religion without a God, and to inculcate a lofty code of virtue apart from the hope or fear of the judgment of a moral Governor. For this, as well as for the vast number of

its adherents, it is one of the most remarkable movements of thought of which we have any record. Nor is its doctrine of the future its least title to this distinction. Much as it has been investigated, it is by no means yet an open page in the history of thought, either as to its origin or as to its genius. It was essentially an ethical reaction, but with its drift as such it introduced a world of new ideas, which are difficult to grasp in their full meaning and relations, although their general scope is clear enough. The rise of this new faith may not have been due simply to the kind of revolt against the Brahmanical ritual and despotism, the system of caste, and the intolerable complications of ceremony and sacrifice, which has been largely given as its explanation.[1] It emerged, indeed, in a section of India which was less subject than others to the Brahmanical yoke.

Other things enter into the account of its beginnings. It originated among a people that had lost their first vigour, their satisfaction with religion, their zest for life, and had become worn, weary, disputatious. It met their case, and it did so by taking over so much of the spirit of their time and circumstance that it is itself justly regarded as "pessimism pure and simple, and as the direct progenitor of the modern German systems."[2] It adopted unquestioned much that was in Brahmanism—its views of man, of the calamity of existence, of the succession of births and deaths, and much else. It taught that all life, whether of gods, or of men, or of brute

[1] Oldenberg's *Buddha*, p. 170, etc., and pp. 391–411; Oman's *Indian Life*, p. 222, etc.

[2] Sully's *Pessimism*, p. 38.

creatures, is essentially and finally the same; that each form of life is "merely one link in a series of successive existences and inseparably bound up with misery"[1]; and that man's great object must be to get rid of individual existence.

It was another attempt at escape from the terrors of the idea of existence which held the Hindu mind, and it proceeded to a large extent on the principle of pouring the new wine of its reforming ideas into the old bottles of traditional Brahmanism. It proclaimed *rest* as the only happiness; and it aimed not so much at the improvement of life and society as at release from both. Its watchword was *deliverance*. "As the vast ocean, O disciples, is impregnated with one taste —the taste of salt, so now, my disciples, the law and doctrine is impregated with one taste—the taste of deliverance."[2] It offered deliverance, above all, from the misery of transmigrations, as Brahmanism did. But the deliverance which it preached was one that meant the setting aside of the Brahmanical priesthood, ritual, and gods, and the substitution of the higher principle of inward moral conditions for the lower principle of outward ritual performance. It agreed with the teaching of the Upanishads, which placed *knowledge* where the Brahmans placed sacrifice; but the knowledge which it inculcated was not the knowledge of God or the One Soul, by which union with the Divine was to be reached. It was the knowledge of the real nature of things, a knowledge which had to be accompanied by purity, universal love, and the nobler moral qualities.

[1] Sir Monier Monier-Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 90.
[2] *Cullavagga*, ix. 1.

It retained the old Brahmanical faith in ascending scales of heavens and descending scales of hells; but the principle on which its graduated systems of rewards and punishments proceeded was ethical, not ceremonial. It spoke, too, of union with Brahma, as Brahmanism did, and taught it to be every way possible for the man who is "kind and full of love, and pure in mind, and master of himself," to become united with Brahma after death. But, at least in its first stage, it did not present this as the highest attainment. It taught that even this was but a transient condition, which would end again in rebirth. Its final beatitude, its perfect life, the only condition superior to all risk of rebirth, is expressed by the terms Nirvana, Arahatship —terms which it is scarcely possible for the Western mind to understand. The noble Path, which is the condition of beatitude, and embraces the "noble conduct of life, the noble earnestness in meditation, the noble kind of wisdom, and the noble salvation of freedom," has Arahatship as its end,—a state which is better than heaven; and the goal of all is Nirvana, the "going out" or "extinction," which expresses perhaps neither the negative idea of the annihilation of the soul, nor the positive idea of its eternal blessedness, but the going out of "desire," or the extinction of "craving," with the quenching of "the fires of lust, hatred, and delusion," which are the issue of "craving."[1]

This beatitude of Arahatship is the last attainment of a system of moral and intellectual self-mastery, in

[1] On this see especially Rhys Davids, *ut sup.* pp. 100–107, 207–217; Oldenberg's *Buddha*, pp. 267–285; *Buddhagosha's Parables*, by Rogers and Max Müller, Preface, p. xvi, etc. See also Appendix, Note A.

which there are three stages—a lowest, meant for those who are to remain in the world, and including most of what is ordinarily understood as moral duty; an intermediate, embracing the former, and carrying it forward to the abandonment of the world; and a highest, which, taking up both these others, goes far beyond them, and rises to the freedom of the Arahat. The condition of Arahatship, therefore, becomes more intellectual than moral. It is the condition of a sevenfold perception,—an insight into the seven great facts of the impermanence of things, non-individuality, corruption, the danger of evil-doing, sanctification, purity of heart, Nirvana. Progress, therefore, is dependent upon knowledge, and first of all on the knowledge that things are transient; that neither creature nor creator is more than a temporary form; that the gods and their heavens endure no more than men and their earth: that in no order of being, human or divine, is there a soul, or self, which lives when the body or form perishes.

In all this the central position belongs to the conception of Karma.[1] The place occupied by the idea of transmigration is uncertain. While it has been usually regarded as an integral portion of Buddhism, it is a question whether it formed part of the original Buddhist doctrine. Its presence and its power are unmistakable in later forms of Buddhism; which forms also differ greatly among themselves in the various countries in which they have established themselves—Nepal, Mongolia, China, Tibet, Japan, Burma, Siam,

[1] Rhys Davids, *ut sup.* pp. 91–94, 115; Oldenberg's *Buddha*, pp. 48, 242, etc.; Monier Williams' *Indian Wisdom*, pp. 57, 77, 80, 329.

Ceylon. The new spiritual elements succumbed to the heavy hand of the traditional beliefs with which they had connected themselves. The ethical religion became a vast sacerdotalism. The old doctrine of the *soul*, too, reasserted itself, with most of its consequences. The faith which began by teaching men to seek the kingdom of God within them in pureness, charity, and mercifulness, in course of time spoke of a heaven into which the soul might have entrance through the physical terrors of Jaganāth's feast, and taught the dogma of an endless passing from existence to existence in brute as well as in human forms. But Mr. Rhys Davids affirms that the transmigration of souls was not taught by Buddha himself, and that the only idea of transmigration which can justly be ascribed to original Buddhism is that of the transmigration of character.

Be that as it may, the dominant and distinctive doctrine is the doctrine of *Karma*. The thing that makes the future, the one thing that remains after death, is this Karma, this "deed," this "act-force"—the result of the bodily and mental acts of the individual, the sum of his good and evil deeds. Each individual is the link between two immeasurable successions of individuals, the product of the one, the cause or impulse of the other. But the connection is not that of soul or personality.[1]

[1] "There is at work in the world," says Bishop Coplestone, "a force by which these elements on which life depends, these faculties and characters, —form, consciousness, sense, perception, mental energy,—*tend to recombine*. No sooner has a man died, and his life-elements been scattered, than they enter, under pressure of this force, into new combinations. A new life is the result. There is a fatal tendency to reproduce life (its name is *Karma*), a fatal attraction by which the elements of life cling to one another. And so no sooner is a man dead, by the dissolution of his life-elements, than

Buddhism offered a heaven which was independent of the hopes or fears of a conscious future, and had no relation either to God or to a surviving self. The questions, "Shall I exist in the ages of the future?" "What shall I be in these ages?"—were questions which wisdom had to forswear. The wise were to live in the practice of the virtues which should make them free, which were "untarnished by the hope of any kind of future." The desire for a future existence was one of the "fetters" which had to be broken. Other religions have taught the certainty of a blessed immortality as the reward of righteousness. This one taught a blessedness which was the reward of the destruction of this desire of a future life, and which was impossible where such desire lingered. Its heaven was one in which "the roots of new existences are all destroyed," and the man is "from the lust of future life set free."

It had, nevertheless, its doctrine of rewards and punishments. It was a very pronounced doctrine, and, on the retributive side, a very terrible one. It had its four-and-twenty heavens on the heights of Māha Meru, and its great hells beneath the earth. These, it is true, being material heavens and hells, were to pass away like other things. Yet the hells are described in terms of horror, as regards both the nature and the duration of the punishments

he comes into being again, by their recombination. For during life he has set in motion that fatal force—all lives set it in motion, and the world is full of it (the consequences of action)—which causes recombination. It remains, after the man is dead, as a kind of desire for new life, and animates, as it were, with the desire to recombine those broken elements of life."—*Buddhism, Primitive and Present, in Magadha and in Ceylon*, p. 114.

endured in them. The fool who commits sin is said to suffer in the other world the pain of one who is struck with iron rods, fed with food like a hot ball of iron, thrown into a blazing pyre, killed with iron hammers, cast into dense darkness, boiled in iron pots, and the like. Though the hells are not everlasting, the penalties are so prolonged as to be incalculable. "A man throws a perforated yoke into the sea. The winds blow it in different directions. In the same sea there is a blind tortoise, which, after the lapse of a hundred, a thousand, or a hundred thousand years, rises to the surface of the water. Will the time ever come when that tortoise shall so rise up that its neck shall enter the hole of the yoke? It may; but the time that would be required for the happening of this chance cannot be told, and it is equally difficult for the unwise being that has once entered any of the great hells to obtain birth as man." [1]

These rewards and punishments were the things that held the Indian mind. The few might rise to the philosophic doctrine, but it was otherwise with the many. A Nirvana which could be attained only by working out a complete freedom from all desire, was a thing for the sage or the recluse, not for the ordinary man. The latter turned to the simpler belief, and sought nothing beyond it. There was nothing beyond it that seemed obtainable by him, and it was itself sufficient. For the wicked man, there was the dread of those hells. For the righteous man, there was the hope of those heavens, and, though they might not be

[1] See Berry's *Christianity and Buddhism*, pp. 82, 83, and the passages quoted there.

the highest possible good, they were enough. "The Buddhist believer who did not feel in himself the power to renounce the world, could console himself with coming ages; he could hope for this, that it might then be vouchsafed to him, as a disciple of Mettayya or one of the countless Buddhas who shall come after him, to don the garb of a monk, and to taste the bliss of deliverance." [1]

Buddhism had also its substitute for the doctrine of a conscious, personal immortality. It proclaimed an after-life of relative happiness for those who attained a certain measure of goodness. Such as answered the requirement were destined, when they died, to be born again into a better condition of being in one of those heavens. Even this was not blessedness, being a condition still within the mesh of existence. For the fully enlightened, therefore, Buddhism proclaimed the eternal rest of Nirvana; which, however it may be interpreted, meant at least the cessation of the personal life, the end of the weary way of individuality.[2] In none of the conditions which might be entered after death was there any real identity of the self. There was no continuing consciousness; there was no *soul* in our sense; there were only certain mental qualities, transient like the body with which they were connected. Buddhism had its theory of identity;[3] but it was the continuance of Karma, not that of the conscious self, that made the individual of the present the same as the individual of a former existence; and what makes the individual of

[1] Oldenberg's *Buddha*, p. 387.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 263–285, and 427; Rhys Davids, *ut sup.* p. 254.
[3] See Appendix, Note B.

the now the same with the individual of an after-existence, is the transference of Karma from one to other. Even this shadowy form of individual identity has to give way, and Karma has to be destroyed in order that final perfection may be reached. The last future, the object of all hope, is a future in which the individual survives only in the effects of his acts, in the mingling of his small good with the vast sum of good, in the addition made by his self-denials to the happiness of the generations who follow him.

The old religion renewed its strength, and in its turn rose in revolt against the Buddhist reform. On the field of India the conflict between the two ended in the decisive victory of the former. The revived Brahmanism restored the old faith, only slightly modifying it. It brought in the new idea of Avatars, or manifestations of the divine in the human. But it did not drop the ancient doctrine of the absorption of the human in the divine, the final emancipation by union with the divine. It asserted the old dogma of transmigration, and gave it a still more terrible form. It taught that the souls of men, after the dissolution of the body, pass into one or other of a multitude of modes and spheres of being—into one of the many heavens and the condition of a god, into one of the hells and the condition of a demon, or back to earth and into the condition, it may be, of animal, plant, material object, or ghost. The state into which the soul enters on each new birth is determined by its actions in the previous existence, not by the sum of these actions, but by each singly in its turn; so that, the power of all the goodness attributable to the soul

in the prior existence being exhausted, any one evil deed dooms it to rebirth in some retributive form. Nor is there any escape but for the few who come to perfect knowledge of the divine essence.

This, then, is the conclusion of Indian thought. Death is not man's end. He has a Future, but of how dread an aspect! The early faith in an immortality with the gods, in which the individual continues to exist, disappears. For the mass of men the Future is one in which the soul passes from shape to shape, wears out body after body, and works out its retribution, in a hopeless struggle with its demerit, in a perpetual effort to burst the mesh of existence. For the select few it is a Future which means with the Buddhist the extinction of individuality in Nirvana, and with the Brahman the absorption of the individual soul in the Universal Soul.

CHAPTER IV

EGYPTIAN BELIEFS

WHEN we pass from India to *Egypt* we come upon another group of beliefs of great and varied interest. In some things they approach the Hindu ideas; in others they stand far apart from these. At certain points the two seem to touch each other in their views of the constitution of man, the condition of the dead, the honours due to the departed, the position belonging to sons as celebrants of the father's funeral rites. These coincidences are so remarkable as to suggest contact between the two classes of ideas. But there appears to be no positive evidence of any such exchange of thought between the valley of the Ganges and the valley of the Nile at a sufficiently early period. These similarities may simply be the result of the same mental instincts operating independently in different peoples. In any case, the Egyptian beliefs have a character entirely their own. The peculiar order of these ideas, their extreme antiquity, the precision with which they were elaborated, the range and duration of their influence, their points of contrast and correspondence with Jewish and Christian beliefs, give them a very distinct place in the history of religious thought.

They are the ideas of a people, who issued probably

from the interior of Asia, and moved southwards, crossing by the Isthmus of Suez or by the Red Sea[1] into the Nile valley and mingling with a different race there; a people who stand alone among the races of the old world, whose origin is so great a problem that they have been variously pronounced to be of Aryan, Semitic, and Nigritic stock,[2] whose very language seems to defy classification;[3] a people of almost unrivalled genius, whose achievements in art, architecture, and mechanical contrivance are still the wonder of the world; to whom we owe the Sphinx, the Colossi of the Plain of Thebes, the temples of Edfou, Dendera, and Philæ, the might and constructive perfection of the Great Pyramid, the unapproachable magnificence of the Rameseum and the columned hall of Karnak; a people given to letters, who have left us, in the *Precepts of Ptahhotep*, the still earlier moral writing found with these Precepts in the Prisse papyrus, and parts of the *Book of the Dead*, the oldest pieces of literature in the world;[4] a people of an antiquity so remote that their monarchy carries us back two thousand years before the Hebrew exodus, and their civilisation stretches away into ages which seem fabulous;[5] withal, too, a people docile and peaceful,

[1] Recent discoveries by Mr. Flinders Petrie are in favour of the latter course. See the *Babylonian and Oriental Record*, June 1894.

[2] Their Caucasian origin is now strongly affirmed. How strongly may be seen, *e.g.*, in Budge's *The Mummy*, pp. 1–3.

[3] Semitic according to Benfey, Ebers, Brugsch, Erman, Wright, and many more; both Aryan and Semitic according to Lagarde; in affinity with Accadian according to Strassmaier; Hamitic, a family by itself, according to Renan.

[4] Tiele, *History of Egyptian Religion*, p. 4.

[5] Their history takes us back some four centuries before Christ; their civilisation, many centuries earlier. The only civilisation that can com-

lovers of flowers even more than of letters, and of an exceptionally religious temper, with whom the worship of the gods, the thought of death, the fears and hopes of the future, were a large part of life.

The Hebrew race was resident for a length of time in Egypt, this land of mystery. The connection between the two countries was of a very definite kind at more than one period. Egypt and Greece, too, were not strangers to each other. In various ways it was at least possible for Egyptian thought to come into relation to Greek and Hebrew thought, and so to the forms in which Christian truth has been expressed. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to ascertain what the ideas of this people really were on the subject of the future life, and whether they had any influence on the races who became the depositaries of Revelation. Happily, there is abundance of material, both monumental and literary. The Egyptians wrote not only in books, but on tombs, palaces, temples, and every kind of monument. So we have reliable records which let us into the secret of Egyptian thought and Egyptian practice three or four thousand years ago. To a very large extent, too, we can fix the order of the facts to which these bear witness. Thus we are able not only to determine the nature of these ideas, but also to trace the course of their development.

The belief in a future life was so associated in ancient times with the Nile valley, that the Egyptians had the repute of being the first people who taught the immortality of the soul. In no ancient people was this

pete in this respect with the Egyptian is the Chaldæan, which is probably older still.

belief earlier or more firmly planted. In this case, too, the belief was of a very definite kind, in its own way both exact and complete, and in very close and evident connection with the theological conceptions of the people. These conceptions, as they are known to us, are an extraordinary mixture of the noble and the ignoble, which makes the Egyptian religion one of the most perplexing problems.[1] It may be that its real genius was monotheistic; that the loftier and purer elements in it were the older; and that it was monotheistic down at least to two thousand years before Christ. But in any case it must have been an indeterminate monotheism, unable to withstand polytheistic and pantheistic degradation. It is admitted by those who contend most strongly for the original purity of the religion, that within the historical period, belief in the unity of God did not preclude the worship of a plurality of gods; and it is certain that the quasi-pantheistic strain overbore the monotheism.

Be it as it may with the primitive spirit of the religion, the fact remains that, whether on an earlier monotheistic basis or not, there rose in course of time a vast corrupt polytheism, and that when Christianity

[1] It is acknowledged even by those who deny the original monotheism of the Egyptian faith, that the farther back we go the simpler the religion is, and that at least the instructed regarded the multiplicity of gods not as separate deities, but as so many manifestations of the hidden God. Tiele, for example, holds indeed that the degradation which is seen in the Egyptian religion is really a "retrogression to the earlier standpoint" of the worship of natural objects as living beings. But he confesses that "the position that fetichism and the worship of natural objects and phenomena as such is nothing but the vulgar corruption of an originally much purer religion, nowhere appears to receive more striking confirmation than in these ancient Egyptian records" (*History of the Egyptian Religion*, pp. 82, 83, 222).

came across it, the most conspicuous feature of the religion was a gross system of zoolatry. The gods of Egypt had become a countless multitude. Every village had its sacred animal and its patron deity; every hour had its special divinity. This theology varied from time to time, one great crisis in its history being marked by the removal of Set from the Egyptian Pantheon. The doctrine of the Future, too, varied with the doctrine of God. Two groups of deities, originally separate, the Râ or sun group, and the Osiris group, became united by the identification of Osiris with the sun. This change in the theology had its effect upon the eschatology, in which the central place was assigned to Osiris.

Further, as the sublimer elements of the theology sank beneath the baser, and the quasi-monotheism yielded to the pantheistic leaven, not only did the old religion lose its ethical quality and become materialised, but the whole conception of the after-life declined in definiteness, hopefulness, and moral power.

What, then, did this Egyptian doctrine of Immortality, of which so much has been said in the old world and in the new, amount to? The tombs are our great sources of information. The papyrus rolls, which have been recovered from these tombs in vast numbers, the inscriptions on statues and walls, the writings on sepulchral cases and wrappings, form for the most part chapters of the famous *Book of the Dead*—the extraordinary collection of prayers and formulæ for the guidance and protection of the deceased in the after-world.

There are other writings from which we gather

something,—*Hymns*, *Tales*, the *Book of Knowing that which is in the Tuat* or the *Book of being in the Underworld*, the *Book of the Opening of the Mouth*, the *Lamentations of Isis and Nephthys*, the *Book of the Breaths of Life*, the *Precepts of Ptahhotep*, etc. But the *Book of the Dead*, or the *Funeral Ritual*, as it was less appropriately termed by Champollion and De Rougé, is our chief authority, and these others are in general agreement with it. To modern eyes, much that is in this book appears strange, confused, and paltry. But who that thinks of its grey antiquity, and of the place it had in the faith and reverence, the hopes and fears of a great people, can look upon it without interest or without emotion? In its present shape it may not go behind the seventh century before our era. But long before it assumed the form of a book, it existed in separate chapters. Its manuscripts take us back to the fourteenth or fifteenth century B.C.; its texts are found earlier far, inscribed on monuments, tombs, amulets, mummy-wrappings. Some of its chapters are assigned to the period of Hesep-ti, the fifth king of the first dynasty, or to that of Menkaurâ of the fourth dynasty.[1] There is reason to say that sections of it belong to times older than the oldest Egyptian history and as remote as the earliest Egyptian civilisation.

To the people of the Nile valley this most ancient volume was pre-eminently their Sacred Book, the one that was more to them than any other, the one that held the secret of all the beatitudes of a future existence. "If one knows this book thoroughly and has

[1] Budge, *The Mummy*, p. 208.

it inscribed upon his sarcophagus, he will be manifested in the day, in all (the forms) that he may desire, and entering his abode, will not be turned back." This was its virtue, as it is declared at the close of its opening chapter. "If this discourse is learnt upon earth, or is written upon the coffin," says an early rubric, "he (the deceased) may come forth upon every day that he pleaseth and again enter his house without impediment. And there shall be given him bread and beer and flesh-meat upon the table of Râ; he shall receive allotment in the Fields of Aarru, and there shall be given him there wheat and barley, for he shall be flourishing as when he was upon earth."[1]

Fortunately there is no lack of copies of the most important chapters of the *Book of the Dead*. They are distributed by the hundred among the museums of Egypt and Europe. But notwithstanding the mass of evidence at our disposal, and the careful investigations of many scholars of the highest critical faculty, the Egyptian doctrine remains far from clear or certain. The corruptions of the texts are serious, and the interpretation is in many cases doubtful. The chronological arrangement of the different chapters is a problem of the greatest difficulty. Even the sense of the title which stands at the head of the book is a puzzle.[2] It would be misleading, therefore, to say that

[1] See Davis' *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*, pp. 59, 60.

[2] Our leading Egyptologists have all tried their hand on this title *Per-em-hru*, *Peri-em-hru*, *Per-m-hru*, *Pert em hru*, *Pirû-m-hrû*, as it is variously reproduced. They have rendered it in different ways, *e.g.* "going out from day," "the going out of the day," "manifestation in the light of day," "outgoing by day," "going forth like the day," "going out in the day." They have also attached very different ideas to it, *e.g.* that of the passage of the soul from this existence to the next, the going out of life, the soul's

a complete or consistent rendering of this eschatology has been made out. Uncertainty and difference of judgment still attach to various points in it, and not least to its doctrine of migration. With these qualifications, however, its outlines may be given as follows.

In the first place, it is clear that the Egyptian idea of the future was emphatically one which associated with it the conception of life. *Everlasting life* is before the justified. The term which is almost habitually applied to the departed is one (*ānchiu*) which designates them *the living*. The sarcophagus itself is called the *lord of life*. The water of life is given to the deceased by Osiris, or by the goddess Nut, "that the soul may *live*." An enormous place is assigned to propitiatory oblations, and those other religious services in behalf of the departed, which all the world over have been witnesses to the belief in the perpetuation of life. The man who passes in righteousness into the other world is described by a phrase which is taken to have some such sense as the "Yesterday which sees endless years." A term (*maa-χeru*, *maâcheru*) is attached to his name, which means "the justified," or the "triumphant."[1] The title given to the coffin in one of the oldest inscriptions is the *chest of the living* (*hen en anchiu*). However difficult they

journey from the night of the grave to the light of a new life, the "beatification of the justified," as Tiele puts it, "after the night of death and conflict." Perhaps it is, as Naville and Budge think, a purely technical or conventional term, the precise import of which is now beyond our reach. See Budge, *The Mummy*, p. 209; Davis' *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*, pp. 61, 62; Tiele, *History of the Egyptian Religion*, pp. 22, 23; Maspero's *The Dawn of Civilisation in Egypt and Chaldæa*, Eng. trans. p. 199; and the *Papyrus of Ani* (British Museum facsimile).

[1] But others think it means "exercising authority," or "speaking truth by the word."

felt it to explain its conditions, however they varied from age to age in their ideas of its nature and its scene, the Egyptians believed from first to last with an intense belief in the continuance of life. The persistence of life, the exchange between death and life, the thought that life must live, and that personal life here means a personal survival hereafter—these were the primary and most constant elements in the Egyptian faith. "It is only evil spirits," says M. Renouf, "who are spoken of in the sacred writings of the Egyptians as 'the dead.'"

In the second place, we find that this life of the future was to the Egyptian so substantial a life that he thought of it always as in some sense material. The idea of pure, disembodied existence, or of an immaterial soul in our sense, was strange to him. The man, who by dying parted with his body, did not thereby become pure spirit; and one of the objects of the ceremonies connected with death and burial was to restore to him his bodily organs in a form suited to his use in the other world. Where other nations have distinguished the abiding Self from the physical environment, and have risen to the idea of an abstract personality, the Egyptians thought of a concrete personality—a substantial Self continuing in a material form.[1] The soul had its own appropriate body. The very shadow of the man was regarded as something substantial.

Further, we see that an elaborate and singular anthropology lay at the basis of the eschatology. In a certain sense, though not in our sense, the man

[1] Wiedemann, *Die Religion der alten Ægypter*, p. 126.

consisted of two distinct constituents, body and soul. But as the soul was not immaterial, as we think of it, so it was not a unity, as we conceive it to be. What we term *soul* embraced several things, which were distinguishable from each other, and all distinct from the body. They remained in connection with each other and with the body during the earthly existence, but parted after death and went their several ways. These included the *heart*; the *Ba* (which most resembles our *soul*, but is represented as needing food and drink); the *Sâhu* (the *form* of the dead); the *χu*, or Khu, the "luminous," the *intelligence*, as some understand it, a "spark from the divine fire," as it is described by Maspero,[1] a kind of lustrous figure of the mummy, or, as others think, the spiritual substance of the *Ba*; the *χaib* or *shadow*, which could separate itself from the man at death. There were also the *Kâ*, which gods no less than men were conceived to possess; and the *Osiris*, in which some recognise a name, and others a real constituent, and indeed the more properly immortal constituent of the man.

The definitions of these terms are by no means certain. The *Sâhu*, for example, is explained by some as the term for the *natural body*. How the several parts of the man were related to each other, is also left in obscurity. It does not appear that the Egyptians themselves ever made this clear. Two or three of these constituents seem practically the same, and it is a reasonable conjecture that they were survivals of different conceptions of the nobler, enduring con-

[1] *Egyptian Archæology*, p. 108.

stituent of man, which had prevailed in different localities in prehistoric times, and had subsequently become combined.[1] The most important ideas are those expressed by the terms *Kâ* and *Osiris*. The former is the man's *double*, something similar to him, not identical indeed with him, but living with him or in him and so like him that the *Kâ* of the child has the appearance of a child, and the *Kâ* of the man the appearance of a man. It is defined as being to the man what *word* is to *thought* or *name* to *form*. It is also described as the *spiritual body*. If this is correct, then we see that the Egyptians drew a broad distinction between these three—the natural body, the spiritual body, and the soul. The human *Osiris* again corresponds to the mummy, but is immortal. When death ensues, the body becomes the corpse or *χa*, figured as a dead fish, and the first duty of the family is to see to its embalmment and entombment. But the *Kâ* enters on a separate existence and an independent activity. It can reanimate the corpse, and so revisit its former home on earth. To it also the funeral offerings and prayers are addressed. The *Kâ*, which was figured by the symbol of two human forearms, with hands at right angles to these, or by a full human form, with a staff and a characteristic sign, was the exact image of the body, invisible yet material; subject to hunger, thirst, fatigue; carrying on the functions of the body, but relieved of the restrictions on mere bodily movement; yet not immortal in the proper sense, but capable of death. It differed, therefore, essentially from the *Ba*. This latter, figured by

[1] See Wiedemann, *Die Religion der alten Ægypter*, p. 128.

the symbol of a bird, a kind of crane or human-headed hawk, could quit the earth, which the *Kâ* could not do. And, though it could live only where it found that which fitted its nature and functions, its destiny was a new world. The locality of the *Kâ* was the place where the mummy rested. The *Ba* and the *Khu* could rise to the gods and live in their light.

There was a special realm of the dead, too, with a special deity to preside over it. It was the land of *Menti*, as it appears on the oldest tombs, or *Amenti* as it is given in the later form—the *hidden place*;[1] it was Ker Neter, the nether world.[2] The realm itself is called by a variety of expressive names—the "Hall of the Depth," the "Land of Knowledge," the "Friend of Silence," the "Concealer of the Resting," and many others.[3] In most cases the divinity of the realm is represented as a goddess, the spouse of Osiris, the mother of all that die, who receives them into her arms and assigns them their places in her deep domain.[4] But one of the chief peculiarities of the Egyptian doctrine was the way in which all was made to centre in Osiris himself, the god who represented the principle of good, both physical and moral, and who was in conflict with Set, the representative of evil.

In its nature and its possibilities, however, this after-existence in which the Egyptian had so deep-rooted a

[1] Or, as some explain it, the *immovable land*.

[2] Tiele, however, is doubtful whether *Ker Neter*, or *Cher-Nuter*, is "properly a subterranean tract" (*History of the Egyptian Religion*, p. 72).

[3] See the list of names given by Brugsch in his *Religion und Mythologie der alten Ægypter*, Zweite Ausgabe, pp. 227, 228.

[4] See the Inscriptions quoted by Brugsch, *ut sup.* p. 229.

belief, was neither a better order of life than the present, nor a more spiritual. It had its supreme beatitudes and its final glory. But, apart from these, it did not rise above the level of the earthly existence. In some things it was beneath it, so that the notes of fear and regret break out now and again in the descriptions of it. In a very real sense, it was a dependent life. Its highest elements depended for their continuance on the continuance of the bodily form. Hence the care with which the Egyptians sought to preserve the body by embalmments, and the pains spent on the erection of strong and secure resting-places for their dead. Hence, too, the placing of statuettes of the deceased in the tomb.

The several constituents which made the personality of the man in the other world were also all dependent for their perpetuation on due provision for their wants. None of them subsisted of themselves. Left to themselves, all tended to decay, enfeeblement, and ultimate destruction. The soul might outlast the body; but in its time it would perish like the body, and the man would sink into another death, which meant extinction. So means had to be supplied for the support and prolongation of the being of the surviving man in all its parts. Food and drink had to be provided for the *Kâ*, lest it should suffer from hunger and thirst. To attend to the necessary funeral offerings was one of the most sacred cares of the family and friends of the dead. Oxen were sacrificed before the tomb, and the choice parts presented for the use of the deceased. Jars of water and vessels of wine or beer were deposited there. Instruc-

tions were given in the *Book of the Dead*[1] for the performance of this primary duty. Magical formulæ were also used, in the belief that the repetition of these would make the deceased certain of the requisite provision.

Under the influence of the same conception, the custom arose of making the funerary statuettes which were known as the *Ushebte* or *Ushabti*, the "Answerers," these being buried with great men that they might *answer* for them, and take their place in labour when they were called to work in the Blessed Fields.[2] And with food and drink it was needful to provide suitable shelter. Hence the tomb, the "everlasting house," in comparison with which the earthly dwelling-place was but an inn, was constructed on the plan of a home, with its rooms for the soul and the *Kâ*. Poor as this notion of the nature of the future life must seem, its power over the mind of the people was vast, and the idea of the *Kâ* was at the heart of all. "In consequence of this belief," says Erman, "they mummified their bodies, they built their indestructible tombs, they established endowments for the sacrifices for the dead, they preserved statues and household goods in the tombs—in short, it is to their faith in the *Kâ* that we owe all our knowledge of the home-life of the people."[3]

The idea of a future judgment for all men was a cardinal point in the Egyptian conception of a future life. This made it a distinctly moral conception. The soul, which seems to have been thought of as coming from

[1] *E.g.* chaps. cv., cvi.
[2] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Tirard's trans. p. 317.
[3] *Ibid.* pp. 307, 308.

the gods, had a retributive future before it. It was for Osiris or for Set on earth, and its deeds here decided its future. Osiris was the judge. Everything turned upon his judgment. The justified one was identified with him, received his name, enjoyed his protection and guidance, and became himself an Osiris. When the dead man reaches the Hall of the Double Truth, he is before the throne of this divine judge. The goddess Maāt, the goddess of Justice, Truth, or Law, is there, holding a sceptre and the symbol of life. The scales are set, the man's heart in the one, the image of Maāt in the other. Horus watches the index; Thoth or Tehuti, the god of letters, takes the record. The standard of judgment is high. It covers all the great requirements of truth, purity, righteousness, charity, piety. Above the balance are the forty-two assessors whose office is with the forty-two great forms of sin. The departed makes his confession. It takes the form of a negative statement, denying his guilt in respect of these sins. His conscience or moral nature, symbolised by the heart in the scale, speaks for him. If the judgment is favourable, he regains the use of hands, limbs, and mouth; he receives back what he had lost by death. His soul, his Kâ, his shadow, are restored, and he begins a new life. If the judgment is unfavourable, he bears the penalty of loss and pain.

But this is not the end. A long and arduous probation lies before the justified. The immediate result indeed of his approval in the judgment of Thoth is the recovery of the faculties and instruments of a real and efficient life. In the *Book of the Dead* large

mention is made of the giving back of the heart, the mouth, the memory, of the setting of the limbs again in motion, of the reuniting of the soul with the body, of the obtaining of breath, and the like. But all this is in the first instance with a view to the equipment of the justified one for discipline and conflict. There is a long way of trial before him with dangers of many kinds, from venomous beasts and from evil spirits, with untold possibilities of injury and loss. The *Book of the Dead* speaks at length of these—of snake and tortoise that have to be withstood, of the crocodile that comes to deprive the man of his magic power, of reptiles that have to be repelled, of the serpent *Apep*, the foe of Râ. Through these and other perils the justified is called to fight his way with the help of his revivified powers, his spear, the magic formulæ and all the minute and circumstantial directions of the *Book of the Dead*. Only when this is accomplished is the full promise of the other world made good to him.[1]

We have little to show either how or at what period these ideas took shape. We have no adequate means of judging whether they originated in a moral conception of life; whether at any particular stage in the history of Egyptian faith they assumed a positively moral colour; or whether they ever stood at a greatly higher level than that on which we now find them. We know them only as they are seen mixed up with the multitude of things artificial and mechanical which surprise us in the *Book of the Dead*. But the fact that man was regarded as somehow the subject of two courses

[1] Tiele, *History*, *ut sup.* p. 70; *Book of the Dead*, chaps. vii., xxxi., xxxii., xxxvi., xxxix., xl., xli., etc.

of probation, and so of two judgments, indicates how grave the Egyptian people once felt the issues of life to be, and how great the boon of immortality.[1]

Can the Egyptian doctrine of the retributive issues of the after-existence be more exactly defined? Only in part, it seems, and much less certainly on the side of the condemned than on that of the justified. By their identification with Osiris[2] and with other deities, by the gift of knowledge, and by the use of the proper formulæ, the justified can triumph over every obstacle and danger. They enjoy a life similar to that of earth, real and substantial as it is. They receive food from the table of Osiris in Ristat. They pass into the

[1] Some recognise a profound moral principle in these ideas, which became obscured and degraded as the Egyptian religion decayed. "We have two distinct systems of tests," says Mr. Brimmer, "for the soul. One, the purely moral one, in which the soul is judged by its conduct on earth, the other, with a deeper significance, the measure of the soul by its own conduct through the spiritual world. This latter test required a perfect knowledge of the soul's powers, an unshaken confidence in its absolute union with Osiris, and a firm resolution to overcome all the obstacles which impeded its progress. In this respect the soul had its salvation in its own keeping, no god intervening to help. This is the underlying principle of the *Book of the Dead*, which expresses a profound thought in a dramatic form. . . . That this faith degenerated in later days into a mere dependence upon the magical power of charms and incantations was a natural accompaniment of the decay of religion. That which was in its essence a high and beautiful conception of the life and progress of the soul, became in the end distorted into a terror which could be allayed only by blind adherence to the letter of the ritual" (*Egypt: Three Essays on the History, Religion, and Art of Ancient Egypt*, pp. 40, 41).

[2] On the question of the antiquity of this idea of identification with the god, see Renouf, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 184; De la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, Erster Band, pp. 291, 292. It is found on the coffin of King Menkaurâ (Mycerinus) of the fourth dynasty, whose date may be about 3633–3600 B.C. "From the time of the Middle Empire," remarks Erman, "the deceased is addressed directly as the *Osiris N. W.*, as if he were that god himself; and the epithet is always added, *of true words*, because formerly the *words* of Osiris had been found true in the dispute with his enemies" (*Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 308).

happy fields of Aaru, Aarru, Aalu, or Ialu as it is variously given, from the gates of which the sun comes forth in the east.

But these Elysian plains, in which the corn is seven cubits high, and the old employments are taken up anew, are only the beginnings of their reward. Their powers are so enlarged that the universe is open to them. They can rise above the human order and limits of existence; they can assume other forms—those, for example, of the turtle dove, the serpent, the bird Bennu (possibly, though not certainly, the Phœnix), the crocodile, the god Ptāh, the golden hawk, the lotus-flower, the heron. They can enter the society of the gods and look upon the sun. The reward of good has its stages and degrees, and these are expressed in a variety of ways. The justified drink of the water of life;[1] they become spirits of light; they reach the point at which the sun is born; they go in towards the circle of the gods; they enter the bark of the sun; they have the light of the glory of Osiris; they obtain perfection in the bosom of the sun.[2]

But of the condemned different things are said. The terms of their destiny are gathered from the statement of the things over which the justified triumph,

[1] "The most usual representation of this," says M. Renouf, "is the picture in which the goddess Nut pours out the water of life to the deceased, from the interior of a sycamore tree. In a picture published by M. Chabas, the deceased kneels before Osiris, and receives from him the water of life from a vessel under which is written *ānch ba*, 'that the soul may live.' The picture is taken from the mummy of a priest who lived twelve hundred years before Christ" (*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 141).

[2] *Book of the Dead*, chaps. c., civ., cx., cxv., cxix., cxxiv., cxlix.; Tiele, *History*, *ut sup.* pp. 29, 70. "To be with the deity" says the latter, "and to be like him, is, even in this, the oldest development of the doctrine of immortality, what constitutes salvation."

the beds and nets of torment, the Neminat or block of execution, the food of filth, the grasp of the "devourer of the under-world." The punishments of evil have also their different degrees, and hell has its many different compartments. Amongst the descriptions given of the fate of the wicked is that of a "second death," and other expressions occur which may point to annihilation as their end. But there are some which denote rather a never-ending death. Thought may have been less formed, and less constant on the subject of the punishments of the future than on that of its rewards.

But it remains that, wherever these punishments come distinctly into view, they are described in words as heavy with terror as the language can furnish. The terms and figures of speech which are used in speaking of them are those which were most associated in Egyptian thought and Egyptian experience with absolute joylessness and misery. To the Egyptian, living in a land in which brilliant light and smiling skies made the joy of life, nothing was more suggestive of unrelieved loss and woe than an existence on which the sun could never shine; and no figure is oftener applied to the final fate of the condemned than that of exclusion from the light, banishment into utter darkness. "To sit in everlasting darkness—a phrase that irresistibly recalls the outer darkness of the gospel—and to be forgotten, were the most dreadful ideas to the mind of the good Egyptian, the friend of the light who his whole life long esteemed no effort that he could make too great, if he could thereby immortalise himself." [1]

[1] Tiele, *History*, *ut sup.* pp. 69, 70.

One question of great interest on which opinion has changed, is that of the migration of souls. Herodotus, as is well known, makes an important statement on this subject. "The Egyptians," he says, "maintain that Ceres and Bacchus preside in the realms below. They were also the first to broach the opinion that the soul of man is immortal, and that, when the body dies, it enters into the form of an animal, which is born at the moment, thence passing from one animal into another, until it has circled through the forms of all the creatures which tenant the earth, the water, and the air, after which it enters again into a human frame, and is born anew. The whole period of the transmigration is (they say) three thousand years. There are Greek writers, some of an earlier, some of a later date, who have borrowed this doctrine from the Egyptians and put it forward as their own. I could mention their names, but I abstain from so doing."[1] The testimony of Herodotus was long accepted without question, or simply with the reservation that it applied only to the unjustified; and it was understood to be confirmed by scenes depicted on the tombs.[2] It was customary, therefore, to say, that this doom of metempsychosis or metensomatosis was a main element in the punishment of those who failed to pass the judgment of Osiris, according to the Egyptians, and that the Greek doctrine was borrowed from Egypt.

But this is now emphatically challenged. It is

[1] Book II. c. 123, Rawlinson's translation.

[2] One of these paintings, for example, is supposed to represent the dismissal of an unjustified soul into the body of a pig. See Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. pp. 195, 196, and the plates in Wilkinson's *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians.*

asserted that there is no real resemblance between the Egyptian doctrine and the Pythagorean, and no reason to suppose that there was any connection between them. As it is now expounded, the Egyptian doctrine differs essentially both from the Greek doctrine and from the Indian, having no relation either to the need of purification or to the doom of punishment. It is simply a doctrine of the assumption of other forms by the deceased, in the sense of a privilege of the justified, a capacity limited to them and exercised at their will.

There appears to be little in the inscriptions or the paintings that can be said clearly to bear out the older view, while the testimony of the *Book of the Dead* applies to something essentially different. That Book speaks largely of metamorphoses which became possible in the other world. But they are changes of form of which the just dead are made capable; and the chief, if not the only, object of these changes seems to be to secure the dead against the attacks of evil spirits and enemies of other kinds, and enable them to escape their malign devices. The *Book of the Dead* has chapters about "performing all the desirable transformations," about transformations into a golden hawk, a sacred hawk, into the chief of the royal circle of the gods, into a god giving light on the paths of darkness, into a lotus, into Ptāh, into a Phœnix, into a bird Shenti, into a soul, a swallow, a snake, a crocodile.[1] It has also one long chapter on "giving perfection to the shades, allowing them to walk in the Great Room, to go out by day in every

[1] Chaps. lxxvi. to lxxxviii. in Davis' English version of Pierret's translation.

shape that will please them," etc.[1] But it seems to say nothing of an expiatory or purgatorial transmigration of wicked souls into animal or other forms.

At the same time it is perhaps premature to take this question as exhaustively investigated and finally settled. Herodotus may very well have mistaken the real character of the Egyptian doctrine, or he may have got a misleading account of it. But it is at least conceivable that some form of the doctrine of transmigration may have been developed in the later periods of the Egyptian religion in connection with the gross zoolatry. Whether it was so, or whether the doctrine of transformation was always a doctrine applicable only to the justified, may be made more certain by further study of the texts and further discoveries in picture or inscription.[2]

It is possible that opinion altered on this as on other things in the course of time, and that its later stages differed greatly from its earlier. We see, at anyrate, that the general conception of the future life changed, and did so to its hurt, as the general idea of religion changed. As the latter became more pantheistic and materialistic, and zoolatry with its attendant superstitions usurped a larger place, the former lost its hopefulness, the outlook became sceptical and gloomy, and the thought of the reward of righteousness decayed. Amenti was the land of heavy slumber, darkness, and sorrow; the water of life was for those who tarried on earth; the true wisdom was to follow one's desires here.

This is the gloomy spirit which finds expression, for example, in the words spoken from Amenti by the

[1] Chap. cxlii.

[2] See Appendix, Note C.

wife of Pasherenptah: "Oh my brother, my spouse, cease not to drink and to eat, to drain the cup of joy, to enjoy the love of woman, and to make holiday; follow thy desires each day, and let not care enter into thy heart, as long as thou livest upon earth. For as to Amenti, it is the land of heavy slumber and of darkness, an abode of sorrow for those who dwell there. They sleep in their forms; they wake not any more to see their brethren; they recognise not their father and their mother; their heart is indifferent to their wife and children. Everyone (on earth) enjoys the water of life, but thirst is by me. The water cometh to him who remaineth on earth, but I thirst for the water which is by me. I know not where I am since I came into this spot; I weep for the water which passes by me. I weep for the breeze on the brink of the stream, that through it my heart may be refreshed in its sorrow. For as to the god who is here, 'Death-Absolute' is his name. He calleth on all, and all men come to obey him, trembling with fear before him. With him there is no respect for gods and men; by him great ones are as little ones. One feareth to pray to him, for he listeneth not. No one comes to invoke him, for he is not kind to those who adore him."[1]

[1] This remarkable passage has been repeatedly published and translated. It is given above as Renouf gives it in his *Hibbert Lectures* (pp. 241–243), referring to Sharpe's *Inscriptions*, i. pl. 4. Maspero reproduces it thus: "O my brother, withhold not thyself from drinking and eating, from drunkenness and love, from all enjoyment, from following thy desire by night and by day; put not sorrow within thy heart, for what are the years of a man upon earth? The West is a land of sleep and of heavy shadows, a place wherein its inhabitants, when once installed, slumber on in their mummy-forms, never more waking to see their brethren; never more to recognise their fathers or their mothers; with hearts forgetful of their wives and children. The living water, which earth giveth to all

The dark and hopeless thoughts which find utterance here are in significant contrast with the feeling which shows itself in many recorded prayers. "Grant that I arrive at the country of Eternity, and the regions of the justified; that I be reunited to the fair and wise spirits of Kerneter, and that I appear with them to contemplate thy beauties in the morning of every day."[1] The longing and the hope thus expressed in words addressed to Osiris, which are inscribed on a stelé of Boulaq, appear again and again in the *Book of the Dead*. "O thou who beamest in the top of heaven, grant me to arrive at the highest point in the sky for Eternity, through the dwelling of thy favourites, to be united with those august and perfect ones in the Netherworld, to go out with them to see thy splendours when thou risest." . . . "N. in the Netherworld, make him to be in the Amenti, and subdue evil; place thyself as a protector behind him against his sins; place him among the venerable and august ones; may he be united with the souls in the Netherworld; may he sail about in the fields of Aarru, and at last may he travel with his heart gladdened . . . the Osiris N. is with them in the Amenti, his heart is gladdened" (chap. xv.).

Theoretically the Egyptian belief in immortality became a highly ethical belief. It should have exer-

who dwell upon it, is for me but stagnant and dead; that water floweth to all who are on earth, while for me it is but liquid putrefaction, this water that is mine. Since I came into this funereal valley I know not where or what I am. Give me to drink of running water! . . . Let me be placed by the edge of the water with my face to the north, that the breeze may caress me, and my heart be refreshed from its sorrows" (*The Dawn of Civilisation*, p. 113).

[1] See Brace, *The Unknown God*, p. 20.

cised, and probably to some extent and for some time did exercise, a strong and healthy influence on the life of the people. But the moral power which properly belonged to it was to a large extent neutralised by the fatal part allowed to magic. It was by the use of magical rites and formulæ that men expected to become victors over almost every form of evil, whether in this life or in the future. These things everywhere obtrude themselves upon our view. They are of the most puerile and degrading nature, and they evidently exercised an immense and most pernicious influence on Egyptian life. They robbed the doctrine of immortality of its moral energy.

There is much that is still far from clear or certain in the Egyptian doctrine of the Future, as in the Egyptian religion generally. At the earliest point at which anything like objective evidence is available, the Egyptians are seen to be already a highly developed nation, far beyond the stage of pupilage in science, art, literature, administration, and the various elements of an advanced civilisation, and in possession of a formed and established religion. But there is no pathway by which we can ascend with sure foot to the beginnings of that religion. And so it is in particular with this special article of the religion, the faith in an after-existence.

We can trace it back some six thousand years. We read it on the oldest monuments and writings. We find prayers for the good of the soul in the other world on the stelæ of a priest of the second dynasty, who may have lived some four thousand years before Christ.[1] We see a curious symbolism associated with this faith

[1] Myers, *Scarabs*, p. viii.

from the remotest period, that of the Scarabæus, the sacred beetle which was to the Egyptian almost what the cross is to the Christian, the emblem of renewal and continued existence, which is so often found in the wrappings of the mummy or in the place once occupied by the heart of the embalmed dead.[1] But the origins of the belief are beyond us. Some seek them in the most familiar phenomena of nature. "The conception formed by the ancient Egyptians in regard to the fate of souls after death," says Tiele, "is derived from what they saw daily happening to the sun, which was to them the most complete manifestation of the Deity. The sun set in the west and rose again in the east, or, put in mythological form, the sun-god, conquered by the powers of darkness, passed at eventide into the realm of the dead, waged there a triumphant contest with numerous enemies, and rose again in the morning with full radiance as if new born. With the human soul it was the same."[2] All such explanations, however, are only so many more or less probable conjectures.

There are diverse elements, too, in this doctrine as in the religion generally, which are scarcely less difficult to understand than are the origins. They may be due to the different ways in which the exuberant symbolism of the Egyptian faith was taken by ruder and by more educated minds. They may also mean that different

[1] See Myers, *Scarabs*, p. 66, etc.; Erman, *ut sup.* p. 315. At later stages in Egyptian history other emblems were used. Mr. Budge notices, *e.g.*, how the frog is often figured on lamps of the Greek and Roman periods, and how "one is known which has the legend εγω ειμι ἀναστασις, 'I am the resurrection'" (*The Mummy*, p. 266).

[2] *History*, *ut sup.* p. 22.

ideas, derived from various sources, were added from time to time to the original belief, or that in the historical period there did not exist one common form of faith throughout the land. In any case the mixture of elements is there to complicate the question.

We have enough, however, to show that the belief underwent great changes, and we can recognise broadly the line of their movement. In the monuments and paintings and writings of the earlier periods it is a simple but vivid belief in the perpetuation of existence after death, and in that as the perpetuation of the individual existence. Even down to the twelfth dynasty (about 2130 B.C.) it seems to retain this simplicity, not going much beyond the thought of an extension into the other world of the kind of life enjoyed in this world—a life continued under material conditions, and dependent on the provision furnished in the offerings. These offerings are the frequent subjects of text and picture, and for a length of time the idea of death and all that is associated with it is subordinate to that of the continuing life.

But from the twelfth dynasty onwards the prominent things come to be death itself in its awful aspect, the funeral ceremonies, the shadow of judgment, the perils of the soul in its journeys and conflicts in the underworld. The old thoughts which were at the root of the whole faith survived. They are found expressed in the Theban and Ptolemaic periods as well as in the Memphite. But they acquired a moral complexion. "From the calm assurance of purely material happiness which the earliest Egyptians loved to dwell on, there developed itself a keener sense of the trials through which the soul

must pass, together with a higher ideal of the future life, a stronger conviction of the moral qualities and acts essential to the justification of the individual."[1]

At what precise point in its history the Egyptian faith in a future life became a distinctly moral faith, with a definite conception of a retributive future, is not easy to discover. The moral idea of life and its issues may have existed in some form, before it is clearly expressed on tombs or in writings. But we find little trace of it in the times of the Old Empire or in those of the Middle Empire. The paintings and inscriptions even of the latter period show little to suggest that the people of those times had any distinct anticipation of judgment, or that their religion taught the fear of hell. But in those of the New Empire (from 1530 B.C.) all is different. The thought of judgment, the conviction that the future life is more than a simple extension of the present life, the belief that the awards of the former are distributed according to the good or evil of the latter, everywhere declare themselves.

It was a great epoch in the progress of the people when the general belief in an after-existence took the definite form of a belief in the moral order of life, the responsibility of man, and the retributive character of the future.[2] The doctrine, however, also degenerated, and gradually declined in purity, certainty, and vitality.

[1] Brimmer's *Egypt*, p. 24.

[2] It is observed that, while the images of the gods are seldom seen in the tombs of the older Empires, they meet us on all hands in the sepulchral temples of the New Empire. Tiele concludes, therefore, "that at this time religion was much more powerful than in the preceding periods." He thinks we may say that it covered the whole field of life, political and social as well as personal and domestic; and that this advance in the conception of immortality was a consequence of the advance in religion and theology.

Its decline was helped by a general decay in the religion as a whole, by the entrance of pantheistic or quasi-pantheistic ideas, and by other things.[1] The result was that Christianity, when it came in contact with it, found little in it that was not despicable and inimical. The Egyptian faith, both in its religious and in its moral elements, had sunk so low that it had become an object of ridicule to heathen writers; and early Christian writers saw in it nothing but a base and corrupting system of animal worship. We have an interesting instance of this in the recently recovered *Apology of Aristides*, one of the earliest of all the arguments addressed to the Roman emperors in defence of the new faith. There the last and worst place is assigned to the Egyptians, the worshippers of beasts and creeping things, the people who have surpassed all others upon earth in evil and ignorance, in hardness and impurity, and have "erred more than all men."[2]

He would connect it also with the introduction of the belief that the dead man becomes Osiris. But this is more doubtful. (*History*, *ut sup.* p. 185.)

[1] The seventeenth chapter of the *Book of the Dead* holds a somewhat peculiar position in the collection. In it we find statements of a quasi-pantheistic kind, which speak of an identification of the deceased with the gods in terms approaching those that are applicable to the idea of an absorption of the deceased in deity. We can scarcely call these, however, more than quasi-pantheistic. There is nothing in them really on a level with the Indian idea. Even those who, like M. Chabas, recognise pantheism in the Egyptian religion, admit that it is an entirely special kind of pantheism. It is only "with great reserve," as Tiele justly says, that the term can be used of the Egyptian faith. It is perhaps put most correctly when it is said that "Egyptian logic saw no difficulty in the belief of the individual existence of the soul while that soul was identified with Osiris. This identification was therefore as far removed as possible from the Buddhist idea of nirvana" (Brimmer's *Egypt*, p. 27; Tiele's *History*, *ut sup.* p. 216).

[2] See Appendix, Note D.

CHAPTER V

BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN BELIEFS

OF greater interest even than those of the Egyptians, are the ideas of the *Babylonians* and *Assyrians*. These nations were of the same stock with the Hebrews, and we shall not be surprised if the religious conceptions of the latter are found in not a few points to resemble those of the former. The popular ideas of the Hebrews on the subject of the soul, death, and the future, are traceable, in point of fact, to those of the Babylonians and Assyrians, or may be carried back, along with those of the Babylonians and Assyrians, to a still earlier centre of thought from which all three were derived. The Assyrians and the Babylonians are taken together, both having substantially the same tongue, religion, literature, culture, and science. Babylonia was the mother country ; and, except for a few centuries, it was the ruling power. But, in the judgment of the great majority of scholars, the primitive population of Babylonia itself was not of Semitic, but of Turanian or Ural-Altaic stock,[1] the dominant

[1] The Turanian relationship is questioned by Gutschmid, Haupt, etc. Others connect the earlier inhabitants with the Kossæans, another non-Semitic people. Tiele thinks they are at least of the same race as the Elamites and non-Aryan Medes, and to be classed with the "Mongoloid races" of Peschel. Professor Terrien de Lacouperie pronounced their language akin to the Chinese. M. Maspero considers it doubtful which of the two races,

race at the earliest date which we can reach being a people to whom has been given the name of Sumerians[1] or Accadians,[2]—a race of highlanders who had come down from the elevated region of Elam, or from some of the north-eastern parts.[3]

The capital of this Sumerian or Accadian people is understood to have been, at one period at least, Ur of the Chaldees, the sacred city of the moon-god, whence Abraham came;[4] and the culture, both of the Assyrians in the north and the Babylonians in the south, seems to have been derived from them. But at a very early date there was an irruption of Semites, and the language of these Semitic conquerors became the language of the conquered land, while the ideas of the conquered were adopted by the conquerors. The supremacy of the Semite race, however, does not appear to have been won once for all. In all probability there was a struggle between the old people and the new, which lasted through several reigns, and was marked by occasional revivals of Accadian power. But by the time of Sargon I.—a date which, as we have every reason to believe, takes us back to 3750 or 3800 B.C.—the conflict was

the Semite or the Sumerian, was first "at the mouths of the Euphrates" (*The Dawn of Civilisation*, p. 551). Some suppose the Semites to have come from the north; their origin is now sought rather in Southern Arabia.

[1] By Oppert, Friedrich Delitzsch, etc.

[2] By Hincks, Lenormant, Sayce, and most English scholars. M. Halévy disputes the existence of this Sumerian or Sumero-Accadian people.

[3] The phrase "Sumir (Shumir) and Accad" often occurs in princely titles. Its precise force is disputed, though Accad is now generally taken to mean Upper Chaldæa, and Sumir, Lower Chaldæa. It may, perhaps, have expressed at first an ethnological distinction.

[4] The identification of the Uru or Urum of the cuneiform inscriptions with the Biblical Ur is still questioned by Halévy and others. But it is supported by Oppert, Schrader, and many more, who in this follow Rawlinson.

ended, and a fusion had been effected between the two populations. At how much earlier a date this assimilation took place we cannot tell; neither do we know precisely what each of the two races contributed to the whole in which they combined.

We have the materials for forming a general estimate of what manner of people this was about four thousand years before Christ. Their civilisation even then was in many things an advanced civilisation. How much farther back it goes, we can at present only conjecture. But it is at least as old as the civilisation of Egypt, perhaps older. Recent discoveries make it clear that, in the earliest stage known to us, it was a more developed civilisation than was formerly thought. Even then the people were able to produce great and imposing works of art, of which the green diorite statue of the high priest Gudea is an example. They were proficient also in some kinds of bronze work. They had a remarkable faculty for gem-cutting, and they were a musical race. We see, too, that culture found its first home with them in the south, rather than in the north, in such cities as Uruk, Ur, Larsa, Sergal or Kaluna, which have been identified more or less certainly with the Erech, Ur, Ellasar, and Calneh of the Old Testament, and in the sacred city of Eridhu. Further, it is clear that their art, their literature, and all things else have the stamp of a genius as distinct from the Egyptian as the great alluvial, corn-producing plain of the two rivers differs from the strip of land between two deserts which is watered by the Nile.

As regards religion, the faith of Accad was at first

apparently a Shamanism like that of the Siberians and Samoyeds of the present day.[1] Every object was believed to be possessed by a spirit. Some of these spirits, or powers of nature, were elevated above others into the rank of gods—Anu, the god of the sky; Hea or Ea, the good of the deep; Mul-il, In-lil, or Mulge, the god of the under-world, or the god of earth and Hades, and others. Epithets applied to deities became by and by the names of new deities, and the sun, under a variety of designations, was made a supreme object of worship. It was perhaps at this stage that the Semite settlers in Sumir, who had adapted themselves more or less to the religion of Accad, made their influence felt, and a sacerdotal Reformation, something like that of Brahmanism, occurred.

A process of modification, transference, and amalgamation seems to have taken place between the two religions, and the triad of primary gods came to be Anu, the god of heaven; Bel, the creator or demiurge; and Hea, the god of the waters, the lord of the wave, the king of the deep. A second triad also was introduced, embracing Sin or Nannar, the moon-god; Samas or Shamas, the sun-god; Raman (Ramman) the air-god. Assyria, at the same time, had its special and supreme god, Assur, who was not worshipped in Babylonia. Beneath these were many other gods of high rank, Adar or Ninip, and Nergal, gods of war; Gibel, the fire-god; Nebo, the god of light and civilisation; the goddesses or consorts of the

[1] Some have affirmed a monotheistic basis for the religion. This was Lenormant's position. But the evidence is very slight, taken as it is so much from the supposed original sense of the word *Ilu* or *El* (De la Saussaye, *Manual*, *ut sup.* p. 481).

gods, Anat, Belit, Davkina ("the lady of the earth," the wife of Ea), Ningal, Shala, and others; and a multitude of spirits—spirits of heaven, spirits of earth, spirits of the nether-world, etc.

The religion, rude as in many respects it was, never sank to the level of the gross zoolatry which marked the last degradation of the Egyptian faith. On the other hand, it never rose to any great height in purity or spirituality of conception. It never became a monotheistic faith. Little or no trace is discoverable of the recognition of one all-supreme god. The later worship of Merodach is still far short of that, though it has some resemblance to it. It is, at the best, a henotheistic religion, one deity being singled out for special or exclusive worship in one place, and another in another. The same terms of exclusive adoration are applied to different deities in different centres. The religion had a variety of elements in it, drawn from different peoples, and it passed through great modifications. Of these the most important probably was that connected with the worship of the Sun. In the oldest Sumerian faith, the first place seems to have belonged to the moon-god. But at a later, though yet very remote period, and probably under Semitic influence, the sun-god prevailed. Marduk or Merodach absorbed many other deities, and became as much the supreme Babylonian god as Asshur was the supreme Assyrian god. With this Merodach, the "glorious one among the great gods," the one whose word was the word of Anu himself, the best thoughts of the Babylonians on a future existence are connected.

With all the mass and confusion of deities, a deep

religious sentiment pervaded the people. This is seen in the hymns which have come down to us. These ancient Accadian hymns, which Lenormant has named the Chaldæan Rig-Veda, are among the simplest, purest, and most impressive of all the remains of ancient piety. Older, perhaps, by a thousand years than any song that can be claimed for David, they read almost like the devout and penitential strains of the Psalter of Israel. They are heavy with the thought of sin. The men who speak in them cry to their gods with the bitter confession of misdeeds and faults, of sins committed which they knew not, of omissions in which they walked and knew not. They tell of a divine wrath that strikes them, of the misery of weeping and no one coming, of afflictions which hurl them into the roaring waters; and they appeal to a merciful god not to abandon them, but to scatter their sins to the winds, and tear their misdeeds in pieces like a garment. It may be a terror of the results of sin rather than the spiritual sense which makes the Hebrew Psalms stand alone in the religious literature of the ancient world. But it is a piercing sense of sin, at least as a destroyer, that gives a deep and singular value to these Accadian hymns.[1]

What is of more immediate interest to us, however, is the fact that we possess the *Lay of Istar's Descent to Hades*, a poem of curious interest, which gives us some insight into the old Chaldæan views of the other world.

[1] Translations are given in *Records of the Past*, especially vol. iii. Professor Sayce takes a higher view than some others of this consciousness of sin, and speaks of it as a "new feature in Chaldæan religion," as if it marked the first recognition of the moral significance of the evil that exists in the world (*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 352). Maspero understands it differently. See his *Dawn of Civilisation*, p. 682.

It has reached us only in Semitic form. But it is supposed to have Accadian matter as its basis.[1] It tells of the love of Istar, the Babylonian Venus, for Du-zi or Dumuzi (another form of Tammuz, the Babylonian Adonis); her passionate grief when he dies; her journey to the under-world in quest of the waters of life; how she comes to the gates of Hades and obtains admission there; how she has to strip herself, according to the inexorable law, of part of her attire at each of the seven gates; how at last she penetrates within the abodes of the dead—a dark and cheerless tract where dust is the food of the unhappy shades, and a grim queen reigns who smites Istar with many diseases, and imprisons her until she is sprinkled with the waters of life, and brought to the light again by a messenger of the gods.

This Lay is taken to form part of a larger composition[2] which also has an important bearing on the Babylonian ideas of the after-life—the great Epic of Isdubar, Gisdhubar, or Gilgames, which we owe to the ingenuity of the late Mr George Smith in piecing together a number of disconnected tablets. The Epic sings of the deeds of the hero Gilgames; his friendship with Ea-bani, who dwells in the mountains and has a mysterious power over the beasts; his victory over the

[1] Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 221.

[2] Dr. A. Jeremias, however, contests this, and endeavours to prove that there is no real connection between the Lay and the Epic. See his *Die Babylonisch-Assyrischen Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 6, etc. The hero's name was read as Isdubar by Mr. George Smith, and has been current in the form of Gisdubar, Gizdubar, Gistubar. Other renderings have also been given. But all are superseded now by Gilgames, which is the interpretation given by Mr. Pinches. Gilgames is identified with the sun-god of the Accadians.

tyrant Humbaba; his scorning of Istar's love; his triumph over her revenge; his sickness and his sorrow for Ea-bani's death; his wanderings on the way to the dwelling of an immortal at the mouth of the rivers; his obtaining the secret of life from Hasisadra[1] there; his hearing the story of the Deluge; his return to Erech; his renewed lament over the unhappy lot of Ea-bani in the deeps; his prayers to Hea and Maruduk for Ea-bani's admission to the seats of the blessed. The interpretation of these ancient tales, and many things connected with them, are yet unsettled. But their value as witnesses to the beliefs of the people who wrote and read them, is independent of the question whether they are to be taken as legends with some historical foundation, or as Sun and Zodiac myths.[2]

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the fact, if it be the fact, that behind the Babylonians and Assyrians, those mighty nations who played so great a part in the old world, in many respects making one people, yet in genius so distinct that they have been termed respectively the Chinese and the Roman of the ancient East, there was this other race, of different lineage, speaking an agglutinative language, the probable inventors of the cuneiform writing, a devout and cultured people, who left the deep impress of their civilisation and religion upon the Euphrates valley. Of almost equal importance would be the fact, if the counter-theory should come to be established, that the people

[1] Probably the Xisuthros of the Greeks.

[2] The former view is represented especially by George Smith; the latter by Lenormant, Sayce, etc.

whose footsteps we discover in the Euphrates valley before the historical period, were themselves Semites, and that to them we owe writing, agriculture, astronomical calculation, navigation, and architecture. The weight of authority is on the side of the former view,[1] and it makes the question of the religious ideas of the Babylonians and Assyrians more interesting, but at the same time more difficult than before.

The interest of this question of the Babylonian and Assyrian faith lies in many things—in the extreme antiquity of the ideas; the vast religious influence which made Babylon the Rome of the old world; the effect of the civilisation and the pioneer science of Chaldæa upon the general civilisation of the nations; the special connection between Babylon and Israel, both at the beginning and at the close of the Hebrew history. The difficulties of the question are not less than its interest. They rise out of the nature of our materials, the fragmentary and disintegrated condition of the clay tablets which preserve our texts, the mixture of Accadian, Babylonian, and Assyrian elements, the uncertainty of the renderings of many of the recovered characters, the unsettled chronology. It is one of the greatest triumphs of modern skill and perseverance that these difficulties have been so largely

[1] The prevailing view, however, that the most ancient inhabitants of the land spoke a non-Semitic language, is contested by Halévy, Guyard, Pognon, Friedrich Delitzsch, and others. A good statement is given by Professor J. F. M'Curdy in an article on "The Sumerian Question" in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, January 1891. He agrees generally with those who think that "the race whom we know historically as the principal users of the cuneiform characters were also their inventors and the chief founders of the Semitic culture." See also his *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, vol. i. pp. 87–95.

overcome. We cannot indeed claim the certainty of result which may be claimed for Egyptology; but we can say at least that the broad outlines of the Babylonian religion are now tolerably clear.

Fortunately, if it is often difficult to extract the testimony of our witnesses, they are not wanting in number. The Babylonians were a literary people. They seem to have practised most kinds of composition. Of the value of their literature we are not yet in a position to form a certain judgment. So far as it has been studied, it has impressed minds very differently. It contains much that is trivial and tedious, and much that is rude and gross, but also things that are nobler and better. It must have been at anyrate an immense literature. The Babylonians had their histories, their mythologies, their legal, agricultural, proverbial, astronomical, and astrological works. They had their poems, like the Hymns, and the great Epic already referred to, and the story of the war in heaven between Tiamat and Merodach. They had also a vast magical literature, including many curious books of spells, such as those which came from the sacred school of Eridhu, and which have been found so like the Atharva-Veda of the Hindus. So far back as the time of Sargon I. libraries were founded in Agadhé and others of their chief cities, and at a later date the Assyrian monarchs continued the work of collectors. It is from one of these libraries, the great library of Assur-bani-pal, stored in the palace of Konyunyik, that we get most of our material. The papyri which once filled its shelves have perished, but its clay books have been recovered in thousands, and have unlocked

the secret of a buried faith. These, however, are by no means our most venerable authorities. The remains discovered at Telloh, in Southern Chaldæa, by M. de Sarzec so late as 1881, and now deposited in the Louvre, take us behind even the reign of Sargon I., and help us in some measure to see how men lived, believed, and worshipped in the land of the two rivers at a period so remote that the cuneiform writing was but in its infancy then.

What, then, were the conceptions of this great people on the subject of the future life? Like the Egyptians, the Babylonians were a religious nation. But if the religion of the former had its inspiration from the other world, and the thought of death and judgment ruled their life, the religion of the latter concerned itself mainly with this world. The gods of the Babylonians were gods of the living. The Babylonian mind moved within the circle of the substantial interests of the present. The people were quick to snatch the good which this existence offered. They were not without a keen sense of the inconstancy of human things, the bitter shortness of their time, the dark shadow of the evil that haunted man's life. But they were not given to anxious anticipation of the future, neither did their thinkers wrestle with the problems of an after-existence. The present world filled their vision and occupied their thoughts. Their early literature gives no evidence even of the practice of ancestor-worship among them. This world was the scene of the divine awards, each man receiving here good for his merit and evil for his demerit. The reward of the gods was the earthly boon of strength, prosperity, long

life, the blessing of children. The curse of the gods was sickness, defeat, sudden death, childlessness. And these awards were given according as men acted rightly or wrongly toward gods and men, in the observance of rites, the performance of sacrifice, the offering of prayer, the practice of truth, justice, and self-control.[1]

They had their thoughts, however, of something beyond. These thoughts were sombre and vague. They lacked the distinctness and certainty of the Egyptian beliefs. The Babylonian notions of another world were necessarily conditioned by their notions of life and the soul, of death and the dead. The oldest tablets show us that the latter were rude and materialistic. The soul and the breath were yet one in idea. The man was conceived to have his "double" or semi-material shade, the *ekimmu*, which corresponded in the main with the *Kâ* of the Egyptians. Death was the "breaker," the "divider," the "judge," the "enemy." A companion, the "burner," went with it. It was the close of the substantial, full, joyous life. The dead were the "invisible" and the "feeble." The grave was their rest, and dreary as were the ideas connected with it, to miss it was yet the worst of evils.

When the dead were buried, jars containing food and drink, dates and other fruits, wine and other liquors, were buried with them. The dead man had his spear, his javelin, his token of office at his hand, in his last resting-place; the dead woman had her combs and cosmetics. But while provision was made in this form for

[1] See the prayers of Tiglathpileser, Nabonidos, and Sargon in Jeremias, *Die Babylonisch-Assyrischen Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, pp. 46, 47.

the deceased, the Babylonians had not the anxious care which the Egyptians had for the continuance of the body. They built no such stupendous, time-defying tombs as the "everlasting houses" of the dead in the Nile land. They did not concern themselves with elaborate embalmments; they even practised cremation. They thought that the dead body was threatened by demons, against whose assaults they sought to protect it by prayers and magical arts; and they ascribed to the *ekimmu* the power of movement. They believed it to be able to quit its tenement and to return to it; capable also of exhibiting affection and gratitude to mindful friends on earth, and resentment to those who cared not for it. Above all, the *ekimmu* of an unburied man was a thing of terror. It might roam about, bringing trouble wherever it wandered. Spells were the protection against it.

The world of the dead was the world of ghosts. It was called by a variety of names—the "lower earth," the "great city," the "dwelling-place," the "pit," the "land beyond," the "house of darkness," the "place of corruption," the "land of no return."[1] It was conceived to be subterranean. It is described at length in the Lay of Istar as an under-world to which there is a descent; and terms are applied to it which represent it as deep beneath the solid earth. It is described, too, as the "far land." In a lamentation over Tammuz it is said that Samas has caused the hero to vanish into the land of the dead—the "far land which

[1] See the list of names given in Jeremias, *ut sup.* p. 61, etc.; also, and especially, Jensen, *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier*, p. 215, etc. Jensen distinguishes between the Sumerian names and the Babylonian, and corrects Jeremias at various points.

one sees not." This "far land" seems also to be thought of as in the remote West. So in the Homeric poems we read of a voyage of Odysseus to the West in order to reach the departed, while yet the resting-place of the dead is an under-world Hades. These appear to be two inconsistent ideas of the realm of the departed which had prevailed at different times. But they may only mean that the entrance to this subterranean home of the dead was imagined to be at the extremity of the known world, in the farthest West.[1]

It must be confessed, however, that much remains doubtful even as regards the Babylonian conception of the locality of the abode of the dead. It has been supposed, for instance, that the idea of an under-world of the departed is mixed up with that of a world-mountain. In various religions the abode of the gods has been identified with a world-mountain. The Hindus had their Meru and their Kailâsa; the Persians, their Alburg bounding the earth to the north; the Greeks, their Olympus. So the Babylonians had their Karsag-Kukúra, the "mountain of the world," or the "mountain of the lands," as it is termed in the inscriptions. One of the titles given to the supreme Assyrian deity, Assur, is that of "King of all the assembly of the great gods"; and, as appears from Berosus, the place of this assembly of the gods was conceived to be a mountain. This mountain was placed in the mysterious North or North-East.[2] It is understood to be referred to by Isaiah (xiv. 13) when

[1] Jensen, *ut sup.* p. 226.

[2] Jeremias argues in favour of the South as a land of mystery to the Babylonian, *ut sup.* p. 61.

he represents the Babylonian king as speaking of exalting his throne "above the stars of God," and sitting upon the "mount of the congregation in the sides of the north."[1] But a mountain is also associated with the lord of the ghost-world in particular. A bilingual hymn, for example, which is supposed to proceed from Nipur, one of the chief centres of Babylonian religion, speaks of "the mighty mountain of Mul-lil, Im-Kharsag (the mountain-sky), whose head rivals the Heavens" with the "pure deep land as its foundation," which lies among the mountains "like a strong, wild bull," while its "horns glisten like the splendour of the sun."[2]

These things, and others of similar kind, have been taken to mean that, at some period in the history of Babylonian ideas, the abode of the dead was connected in some way with the seat of the gods. Some have thought that it was imagined to be a great house within the mountain of the assembly of the gods;[3] some, that a belief in a subterranean Hades existed alongside a belief in a Hades and a Paradise of the gods on a great northern mountain;[4] some, that the world-mountain which was the dwelling-place of the gods, was supposed to be situated at the entrance to the under-world.[5] It is possible that here again

[1] See Delitzsch, Cheyne, etc., on chap. xiv. 13, in their Commentaries on Isaiah.

[2] Translated by Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 362. [3] So Jeremias, p. 61.

[4] See Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 359–364.

[5] Schrader, who thinks it conclusively proved by Lenormant that the Babylonians had the idea of an Olympus of the gods, is of opinion that they conceived this mountain-abode of deity to be "situated in the Arâllû district, *i.e.* at the spot where lies the entrance to the lower world." He refers specially to a passage in Sargon's Khorsâbâd inscription, which runs thus: "I'a (Aos), Sin, Samas, Nebo, Adar, and their exalted

we have an instance of the fusion of two earlier ideas, originally distinct, and coming from different sources. But it may also be that this whole conception is simply a modification of an earlier way of thinking, according to which the gods dwelt on earth, and the earth itself was imagined to be a mountain.[1]

It is also affirmed that the Babylonians thought of the habitation of the dead as a great city, and give it the name *Su-âlu*, "mighty city," corresponding to the Hebrew *Sheol*. If this were certain, it would give us at once a very remarkable conception of the world beyond, and an interesting point of contact with Hebrew ideas. But as yet it can scarcely claim to be more than a pleasing conjecture.[2] There is, however, another and more certain name for the abode of the dead. It is the name Aráli or Arâlû, the equivalent of three characters which are understood to mean the "house of the land of death."[3] This land of

consorts, who amid the house Charsaggalkurkurra (*i.e.* the house of the mountain summit of lands) of the Aralli mountain in eternity are born, founded gleaming sanctuaries, artistically wrought cells, in the city Dûr-Sarrukû" (*The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament* Eng. trans. ii. p. 79. See also Delitzsch, *Wo lag das Paradies?* p. 117).

[1] See the argument of Jensen (*ut sup.* p. 204, etc.), and his criticisms of the supposed connection between the Babylonian idea and Isaiah's "mount of the congregation."

[2] Friedrich Delitzsch has the credit of proving, as some think, that the Babylonians called their under-world Suâlu. See his *Paradies*, p. 121, etc. He is followed by Jeremias and others. Schrader, however, denies that the name has yet been made out in the inscriptions. See his *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, *ut sup.* ii. p. 80. Jensen also rejects the word. See his *Kosmologie*, *ut sup.* p. 222, etc.

[3] Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 3. Jeremias (p. 59) asserts that the inscriptions make no mention of a *land* of Arâlû. Delitzsch (*Paradies*, pp. 102, 118) and he both take it to be a special name for the "mountain of the world" or the "mountain of the gods." This is refuted by Schrader (ii. pp. 79, 80) and Jensen (p. 230).

the dead is imagined to be enclosed by walls, and to be encircled by the river of death, Datilla. It is under the rule of deities of its own. There is a king of Arâlû, the Mul-il or Mul-nugi referred to above, the "lord from whom is no return," otherwise named Irkalla.[1] There is also a queen of the same, known as Nin-ki-gal, "queen of the great country," and, though less frequently, as Allat or Allatu,[2] who receives such titles as these: "lady of the deeps," "lady of the magic wand," "lady of the righteous sceptre." The gloomiest possible aspect is given to this under-world. It is peopled by demons, the most terrible of whom are the seven spirits of the Abyss, termed Anunaki, the enemies of Hea, who watch jealously over the waters of life in Arâlû.[3] Darkness, dust, relentlessness, are the things that most belong to it. The first of these, its dreary darkness, makes the recurrent note when it is described.[4]

[1] Irkalla is the name which occurs in the *Lay of Istar's Descent*. It is taken to be a "Semitic form of a proto-Chaldæan word." Sayce, *ut sup.* p. 154.

[2] Allat appears also as the spouse of Nergal, and Nergal as the god of the under-world, with the epithet "lord of the deep waters."

[3] Jeremias, p. 72.

[4] It is thus described in the *Lay of Istar*:—

1. To the land whence none return, the region (of darkness),
2. Istar, the daughter of Sin, (inclined) her ear,
3. yea, Istar herself, the daughter of Sin, inclined (her) ear
4. to the house of darkness, the seat of the god Irkalla,
5. to the house from whose entrance there is no return,
6. to the road from whose passage there is no return,
7. to the house from whose visitors the light is excluded,
8. the place where dust is their bread, (and) their food is mud.
9. The light they behold not, in darkness they dwell,
10. They are clad like birds in a garment of feathers.
11. Over the door and the bolt the dust is scattered.

(Sayce's translation; compare Schrader, *ut sup.* ii. p. 156.)

The Babylonian doctrine of the future life rose but little above those rude and cheerless ideas. More has been claimed for it, but the claim is not made out. The spirit of the old Accadian Penitential Psalms was lost in the trivialities and inconceivable superstitions of the popular mythology and magic. Worship became a stupendous ritual. Its virtue lay in rigid attention to the last letter of a prescribed ceremonial. Everything was believed to turn on portents, prodigies, horoscopes, amulets, exorcisms, and an immense system of significant gestures and formulæ. The vast place which was ursurped in Babylonian life and thought by the faith in spells and incantations debased the religion and clouded the eye when it turned to the future.

It has been claimed for the Babylonian doctrine that it was an ethical doctrine of considerable strength. Its under-world has been affirmed to be a scene of moral decisions, not a mere place of detention. But the evidence of this is scanty, and the little that is offered is doubtful. Sentences occasionally occur which are supposed to imply a belief in the penalties of the future — "may the great gaoler keep thee," "may the shadow of the dungeon be thy resting-place," and the like. Istar, too, is represented as suffering loss and pain in the under-world. When she enters its gates she is stripped of her robes; when she gets into the palace of the "lady of the great land" she is given over to Namtar, and is visited with diseases in punishment of her crimes in the upper world. Istar is supposed to be, to some extent, a

personification of those who go down to death, as is the case with the Osiris of Egypt. What is said of her fate in the under-world is taken to hold good of the lot of others; and it is inferred[1] that the Babylonians believed that the dead had to appear naked before the god of the under-world; that he, as judge, determined their lot there; and that the condemned were taken by Namtar to a place of imprisonment and pain. But all this does not carry us far. At the most, it indicates only the dim and hesitating beginnings of a belief in a retributive future. There is no distinct doctrine of rewards. The evil and the good alike enter this dark land of detention, and together they dwell in it.[2]

It has also been asserted that the Babylonian

[1] See Jeremias, *ut sup.* p. 76.

[2] It should be added, that of late the Babylonian cylindrical seals have been cited as witnesses to the Babylonian belief in a future judgment. In a paper, entitled "The Babylonian Seals," contributed to *Scribner's Magazine* (January 1887), Dr. W. Hayes Ward refers to these as dealing in many cases with the soul and the under-world. Mr. T. Tyler regards Dr. Ward's statement as probably exaggerated, but mentions at least one remarkable seal, which seems to him very clearly to exhibit the disembodied soul under judgment in the lower world. It represents a "figure, half-man and half-bird, being led to the god by the figure in front of him, and pushed on by the figure behind. The rear and fourth standing figure, instead of lifting his empty arms, carries a victim for sacrifice. The god is distinguished by streams flowing from his abdomen, while near them are several fishes, to indicate that it is water that is delineated. The god would seem to be Hea, deity of the waters of the lower world." Dr. Ward thinks that the person under judgment is being changed into a bird for his offences. But Mr. Tyler shows that the figure is simply intended to represent the person as brought up unwillingly for judgment, it being the Babylonian habit to give the disembodied soul a semi-birdlike form. There is an attendant who seems to wait for the pronouncement of the sentence; the instrument of punishment seems to be in this attendant's hand; and the severity of the judgment is gathered "from the shrinking away of the soul, and from the position of its hands." See Mr. Tyler's communication on "The Babylonian Idea of a disembodied Soul," in the *Babylonian and Oriental Record*, vol. i. No. 4.

doctrine included the idea of a resurrection of the dead. But this, too, is true only in a very limited sense. It is mainly an inference from the attributes of the god Marduk or Merodach. This deity certainly had a very high and singular place in the Babylonian Pantheon, and seems to have been, like the Mithras of Persia, a form of the sun-god. He is celebrated as the "merciful one among the gods," the "protector of the hosts of men," at once the healer of the sick and the restorer who "brings the dead to life." But the appeals made to him in both characters seem to keep within the limits of the faith in incantations, and the life to which he raises is only the life of earth.[1]

In the ideas connected with Merodach, and in others of more occasional occurrence, we may recognise the dim and uncertain sense of a better future and the points of attachment for a clearer hope. In the Epic of Gilgames the ghost of Ea-bani is represented as rising to heaven and dwelling with the gods. Mention is made, too, of an Island or Islands of the Blest, and the way thither is described. In these is the abode of the immortal man, Pirnapistim,[2] who escaped the Deluge. There is a resting-place for heroes, who, by the power of the gods, might be saved from death and transported to happy fields. And there are hints of a fountain of youth and a tree of life at the extreme

[1] "Whatever might have been the sense afterwards attached to the expression," says Professor Sayce, "in the early hymns it means nothing more than a belief in the power of spells to restore the dead to life."—*Hibbert Lectures*, p. 358.

[2] See Jensen, *ut sup.* p. 212, etc. The name has been variously read Shamashnapisting, "Sun of life," Sitnapishtim, "the Saved," and now Pirnapishtim or Pirnapistim.

limit of earth, which it was given only to one like Gilgames to reach.[1]

Above all, the point of issue for a better hope may perhaps be discovered in the idea of the waters of life in Arâlû, and in that of "the land of the silver sky," which the Babylonian prayed he might enter. But the better hope did not come. Ea-bani was more than man. In Pirnapistim, the Babylonian Noah, we have a case of translation or exemption from death, and what is said of him seems to have no relation to the other world. Exceptional things might be surmised for a select few, for heroes, and for those who were half-divine. The warrior, too, who dies in battle and obtains honourable burial might have some satisfaction. But the misery of the unburied was inexpressible. And the future which awaited the mass of men, good and evil alike, prince and slave together, was an existence which was scarce existence, in an under-world which was a land of forgetfulness, a habitation of shades, uncheered by the light of day, and without distinctions of lot according to worth. The deceased Ea-bani, called up from beneath like a blast of the wind, is asked by the hero to say how it fared with the dead. He cannot reply. To open the earth and tell what he had seen of the sorrows and woes of the dead, would make his friend faint away, and overthrow him with terror.

[1] Jeremias, *ut sup.* pp. 89–93; Maspero, *The Dawn*, etc. *ut sup.* p. 583.

CHAPTER VI

PERSIAN BELIEFS

PASSING from the Babylonian faith to that of ancient *Iran*, we come upon another great type of belief which is of vast importance, both for itself and for its relations. It is one of the highest, perhaps the very highest and purest of all the old Ethnic religions. It is a faith with a singularly clear and decisive doctrine of future retribution, and with a profound conception both of good and of guilt. It is the faith of a people whose historical connections, both with Jew and with Greek, were such as create the presumption of a communication of ideas. It is the opinion, indeed, of many inquirers that Persian modes of thought and Persian beliefs have made their way into both the Old Testament and the New, and have given form and colour to important sections of Christian doctrine.[1] Nor are the historical relations of the Persian confined to the Hebrew and Hellenic races. They extend to other peoples, notably to the

[1] Among recent statements on this subject may be named Canon Cheyne's articles on "Possible Zoroastrian Influence on the Religion of Israel" (*The Expository Times*, vol. ii. pp. 202, 224, 248, etc.), and the chapter on the "Rise of Doctrine of Judgment after Death," in his *Bampton Lectures*, p. 381, etc.; also papers by the Rev. J. H. Moulton in the *Thinker* for 1892, Dr. L. H. Mills in the *Nineteenth Century*, January 1894, etc.

Babylonians. The Persian, indeed, was the immediate heir to the civilisation, the ideas, the influence of the Babylonian. And the position won by the Persian people in the conflict of nations was one of the greatest.

Taking them, not in the limited sense of the inhabitants of Persia, but in that of the great Iranian race, we have in them a people who swept over an immense extent of Asia between the two great seas, the Caspian and the Persian Gulf, and between the flats of the Tigris and the heights of the Hindu Cush. Their history, too, is a long and changeful one, covering the great space between the ninth century B.C. and the seventh century A.D., and running its eventful course through the ancient Median Empire, the Persian monarchy of Cyrus, the brief Macedonian dominion, the kingdoms of the Parthians and the Sassanids. Sir William Jones has said of Iran, that in remote antiquity it was "the true centre of population, of knowledge, of languages, and of arts."[1] However it may be with this high claim, it is certain that on more than one occasion services of the highest moment to the progress of humanity have been rendered by Iran. Among the earliest and greatest of these services was its repulse of the Scythian inroad, which threatened the Assyrian Empire. By this it saved the Semitic race from being overwhelmed, and secured the civilisation of the world.[2] On all accounts, therefore, the Persian ideas demand careful attention.

[1] Schaff-Herzog, *Encyclopædia*, iii. 1808.
[2] Von Ranke's *Universal History*, p. 95.

It is by no means easy, however, to ascertain what these ideas were, and how they stood related to those of other nations. Many questions connected with the religion of Persia are yet in suspense. It is not that sources of information fail us. We have not only the testimonies of foreign writers, but also the religious books of the people and important inscriptions. Hard as was the problem presented by the interpretation of these books and inscriptions, the labours of scholars like Anquetil-Duperron, Rask, Burnouf, Spiegel, and others have made their contents accessible. But our difficulties arise out of the obscurity which shrouds the origins of the religion, the changes through which it passed in the lapse of centuries, the late date of some of its documents, the mixed character of the contents of all.

It is connected with the name of Zoroaster, the Greek form of the old Iranian Zarathrustra. But everything bearing on Zoroaster is so disputable that some scholars of mark banish him from the realm of history and pronounce him a mythical personage, a Persian god endowed with human attributes.[1] An opinion so extreme is the refuge of despair. But even among those who are of the opposite view, some of the most reliable students find the objective evidence so dubious that they hold the historical existence of Zoroaster rather as an inference from the character of the religion.[2] The uncertainties attaching to his date are so great that some place him near the time

[1] Especially J. Darmesteter and E. Meyer.

[2] So Spiegel and De Harlez. See De la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, ii. p. 23.

of Moses, others assign him to about 1000 B.C., and others make him a contemporary of Confucius, Buddha, and Pythagoras.

Neither is there much agreement as regards what he did for the Persian faith, except that he was not the creator of the Iranian religion, but the reformer of an older system of belief, or the adjuster of differences between two systems. It is supposed that in his time there existed two distinct stages of culture, with two distinct cults,—a higher cult of Ahura-worshippers, or worshippers of a supreme and wise deity, and a lower cult of Daêva-worshippers, or worshippers of evil spirits. And what he did, it is thought, was to construct a new form of faith and worship with a dualistic view of the world corresponding to the dualism in belief, the victory being with the Ahura cult and the higher conception of deity, and the Daêvas or evil spirits being sunk in the idea of one great spirit of evil, Ahriman.[1] But what the precise beliefs were which he reformed or readjusted, and what his work of reformation or readjustment amounted to, are ques-

[1] In his explanation of the Zoroastrian faith, Professor K. Geldner relies mainly upon two things: First, the fact that in the old Indian religion the word *dêva* meant god or good spirit, while in the Avesta *daêva* is applied to evil spirits. Second, the fact that the term *asura*, which is a term for deity in the older Vedic hymns, denotes evil spirits in the later hymns; while in the Avesta the corresponding term, *ahura*, is a designation of God, especially in the name of the supreme God, which unites the Ahura with the adjective *mazdâo* = wise. The two terms, *deva-asura* and *ahura-daêva*, thus came to have opposite meanings in the Hindu religion and the Zoroastrian respectively. Professor Geldner thinks this difference arose out of an ancient distinction in the ideas attached to *deva* and *asura*, both words having originally been names of deity, but expressing different conceptions of deity. He holds the difference to be the key to the Zoroastrian doctrine, and endeavours to trace the history of the difference in idea in the formation of rival religious parties and in the ultimate reconciliation. See his argument in the *Ency. Brit.* xxiv. p. 821, etc.

tions to which only hypothetical answers can be given.

For our knowledge of the religion which is associated with his name we are dependent mainly on the two great sacred books of Mazdaism, the *Avesta* and the *Bundehesh* or *Bundahish*. The second of these is so largely occupied with questions of cosmogony that it has been called the *Genesis* of Zoroastrianism. It is of extreme interest for theology as a whole, and not least for the doctrine of immortality. It is, however, of late date, not earlier than the third century of our era. It contains at the same time older matter with which criticism can work, and it contributes both to the understanding and to the completing of the system of religious beliefs which is given in the Avesta.

As to the Avesta itself, which is of supreme importance as our primary authority, it is unfortunately the case that in many things of great moment, both in its history and in its testimony, our knowledge is limited and uncertain. The question of the land of its birth is yet undecided, opinion being divided between Eastern Iran and Media in the North-West.[1] Still more obscure is the question of its date, some placing it comparatively late, others asserting a very high antiquity.[2] It is but

[1] The older view, represented by Burnouf and others, was in favour of Eastern Iran, or more definitely, Bactria. This gave way to the opinion, strongly advocated by Spiegel, and supported by Darmesteter, De Harlez, etc., that Media was the home of the language and the book. More recently, as in the case of Geldner and Geiger, the Bactrian theory again finds favour. Different portions of the collection may have come from different quarters.

[2] De Harlez is of the former opinion. Geiger, on the other hand, holds the book as a whole to be very ancient, and to bear witness to a civilisation older even than the Median era. Dr. Mills thinks that the historical parts cannot possibly be later than seven or eight centuries before Christ;

a portion of a much larger sacred literature, and has been subject to much redaction. It comes to us in the form which it finally took under the Sassanids. It is a collection of writings of various degrees of interest, and of dates which it is impossible to fix with any measure of precision. But the heart of the whole book is the series of Gâthas or hymns, which profess to give the direct and express utterances of Zoroaster himself. The foundations of the religion must be sought in these hymns, and these are by far the oldest section of the Avesta. Their contents, their style, their archaic language are thought to point to a high antiquity.[1]

The religion which is contained in these remarkable books was confined, with few and slight exceptions, to the people of Iran. Though it has but a few adherents now in Persia itself, and survives chiefly in India in the monotheistic development of the Parsi faith, it held the Persian mind till the end of the Sassanid dynasty, when it sank beneath the wave of Moham-

that the later genuine parts may be placed between the seventh and third century B.C.; that there are additions "indefinitely later"; but that the hymns are as old at least as the oldest parts of the Rig-Veda. A new and startling turn, however, has been recently given to the whole question by the publication of the third volume of the late M. Darmesteter's translation of the Avesta, in which he argues that the book as we have it is later than the conquests of Alexander, and belongs to the period between the first century before our era and the fourth century after it.

[1] The date even of the oldest texts in the Avesta is brought down by some to the Sassanid age. Darmesteter's final conclusion, as already indicated, is in favour of a late date. Professor Geldner's opinion is that all who hold by the historical existence of Zoroaster must also hold that the Gâthas proceed from him. He would claim for them, therefore, a date as high as about the fourteenth century B.C. Dr. Mills thinks that criticism points to a date between 1500 and 1200 B.C., and that a still remoter age may perhaps be inferred from the circumstance that Mithra, Agni, Indra, Soma, and the Pitaras do not appear in them. See article "Zend," *Chambers' Encyclopædia.*

medan aggression. The overthrow of the Sassanid Empire was so complete, that within a century of the event the conquered Persians had almost all become, by choice or by constraint, adherents of the faith of their Arab conquerors. Those of them who held by the old religion had to leave their own country in quest of a new home and freedom of worship. "That home," says Darmesteter, "they found at last among the tolerant Hindus, on the western coast of India, and in the Peninsula of Guzerat. There they throve, and there they live still, while the ranks of their co-religionists in Persia are daily thinning and dwindling away." He adds that they "settled first at Sanǧân, not far from Damân; thence they spread over Surat, Nowsâri, Broach, and Kambay; and within the last two centuries they have settled at Bombay, which now contains the bulk of the Parsi people, nearly 150,000 souls." On the other hand, the Parsis still in Persia, who were reported to have numbered nearly 100,000 souls a century ago, have sunk to "8000 or 9000 souls, scattered in Yezd and the surrounding villages." [1]

The faith of this great people seems to have been a strange commixture of elements, higher and lower, polytheistic, dualistic, monotheistic, the origins and relations of which make a difficult, perhaps an insoluble, problem. In its eschatology, as in its theology generally, it has features which suggest indebtedness to other faiths. There are resemblances between the Avesta and the Vedas which lead some to regard the religion of the former as deeply influenced by that of

[1] *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. iv. p. xi.

the latter.[1] There are things which point, as some think, to the presence of Turanian[2] elements, and others which, in the opinion of skilled students, make it debtor to the Semite, not only in its monotheistic strain and its doctrine of creation, but in its teaching on the future life. It is a complex system, in which other than primitive Iranian ideas find a place. Nature-worship, ceremonialism, mythology, appear in it to lie side by side with spiritual doctrine, and with a high morality which magnifies truth above all else. No single theory of its rise, no single definition of its genius, seems to meet its circumstances. It is neither a simple case of evolution from a ruder and more primitive faith, nor merely an older theology reformed. It is probably both these things, and has undergone important changes in the direction of more concrete conceptions of deity, an elaborate ritual, and an active priesthood.

All that is said of its theology in general is true of its eschatology in particular. Its whole conception of man, the soul, the future life, is ruled by its conception of deity. Its doctrine of deity is dualistic, but not in the sense of an absolute or endless antithesis between two equal powers. There is a spirit or divinity of good, Ahura-mazda (Ormuzd), the god of light, order, purity, and right; and there is a spirit or divinity of evil, Angro-mainyush (later Ahriman).

[1] Especially Haug, whose views, however, on the relations between the Zoroastrian faith and the Hindu are not accepted by Darmesteter, De Harlez, Mills, Geiger, etc.

[2] De la Saussaye (*ut sup.* ii. p. 19) refers especially to the custom of exposing, instead of burning or burying, the dead as a possible link of connection with the religion of the Steppes, and thinks that Turan was at least able to influence Iran from Babylonia, Media, or some part of Central Asia.

Each is eternal, and each has creative power. But the might of the latter is not unlimited, neither is his dominion for ever. Evil is not eternal *a parte poste*, though it is eternal *a parte ante*. With each, too, are associated certain powers or beings as his ministers and instruments. Ahura-mazda is attended by the six "sacred, immortal ones," Ameshâ-spentâ (represented later by the seven Amshashpands), the embodiments or personifications of great ideas—the ideas of goodness, purity, perfect sovereignty, wisdom, completeness, immortality. With these, too, is "fire," Atar, the minister or the son of Ahura-mazda. So Angro-mainyush has his servitors—the Daêvas or demons, the Drujas or deceivers, the Paraikas or seducers.

The history of the world is the history of the antagonism between these two. Their conflict is seen in the material world and in the spiritual. Its special theatre is the moral life of man. Man, the work of Ahura-mazda and the possessor of the high gift of freedom, contributes by his every activity to the triumph of the one or the other. His protoplast, Gayômart (*i.e.* "mortal life" or "human life"; later, Kayûmars, Kaiomorts), was slain by Angro-mainyush, by whom also the first men, the offspring of Gayômart, were beguiled. So man's life is a fight against evil, both physical and moral. There is a moral meaning in his every act, and for everything he comes into judgment hereafter. Mazdaism is not a religion of grace and forgiveness, and for man's guilt there seems no remission. But it is possible that his good deeds may have merit sufficient to counterbalance his evil deeds.

The ancient Persians had rigid and peculiar ideas

on the subject of the disposal of their dead. The practice of burning or burying the dead, which prevailed among the Indo-Europeans, was condemned by their sacred books. Their custom was exposure—a custom which seems to have originated in the sense of the sacredness of the elements and the uncleanness of the corpse. Fire, earth, water were too holy to be brought into contact with the defilements of the dead. Burial and burning were deeds for which there was no atonement.[1] The corpse was laid out on some hill-top, with a layer of stone or brick to separate it from the earth, or in a Dakhma, a round pit-like building erected for the purpose. It seems to have been also the practice to expose the dead naked, "clothed only with the light of heaven." So it is said that "whoever throws any clothing on a dead body, even so much as a maid lets fall in spinning, is not a pious man whilst alive, nor shall he, when dead, have a place in the happy realm."[2]

When a man dies, and his body is exposed to be the food of bird or beast, his soul crosses the Bridge of Chinvat (*cinvato peretush*), the Bridge of the Gatherer or Accountant.[3] For three days, good spirits

[1] *Farg.* i. 13.

[2] *Farg.* v. 61. The modern custom, however, is to cover the dead with old clothing, the older the better. Darmesteter contrasts the practice of the Greeks, who dressed "the dead in their gayest attire, as if for a feast." But he adds that "the difference is only in appearance; for after the fourth day, when the soul is in heaven, the rich garments are offered up to it, which it will wear in its celestial life" (*Sacred Books of the East*, iv. p. 65; see also pp. lxxxix–xci, and *Farg.* vi. 51).

[3] Tiele questions this explanation of Chinvat. He thinks, too, that the idea of the bridge was "borrowed from the old Aryan mythology, and was probably originally the rainbow" (*Outlines of the History of the Ancient Religions*, Carpenter's translation, p. 177). On the Bridge of Chinvat or Kinvad see, among other passages, *Farg.* xiii. 3, xviii. 6, xix. 30. It was

and evil, paradise and hell, struggle for possession of his soul.[1] Then the reckoning of his life is taken. The conscience of each man confronts him. The good thoughts, and words, and deeds of the man of truth appear in the form of a fair maiden of glorious race; for the man of falsehood there is a corresponding apparition of the evil things of his earthly life.[2] Three destinies lie before the man. If the good in him prevails over the evil, his way is to paradise, Garô-demâna, the abode of song, which is the dwelling-place of Ahura-mazda. If the evil is judged to prevail, he sinks into Duzakh, the abyss tenanted by the spirits of evil, "down into the darkness of the earth-spirit, down into the world of woe, the dismal realm, down into the house of hell"; there he suffers the pains of his sins.[3] If the balance is equal and the judgment indeterminate, there is an intermediate state,[4] in which he is reserved till the decision of the last day.

The religion of Persia, however, was a religion of hope. One of its greatest ideas was that of a new era and a new world. It looked for the end of this present world with all its evil, and the establishment of the "desired kingdom," in which heaven and earth shall be one. The earlier doctrine taught that this

supposed to extend over hell and to lead to paradise; to widen to the length of nine javelins for the souls of the pious, and to contract to a thread for the souls of the wicked, so that they fall off it into hell. Darmesteter refers to the analogous cases of the Sirath Bridge of the Mussulman, the Yorkshire "Brig o' Dread," etc. *Sacred Books of the East*, iv. 212.

[1] See Fargard, vii. 52, and Darmesteter's note.

[2] Yast, xxii. See Appendix, Note E.

[3] Vend. xix. 90–110.

[4] At least according to the Pahlavi books, where it is called *Hamésta-kâns*.

consummation was not far off. It spoke of a final struggle for which all things were preparing, in which Ahura-mazda was to triumph over the Daêvas and their lord. It spoke, too, of a universal judgment thereafter to be held by Ahura-mazda, issuing in the casting of the spirit of evil and all the wicked into hell, and the reception of the good into the fellowship of the god of light and into the happiness of the kingdom in which the sun shines for ever.

There were developments of this eschatology, some of which are of great interest. The earlier theology changed. It took a more concrete and in some respects less spiritual form. The worship of the elements attained a larger place. Anahîta, the goddess of the waters, Tishtrya, the god of the dog-star, Naïryô-sanha, the fire-god, and others, partly survivals of the old Aryan Pantheon, partly, perhaps, foreign additions from Chaldæa and elsewhere,[1] became objects of the popular homage. Above all, a central place in the faith and adoration of the people was given to Mithra, the sun-god. Yet all these ranked only as the Yazata or "worshipful," Ahura-mazda retaining his pre-eminence.[2] With this there was a great extension of the ritual and legal elements in the religion—a vast enlargement of the functions of the priesthood, and a minute elaboration of ordinances, especially those of ablution. With this, too, the eschatology underwent important changes. It ventured into greater detail, and broke away into some new directions.

One of those later doctrines, unknown to the

[1] Tiele regards Anahîta as a Semitic importation.

[2] See Tiele, *Outlines of the History of the Ancient Religions*, p. 170.

Gâthas, was that of the *Fravashi*. This is the subject of Yast XIII., the Farvardûi Yast, the first eighty-four sections of which speak of the powers of the Fravashis generally. The latter seventy-four sections deal with the Fravashis of the heroes of Zoroastrianism, beginning with the first man, and ending with the Deliverer. The term is of uncertain meaning,[1] but expresses an idea something akin to that of the Egyptian *Kâ*, the Indian *Pitri*, or the Latin *Genius*. It was perhaps the Iranian modification of the idea of the *double*,[2] one of the most widely diffused of all ancient ideas. It was perhaps in some sense the heavenly type of the individual. It has been described also as "the inner power in every being that maintains it and makes it grow and subsist."[3] It was not confined indeed to man. It was ascribed on the one hand to inanimate objects, and on the other hand even to the "sacred immortals." Occasionally, at least, it is also found identified with the stars. But in the case of man it indicated his immortality, or rather the fact that neither in its beginning nor in its end is his existence limited to his

[1] Supposed by Tiele to be "the earlier grown"; by Geldner, to mean "confession of faith."

[2] "Everywhere we find expressed or implied the belief that each person is double; and that, when he dies, his other self, whether remaining near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends" (Herbert Spencer, *Fortnightly Review*, 1870, p. 537).

[3] So M. Darmesteter. He thinks also that the Fravashis were originally the same as "the Pitris of the Hindus or the manes of the Latins, that is to say, the everlasting and deified souls of the dead"; but that "in course of time they gained a wider domain, and not only men, but gods and even physical objects, like the sky and the earth, etc., had each a Fravashi" (*Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxiii. p. 179). See also De la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, ii. p. 20, etc., and the authorities cited there.

stay on earth. His *Fravashi* was in being before his birth, and it continued in being after his death. It was the soul of the dead or his surviving double, and it was also his genius or protecting spirit.[1]

There were also other ideas which became very prominent in the later faith. One of these was the idea of the *Haoma* or *Homa* drink (corresponding to the Indian *Soma*), which brought life.[2] There were the doctrines, too, of the coming of a great prophet or saviour, Soshyant (Saoshyânt, and later, Sosioch); the raising of the dead; the distinction of millennial stages in the final story of earth; and in the end a general restoration. The limited duration of the world and the renovation of the earth may be said to rank among the most characteristic tenets of Zoroastrianism. In their simpler forms they belong to the older stages of the religion. The work of restoration was to be done by Saoshyânt, but he was to be helped in the work by pious men. "We sacrifice," it is said in the Zamyad Yast, "unto the awful Kingly Glory, made by Mazda . . . that belongs to the gods in the heavens and to those in the material world, and to the blessed ones born or not yet born, who are to perform the restora- of the world. It is they who shall restore the world, which will (thenceforth) never grow old and never die,

[1] In this latter sense the Fravashi applies only to the faithful. "Unbelievers," says Professor Geldner, "have no *fravashi*" (*Ency. Brit.* xxiv. 823). The idea of the "guardian angel," which afterwards obtained a large place in Judaism, does not appear in the Gâthas.

[2] Two Haomas are distinguished, the earthly Haoma, which is golden, and is first among healing plants; and the heavenly Haoma or Gaokerena, which grows in the sea Vouru-kasha among the ten thousand healing plants. The dead are made immortal by drinking of the Gaokerena on the day of the resurrection; *Bundehesh*, 42, 12; 59, 4. See *Sacred Books of the East*, i. pp. lxix and 72.

never decaying and never rotting, ever living and ever increasing, and master of its wish, when the dead will rise, when life and immortality will come, and the world will be restored at its wish; when the creation will grow deathless,—the prosperous creation of the Good Spirit,—and the Drug shall perish, though she may rush on every side to kill the holy beings; she and her hundredfold brood shall perish, as it is the will of the Lord" (*Darmesteter's Translation*).

The developed eschatology, therefore, took this form. A crisis was hastening, when Ahriman was to triumph for a time. But it was to be followed by the advent of Sosioch, the Persian Messiah, the conqueror and the judge. His coming was to be heralded by the appearance of two prophets,[1] whose eras should each be a millennium. With the advent of Sosioch at the close of the third millennial period, the dead were to be raised to life. The resurrection was to be a process occupying a certain length of time. It was to begin with the return of Gayômart, the protoplast; then the earliest members of the family of man, Mashya and Mashyoi were to rise; then others, until all should be complete by the end of fifty-seven years. With this the general judgment was to come, with the separation of the evil from the good. A purgatorial fire was also affirmed, through which just and unjust alike should have to pass, gentle for the righteous, terrible for the wicked, but terminating in the restoration of all. On this was to follow the final combat between the evil spirits and

[1] Called Ukhshyat-ereta and Ukhshyat-medah, or Hushedar and Hushedar-mah, begotten of Zarathrustra, as Saoshyant himself. *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxiii. p. 195.

the good, in which the former were all to perish but Ahriman himself and the serpent Azhi. The final acts would be the destruction of those two by Ahura-mazda and Sraosha, the priest-god;[1] the purgation of hell itself, and the renovation of the earth by a purifying fire.

The Persian doctrine of immortality had some remarkable points of affinity with the Christian doctrine. It used some of the analogies which are familiar to us in the New Testament. It met the difficulty regarding the rising of the body by pointing to the case of the corn and the buried grain. But the relations in which the Persian doctrine stands to the Christian are yet far from being decided. The developed doctrine belongs to a late period, although its roots are certainly in the older books. Its foundations were laid in a conviction of the moral issues of life, and in a sense of the dread realities of demerit and guilt, such as no other ethnic faith seems to have attained to. There was a spirit in it which should have made it mighty and enduring. But it missed its mark. There were weak and beggarly elements in it which proved fatal. Its best parts were complicated and lowered by things both senseless and gross, like its prescriptions regarding the hair and the nails.[2] Its noble

[1] *Bundehesh*, 76, 11.

[2] The Vendidâd devotes Fargard xvii. to this subject of the hair and the nails. These, when cut and so separated from the body, become dead matter, the prey of the demon and all uncleanness. They are delivered from Ahriman by the use of certain spells and prayers. Zarathrustra asks Ahura-mazda what is the "most deadly deed by which a man most increases the power of the Daêvas"? Ahura-mazda replies thus: "It is when a man here below, combing his hair or shaving it off, or pairing off his nails drops them in a hole or in a crack." Darmesteter refers to analogies among the Esthonians, the Gauchos of the Chilian pampas, etc. *Sacred Books of the East*, iv. p. 186.

maxims of truth and holiness, its lofty conceptions of life and death and the future, were well-nigh buried in an intolerable mass of puerilities and absurdities. It spoke much of immortality, but thought of it as a gift contained in a certain drink. It had the great conception of a resurrection of the dead often on its lips, but it burdened it with crude explanations of the method. Each of the elements was to give back its own contribution to man's body: the earth was to restore the bones; the water, the blood; the fire, the life.

Like the theology, the eschatology aimed high. The theology strove after a monotheistic view of the world. It did this in various ways, and finally by the conception of *Zvran akarana* or *Boundless Time*[1] as the supreme divinity, above both Ahriman and Ormuzd. The eschatology also in its own way strove after a lofty, consistent, ethical, hopeful doctrine of the

[1] It is admitted that the doctrine of *Boundless Time* as the supreme divinity belongs to the latest period of Zoroastrianism. Tiele (*Outlines*, p. 107) says of it "that it is probably no earlier than the time of the Sâsânidae, and is an attempt to restore Monotheism, which was endangered by the application of dualism to the conception of deity also." The criticisms of De la Saussaye (*Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, ii. p. 49) on the position claimed for this abstraction in the speculative reduction of dualism to unity, deserve notice. Darmesteter (*Sacred Books of the East*, iv. p. lxxxii) says that "the reflective spirit that had given rise to Mazdeism never rested, but continued to produce new systems"; that "when the Magi had accounted for the existence of evil by the existence of two principles, there arose the question how there could be two principles, and a longing for unity was felt, which found its satisfaction in the assumption that both are derived from one and the same principle." He thinks that this abstract, monotheistic principle got different names among different sects—Space, or Infinite Light, or Boundless Time, or Fate. He further points out that Time, according to the Persians, was twofold—"there is the limited Time that measures the duration of the world and lasts 12,000 years, which is Zvran dareghô-huadâta, 'the Sovereign Time of the long period,' and there is 'the Boundless Time,' Zvran akarana." See also Farg. xix. 9.

future. But both failed, and failed so completely that we have now to contemplate the remarkable fact that "the purest religion of antiquity (except the Jewish) should have almost perished from the earth."[1] The theology was from the first an eschatological theology. The Gâthas themselves are mainly eschatological hymns. But the canker of sacerdotalism seized the heart of the religion. Even the idea of God receded, and passed into the background in the later forms of the doctrine of immortality.

The nerve of this lofty theology was cut, the moral energy of this far-reaching eschatology was dissipated, by a relentless ceremonialism and an overwhelming casuistry which confused the conscience. Penalties in this world and penalties in the world to come were declared for every offence. The doctrine of repentance was also taught. Confession and the repeating of the Patet or formula of penitence saved the offender, except in the case of certain inexpiable sins, from the penalties of the future world, though not from those of the present world. But the moral sense was blunted by the artificiality of the penalties, and by the inequalities in the punishment of different crimes. It was blunted still more by the financial value which in the latest stages was put upon men's deeds, and the financial equivalents exacted as atonements for men's crimes.

Purity, which was pronounced the greatest good, next to life itself, was regarded more as a physical state than an inward quality. It became a ceremonial condition, acquired by ritual purifications, regulated in matter, degree, and duration by the nature of the

[1] Brace, *The Unknown God*, p. 197.

defiling object as much as by the character of the persons defiled. It was mixed up in thought with the belief in demons and possession. Its loss was due to the demon's work in the man. Its recovery was effected by the demon's expulsion.[1] Processes of cleansing entered more and more deeply into the whole conception of religion. They became extraordinarily burdensome and complicated; most of all in the case of the uncleanness contracted by contact with a dead body, the cure for which was the "nine nights" Barashnum.

Much of the people's thought was engaged, too, by questions of attire. The man who continued for three years without wearing the sacred girdle "made the unseen power of death to increase." Spells ruled the people's lives, both here and hereafter, and were the prescribed refuges from most dangers and ills. Everything came to turn at last upon the power of the priesthood. The secret of victory over evil was sought, not in the help of deity, but in the virtue of sacrifice; and sacrifice itself consisted of two things to which equal efficacy was ascribed, offerings and spells. The Parsis have been called "the ruins of a people," and their sacred books "the ruins of a religion." The doctrine of the future which is taught in these remnants of the sacred books of Mazdaism is the ruins of an eschatology.

[1] The impurity which is dealt with in the Vendidâd may be described, says Darmesteter, "as the state of a person or thing that is possessed of the demon; and the object of the purification is to expel the demon" (*Sacred Books of the East*, iv. p. lxxxvi).

CHAPTER VII

GREEK BELIEFS

THERE is, however, another great people, the *Greek* people, who have left their mark, as perhaps no other people have done, upon the wide world of thought. The people, of whom came Homer, Pindar, and Plato, have a place which can never be forgotten in the history of belief on the subject of man's future. Of all the nations of antiquity they were the most modern-minded. Their ideas and their vocabulary have been laid under heavy contribution by the makers of Christian theology. In their reasonings we see the highest achievement of ancient speculation on the soul and its immortality. Their historic period reaches to eight hundred years, if not to a thousand, before Christ. The literature which they have left us is not only an incomparably rich literature, but one that is free from many of the difficulties attending the study of the literatures already referred to. Their religion, too, has been the subject of long and careful investigation, and its main features are readily recognised. Here, therefore, we feel upon more certain ground.

Not that everything is clear to us even in this Hellenic faith. On the contrary, in the religion generally there are not a few questions which are yet in

suspense; and in the eschatology, in particular, there are things which continue to be of disputed interpretation. The origins of the religion are obscure, and it is still matter of debate what influences told upon its formation and development, and in what degree. Some insist upon its native, national character, and restrict the foreign elements to very little.[1] Some deny the operation even of Phœnician influence, or reduce it to very modest dimensions.[2] Others make much of it.[3] A very large place used to be claimed for Egyptian influence; the tendency now is to limit that influence greatly, and to allow it less of a direct and more of an indirect action. Recent investigation also raises new questions as to possible connections between the religion of the Greeks and that of the Assyrians and Babylonians.[4]

The naturalistic elements again, while freely recognised, are variously construed. Some who allow them a very large place in the religion as it is seen in historical times, think they point back to a prehistoric monotheism. Others contend that they imply an earlier and larger nature-worship. The probability is that the Greek faith had gone through great changes before its historical period. What these changes were we cannot determine. But even those who think that the Hellenic religion in the Pelasgic era was of no

[1] So K. O. Müller, who allows little more than a modicum of the Phrygian element.

[2] Petersen takes this side. See his important article in *Ersch und Gruber*, lxxxii.

[3] This is the case with Curtius in his *Griechische Geschichte*. De la Saussaye is of the same way of thinking, though less positively. See his *Lehrbuch*, *ut sup.* vol. ii. p. 68, etc.

[4] See Appendix, Note F.

higher order than the Vedic and Germanic religions, admit that when it passed that stage its development was quicker and better than that of most faiths; that the gods were conceived less as nature-powers and more as conscious, personal agents; and that the polytheistic level was so far transcended by the conception of one sovereign god, Zeus, on whom all other gods depended, and whose counsel was accomplished in all events. With this "monarchism has touched the borders of monotheism."[1] In like manner, Greek thought on the subject of the future had no doubt passed through great changes during the prehistoric period. But by the historic period it had long gone beyond the animistic stage, if it ever had such a stage, and the soul-cult or spirit-cult had given place to higher forms of homage and celebration, of which departed ancestors and heroes were the objects.

The Hellenic eschatology had its points of kinship with the great eschatologies which have been already mentioned. It had also some features which distinguished it sharply from them. One of its most marked peculiarities was the loose connection in which it stood with the theology. Such belief as the people had in a future existence was the product of their poetry and philosophy rather than of their religion. The bards and the sages of Greece were in this respect the priests and the prophets of Greece.[2] Hence it happened, that while the speculative thought of Greece provided the most systematic proof and the loftiest exposition of the soul's immortality, the people as a whole kept by the old

[1] Tiele, *Outlines*, p. 215.

[2] See Welcker, *Griechische Götterlehre*, ii. 66.

mythologies, and faith in that higher immortality never became cordial or general. Another characteristic of the Greek idea of the future was its neutral or non-ethical tenor. As it entered little into Greek worship, it also counted little as a moral force telling on Greek life. "While of all ancient peoples the Greeks," it is said, "had the profoundest faith in the reign of moral law, no ancient people seemed so little conscious of any religious connection between the present and the future life."[1] They had the strongest sense of the retributive hand that is laid upon men's lives. But it was the sense of a retribution which was at work in this world, not one which followed men also into a future life.

The interest of these Hellenic ideas is greatest at two very different stages in their career, the Homeric and the Platonic. We see them in their earliest literary form in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Apart from all questions of origin, unity, and integrity, these poems are an invaluable witness to the belief and sentiment of the Hellenic people in their most ancient historical period. And though the two poems have distinct characteristics, and the *Odyssey* indicates a deeper sense of the problems of existence than the *Iliad*, they have, with certain incidental differences, substantially the same doctrine, if doctrine it can be called, of man's future. It is a hesitating, cheerless, fragmentary doctrine. It is also an inharmonious doctrine, with elements which refuse to unite. Its inconsistencies are palpable. They are explained partly by natural difficulties of thought, partly by derivation

[1] Fairbairn, *Studies in the Philosophy and History of Religion*, p. 168.

from different sourees. What the belief meant is best seen by looking at the Homerie ideas of *life*, *death*, and the *soul*.

The Greek people had an almost unrivalled zest for life. And to the Homerie Greek, life is the bodily, substantial life of earth. It is not unmixed satisfaetion. There is a cloud upon its brightness, a pitiable narrowness in its space, a penury in its fulness. It is dependent on the gods, and the gods are fickle, grudging, deceitful, ofttimes beguiling men, and bringing on them many sorrows. It is bound by a Fate, a *Moira*, whieh may be in the hands of Zeus, but whieh makes men helpless. It is dogged by a dread Mischance, an *Até*, which takes ealamitous forms of blindness and infatuation. There is an irony in it which bears men to the heights of suecess and attained desire, only to moek them on the moment with defeat and destruetion. A sense of the futile and the burdened breaks through it all, a yearning after tears (ἵμερος γόοιο), whieh is most felt by the greatest heroes. But with all this, it is to earth, as earth eomes to man in the benignant air and golden light of Hellas, that the Greek looks for his true home. The throbbing, tangible existenee that now is, with its familiar aetivities, its domestie eharities, its substantial joys, the glory of arms, the affairs of soldiery, the engagements of hospitality, makes *life* in all its strength and fulness; and this bright world of sense is the theatre of man's real being.

Death, therefore, is the worst of evils, and it is stronger than the gods. Zeus himself weeps tears of blood over the doom of Sarpedon, which he sees,

but, even in his own deathlessness, cannot avert. Sometimes, it is true, death may be a negative boon. Mishap may so pursue a man that there is no longer any spirit in him that he should desire to live and see the light of the sun. But even when it takes one from the intolerable woes of the present, it has no hope in it for the future. There is a softened death, which comes by the gentle darts of Artemis and Apollo. It is the happiness of the Syrian isle in which Eumæus spent his childhood that the Archer-god visits its people, when the measured number of their days is completed, and removes them by his tender arrows. But in itself death is horror. The darkest designations are heaped upon it. To the reflective, brooding Hindu the world is little and life is a burden. To the quick, sensitive Greek life is joy, and the world is its genuine scene and proper minister. To be on earth is to live; and death is the sorest of ills, because it takes man away from earth and life.

Yet death is not the end of man. Something survives. That is the important point, although what does survive is not the full, real man. The idea of the extinction of existence was never congenial to the Greek mind. It was only the few whose thoughts in any age took that direction. Literature and inscriptions bear witness to an intense and constant belief in the persistence of being. So it is with the Homeric poems. They nowhere teach or suggest that death means annihilation, but always that it implies the continuance of existence, though an existence short of life.[1] When a man dies, the *soul* or ψυχή flies away

[1] One has been found bold enough to challenge this, but he stands

by the mouth or open wound, and this survives. Its flight leaves the body mere flesh and bones (*σὰρξ καὶ ὀστεα*), and brings the man's substantial life to its close. That life cannot be regained. "Kine and goodly flocks," says Achilles, "are to be had for the harrying, and tripods and chestnut horses for the purchasing ; but to bring back man's life neither harrying nor earning availeth, when once it hath passed the barrier of his lips."[1] But the *ψυχή* itself passes into the other world, and continues to exist. This *ψυχή* is not *soul* in our modern sense. The ideas of soul and spirit, the distinctions between the material and the immaterial, with which we are familiar, are foreign to the Homeric poems. The *ψυχή* is more a physical thing than a mental ; material rather than immaterial ; apprehensible, yet shadowy. It is the bond or principle of animal life, something more than breath, but less than mind or spirit.

There are other terms for the seat of the intellectual and emotional powers, or for these powers themselves —*νόος, ἦτορ, θυμός, φρένες ἔμπεδοι, καρδίη, κῆρ, στῆθος, μένος*. But the Homeric idea of life is so bound up with the idea of *bodily* life, that when this *ψυχή*, which is itself neither intellectual nor moral, but physical, is parted from the body, the powers expressed by those other terms, the powers of mind and feeling, come to nought.[2] The activities denoted by the terms *ἦτορ,*

almost alone in his doubt. See Kammer, *Die Einheit der Odyssee*, p. 510, etc.

[1] *Iliad*, ix. 406–409, Leaf's trans.

[2] On the points noticed thus far, see such passages as *Iliad*, viii. 123, ix. 409, xi. 334, 682 ; also i. 193, iv. 470, v. 671, xv. 163 ; and *Odyssey*, xviii. 228, xxi. 154, etc.

κραδίη, νόος, etc., reside in the φρένες, and the φρένες subsist only here. "Oh, strange!" cries Achilles, "in the House of Hades is soul and image (ψυχή καὶ εἴδωλον), but no wits (φρένες)."[1] There is one instance, indeed, in which the "wits" continue unimpaired (φρένες ἔμπεδοι) in the under-world, and with them mind and discretion (νόον πεπνῦσθαι). It is that of Teiresias: "Theban Teiresias, the blind soothsayer, whose wits abide steadfast. To him Persephone hath given judgment, even in death, that he alone should have understanding; but the other souls sweep shadow-like around."[2] His case, however, is an entirely exceptional one. Even the θυμός, which is associated with the ψυχή, and the departure of which, like that of the ψυχή, is said to be the cause or sign of death, has no after-existence. The terms are so far interchangeable that the θυμός may be spoken of as descending to the other world;[3] but it is nowhere described as continuing there. On the contrary, it is sharply distinguished in this respect from the ψυχή, and the latter alone is represented as resident in the other world.[4]

What makes the future so dark an anticipation, is the poverty of the existence which is expected there. It is not that the body is regarded as the superior of the soul, so that when the former perishes the real *self* comes to end.[5] Neither is it that the soul is

[1] *Iliad*, xxiii. 103, 104.

[2] *Odyssey*, x. 493–495, Butcher and Lang's trans.

[3] *Iliad*, vii. 131.

[4] *Odyssey*, xi. 221, 222. Here the θυμός is what leaves the "white bones" when one dies, and the ψυχή is what "flies away and flits like a dream."

[5] Nägelsbach takes the view that the *Ego* ceases to be when the body dies. See his *Homerische Theologie*, p. 388, a most scholarly and indispen-

thought of apart, and the flight of it felt to be the passing of the self into inferior conditions.[1] The later idea of the supremacy of the soul and the misery of its present position of imprisonment in the body is alien to Homer, and it is only incidentally that any word is uttered expressing any such feeling. These ancient Epics do not distinguish between part and part in man, or between the visible man and the real man. It is the living man as he is seen in his breathing, thinking, active corporeity, that to them makes the real man and the only *self*. The Greek of those old times did not think of body and soul as the Egyptian did. He did not suppose the continuance of the latter to be dependent on that of the former, as the Egyptian imagined it. Neither did he strive, with the Egyptian's anxiety and laborious ingenuity, to preserve the corpse, or to provide a tenement for the soul. But he did not think of mind as subsisting and acting without a physical connection, nor did he conceive of the soul as in itself the personality.

Two ways of speaking of the personality lie side by side; one which seems to identify it with the body, another which seems to identify it with the ψυχή that inhabits and animates the body.[2] These different modes of expression may be traceable to the conception

sable book. Compare also Welcker, *Griechische Götterlehre*, i. 811, and Rohde, *Psyche*, i. pp. 4, 5. De la Saussaye speaks of the body as the proper man, *Lehrbuch*, *ut. sup.* ii. 99.

[1] Grotemeyer holds the ψυχή to be the Ego. See his *Homer's Grundansicht von der Seele.*

[2] πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν, *Il.* i. 3; παννυχίη γάρ μοι Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο ψυχὴ ἐφεστήκει,—— ἔϊκτο δὲ θέσκελον αὐτῷ, *Il.* xxiii. 105, 107. On the other hand, εἰς ὅκεν αὐτὸς ἐγὼν Ἄϊδι κεύθωμαι, *Il.* xxiii. 244, and such passages as *Il.* xi. 262, 263, xiv. 456, 457, xv. 251, 252.

of a *double* attached to or resident in man.[1] But the main fact is that the *bodily* is so much in the foreground in the whole conception of life, that *being*, so far it has worth or meaning, is corporeal being. Apart from the living body the mental faculties, consciousness, memory, and emotion, sink into dormancy and enfeeblement. Only one thing can restore them to even a momentary activity—a draught of blood, in which the life was thought to be. Death is so hopeless an evil, because it ends real life by the disjunction of the ψυχή and the dissolution of the φρένες. The real man is the man of flesh and blood, partaker of the tangible existence of earth, and what subsists in the *hereafter* is only an attenuated edition of the man.

In that *hereafter* there is a gathering place for the departed. It is the *house of Hades*; and that is an under-world. The descriptions of the locality naturally vary. It appears to lie beyond the dark tract called Erebos. In some passages it seems to be situated in the distant West, beyond the earth-encircling stream. But the usual representation places it in the heart of the earth or under the earth (ὑπὸ κεύθεσι γαίης).[2] It is ruled by special deities. It has its own king, Aïdes, the implacable, of all the gods the most hateful to

[1] See Rohde, *Psyche*, i. pp. 5–7; and compare Autenrieth's Note in Nägelsbach, *ut sup.* pp. 381, 382.

[2] Eggers (*De Orco Homerico*) holds that the Homeric poems speak only of one abode for the departed, and place it in the heart of the earth. Mr. Gladstone's view, as given in his *Homer and the Homeric Age*, is rather in favour of the Western locality. Voss and Nitzsch (see especially the *Anmerkungen zur Odysse* of the latter, iii. p. 187) affirm a subterranean Hades with a western entrance beyond the Ocean stream. Völcker and Welcker (see especially the latter's *Griech. Götterlehre*, i. p. 799) recognise two different ideas of the locality.

mortals;[1] and its own queen, Persephone the dread.[2] Zeus, the father of gods and men, has no dominion within it.[3] Its condition is painted in the darkest colours. It is a place "desolate of joy." Its plains are barren; its rivers are rivers of hate, sorrow, lamentation, and fire; its trees are poplars.[4] The sun never pierces its gloom; everlasting night weighs heavily upon it; it is a horror to the gods themselves.

The existence to which the departed are doomed is dreary like the place. The ψυχαί survive as εἴδωλα, images or shades of what the men were on earth. With the dwellers in the house of Hades all is unreal, indigent, unsubstantial. The people of that lower world are "pithless heads" (ἀμένηνα κάρηνα); they are like smoke or vapour; they flit about like shadows. They are so thin and intangible that, like a phantom in a dream, the mother of Ulysses thrice eludes the hero's grasp. They are witless (ἀφράδεες), heartless (ἀκήριοι), lacking the full-voiced speech of intelligence. The clang of the dead in Hades is like the noise of vultures, or the gibbering of bats, squeaking all around. They have all that they had on earth, but in reduced, deceptive form. They can be recognised, though they cannot recognise. They have no spirit (θυμός); yet, in their vacant way, they can mourn, and wish, and hate. They follow vaguely

[1] *Iliad*, ix. 158, 159.

[2] On this Queen of the shades, see especially Preller, *Demeter und Persephone*, p. 9.

[3] One passage (*Odyssey*, xi. 300–304) is thought by some to be out of harmony with this; see Gladstone, *Homer and the Homeric Age*, ii. 210. But it is doubtful whether it implies even a limited extension of the dominion of Zeus.

[4] "The frailness, fragility, and inconstancy of the poplar tree," says Ruskin, "resembled the fancied ghost people."

and emptily the old pursuits of the upper-world, and they are capable of a momentary return to quick, conscious, rational life. They taste of blood, and the tides of intelligence, recollection, perception, feeling, volition come back upon them.[1] They wake up for a brief space as from a heavy trance, and understand and speak with intelligence. Their condition is altogether valueless, fantastic, inglorious. The most indigent position on the sunlit earth is better than all the doleful mockeries of Hades. The lot of the meanest hind in this world is to be preferred to kingship in the world of the departed. Thin, impoverished copies of their former selves, the dead endure an existence stripped of all that is desirable, emptied of all the glory and fulness of real life.

Has this existence in Hades any moral relation to the earthly life? Except in unsteady form and limited degree the Homeric future is not a retributive future. There is neither a heaven nor a hell for men as such. All go down equally into Hades; all have the same gloomy existence in it—Agamemnon and Achilles with their basest serfs; and there is deliverance for none. The deities who rule the under-world, do so without respect to piety or impiety. There are some things which seem to go beyond this, but they do not carry us far. There is the case of Minos, sitting as judge in Hades, and listening to the pleadings of the shades.[2] But apart from the suspected character of the section

[1] In the last book of the *Odyssey* a conductor of the dead appears, and Agamemnon seems to recognise Amphimedon without the help of the blood. But this second Nekyia is too doubtful to disturb the general view.

[2] *Odyssey*, xi. 568–571.

of the *Odyssey* in which Minos appears in this character, the passage probably does nothing more than represent him in the fictitious exercise of an office which was held in its reality on earth. He is a judge who pronounces blank decisions on blank disputes, and his judgments have to do not with the deeds of men in their former life on earth, but with differences which take place among them in Hades itself. There are the cases of Cleitus,[1] whom "the golden-throned Dawn snatched away for his very beauty's sake, that he might dwell with the Immortals," and Ganymede,[2] "caught up to be cup-bearer to Zeus, for the sake of his beauty, that he might dwell among immortals." But these are cases of assumption to the society of the gods. There are the instances of Castor and Pollux,[3] where we have an ebb and flow of being, heroes shades the one day, alive the next. There is Herakles, whose εἴδωλον is in Hades, while he himself (αὐτός) is with the gods;[4] and there is Teiresias,[5] as mentioned above, who by the grace of deity retains consciousness and reason. But these are uncertain and partial testimonies, even if original.

There are also the more significant figures of the Erinyes, those dread embodiments of the might of moral law and the avenging power of the passions. Out of some dozen passages, however, there is but one that seems to carry us beyond the present life.[6] The

[1] *Odyssey*, xv. 250, 251.

[2] *Iliad*, xx. 232–235.

[3] *Odyssey*, xi. 300–304.

[4] The passage in *Odyssey*, xi. 601, etc., which speaks of Herakles and his shade, are doubted, however, even by ancient critics.

[5] *Odyssey*, x. 493–495.

[6] *Iliad*, ix. 454, 567, xv. 204, xix. 87, 258–260, 418 xx. 232, xxi. 412; *Odyssey*, ii. 135, xi. 279, xv. 234, xvii. 475, xx. 78. See also *Iliad*, iii. 278, 279.

exceptional passage is the one in which Agamemnon invokes Zeus and Gaia and Helios, and with them also the Erinyes, who,

> "In realms of nether night,
> Mark each bold sinner and chastise the falsely swearing wight."
> —*Iliad*, xix. 258–260.

In every other case in which they appear their penal ministry has earth for its scene. If it is too much, therefore, to say with some [1] that the occurrence of one or two exceptional cases may indicate the existence of a larger faith, it is probably too much to deny with others [2] that the Homeric poems anywhere suggest the belief in a judgment of the departed. The penal cases of Tityos, Sisyphus, and Tantalus, in the eleventh *Odyssey*, it is true, cannot be relied on, as they are, in all probability, post-Homeric interpolations.[3] But the conception of the oath, the action of the Erinyes, and the mention of a Tartaros, suggest at least glimpses of the truth that moral awards await men hereafter, and that the penal consequences of conduct follow them into the other world.

The early Hellenic doctrine, therefore, is hesitating, fragmentary, inconsistent, barren of hope, divorced from vital religious interest. It affirms an after-world, which is a joyless land,[4] wrapt in murky gloom, the dark shadow and spent copy of this world, in which men continue to exist as the wretched images of their former selves, perpetuating the character which was theirs on earth, engaging in the old pursuits, but

[1] *E.g.* Welcker. [2] *E.g.* Nitzsch.
[3] See especially Nitzsch, *Anmerkungen*, iii. p. 304, etc.
[4] ἀτερπέα χῶρον, *Odyssey*, xi. 94, etc.

all wearily and feebly—the judge deciding unreal cases in an unreal assize, the shadowy hunter driving shadowy beasts with shadowy club. It is a world so inane and unwelcome that only one thing is worse than to be a denizen of it. That one thing is the woe of being left unburied, the greater woe which compels the shade to hover homeless between earth and Hades, a misery to itself and a terror to others. The baldness of the doctrine is unrelieved by any of those speculative ideas by which men elsewhere have sought to give to similar conceptions a more definite and more ethical character. The dogma of metempsychosis, which has seemed to other peoples to solve much of the mystery of being, and to explain the sorrows and inequalities of human life by interpreting the earthly existence as a penitentiary for past evil and a probation for an after-life, has no place in the thoughts of these early Greeks. In the Homeric ideas there are hints of a richer and more positive doctrine. But they are only hints, and they look only to the destinies of exceptional classes or individuals, not to those of men generally.

At the best the idea of the moral issues of life appears only in indistinct and contracted form. It also moves more in the direction of the penalties of the future than in that of its beatitudes. There is a Homeric paradise in the Elysian plain. But it is only at "earth's farthest end," near the ocean; it is reserved for a few favourites of the gods, like the fair-haired Menelaus; the privileged few enter it by an act of bodily translation; and the right to its joys is not determined by moral considerations.[1] There is a Homeric

[1] *Odyssey*, iv. 563, etc.

hell, in the Tartaros of the *Iliad*, which is described as a distant murky abyss, with its gates of iron and its floor of brass, lying as deep beneath Hades as the earth lies deep beneath heaven.[1] Sins are punished there, but they are the sins of insurgent and defeated immortals—Kronos, Iapetus, and the Titans. There is the harrowing picture of the shades of Tityos, Tantalus, and Sisyphus suffering ceaselessly the heaviest of all conceivable penalties—the grinding pangs of defeated effort and resultless toil.[2] But this again belongs to a section of the poem which is generally regarded as the work of some later Rhapsodist, and at most it applies only to the case of a few surpassing criminals. The mass of men pass into Hades, the evil with the good, the slave with the prince; and from Hades there is no deliverance. Rewards and punishments are distributed by the gods, but it is in the form of good fortune or evil on this side of death. Homeric thought on the subject of the future practically stopped short at this conception of a Hades-existence as the common lot for all—an existence so emptied of the strength and fulness of life that nothing could dispel its gloom, no honour or consideration within its dark domain could make it tolerable.[3]

Greek thought never rose clearly and continuously above this. So far as the faith in a future existence possessed the mind of the people it kept by this level. In certain points an advance was made upon the early belief, but it was neither a steady nor a permanent advance. So far as the literature reflects the mind

[1] *Iliad*, viii. 13, etc. [2] *Odyssey*, xi. 576–600.
[3] See Tyler, *The Theology of the Greek Poets*, pp. 197–201.

of Greece, it must be said that, notwithstanding the nobler ideas which find occasional expression in the poets and the philosophers, there was a decay in the power and vivacity of the belief. The conceptions, for example, which appear in the Hesiodic poems, are in all essential respects on the same plane with the Homeric. The main point of difference is that there are some things in the former which may point to a change in the belief, and suggest an earlier stage at which there was a more definite faith—a faith in a higher life for man after the close of his measured time on earth.[1] Death came like a sleep to the men of the golden race, and it made them like the gods, partakers in their invisible rule and immortal life, yet generically distinct from them, tutelary demi-gods (δαίμονες), with a more limited sphere than the Olympian divinities possessed, protectors of men, the "police of the gods" taking note of right and wrong.[2] The men of the silver race, less loyal to the gods, had their abode under earth, but obtained honour, though of inferior kind, and became the blessed in the under-world.[3] The men of the

[1] See Rohde, *Psyche*, i. p. 102.

[2] *Works and Days*, 116, etc. On the Hesiodic idea of the δαίμων, see Rohde, *Psyche*, pp. 69, 70, and Grote, *History of Greece* (edition of 1869), i. pp. 67–70. Some connect the Hesiodic doctrine of guardian dæmons with the Oriental doctrine of angels. Grote speaks of them as "generically different from the gods, but essentially good, and forming the intermediate agents and police between gods and men." He thinks that here we have the "seed of a doctrine which afterwards underwent many changes, and became of great importance; first as one of the constituent elements of pagan faith, then as one of the helps to its subversion." Some, but without sufficient reason, question the genuineness of the line, οἵ ῥα φυλάσσουσίν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα.

[3] *Works and Days*, 141, etc. On the remarkable expression, τοὶ μὲν ὑποχθόνιοι μάκαρες θνητοὶ καλέονται, see Nägelsbach, *Nachhomerische Theologie*, p. 412, etc.

heroic race, too, became heirs of a happier life in the Islands of the Blest, where the bounteous earth yielded her stores three times a year.[1] But for the men of his own age, the iron race, there is in Hesiod no word of hope, no elevation to the immortal life of the gods, no translation to happy isles, but the dark, inexorable doom of descent to the under-world held by the relentless Aïdes.[2]

Neither was the belief helped by the early philosophical schools, except that in Anaxagoras the idea of the soul as a physical thing yields to the idea of *mind*, and the way is prepared for a rational proof of a future life for man. The Lyric poets, again, are silent on the subject, or keep within the limits of the popular Homeric beliefs.[3] But a contribution of some moment was made by the *Mysteries*.[4] The importance of the Eleusinian Mysteries in relation to the Hellenic view of the future is seen by what is said of them in Greek and Roman literature. "Thy Athens," says Cicero to

[1] *Works and Days*, 157, etc. Heyne interprets lines 166 and 167 as meaning that all the heroes passed to these μακάρων νῆσοι. Welcker and others think more correctly that a distinction is drawn between those who perished in war and those who are described as reaching the Islands of the Blest by the act of Zeus. Nägelsbach (*Nachhomerische Theologie*, p. 410) remarks on the absence in Hesiod of any doctrine of a judgment in the future world. He points out that the men of the golden race and those of the heroic enter no Hades, but continue their life, the former on or about earth, the latter in the Islands of the Blest; and he takes the descent to Hades to be itself retribution in the case of the men of the silver and brass races.

[2] *Works and Days*, 174, etc.; *Shield of Hercules*, 151, etc.

[3] See, *e.g.*, Anacreon, *Fr.* 44; Theognis, 567, 705.

[4] On these, see Welcker, *Griech. Götterlehre*, ii. p. 511, etc.; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 69, etc.; Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 397, etc.; Dyer's *The Gods in Greece*, p. 122, etc.; Percy Gardner's *New Chapters in Greek History*, chap. xiii.; Lenormant's articles in the *Contemporary Review*, 1880, etc.

Atticus, "seems to have produced many other excellent and divine things, but nothing more excellent and nothing better than those Mysteries, by which from a wild and savage life we have been trained and raised to a higher humanity. They are truly called *initia*, for it is through them that we have learned to know the beginnings of life. And we have received from them not only good reason why we should live with joy, but also why we should die with a better hope." In the *Phædo*, Plato gives the opinion that "the founders of the Mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago, that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods." Among references of different kinds which he makes to the same subject in others of his writings, he also mentions it as a tradition "firmly believed by many" and "received from those learned in the Mysteries," that the crime of murder will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will suffer what they did by a compensation of nature, and end their lives by the hand of another."

Nor is it only philosophic writers like Cicero and Plato who speak to the significance of the Mysteries and the truths they were understood to convey. On the walls of the *Lesché* at Delphi, Polygnotus painted the punishments endured in Hades by those who passed out of life uninitiated. Poets, Sophocles and Pindar among the number, sang of the privilege of initiation as if on it the whole blessedness of immortality

depended; and orators and writers of various ranks refer to the rites in a similar strain. To die, as Plutarch expressed it, was to be initiated into the greater Mysteries.[1] It is a remarkable circumstance, at the same time, that in the Greek epitaphs little is found to suggest that the Mysteries had the importance which is ascribed to them in the literature, or that the higher conceptions of the future life which they are understood to have communicated had materially affected the general belief.[2] It is but a measured value, therefore, that can be safely claimed for them. Yet there is every reason to believe that they had to do with the things of the after-life, and that one of their main objects was to inform and influence the Greek mind on the subject of immortality.

In what way and to what extent they did this, however, is not so clear. Very different estimates have been made of these remarkable celebrations. Writers of a former time, Warburton in particular, regarded them as repositories of fragments of a primeval revelation. Scholars of our own day have spoken of them as teaching a lofty, spiritual doctrine, especially on the unity of God and the moral awards of the future life.

[1] For the above, see, *e.g.*, Plato, *Phædo*, 69, *Phædrus*, 244, *Gorgias*, 497, *Repub.* 364, *Laws*, 870; Pindar, *Thren.* 8; Isocrates, iv. 28; Cicero, *Legg.* ii. 14, 36; Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* p. 27.

[2] "In all the Attic epitaphs which have come down to us," says Professor Percy Gardner, "we discern not a trace of any such doctrine as we should have been disposed, from such indications (in the literature), to attribute to the College of Priests who conducted the mysteries. When the next world is at all spoken of, it either appears as the Homeric realm of Hades and his bride Persephone, or else is mentioned in the vague language of the philosopher as æther and heaven. The inference seems inevitable. We are strongly warned against attributing too much influence over the ordinary mind, or any very lofty and spiritual teaching" (*New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 333).

But there seems to be no ground for believing that there was anything like a theology connected with them. The instruments which they employed seem to have been symbolic rites, or dramatic representations which conveyed impressions of truths rather than doctrinal statements. They added to the general belief that man survives death, the special belief that the initiated have a privileged position in the after-world, and enjoy an existence which is *life*. It was not their object to inculcate any profound doctrine, to preach a pure monotheism, or to break positively with the popular faith. But they rendered the great service of giving the hope of a better immortality; and they did this, not by dogmatic, but by spectacular and ceremonial teaching; not by repudiating the common belief, but by enlarging and elevating it.

The Orphic Mysteries differed from the Eleusinian in their foreign origin, and in the pantheistic ideas at their basis. In them, too, the conception of the future was different. The idea of the body as the shackle and hindrance of the soul, an idea so alien to Homer, had appeared in the circle of Orphic thought. The soul was regarded as a part of the divine, a *particula auræ divinæ*, for which the body in its limited and perishable condition was no fit organ, but a grave or prison.[1] With this came the dogma of transmigration. The existence of the soul in the body was its punishment for sins in a previous condition; and the doom of its sins in the body was its descent into other bodies, and the postponement of its deliverance.[2]

[1] τὸ σῶμα σῆμα. See the important passage in Plato, *Cratylus*, 400.

[2] See especially Lobeck's *Aglaophamus*, p. 465, etc.

When all is said in qualification of extreme statements which have been made on the subject, it must still be allowed that the Mysteries marked an important stage in the history of the belief, the Eleusinian in brightening it, the Orphic in moralising it. The latter, too, gave a new certainty and a new gravity to the whole conception of a future life. They made the soul a divine thing, and the departed something different from mere shadows of their real selves. But they did this at the sacrifice of the distinct individuality of man.

In the great poets we also find something added to the belief. The most considerable contribution to its invigoration is made by Pindar rather than by the dramatists. Yet in none of the Greek writers is stronger expression given to the simple belief in continued conscious existence after death than in Æschylus and Sophocles. With them the dead are in two senses the "mighty dead." It is of the princely dead that they speak, not of the common herd of men. And they make these dead half-divine, endowing them with the powers of answering prayer, receiving sacrifice, and acting on the world of the living for good or evil.[1] King Darius is described, not only as blessed (*μακαρίτης*), but as godlike and divine (*ἰσοδαίμων, θεός*) in Hades.[2] Mind or thought is spoken of in terms which go far beyond the Homeric idea of the *soul* or *φυχή*. It is something which the devouring jaw of fire cannot consume even in the dead.[3]

[1] *Choeph.* 5, 130, 147, 459, 479, etc.; *Electr.* 446; *Ajax*, 1144, etc.

[2] *Persæ*, 634, 645.

[3] *φρόνημα τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαμάζει πυρὸς μαλερὰ γνάθος. Choeph.* 323 (320).

On the other hand, the old Homeric conception of the cheerlessness of the Hades-life persists. The dead dwell in densest gloom, and enjoy only the shadows of their former greatness and honour.[1]

The thought of reward or blessedness in the other world scarcely appears. There is, indeed, one distinct reference to that in Sophocles, in a fragment which seems to express the Eleusinian hope of a thrice happy life for the initiated.[2] But even when it might be most expected, as in the case of the purged and tried Œdipus, it is not found. All that the Chorus asks or contemplates even for him, is that he may have an easy death; that the Furies may not punish the evil which he has done unwittingly; and that Cerberus may not detain his soul "at the threshold of Dis."[3] All through it is the penal aspect of the future existence that faces man in the Tragic poets, when there is more expressed than the universal misery of the underworld. Not even in the house of Hades is there freedom for man; not even there can man escape his evil deeds; even in it there is a "second Zeus," who "to the dead assigns their last great penalties."[4]

In this as in other things there is a difference between Euripides and the authors of the *Agamemnon*

[1] *Persæ*, 835; *Choeph.* 346, etc.; *Fr. Sisyph.* 216, etc.

[2] This interesting passage is as follows:—*ὦ τρισόλβιοι κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη μολῶσ' ἐς Ἄϊδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.* Brunck's *Soph.* ii. p. 244; Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* p. 27.

[3] *Œd. Col.* 1551, etc. See Wunder's edition, and Hermann's Note; also Nägelsbach, *Nachhom. Theol.* p. 412.

[4] *οὐδὲ μη' ν' Ἀιδου θανὼν φύγῃ μάταιον αἰτίας πράξας τάδε Κἀκεῖ δικάζει τἀμπλακήμαθ', ὡς λόγος, Ζεὺς ἄλλος ἐν καμοῦσιν ὑστάτας δίκας, Supp.* 228. See also *Supp.* 415; and Plumptre's *The Tragedies of Æschylos*, pp. 225, etc., 406, etc.

and the *Antigone*. In Euripides we find a mixture of ideas, but no clear note of personal conviction. So far as it is possible to discover the poet's own attitude to the belief, it seems to be that of the sceptic or agnostic, if not that of the positive gainsayer. But his dramas speak now the voice of the popular faith, and again that of the philosophy of Anaxagoras; now that of Orphic thought, and again that of the Sophist. Some of the dead enjoy the honours of heroes in Hades.[1] Yet in Hades Priam knows nothing of the suffering of Hecuba.[2] The possibility of good for the pious in the other world is sometimes doubted, sometimes affirmed.[3] The whole question of an after-life is put as a question unanswered.[4] At death the soul returns to the air, its creative element, and parts with its independent existence. The mind of the individual does not survive his death, but, falling back into its original, it shares in the thought of the universal mind.[5] Nay, man himself is nothing, and sinks into nothing.[6]

It is in Pindar, however, that the Greek mind is seen in its deepest religiousness. Another atmosphere is about us in the Odes of the noble Bœotian. The things of the future are much on his lips; and, while he speaks often in conformity with the old Homeric sentiment, he rises far above it. "There is nothing,"

[1] *Hecuba*, 530. [2] *Troades*, 1306.

[3] *Alcestis*, 756; *Androm. Fr.* 885.

[4] τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται. *Poly. Fr.* 634. On which see Plato, *Gorgias*, 492.

[5] ὁ νοῦς τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών, *Hel.* 1013. See also *Chrysipp. Fr.* 833, and Nägelsbach's remarks, *ut sup.* p. 461.

[6] κατθανὼν δὲ πᾶς ἀνὴρ γῆ καὶ σκιά. τὸ μηδὲν εἰς οὐδὲν ῥέπει, *Meleagr. Fr.* 537.

says K. O. Müller, "in which Pindar differs so widely from Homer as in his notions respecting the state of men after death."[1] Eleusinian, Orphic, and other ideas deeply influence him, and the whole conception of the future obtains at his hand a new magnitude, new definiteness, new moral relations. The soul is from the gods, and what survives in the other world is that soul itself, no reduced, unconscious image.[2] The future existence is one of moral awards for the evil and for the good; not for the exceptional few, but for all. It is a life of happiness and knowledge for the initiated. "Blessed is he who has beheld them [the mysteries], and descends under the hollow earth; he knows the end; he knows the divine origin of life."[3] It has its Islands of the Blest for the virtuous,—not for a few favourites of the gods, but for all the pure. While it is night here, the sun shines there, and happy souls pursue a life of free and joyous activity.[4]

There is a judgment, too, not for the perjured only, or for a few surpassing criminals, but for all men and all their misdeeds. "The souls of the wicked, when they die here, forthwith suffer punishment; and some one beneath the earth, pronouncing sentence by a baleful necessity imposed upon him, declares the doom

[1] *History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, Eng. trans. p. 229.

[2] *Thren.* 2, ζῶον δ' ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδωλον· τὸ γὰρ ἐστι μόνον ἐκ θεῶν, κ.τ.λ. Donaldson recognises the influence of the doctrines of Heraclitus and Pythagoras in this remarkable passage, and gives the sense thus: "By a happy lot, all persons travel to an end free of toil. And the body, indeed, is subject to the powerful influence of death; but a shadow of vitality is still left alive, and this alone is of divine origin; while our limbs are in activity, it sleeps; but when we sleep, it discloses to the mind in many dreams the future judgment with regard to happiness and misery" (J. W. Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes*, p. 372).

[3] *Thren. Fr.* 8.

[4] *Thren. Fr.* 1.

awarded for offences committed in this realm of Zeus."[1] Nothing finds stronger, more frequent, or more varied expression than the contrast between the destiny of the righteous and that of the unrighteous. "The good lead a life without a tear among the honoured of the gods, whoever habitually delighted in probity."[2] "The souls of the impious flit about beneath heaven on earth in murderous pains, under the yoke-straps of evils from which is no escape; but those of the pious dwell in heaven, and singing, chant the Blessed One in hymns."[3]

The sense of the grandeur of the soul and the fates contained in its moral life takes form in other ideas which appear in Pindar. In its nobility it is appointed to more than one birth. It is subject to a discipline of expiation and purification in this world and in the next. Souls that go down to Hades and atone for past offences, return to earth and become great men, wise men, heroes. Souls that pass three probations in the earthly life and in the after-existence, and keep themselves from all sin, enter Hades no more, but rise to those happy scenes where Peleus and Cadmus dwell, whither also Thetis brought Achilles. "As to those from whom Persephone receives an atonement for past sin, the souls of such she restores in the ninth year to the sun above. From them spring illustrious kings, and men swift in might and greatest in wisdom; and

[1] *Olymp.* ii. 5 (105). See Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes*, p. 17.

[2] *Olymp.* ii. 65 (120), etc. See Donaldson, *ut sup.* p. 18.

[3] *Thren. Fr.* 3. Dissen and Donaldson suspect the genuineness of the passage, on the doubtful ground that the diction and the sentiment are not Pindaric.

in the aftertime they are called sacred heroes by men."[1] "Those who thrice in this world and thrice in the other world endured to keep the soul from all wickedness, accomplished the path of Zeus to the tower of Kronos; there the gales of Ocean breathe around the Islands of the Blest, and flowers of gold flash.[2]

Pindar's successor in the lineal descent of thought was Plato, the Greek prophet of the Ideal and the Eternal. The great ideas of the soul's dignity, its vitality, its independence of the body, its divine origin, its probation, the judgment it has to endure, the inclusion of all souls, good and evil, small and great, in the moral awards of the future,—ideas which are taught in some measure by the Tragic poets, and more largely and constantly by Pindar,—reappear in Plato, and rise in him to their loftiest exposition, their most consistent and most ethical application. With Plato is for ever associated the great Athenian preacher to whom the reasonings of the Dialogues are ascribed. As to Socrates himself, some uncertainty will always attach to the question of his personal belief. "The closing scenes," says Dean Stanley,[3] "which Plato has invested with such immortal glory, can never be forgotten. The Hebrew prophet, the Christian martyr, might well have couched their farewells to the audience before which they, like him, often pleaded in vain, almost in the same words: 'The hour of my departure is arrived, and we go our ways. I go to die, and you to live. Which is better, God only knows.'" The calm, the simple cheerfulness with which he waited his death,

[1] *Thren. Fr.* 4.
[2] *Olymp.* ii. 67–73 (122–130).
[3] *The Jewish Church*, iii. pp. 217, 218.

the hope which he expressed in his last moments that beyond the grave he should meet the true judges, and the poets, and the heroes of ancient time, and pursue with them the search into truth and wisdom,—these things and others in the records of his trial and death bespeak a clear and expectant faith. In Xenophon's *Apology*, on the other hand, he counts his decease a kindness of the gods as a timely relief from the disabilities of old age ; but says nothing of immortality.[1] Even in the Platonic *Apology*, while he thinks there is cause to hope that in either case death will be a gain, he does not decide which of two things it may be—an endless sleep, or a journey of the soul to another world.[2] Some doubt, therefore, may remain.[3]

But Plato himself, at least, is more assured. He looks at the belief in different aspects in a number of Dialogues. In the *Meno*, for example, he introduces it in connection with its basis in tradition. In the *Republic* he supports it by the remarkable argument,

[1] Sects. 6–27. [2] Sects. 40, 41.

[3] See Zeller's *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, pp. 147, 148, Reichel's trans. ; Sir Alexander Grant's *Ethics of Aristotle*, i. pp. 161–163. Grote contrasts "the tranquil ascendency and rational conviction, satisfied with the past, and welcoming instead of fearing the close of life," which are ascribed to Socrates in the *Phædo*, with the fact that in the *Apology*, "when addressing the Dikasts, Sokrates not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty, but expressly disclaims it" (*Plato*, vol. ii. pp. 195, 196). Jowett admits that "the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of Plato, is an argument to the contrary." His conclusion, however, is on the whole in favour of the sage's personal belief. "Yet in the Cyropædia," he says, "Xenophon (viii. 7, 19 fol.) has put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the *Phædo*, and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who recognised a divine plan in man and nature (Xen. Mem. i. 4). And the language of the *Apology* confirms this view" (*The Dialogues of Plato, etc.*, vol. i. 425).

that if the soul survives the attacks made upon it by its own diseases, those of cowardice, injustice, intemperance, folly, much more may its vitality be proof against things which wear out the body.[1] In the *Timæus* he deals with it in the light of the soul's divine origin, and in relation to the idea of transmigration. But it is in the *Phædrus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phædo* that he gives his most characteristic exposition. Each of these great Dialogues handles it in its own way,—the *Phædrus* regarding the soul as a principle of motion and a prior existence; the *Symposium* looking mainly to its present existence; the *Phædo* unfolding the grandeur of its after-existence. It is the *Phædo*, above all, that gathers into one the finest threads of Plato's varied reasonings, and completes his high argument.

In many respects the Platonic doctrine marks an advance which cannot be too highly appraised. Set forth as it is with the logical resource and the literary art of this masterpiece of Plato's genius, a Dialogue which has all the unity of a great drama and all its perfection of form, the Platonic doctrine far surpasses the previous attainments of Greek thought on the subject of a future life. Its burden is something very different from the old belief in a shadowy continuance of pithless, gibbering shades. It gives a new meaning to the dim vaticinations of things eternal, which sought vague but persistent expression in the popular faith, and to the stronger sentiment which found voice in Orphic and Eleusinian mysteries, in Tragedy, and in Pindar. "The Tragedy of the Greeks," it is said, "is

[1] Book x. 610, D–E.

not 'rounded' by this life, but is chiefly set in decrees of fate and mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth."[1] But this imperishable Dialogue infuses into the anticipations of the Tragic poets a force and a reality more than their own, by providing them with a rational basis and a logical form. Its message is the intimation of a hope which rests, not on instinct only or feeling, but on reason. Planting it on the deep foundation of the immutability of moral distinctions, it makes the whole conception of the future an ethical thing, telling with an influence which it never had before on men's thoughts of the present life.

The Platonic doctrine is first and last a doctrine of the persistence of the soul. The wealth of Platonic logic and Platonic imagination is spent upon the proof of this one truth, at whatever cost to other kindred truths. The arguments by which it is sustained—arguments taken from the soul's desire and capacity for knowledge, its simple and indivisible nature, its essential vitality, its habit of command, the law of contraries or the "circle of nature," the power of reminiscence, and the like—seem strange to us now. Of much that they build on we are ready to say that it is transparently verbal and unreal. But they were relevant to the thought of the time; and there is something in them—a temper and an attitude—which is better than themselves. Some of them, those taken from the ethical considerations of the soul's aspirations and the need of moral readjustment, have a permanent value.[2] The most distinctive of them all, the

[1] Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, i. p. 418.

[2] See what is said by Jowett of Plato's use of these arguments, as com-

one that turns upon the question of eternal ideas, has conspicuous drawbacks. It bears upon the prior existence of the soul rather than its after-existence; it rests upon a number of assumptions regarding the existence of ideas and their relation to the soul; and it is applicable to other living creatures as well as to man.[1] But it, too, is more than it seems. "To deal fairly with such arguments," it is justly remarked, "they should be translated as far as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are eternal, their souls are eternal; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and his age as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among ourselves."[2]

The Platonic doctrine is not only the reasoned affirmation of a future life. It is a serious and consistent assertion of the retributive order of that life.

pared with the reasonings of Butler and Addison from the "moral tendencies of mankind," and "the progress of the soul towards perfection." It is justly added that Plato earns belief "for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations" (*Dialogues of Plato*, i. pp. 421, 422).

[1] In assuming, for the purpose of his argument, the existence of "eternal, self-existent, unchangeable Ideas or Forms," Plato has also to assume, as Grote explains it, "the congeniality of nature, and inherent correlation between these Ideas and the Soul: . . . the fact that the soul knows these Ideas, which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state of existence: . . . and the essential participation of the soul in the Idea of life, so that it cannot be conceived without life, or as dead." Hegel's view that Plato did not think of the soul as a separate thing, but understood it to exist essentially as "the Universal Notion or Idea, the comprehensive aggregate of all other Ideas," and that the "descriptions which he gives of its condition, either before life or after death, are to be treated only as poetical metaphors," is rejected by the historian of Greece as too refined, though it throws light on some particular expressions. *Plato*, vol. ii. pp. 190, 191.

[2] Jowett, *ut sup.* i. p. 420.

It preaches a judgment after death for all souls according to their deeds on earth; a heaven for the pure, and a hell for the impure; a just gradation of rewards and punishments; and an exact correspondence between the sin and the penalty. It includes also an intermediate state, with processes of penance, discipline, and purification. It adopts the traditional ideas as the vehicle of its message. It speaks of the "Islands of the Blest," where the good enjoy the fellowship of the gods and see the wonders of the heavens as they are; and of a Tartarus in the interior of the earth, the dark scene of woe, into which pour streams of fire and water and mud. It distinguishes different fates for different kinds of souls. Those who in the judgment are pronounced neither evil nor good are committed to the Acherusian Lake, to dwell there until they are absolved. The incurably corrupt are hurled into Tartarus, to be for ever imprisoned there. Those who have been guilty of offences not irremediable are consigned to the same Tartarus, but only for a time, until they find mercy with those whom they have injured. Those who have been eminent in righteousness are "released from this earthly prison and go to their pure home, which is above, and dwell in the purer earth." The few who have purified themselves by philosophy "live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell." [1]

[1] *Phædo*, 113, 114; and Jowett, *ut sup.* i. pp. 494, 495. "While others," says Grote, "in their conceptions of posthumous existence, assured the happiest fate, sometimes even divinity itself, to great warriors and lawgivers — to devoted friends and patriots like Harmodius and

But while Plato adapts himself to the current modes of thinking of the future, and develops his argument in terms of popular mythological ideas, he recognises the measure of these things. He does not claim that the soul's future will be exactly as he describes it; but he is confident that, if the soul is immortal, something of the kind that he imagines for it must be before it. His concern is to affirm the moral principles which are imperfectly expressed by these ideas and figures. The real grandeur of his doctrine is this quick, moral interest with which he animates all its parts. It is to the judicial issues of the earthly life, and the moral significance of the soul's immortality for the present existence, that he directs the full strength of his argument. "If the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit, not only of their

Aristogeiton—to the exquisite beauty of Helen—or to favourites of the gods like Ganymêdes or Pelops—Plato claims that supreme distinction for the departed philosopher. The Philosopher, as a recompense for having detached himself during life as much as possible from the body and all its functions, will be admitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple, unattached to any body. The souls of all other persons, dying with more or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them, and for that reason haunting the tombs in which the bodies are buried, so as to become visible there as ghosts, are made subject, in the Platonic Hades, to penalty and purification suitable to the respective conditions of each, after which they become attached to new bodies, sometimes of men, sometimes of other animals. Of this distributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea. Nor is Plato consistent with himself, except in a few material features" (*Plato*, vol. ii. pp. 201, 202).

body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom." [1]

With all necessary abatements Plato's discussion of his great theme is worthy of the honour in which it has been held. It is not too much to say of it that it is "intrinsically the greatest contribution drawn from philosophical speculation upon the question . . . the noblest single offering that human reason has yet laid upon the altar of human hope." [2] It is easy at the same time to exaggerate its importance. The Platonic doctrine has very mixed and peculiar elements. It depends for its main support on the theory of the pre-existence of the soul.[3] It is entangled with the dogma of metempsychosis.[4] It is connected with other strange and dubious notions on the subject of human souls, to which at least occasional expression is given — the

[1] *Phædo*, 107. Jowett, *ut sup.* pp. 488.

[2] Geddes, *The Phædo of Plato*, pp. xxvii, xxviii.

[3] Simmias at once accepts the position that the soul must have had a prior existence, but is not so readily convinced of the truth of a future existence. Cebes also sees that the soul was in being before it became connected with the present body; his doubt is whether, though it is capable of outlasting many bodies, it is eternal *a parte post* (*Phædo*, 86–95). "In fact the reference to an anterior time," remarks Grote, "is more essential to Plato's theory than that to a posterior time, because it is employed to explain the cognitions of the mind, and the identity of learning with reminiscence" (*Plato*, vol. ii. p. 191).

[4] The place which the doctrine of metempsychosis had in Plato's thought is seen from such passages as these, among others, *Phædo*, 70, 81; 403, 425; *Phædrus*, 428; *Timæus*, 42, 92; *Meno*, 81. Plato's argument "being founded in great part on the Idea of Life," observes Grote, "embraces everything living, and is common to animals (if not to plants) as well as to men; and the metempsychosis—or transition of souls not merely from one human body to another, but also from the human to the animal body, and *vice versâ*, is a portion of the Platonic Creed" (*Plato*, vol. ii. p. 191).

number of souls, the work of the Demiurgus in the formation of souls, the place assigned to each soul in its own peculiar star,[1] the relation of man's soul to the world-soul,[2] its single or tripartite nature,[3] its distribution in the body,[4] its visible, spectral form,[5] its retributive attraction to the bodies of beasts, birds, and insects.[6]

At its best the hope which it offers is a hope for the philosopher rather than for the man as such. The intellectual interest overmatches the moral, and affects the whole conception of purification. Even at death there is no perfection for the souls of the non-philosophic. Above all, it is the doctrine of an immortality for only the half of man. It depreciates and degrades the body. It makes the body the source of all the evils and defilements which mar man's life, the impediment and prison of the soul, the hindrance in the way of virtue and knowledge. It is the duty of the sage to dishonour the body. Death is to be welcomed as the release of the soul from the oppression of the body. Purity is attainable only by separation of the soul from the body. The light of truth cannot be beheld but by

[1] *Timæus*, 41, 42. [2] *Timæus*, 37–44.

[3] Single in the *Phædo*, 78, etc.; tripartite in the *Republic*, iv. 439, 441, 422, and the *Timæus*, 69. See Grote's *Plato*, ii. p. 159, etc.

[4] *Timæus*, 69–73.

[5] *Phædo*, 81; where the craving after the corporeal is said to drag the soul down again into the visible world, and keep it "prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighbourhood of which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight, and therefore visible." See Jowett, *ut sup.* i. p. 458.

[6] The gluttonous, the wanton, the drunken pass into asses and animals of like nature; the unjust, the tyrannous, the violent, into wolves, hawks, and kites; the temperate and the just, into bees, wasps, ants. *Phædo*, 81.

being rid of the body. The heaven of man's highest aspiration is a bodiless condition.

This was the best which the world had to offer when Christianity came. Ideas of many different kinds had possession of the human mind; some of them of a nature appalling to the general sense of mankind, the offspring of terror; others clouded, gloomy, faltering, the children of uncertainty, bringing no strength or inspiration to life. The conception of a retributive future established in perfect righteousness was fitful, and the dread of hell was stronger than the joy of heaven. The highest that was reached did not rise to the rank of a permanent contribution to man's faith and hope. It failed to take hold of the common mind. It did not even address itself to the mass of the people. The great advance made by Plato reckoned for little in the heavy tides of traditional opinion and counter-speculation. His arguments did not convince. The interlocutors in the *Phædo* have their doubts as the argument proceeds step by step; and when at last they profess themselves satisfied, Simmias must still say that he feels, and cannot but feel, uncertain in his mind when he thinks of the magnitude of the subject and the littleness of man.[1] Socrates himself lapses into meditative silence in the height of his reasoning, and confesses that there are "many points still open to suspicion and attack—if anyone were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly."[2]

Profound as has been its intellectual interest and far-reaching its influence, few have been satisfied by the Platonic doctrine. It made but scanty conquests

[1] *Phædo*, 107.

[2] *Phædo*, 84; Jowett, *ut sup.* i. p. 461.

either at the time or in later schools of Greek and Roman thought. It was not accepted even by Plato's own immediate disciples. It does not appear to have obtained any place with Aristotle, in whose writings the whole question of the immortality of the soul is ignored; or, if not ignored, it is left so indeterminate by the great Stagirite that Origen[1] classes him with Epicurus in this matter, and modern scholars, not a few, have concluded that he did not believe in the soul's after-life.[2] The Stoics, notwithstanding the sympathy which might seem natural in their case with the moral purpose of the Platonic doctrine, continued to think of the soul of man as destined to immediate reabsorption into the great world-soul after death, or as surviving, if it survived at all, only

[1] *Contra Celsum*, iii. 75.

[2] What is known of the *Eudemus*, a lost Dialogue belonging to Aristotle's youth, seems to show that then, at least, he could not have held the soul to be mortal. But it is very different with his extant writings. Döllinger understands the doctrine which appears in the *Ethics* and elsewhere to amount to this, that "the really human in the soul, that which has come into being, must also pass away," and that "only the divine reason is immortal" (*The Gentile and the Jew*, i. pp. 338–340). Grote regards Aristotle's definition of the soul as involving a negation of the soul's survival after death. He adds that Aristotle "admits as credible the separate existence of the rational soul, without individuality or personality." See his *Plato*, ii. pp. 203, 204. The doctrine found in the *De Anima* and other writings, in which Aristotle speaks of the varieties of souls,—the nutritive soul, the sentient soul, the movent, appetitive, imaginative, noetic souls,—means, according to Grote, that individuality and immortality are things incompatible. The *Nous* is individualised in each person, and the *Nous* remains. But the intellectual life of the man dies out no less than the sentient life. See Grote's *Aristotle*, ii. pp. 193, 233, 234. Sir Alexander Grant thinks that Aristotle does not pronounce on the question, but passes it by as a question of theology; that if he believed in immortality at all, it could only have been an immortality like the Buddhist Nirvâna, death destroying the ἐνέργεια that makes happiness; that in any case he did not connect man's moral nature with the idea of a future life, and probably had no clear opinion on the whole subject. See his *Ethics of Aristotle*, i. pp. 299–302.

till the world's periodic conflagration.[1] Thinkers like Galen, otherwise among Plato's most appreciative students, could not go with him in this.[2] Even Cicero, who accepted Plato's doctrine, and reproduced so much of Plato's reasoning, seems never to have got beyond conjecture and probability, and never to have followed more than the uncertain speculative arguments derived from the nature of the soul.[3] At one time, with a confidence which seems to soar above all doubt, he can speak of a future life in which he shall join the society of the gods, and can protest that, if he errs in thinking the souls of men to be immortal, he delights in his error, and will not permit it to be torn from him so long as life lasts. But, again, when he has to face sorrow and find consolation for himself or others, his confidence wanes, he seeks comfort in insensibility, and can only say that "if there is nothing good in death, at least there is no evil."[4]

Even this is more than appears in the great mass of Greek and Latin literature belonging to the century before and the century after Christ. One despairing strain is heard in the poetry of Rome, lyric, elegiac, philosophic, and tragic. Horace sees nothing after death but weary night, endless exile, that makes it wise to snatch the present hours for pleasure.[5] Catullus knows of nothing to follow the short day of life but

[1] So apparently Seneca, *Consol. ad Marc.* 26. See Döllinger's *The Gentile and the Jew*, ii. p. 140.

[2] On this see especially Grote's *Plato*, ii. p. 204.

[3] *Tusculan Disput.* i. 27, 31, v. 13, etc.

[4] *Tusc. Disp.* i. 38 ; and especially his *Letters*, e.g. *Ad L. Mescin* v 21 ; *ad Toran.* vi. 21.

[5] *E.g.* Od. i. 14, 15, ii. 3, 27, iv. 9, etc.

the sleep of an eternal night.[1] "When the body has died," reasons the great thinker who sings of the *Nature of Things*, "we must admit that the soul has perished, wrenched away throughout the body. . . . No one wakes up, upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come."[2] The same sentence upon man's hopes is uttered, whether we interrogate poetry, prose or sepulchral inscription. "We shall soon fall asleep to wake no more," is the voice that recurs in the Greek anthology. "Earth and fire consume all that remains after death,"—this or its equivalent is the writing on the tombs.[3] The immortality of the soul is to men like Pliny a vain dream, the invention of folly or of mistaken desire.

The voice of the literature is also the voice of the monuments. "The wind which blows from the tombs of the ancients," says Goethe in a familiar passage in his *Italienische Reise*, "comes with gentle breath as over a mound of roses. The reliefs are touching and pathetic, and always represent life. There stand father and mother, their son between them, gazing at one another with unspeakable truth to nature. Here a pair clasp hands. Here a father seems to rest on his couch and wait to be entertained by his family. To me the presence of these scenes was very touching. Their art is of a late period, yet they are simple, natural, and of universal interest. Here there is no knight in harness on his knees awaiting a joyful resurrection.

[1] *Catullus*, v. 4.

[2] Lucretius, *De Rer. Nat.* iii. 798, 799, 929, 930. See Munro's *Lucretius*, ii. pp. 76, 79.

[3] See, *e.g.*, *Anthol.* i. 145; *Murat*, p. 1321; and the examples collected in Döllinger, *ut sup.* ii. pp. 142–147.

The artist has, with more or less skill, presented to us only the persons themselves, and so made their existence lasting and perpetual. They fold not their hands, gaze not into heaven; they are on earth, what they were and what they are. They stand side by side, take interest in one another, love one another; and that is what is in the stone, even though somewhat unskilfully, yet most pleasingly depicted." Much has been done, since Goethe visited Verona, in collecting and interpreting Greek and Roman epitaphs and sepulchral reliefs. But the witness of the tombs is only seen the more clearly to be what he recognised it to be. It is of the earthly life and the happiness of the past, not of the future and the hope of a larger existence, that they speak. They show us how dumb the Greeks and Romans were before the mystery of death, how small a place the anticipation of an after-life had even in the thoughts of sorrowing Athenians.

The belief was not extinguished. The cold criticism of the philosopher, the gay scepticism of the court poet, the sneer of the satirist, could not quench it. It outlived the present-worldliness of the Epicurean, the proud fanaticism of the Stoic, the reasoned negations of Lucretius, the matter of fact denials of Pliny, the bitter arrows of Lucian's scorn. There were at least some, of whom Plutarch is perhaps the best among the later instances, who continued to hold it with conviction. Even the jibes of a Lucian speak to the fact that the mass of the people had not wholly forsworn the ancient faith in an after-existence, with its happy fields for the good, and its torments of the

Furies for the evil.[1] And that this was the case is otherwise made good. The tombs, which so generally ignore the future, at times reveal other thoughts. Among those of Sparta and Northern Greece in especial a sentiment is found which shows incidentally, but with sufficient clearness, that the old belief in the persistence of life, and the view of the future which meets us in the historical beginnings of Greek civilisation, as seen in the Homeric poems, had continued to live.[2]

But if the belief survived, it was only in inconstant, hazy form—a tradition, a surmise, a faltering hope, a wish or a conjecture such as is uttered by Tacitus, that there might be something beyond the grave, at least for the souls of the noble few.[3] The most significant of all the tokens of its feebleness and futility is the fact that, even when it was most definite it had lost its moral meaning, and had parted with its moral connections. The Athenian tombs have nothing to say of a blessed immortality. They are silent on the whole subject of the rewards and penalties of the future. Until we reach a period late enough to admit of the introduction of Egyptian ideas and acquaintance with Egyptian art, we find no representations of the judgment of the soul among the funeral monuments of Athens. Cicero sees nothing more than a poetic fancy or ancient superstition in the idea of a retributive future, and in all that he writes so eloquently on the subject there is no recognition of the moral grounds

[1] Lucian, *De Luct.* 7–9.

[2] See Professor Percy Gardner's chapter on Spartan Tombs and the Cultus of the Dead, *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 339, etc.

[3] *Agricola*, 46.

for the hope of immortality. Plutarch, too, who holds it unreasonable to suppose that a thing like the soul of man should be made to live but for a day, speaks of the question of rewards and penalties in the after-life as one into which it is useless to inquire.[1]

When Christ came Hellenic thought ruled the world, and the world was a Roman world. What might have been had He not come, may be judged by what we see of Græco-Latin belief and disbelief, and by what the Platonic Dialogues show us of the last attainment of reason in its efforts to interpret and confirm sentiment. "A future state, it has been said, was discovered by the ancient world, like the Copernican system, as one guess among many. Rather say it was a shadow, a thought, a hope, a poetical fancy, to which the tradition of ages had given a sort of reality."[2] To make the hope of immortality man's sure and permanent possession, One was needed who could speak with a higher authority than that of the philosopher, One in whom was manifest the power of an endless life.

[1] *Nec suav. viv. posse*, 1104, 1105.
[2] Jowett, *St. Paul's Epistles*, etc., i. p. 81.

BOOK SECOND

The Old Testament Preparation

The free elevation of a people towards the divine grace, which is in reality ever coming forth to meet man, but yet at favoured moments calls to him with especial power, and the fruitful co-operation of human action with divine truths and powers, are the sources of all true nobility of character among men, and therefore in an especial degree of the nobility of the Mosaic age. So, perhaps, the most beautiful idea concerning this age is that of the great prophets of the eighth century : that Jahveh found Israel young and helpless in the desert, and in pure love adopted him as His son; and Israel responded to this great and prevenient love of Jahveh, and willingly submitted to His guidance.—Ewald.

In that age, however, the soaring hopes of the youthful community had only looked for the perpetuity of the pure Theocracy ; but now the noblest expectation could not help being directed to the coming of the true human King through whom the Theocracy would be consummated ; and thus the development of all Messianic hopes was enabled to make an important step in advance. . . . He is to be looked for, to be longed for, to be prayed for ; and how blessed it is simply to expect Him devoutly, and trace out every feature of His likeness ! To sketch the nobleness of His soul is to pursue in detail the possibility of perfecting all religion ; and to believe in the necessity of His coming is to believe in the perfecting of all divine agency on earth. Before the lightning flash of this truth in Israel's soul, every lower hope retreated.—Ewald.

CHAPTER I

NEGATIVE ASPECT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT PREPARATION

THE ideas which were current in the ancient world on the subject of a future life are of enduring interest, historically and philosophically. They are a witness to the living instinct of the human heart. They are a record of the endeavour of the human mind to find for that instinct a rational basis and an intellectual expression. They show the direction in which the deep craving of sentiment and the high argument of reason moved, and where they both stopped short. They point at the same time to a completeness and a certainty which were to come from beyond themselves.

But beside the Ethnic preparation, there was a preparation of a more positive kind, without which Christianity could not be; and beside the ideas and beliefs of the "nations," there were the thought and the faith of another people, to whom we owe the most vital pre-Christian contribution to the hope of immortality. The doctrine taught by Christ and His apostles cannot be historically interpreted apart from the ideas of the time, especially the Jewish ideas which are reflected in the non-canonical literature. Still less can it be separated from the faith and thought of the

Hebrew Scriptures to which it constantly attaches itself. Christianity had a creative power of its own, and brought new elements of truth into the world. That is a fact of the highest consequence, which has to be emphatically reasserted in face of present tendencies to allow too little for it. But, on the other hand, it is not to be overlooked that even in its most original contributions to faith and knowledge Christianity had a preparation, and that the forms in which its message to humanity was conveyed had been long making. It is in every way of essential moment, therefore, to study the beliefs of which the Old Testament gives witness, the relations in which these stand to the teaching of the New Testament, and the influence which the faith of Israel had upon the substance and the form of the Christian doctrine. In this the Old Testament prophets have a specially important place. In them we touch the point of issue for much that is seen in larger and more definite form in the New Testament.

Now, as regards the Old Testament view of immortality, it must be said at the outset that, while there are many difficulties connected with it, in fixing the meaning of particular statements, in tracing the line of the transmission of thought, in determining the chronological relations of beliefs and forms of expressions, the most formidable and most continuous difficulty is the first difficulty—that of transporting ourselves into a world of ideas, on the present and on the future, on good and on evil, on what makes life and what makes death, which are singularly unlike all that the Western and modern mind is accustomed to. We have to place ourselves outside a vast environment of intel-

lectual habit—the late result of the thoughts of men as for many centuries they have been directed to the problems of the future. We have to unlearn those philosophical conceptions and distinctions which rule our modern thinking. Above all we have to retire behind those specifically Christian views which have become a second nature to us. We have to divest ourselves for the time of this entire mental equipment, and transfer ourselves back to the position of thinkers and believers on whose horizon such things had not risen, and whose own ideas were entirely different, though prophetic of those later forms of thought and faith and contributory to them.

In this everything is difficult. It is most difficult to recede for the occasion from the Christian standpoint, and avoid reading into the familiar terms of the Old Testament meanings which are not theirs, but which have been made over to them almost beyond recall by the long force of devout association and the instinct of practical piety. It is not less difficult to do justice to the positive side of this essential preparation, and accommodate ourselves to a consistently historical use of the Old Testament. The original and intended sense should surely be the most edifying sense; and if so, the historical sense of the Old Testament must be sought and valued as the most profitable sense. Yet there is strong temptation to deal otherwise with the Old Testament, and to find in its institutions and in its words of hope, in its promises and in its prophecies, a wider range, a less immediate and temporal application than they historically possess. Religious phrases have often a very different meaning, and familiar figures a very

different point, in the historical situations in which they lie in the Old Testament, from what they have when they reappear in the New Testament. This is apt to be overlooked. Neither is it easy to adapt ourselves, in studying what is said on the subject of man's future, to the larger and more distinctive ideas of the Hebrew Scriptures—ideas of *man* which ignore our partition of him into body and soul, ideas of *life* which turn essentially on the relation to God, ideas of the *individual* which sink him characteristically in the nation, and link his personal interest and hope with the corporate interest and hope of the community.

There is the further difficulty, that the terms in which the Old Testament expresses itself on the future are for the most part figurative terms, and that the imagery varies to some extent with the period and the mind. Men of God, inspired by the faith in a divine order in human affairs, and by the sense of a divine work in the world with a certain goal before it, looked through the confusions of the time to a great future for Israel, and for the world through Israel. Their forecasts of this future became more vivid and more concrete as the circumstances of the time seemed the more to contradict them.[1] Truths of eternal moment, principles of more than temporary application, gleam through the strong colours and localised imagery in which these prophetic visions are cast. But it is easy

[1] On this see Ewald's *Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, B. iii., Zweite Hälfte, p. 424; also his *Old and New Testament Theology*, translated by Goadby, p. 363. Ewald makes some just remarks on the imagery of the Old Testament where the "sphere of knowledge extends into the sphere of anticipation"; and on the question of the abiding truth conveyed by figurative passages in which the colouring differs "as the age or the mind differed to which their origin may be traced."

to drive the figures too far, and impose on them more than they were meant to bear. The difficulty is increased by the circumstance that the words on the Last Things are fragmentary, occasional, and not always easy to harmonise. This is the case even with the New Testament. But it is much more the case with the Old Testament, in which God spake on this subject as on others "by divers portions and in divers manners." Nowhere, therefore, is greater caution needed than in interpreting the teaching of the Old Testament on immortality. After all is done, it will be with us as it was with the students of the Hebrew Scriptures before Christ. They did not succeed in drawing from the Old Testament a conception of the Messias that was found to correspond with the reality when He came. Neither may we expect to gather from the prophetic pictures of the consummation such a view of the Last Things as will prove, when seen in the light of the event, to have been wholly true and adequate.[1]

It must be added that any statement of the origin and development of Old Testament doctrine which can be made at present, must be given subject to the correction of a progressive historical criticism as from time to time it establishes its conclusions. In the present position of things only a provisional acceptance can be claimed for any chronological classification of the Old Testament writings. This might seem to render any construction of the order and the way in which any doctrine is delivered uncertain, and at the best but tentative. And no doubt our way would be

[1] See *Jahrbb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1856, p. 331.

clearer and surer were it practical to put each particular writing which is now included in the Canon in its own particular place in the historical order of the books, and in the historical presentation of the doctrine. But less depends on this than at first appears. For while it may not be possible to fix the date of each separate writing, it is possible to determine, in large outline at least, certain periods in the history of the literature, and to associate the less or more developed forms of religious belief with these. But what is of more consequence is the fact that the Old Testament faith was a thing of the *life* more than of the literature of the people. It does not follow, therefore, that the place occupied in the Hebrew writings by any of the beliefs of Israel necessarily indicates the actual position of these beliefs in the history of the people.[1] It will also be seen, in the course of the inquiry, that the uncertainties of criticism do not disturb our view of certain marked stages in the progress of Hebrew faith and Old Testament teaching on the subject of immortality.

It will be convenient to refer at first to certain ideas which are foreign to the Old Testament. The idea of

[1] "Israel's Religion," says Professor Hermann Schultz, "ist im *Leben*, nicht in einer Literatur entstanden und gewachsen." See the Preface to the fourth edition of his *Alttestamentliche Theologie*. He is content with a large general distribution of the writings and the beliefs, and declines to attempt a detailed historical classification, such as would involve the fixing of the date of each particular book. He adopts this plan, not only on account of the state of suspense in which important findings of criticism remain at present, but because the other course might mislead. It might make it seem as if in the Old Testament we had the ancient religious literature of Israel in approximate completeness, and as if we could infer from their appearance in a particular prophetic writing, that certain religious ideas were peculiar to that writing, or specifically of its date.

Extinction is one of these. It is true that sometimes we come upon things which appear to point the other way. There are voices in the Book of Psalms which speak as if the end of man's earthly history were the end of his whole history: *O spare me (look away from me), that I may recover strength, before I go hence, and be no more* (xxxix. 13); *his breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts (purposes) perish* (cxlvi. 4.). A similar strain is heard with a more mournful distinctness in the sublime book in which we have "our first, oldest statement of the never-ending problem, man's destiny and God's ways with man here in this earth."[1] In the swayings and tossings of sentiment and argument which make the drama of the Book of Job we come upon utterances like these: *Now shall I lie down in the dust; and thou shalt seek me diligently, but I shall not be* (vii. 21, R.V.); *there is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease. . . . But man dieth and wasteth away; yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fade from the sea, and the river decayeth and drieth up; so man lieth down, and riseth not: till the heavens be no more they shall not awake, nor be roused out of their sleep* (xiv. 7–12, R.V.).

The same note is struck again, and with a heavier melancholy, in the book which has the saddest tone of all the Old Testament writings, and preaches most loudly the defeat of every way of seeking the happiness of life apart from God. Koheleth reflects "the gloom of the soul vanquished by the anomalies and mysteries

[1] Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship*, in the chapter on "Mahomet."

of human life"[1] in sentences like these: *That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them; as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath* (or, *spirit*); *and man hath no pre-eminence above the beasts: for all is vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man whether it goeth* (or, *that goeth*) *upward, and the spirit of the beast whether it goeth* (or, *that goeth*) *downward to the earth? Wherefore I saw that there is nothing better, than that a man should rejoice in his works; for that is his portion: for who shall bring him back to see what shall be after him?* (Eccles. iii. 19–22, R.V.).

Passages like these, in which the Old Testament speaks of man's end in strange and absolute terms, have induced some to say that, in certain books at least, and at certain stages of its faith, it recognises no kind of future for man, but regards him simply as ceasing to be when he dies. But these incidental utterances are far from justifying such a conclusion. They can be made to do so only by divorcing them from their immediate occasion and purpose, and ignoring the whole tenor of the Old Testament, which is obviously anti-materialistic. They form no part of its general thought or belief, far less of its teaching. They reflect moods of feeling, sinkings and fluctuations of hope, which may come at times on any mind in the dark and painful things of life. Or they express what death means when for the moment it is looked at simply from the side of nature, as the removal of the

[1] Dean Bradley's *Lectures on Ecclesiastes*, p. 39.

individual from the engagements, possessions, and activities of the familiar earthly scene.

The idea of death, it is true, is sometimes connected with the *Nephesh* or *soul*, as in Balaam's wish: "Let me die" (*i.e.* let *my soul* die) "the death of the righteous"; and in the phrase "they die" (*i.e.* their *soul dies*) "in their youth."[1] There are even cases in which the *soul* appears to be identified with the corpse, as when it is said, "Neither shall he go into any dead body" (*i.e.* to the *soul* of one that is dead).[2] But these are merely instances of the use of the word *soul* as an equivalent of the personal pronoun, or in the sense of person, as we speak of so many *souls* perishing, —a use due to the fact that the *Nephesh* or soul is regarded as the centre of the personality.[3]

[1] Num. xxiii. 10; Job xxxvi. 14.

[2] נֶפֶשׁ מֵת, Lev. xxi. 11. So Num. vi. 6: "He shall come at no dead body" (*i.e.* at no *soul* of one dead); and xix. 13: "Whosoever toucheth the dead body of any man that is dead" (*i.e.* a dead one, the *soul* of the man who dieth).

[3] Delitzsch refers to Num. xix. 11, 13; also to Lev. xxii. 4; Hag. ii. 13, and other analogies. He compares the Talmudic and Syriac employment of *naphsho* (*nafscho*) in the sense of a *monument* erected over the dead, and cites the idea extensively entertained in antiquity, that the soul retains a certain association with the corpse. This latter idea is also found in the Talmud, which speaks of the soul as hovering about the dead body for twelve months. He thinks, therefore, that the explanation of such terms as those in Num. xix. 11, 13 is to be sought in the impression, "gloomy, spiritual, phantom-like," which is made by the corpse, and in the feeling that the connection between the body and the soul is not entirely neutralised by death. See his *System of Biblical Psychology*, pp. 522–525 (Clark's trans.). For the simpler view, see Böttcher, *De Inferis*, etc., § 127; Schultz, *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, p. 628; Knobel and Dillmann on the relative passages (*Kurzgef. exeg. Handbuch zum A. T.*); Oehler's *Old Testament Theology*, pp. 150, 169, 172 (Day's edition); Riehm's *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, p. 190. Perhaps what underlies those expressions in which the soul is spoken of as *dead* or *dying* is simply, as Riehm suggests, the idea that the continuance of existence in the under-world meant, not the continuance of real life, but the reduction of the personality to a shade.

That the idea of extinction is foreign to the Old Testament needs no arguing. The mention of the arts of the necromancer, which are forbidden by the Law and derided by the prophets, indicates the hold which the belief in an after-existence of some kind had upon the mind of the people.[1] The instances of the restoration of the dead to life, and the prophetic anticipations of a resurrection, however understood, show at least that at the time to which these records belong death was not supposed to be absolutely and irremediably an end to man.[2] The thought of annihilation is inconsistent with the general conception of a realm of the dead, distinct from the grave, which pervades the Old Testament. It is at variance also with the whole Old Testament doctrine of God and man. Where there is no belief in a God, disbelief in a life beyond the grave is natural. But Israel's faith in God was the guarantee of Israel's faith in a *Hereafter*, and all that the Old Testament has to say of what God and man are to each other forbids the thought of extinction.

The problem which pursues the mind of Israel is not the possibility of a future existence, but the nature of that existence. That there is a *Beyond* of some form, is one of the things most obviously presupposed all through the Old Testament, in the Pentateuch and the Book of Job not less than in the prophets. Even the doubts of Ecclesiastes do not negative it. Looking at things as nature presents them, the Preacher may be unable to say whether a man has any pre-

[1] Lev. xix. 31, xx. 6 ; Deut. xviii. 11 ; 1 Sam. xxviii. 7 ; Isa. viii. 19.
[2] 1 Kings xvii. 21 ; 2 Kings iv. 34 ; Isa. xxvi. 19, etc.

eminence over a beast,—whether the spirit of the man goes upward, and the spirit of the beast downward.[1] But he knows that God has put into man's heart, not only the consciousness of his limitations, but something that takes him beyond them and speaks of the eternal.[2] How differently the Old Testament

[1] Eccles. iii. 19–21. The sentiment is so far like that in Prov. xv. 24. It is suggested, indeed, that this passage may have been in the writer's mind. A closer parallel is Ps. xlix. 14, 20, only that in Ecclesiastes "the thought is generalised in the tones of a half-cynical despair, all the more striking if we assume that the belief in immortality, as afterwards developed in the creed of Pharisaism, was at the time gaining a more definite form among the writer's countrymen" (see Plumptre's *Ecclesiastes*, *in loc.*). If the question in ver. 21 is taken to be (as the ancient Versions put it, and the context requires) the sceptical question whether there is an "upwards" for the spirit of man, in contrast with the "downwards" of the spirit of the beast, it is still something different from positive denial. It is a dilemma which, as Delitzsch observes, makes it "no surprise if Koheleth finally decides that the way of the spirit of a man is upwards." Mr. Tyler, who affirms the composite nature of the book, thinks this is one of the passages in which Epicurean sentiments are expressed. On the other hand, he admits that in ix. 5–10, another passage which he regards as essentially Epicurean, there may be the idea of an after-existence for men, at least in the condition of inert shades; and further, that the idea of individual immortality may underlie chap. iii. 17. See his *Ecclesiastes*, pp. 64, 65.

[2] Eccles. iii. 11. The rendering of the A.V., and also of the R.V. in its *text*, has undoubtedly strong support in the LXX., Aquila, the Vulgate, and in interpreters of the rank of Knobel, Ewald, etc. Professor Cheyne also adheres, accepting Lord Bacon's paraphrase: "God has framed the mind like a glass, capable of the image of the universe, and desirous to receive it as the eye to receive the light" (see his *Job and Solomon*, p. 210). The use of "*Olam*," however, both in the Old Testament generally, and in Ecclesiastes in particular, is too weighty an argument for the rendering "eternity" to be readily set aside. It is obvious, too, that neither rendering can be taken without further explanation. Mr. Tyler, who adopts "set the world in their heart," makes it mean that men are "moved by an internal impulse to occupy themselves with its pursuits." Dean Plumptre, who takes the other view, finds in the words, not the hope of immortality itself, but rather "the sense of the infinite which precedes it, and out of which it grows." It is the sense of something beyond the limitations of earth, the instinct of a more enduring existence, the certainty of which cannot be made good by reason. See also Delitzsch, *in loc.*, who adds that "it is not so much the practical as the intellectual

would have spoken, had it thought of the death of man as the extinction of the being of man, will at once appear if we compare it, in its gloomiest and most doubtful passages, with the words of the great Latin genius who "devotes his poetical rage to representing the clear philosophical conception of total annihilation."[1]

But if the Old Testament doctrine is opposed to the materialistic explanation of man's origin and end, it is no less opposed to the *Pantheistic* view of his future. The continued life which it presupposes or teaches is not a life merged in any world-soul or abstract deity. The notion of an after-life which involves the loss of personal identity, the thought of an immortality reserved for the intellectual *élite* who are capable of realising the connection of their existence with that of the universal Spirit or Substance, has no place in the Old Testament. This may seem remarkable, when one considers the natural aptitude of the Eastern mind for pantheistic speculation, and the departures which were made in that direction by later Judaism. It may seem the more remarkable when it is remembered that, in its doctrine of union with God as the highest object of attainment and the secret of life, the Old Testament has something which seems to be in affinity with that order of thought.

Some who think that the later books of the

side of this endowment, and this peculiar dignity of human nature, that Koheleth has here in view."

[1] Canon Mozley notices how Lucretius shows us "what language that is which does express this latter idea, and . . . how different it is from that of the Old Testament description of the phenomenon of death" (*Lectures and other Theological Papers*, p. 53). See also Wright's *Ecclesiastes in Relation to Modern Criticism and Pessimism*, p. 192.

Hebrew Canon betray the influence of Greek thought, are disposed to find at least incidental traces of pantheistic ideas in these writings. In particular, the Book of Ecclesiastes is supposed to reflect the doctrine of Stoicism on the subject of man's end; not only the current doctrine, that souls survive for a certain period,—those of the virtuous till the great world-conflagration, and those of the wicked for a limited time in a penal condition in the under-world,—but the less usual doctrine, that at death the human soul mingles with the eternal world-soul.

An instance of this is thought to be furnished by the Preacher's declaration at the close of his dark thoughts on life: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."[1] "If we understand the last clause," it is argued, "to denote the reabsorption of the soul into the Deity, there is then a congruity with the first clause, which points to the dissolution of the body, and to its particles mingling again with the earth."[2] But

[1] Eccles. xii. 7.

[2] Tyler's *Ecclesiastes*, p. 65. Knobel, Hitzig, Warburton, Le Clerc, are among those who find in this passage the ideas of the loss of personality and the reabsorption of the soul. Böttcher, notices, however, the difference between a verse like this, in which it is the *Ruach* that is spoken of, and such a passage as Ps. xlix. 15, in which the *Nephesh* is in view. He thinks that Eccles. xii. 7 gives nothing beyond a general statement of the fact that at death the vital principle goes back to God from whence it came. *De Inferis*, p. 247. Ewald connects the sentence closely with the preceding figures, and takes its point to be simply this: that the spirit can no more return to the body, when once it has gone back to God at death, than one can get at the deep water in the well when once the wheel is broken. See his *Salom. Schriften*, p. 326. Professor Cheyne regards the verse as a "direct contradiction of iii. 21," and inclines to deal with it as an interpolation. He admits, however, that if the word *Ruach* means the "personal conscious side of man" in iii. 21, it should have the same meaning here. *Job and Solomon*, pp. 227, 228. The Targum understands

the introduction of this philosophical idea would be strange indeed in a passage which speaks in simple, natural terms of the transiency of life and the weariness of age, and of nothing else. It would be inconsistent, too, with the conception of Sheol which appears in this book precisely as it does in others. The whole Old Testament view of man, which is a broad, non-philosophical view, asserting from its beginning to its end both the personal life of man and the dignity of man, but never speaking of the soul as a *portion* of God, stands far apart from the pantheistic explanation of man's future, whether in its Stoical form or in any other. The intimation of an after-existence which is given in the general thought and teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures, may be indistinct and incomplete. But the future to which it points is not of this abstract and impersonal kind. It is an existence which has lost the warm colours of life. But it is one in which the *self* subsists, though it be in the reduced measure of a shade.

Neither has the Old Testament anything in common with the dogma of *Metempsychosis*. In the course of

it of the return of the spirit to stand in judgment before God ; and this is held by Plumptre and others to be substantially correct. Dr. Wright, being of opinion that the *judgment* which is mentioned in iii. 17, viii. 10–15, xi. 9, means more than the judgment which takes effect in the present world, thinks it unnatural to explain the passage as "signifying a mere yielding back to God the vital breath of life which He has bestowed on man" (*Ecclesiastes, ut sup.* p. 174). Delitzsch concedes that it expresses in the first instance only the fact that "the component parts of the human body return whence they came." But his view is, that the question left unsettled in iii. 21 is here answered in the affirmative, and that what is said both of *Sheol* and of *judgment* makes it clear that the return of the spirit upwards to God, which is here asserted, cannot be "thought of as a resumption of the spirit into the essence of God" (see his *Commentary, in loc.*).

time that dogma did obtain a considerable place in Judaism, but not in any definite form till a very late period. The Karaite Jews seem to have held it from the seventh century of our era onwards. It is inferred from Saadia's assaults upon it that it was in favour with certain Jews of the ninth century. It has a distinct position in the Kabbalah. In the Book of *Zohar* all souls are regarded as subject to transmigration. Men, it is said, are "ignorant of the many transmigrations and secret probations which they have to undergo, and the number of souls and spirits which enter into this world and do not return to the palace of the Heavenly King;" . . . "they do not know how the souls revolve like a stone which is thrown from a sling; as it is written, 'And the souls of thine enemies, them shall He sling out, as out of the middle of a sling' (1 Sam. xxv. 29)."[1]

A statement made by Josephus has led some to think the dogma was accepted by the Pharisees of our Lord's time. He speaks of them as holding that "every soul is imperishable, but only those of the righteous pass into another body, while those of the wicked are, on the contrary, punished with eternal torment."[2] But elsewhere he gives another and more exact account of the opinions of the Pharisees. In this he explains their belief to be, that "an immortal strength belongs to souls, and that there are beneath the earth punishments and rewards for those who in life devoted themselves to virtue or vile-

[1] See Ginsburg, *The Kabbalah, its Doctrines, Development, and Literature*, pp. 42, 43.

[2] *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 14.

ness; and that eternal imprisonment is appointed for the latter, but the possibility of returning to life for the former."[1] If the less definite statement is read in the light of the more definite, it will appear probable that in the former Josephus simply gives a Greek philosophical form to the ordinary doctrine of the resurrection, which is ascribed in the New Testament to the Pharisees.[2]

It has also been inferred from one or two passages in the Gospels that this doctrine of transmigration was a common Jewish belief in our Lord's time. The passages referred to are those in which Herod the Tetrarch in his dismay speaks of Jesus as a reincarnation of the Baptist;[3] those in which both Christ and John are reported to have been taken by the people for reappearances of some of the ancient prophets;[4] and that in which the disciples put to Jesus the question about the blind man, "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?"[5] But these passages are not sufficient for the purpose. It is doubtful whether the last is more than the statement of a difficulty, with no very definite notion of the answer to it. If there is more in it, it may be the idea of ante-natal sin.[6] The others speak, not of a re-

[1] *Antiq.* xviii. 1. 3.

[2] See Böttcher, *De Inferis*, p. 552; and Schürer's *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, Div. ii. vol. iii. p. 13 (Clark's trans.). Delitzsch also takes it to be nothing more than the Biblical doctrine of resurrection maintained by the Pharisees in opposition to the Sadducees, "on which Josephus, that it might not be used to put him to shame before the Romans, puts this Pythagorean-Platonic judgment" (*System of Biblical Psychology*, p. 545, Clark's trans.).

[3] Matt. xiv. 2; Mark vi. 16; Luke ix. 9.

[4] Matt. xvi. 14; Luke ix. 19; John ix. 21. [5] John ix. 2.

[6] Bishop Westcott observes "that it is perhaps most natural to suppose that the question, which in itself belongs to a Jewish mode of thought, was asked without any distinct apprehension of the alternatives involved"

embodiment of the soul, but of a reappearance of the person, and imply nothing beyond the belief that "one and the same man may emerge at several times under different names in the current history of the world."[1] In the New Testament, therefore, there is little or nothing to show that the Jews to whom Christ's teaching was addressed, were familiar with the idea of transmigration.

There is even less reason to say that there is any indication of it in the Old Testament. Some of the Fathers, it is true, did connect it with the Hebrew Scriptures. Origen,[2] for example, used it to explain the passages which speak of Jeremiah's sanctification from the womb and Jacob's struggle with Esau.[3] But it was only by allegorical methods of interpretation that this could be done. This freedom from all connection with the dogma of transmigration is a remarkable fact in the history of Israel's faith. It

(see his *Commentary, in loc.*). Godet, remarking on the fact that the doctrine of metempsychosis was never popular in Israel, says: "It would therefore have been necessary to admit that this man's misfortune was either a chastisement inflicted in anticipation of his future sins, or the punishment of some sin committed in the embryo state (Ps. xl. 7),—both very improbable explanations"; and the disciples, he thinks, perceiving no reasonable solution, asked Jesus to decide. Calvin finds the idea of transmigration here; De Wette and others, that of the pre-existence of souls; Tholuck, that of suffering as a punishment in *anticipation* of sin. But even if we had better reason to believe that these philosophical doctrines had found their way into Jewish thought at this period, we should require, as Meyer rightly suggests, very strong evidence to entitle us to say that they had become popularly known among the mass of the people.

[1] Delitzsch, *System of Biblical Psychology*, p. 545. He refers to the Rabbinical idea that Beor, Cushan-Rishathaim, and Laban were one and the same person.

[2] *De princ.* i. 1, c. vii.; *Contra Celsum*, i. 3; and Ginsburg's *Kabbalah*, p. 43.

[3] Jer. i. 5; Gen. xxv. 26; Hos. xii. 3.

would be a still more remarkable fact if we could say that, during the periods of Israel's most intimate connection with Egypt, this dogma had the place in Egyptian thought which used to be asserted for it. Apart from that, it is also significant that there is no trace in the Old Testament even of that belief in the power of the justified to transfer themselves from place to place and from body to body, which is so prominent in the *Book of the Dead*.[1]

Its detachment from this whole range of thought, too, distinguishes Israel's faith decisively, not only from the beliefs which dominated the distant East on the subject of man's future, but from the Hellenic thought which touched it so closely in its later stages. The idea of metempsychosis obtained such a position in the doctrines of the Pythagoreans and the Orphic brotherhood, in the systems of Empedocles and Plato, and in other varieties of Greek speculation, that Nemesius goes so far as to say that all those Greeks who believed in the immortality of the soul held also the dogma of *metensomatosis* or transmigration.[2] There was much to commend the latter to the Greek thinker. We can understand, to some extent, the tremendous grasp which it has had upon the human mind, and how it should have had the assent of the great Platonist teachers on to the third century of our era. It seems to meet in a large and reasonable way the natural craving for continuance of being. It suggests a form of existence which makes an indefinite prolongation of being

[1] See above, p. 45.

[2] Κοινῇ μὲν πάντες Ἕλληνες, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφηνάμενοι, τὴν μετενσωμάτωσιν δογματίζουσι (*De Natura Hominis*, ii. p. 50).

easily conceivable. It allies itself with the great conception of the unity of life.[1] It deals with the problem of the origin of evil in a manner which appears to solve it, by removing it to a measureless distance. Above all, it professes to give an explanation of the anomalies of existence, and the lack of accord between desert and fortune. It accounts for what is by what has been, and furnishes at the same time motives for the righteous use of the present by hopes and fears drawn from the future.[2]

The terrors of the future, it is true, in point of fact overbore all else that the dogma offered, darkening the life of the people, and cutting the nerve of such belief in the soul's immortality as the ancient world could reach. But, theoretically regarded, it seemed to provide the necessary background to the present life, and

[1] "If a man," says Professor Max Müller, "feels that what, without any fault of his own, he suffers in this life can only be the result of some of his own former acts, he will bear his sufferings with more resignation, like a debtor who is paying off an old debt. And if he knows besides that in this life he may by suffering, not only pay off his old debts, but actually lay by moral capital for the future, he has a motive for goodness, which is not more selfish than it ought to be" (*Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 165).

[2] In the Virgilian vision of the Underworld man and beast, winged things and the monstrous forms bred in ocean, all have their life from the soul or spirit that inly sustains "heaven and earth, the liquid fields, the shining orb of the moon, and the Titanian star." The soul of the individual is of divine birth. It is a part of the universal soul, but is clogged and dulled by the body to which it is attached. Hence its fears and sorrows and infirmities. Hence, too, when death comes, there must be a schooling in punishment, that "the forfeit of a lifelong ill may be paid," and the "taint of guilt washed out beneath the dreary deep or burned away in fire." Thereafter the shades are "sent to the broad spaces of Elysium, some few of us to possess the happy fields; till length of days completing Time's circle takes out the ingrained soilure and leaves unstained the ethereal sense and pure spiritual flame." After a thousand years they drink of the river of Lethe, "regain in forgetfulness the slopes of earth, and begin to desire to return again into the body" (*Æneid*, vi. 723–731, Mackail's translation; and Conington's *Virgil*, ii. 418, 419).

to furnish a solution of its moral riddles, which showed, not only that right will be done in some distant future, but that right is being done here and now. These moral enigmas and incongruities haunted the mind of Israel as they haunted the mind of other nations. We see by the Old Testament how the Hebrew saint wrestled with them under a weight of pained perplexity which was possible only where there was such faith as his in a Divine order. But a doctrine which accounted for the maladjustment of things by affirming a previous condition of being of which men had no recollection, was too remote and intangible to satisfy Israel's sense of the intimacy and immediacy of the relations between God and His people. In their cries for light upon the ways of God which coupled calamity with righteousness, the Hebrews did not fall under the spell of this dogma ; nor in their darkest thoughts did they become victims of the terrors with which it burdened existence. The soul-wandering which explained life, also poisoned life, and robbed it of its zest. But the Israel of the Old Testament knew nothing of the misery of existence which transmigration meant to the Hindu, and nothing of the longing for the extinction of individual existence as the true beatitude.

As it is with the dogma of transmigration, so is it with that of the *Pre-existence of souls.* The attitude of the Old Testament to the former is also its attitude to the latter. They are related dogmas, and both are connected in ancient belief with the dogmas of emanation and absorption. The theory of metempsychosis supposes a prior existence for the soul as well as an

after-existence; and in the great systems of thought its underlying principle is, that all finite souls are parts of the Divine or Universal Soul, separating from it, passing into bodily forms, incurring contamination, bearing penalty, doing penance, undergoing purification, and merging again in that from which they came. There is an intimate and natural connection between these things in ancient speculation on the soul and its destiny. And the reason is evident. "The ancient mind," says Canon Mozley, "was imprisoned within the vice of that old axiom, that *whatever is generated must decay.*"[1] This meant that if the soul is imperishable it must be ungenerate; that if it is eternal *a parte post*, it must be eternal *a parte ante*; that the individual soul must have its life in the Universal Soul, and come as an emanation from it.

It being characteristic of ancient speculation to regard the pre-existence of the soul as implied in the immortality of the soul, the same mental habit, it has been thought, must have appeared in the case of the Hebrews and their ideas of the future; and certain passages in the Old Testament have been imagined to bear this out. But the evidence utterly fails. At the most, only three or four passages—particularly Job i. 21 and Ps. cxxxix. 15, 16; sometimes also Deut. xxix. 14, 15 and Job xxxviii. 19–21—are cited; and only artificial interpretations can lend even these sparse instances any semblance of relevancy.[2] Traces of the same belief

[1] *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, p. 36.

[2] In Job i. 21, J. D. Michaelis and one or two more take the allusion to be to the earth as the first mother of all, so that the idea becomes that of a prior existence in the deep bosom of earth. Others under-

have also been detected by some in the New Testament writings. It has been supposed, for example, to be latent in the passage already referred to in the narrative of the man born blind.[1] But the words prove belief in the pre-existence of the soul as little as belief in transmigration.

Outside the Canonical books the case is different. The dogma appears in the Apocryphal literature. The *Wisdom of Solomon*, like as it is to the *Hochma* books of the Old Testament, betrays the influence of the Greek philosophy in this as in other things. With its Alexandrian conception of the soul as the proper *self*, and its Alexandrian idea of the body as a burden, an earthly tabernacle weighing down the mind,[2] it seems to hold the soul to be a pre-existent thing, which in time enters a body adapted to what it had been in the pre-temporal condition. "Now, when I considered these things in myself," says the Speaker, "and pondered that immortality is in the alliance of wisdom . . . I went about seeking how I should take

stand the "thither" to refer to the condition of non-existence out of which existence comes. So Hupfeld substantially. In Ps. cxxxix. the idea of pre-existence is supposed to lie especially in the 15th verse. But ver. 13 indicates what the Psalmist has in view when he uses the phrase the "lowest parts of the earth." Both in Job and in this Psalm there is a comparison, somewhat broken in form, between the earth and the womb as the "laboratory of the origin of existence," and all that is said in the Psalm is said with respect to the Divine omniscience and omnipresence, to which nothing is secret or remote. In Job xxxviii. 19–21, the rendering of the Septuagint is appealed to. See the commentaries, especially Delitzsch's, on Ps. cxxxix.; also Oehler's *Old Testament Theology* (Day's edition), pp. 151, 152; Deane's *The Book of Wisdom*, p. 158; Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 632.

[1] John ix. 2. De Wette, Brückner, and others found the doctrine of pre-existence here. But, *per contra*, see especially Meyer *in loc.*

[2] ix. 15: *φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχὴν, καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα.*

her to myself. For I was a goodly child (a youth of good, *or* comely parts), and obtained a good soul; or rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled."[1] Similar opinions are ascribed by Josephus to the Essenes. He reports them to have taught not only that, in contrast with the perishable body, the soul is immortal, but that souls exist originally in the subtlest ether; that descending from that, drawn by a kind of natural yearning, they become united with bodies as with prisons; and that when freed from the fetters of flesh, they rejoice and soar aloft as if delivered from a long bondage.[2]

It is also one of the points in Philo's system in which his Platonism most distinctly asserts itself, though with characteristic Jewish modifications. To him the body is the source of evil, the corpse, the coffin, the tomb of the soul. The sensitive animal soul in man rises by generation, but the reasoning spirit or rational soul comes to him from without, being an emanation

[1] Chap. viii. 17, 19, 20: *παῖς δὲ ἦμην εὐφυής, ψυχῆς τε ἔλαχον ἀγαθῆς. μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἦλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμίαντον.* The words might not imply more than that souls come from God, or that they have a pre-existence in the Divine mind and purpose. It is generally admitted, however, that they point to some kind of real pre-existence. At the same time, it is not a pre-existence quite the same as that affirmed by the Neo-Platonists or by Philo. The idea of matter as necessarily evil is not expressed here; nor have we the distinctions which are found in Philo. See Deane's *The Book of Wisdom*, p. 158; also Appendix, Note G.

[2] *Bell. Jud.* 8. 11. The bearing of the statement is not quite clear, neither is it certain that it is altogether correct. It runs as follows:— *καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτοῖς, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν, καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μέν, ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος, ὥσπερ εἱρκταῖς τοῖς σώμασιν ἰυγγί τινι φυσικῇ καταspωμένας. ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀνεθῶσι τῶν κατὰ σάρκα δεσμῶν, οἷα δὴ μακρᾶς δουλείας ἀπηλλαγμένας, τότε χαίρειν καὶ μετεώρους φέρεσθαι.* See Schürer's *History of the Jewish People*, *ut sup.* Div. II. vol. iii. p. 205; Deane's *The Book of Wisdom*, p. 157; Fritzsche u. Grimm's *Kurzg. Exeg. Handbuch zu den Apocryphen*, 6th Lief. p. 177.

from Deity. These divine powers or emanations have their original seat in the air, and are of different ranks. Some of them reside in the higher regions of the atmosphere, and act as the media of the Deity in His intercourse with the world. Others dwell nearer earth, and under the spell of sense descend into mortal bodies. This distinction of orders appears to be original. Those of the former order are incorruptible, have divine thoughts, and are known among the Greeks as heroes and dæmons (δαίμονες, in the early, good sense of the word), but are called *angels* by Moses. Those of the latter are corruptible, not in virtue of their intrinsic nature, but in consequence of their connection with bodies, from which, however, it is possible to obtain release in time. The souls of men are of this second order, emanations pre-existing in the air, and drawn by sense into the prison-house or grave of the body, in which their true life is dormant.[1]

The same doctrine attains large dimensions at a later period in the history of Jewish thought. In the Talmud we find the idea of the Holy One taking counsel with the choir of souls, when he is about to create the world. Human souls are also represented as dwelling in the seventh heaven before they are born on our earth, and as quitting the divine storehouse of souls from time to time in order to people the world. These ideas appear in forms still more peculiar and more developed in the Kabbalah. The book of *Zohar*

[1] Among other passages, see *De Somniis*, i. 642 ; *De mundi opificio*, i. 15 ; *De migratione Abrahami*, i. 438 ; *De Gigantibus*, i. 263. See also Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen*, iii. 2, pp. 319–402 ; Gfrörer's *Philo*, i. 373–415 ; Schürer, *ut sup.* Div. II. vol. iii. pp. 377, 378 ; Drummond's *Philo Judæus*, i. pp. 336, 337.

teaches that when God purposed to create the world, He had it before Him in idea, and that He then made all the souls of the race of men that were to be, having them before Him in the forms which they were to take in the body, and foreseeing that were some among them who would "corrupt their way upon the earth."

In this late outcome of Jewish thought all the souls that are designed by God to occupy human bodies and live for a time on earth, pre-exist in the invisible world of emanations. In that world the souls of righteous men are higher in dignity than the angels; and there is a reason for their descent to earth. The question why souls living thus on high should come down into the imprisonment of the earthly, bodily life is left unanswered, or vaguely dealt with by Philo. But in the Kabbalah it is distinctly put and definitely answered. Their descent is not of their own choice, but by the will of God, who sends them for a time into this world, as a king sends his son into the country for a period, to grow up and be educated, and learn the customs of the court.[1]

So it is in the lengthened range of Jewish thought outside the Old Testament, and the survey is instructive. Within the Old Testament we are in another world. The doctrine of the soul's pre-existence has been accepted by Christian philosophers like Henry More as the most rational explanation of some of the great mysteries of being. It has been used in Christian interests by theologians like Origen in ancient days. Divines like Julius Müller have applied it in much more recent times

[1] On the doctrine of the Talmud and the Kabbalah, see Ginsburg's *The Kabbalah*, pp. 30–34; Delitzsch's *Biblical Psychology*, pp. 43–45.

to the exposition of the Biblical doctrine of sin. It need not carry with it the disastrous connections and consequences which it had in the later Jewish writings. But it does not exist even in its purest form in the Old Testament. And how naturally it allies itself with what is repugnant to Christian truth, and in particular with what impairs the hope of a real immortality, is seen by the associations in which it stands in these Jewish books.

Its affinities are with the doctrine of emanations and with a pantheistic view of the world. Even in Plato it approaches that. In the Platonists and the Stoics it is that. To them the human soul is not a work of God, but a portion of God. It was a just observation of Warburton that, while the thinkers of the ancient world spoke of God and Matter as self-existent, they knew no third self-existence, and could not but hold the human soul to be a part of God in holding it to be eternal.[1] But in the Jewish philosophies the doctrine of pre-existence is even more fatally entangled in these meshes. Man is indeed the microcosm, an epitome of the universe; and his soul lives in the celestial world before it appears in its earthly tabernacle. But that celestial world is the world of emanations, and man is not the immediate work of God, but owes his existence to Intelligences[2] who are themselves evolutions of Deity. The God to whom man's soul is related is an abstract Deity, the Boundless One, who contains all within Himself; and man's world, which comes into being after the destruction of previous worlds, is not the creation of God, but a further expansion

[1] *Divine Legation*, iii. 4.

[2] The ten *Sephiroth*.

of God, the evolution of Intelligences who are themselves emanations from God.

But the Old Testament stands utterly aloof from those speculative notions and all their complications. It recognises an ideal pre-existence, but no other. It expresses in many significant statements a doctrine which appears in its full magnitude in the New Testament, the doctrine that man and his history are present to the eternal foreknowledge and purpose of God.[1] But it knows nothing of an actual existence of souls previous to the creative act that makes man at once body and soul, and nothing of a pre-temporal origin of souls that makes them of God's substance. Had it gone in the direction of those later ideas, it could not have furnished the basis for the hope of a real immortality. These ideas, whether Hellenic or Jewish, struck at the roots of that hope, and took from the dignity of man while seeming to exalt him. They did so by stripping man of his real personality. Absorption is the end where emanation is the beginning. A being originating of the substance of God merges at last in the essence of God.

This aloofness of the Old Testament from ways of thinking of a future life, which are familiar to us in other literatures, demands the first attention of the student. It is a thing of the utmost moment, and it is by no means limited to the instances already given. It extends to others of different degrees of importance. The Old Testament is clear, for example, of the idea of circles of the under-world, of which much is made in

[1] Gen. i. 26; Jer. i. 5; Ps. cxxxix. 16; Acts xv. 18; Eph. i. 4; Rom. viii. 28–30; 1 Pet. i. 1.

some of the Ethnic religions. Occasional passages have been grasped at as if they implied this; but mistakenly. The one which is supposed to be most to the purpose, is Prov. ix. 18. But the mention of the "depths of Sheol" there is but a metaphorical description of the deep destruction, the death in life, that is in the house of lasciviousness. Neither do we find any recognition of the notion which was common to so many nations, that the repose of the soul is dependent on the burial of the body. The section in Isa. xiv. 15–23 simply states that the Babylonian monarch will not have the honourable burial of a king, nor be laid with his regal predecessors in the ancestral tomb.

The Old Testament is no less free from those exaggerated conceptions of the *body* which have been congenial to ancient faiths and philosophies. In one aspect Egyptian thought and later Greek thought stood at opposite extremes in this matter; as the Homeric ideas and the Platonic speculations were also far apart from each other. But the Old Testament has nothing in common with either extreme. On the one hand it knows nothing of the Platonic degradation of the body into the mere cell, shackle, or sepulchre of the soul. In the whole compass of the Hebrew Scriptures there are not more than one or two phrases which can with any plausibility be said to approach the Greek philosophical idea.[1] On the other hand these Scriptures

[1] The passage mainly in question is the one in Dan. vii. 15: "I, Daniel, was grieved in my spirit in the midst of my body, and the visions of my head troubled me." The word rendered "body" is נִדְנֶה = a *sheath*. The spirit of the prophet is compared to a sword, and his body to the scabbard in which it is laid. Ewald translates thus: "Pierced through felt the heart of me Daniel in the midst of its sheath, and the visions of my head confound me." That is to say, Daniel's soul is agitated,

have as little affinity with that exaltation of the body which belongs to the idea of life in the great Greek epics, or with the conceptions which gave force to Egyptian customs in the disposal of the dead. These customs were connected, as we have seen, with the belief that the continuance of the body and the survival of the soul were somehow dependent on each other; that the corpse had to be preserved and the soul retained in its old associations, if in the after-life the departed was to resume his faculties in their integrity, have his "body complete," and "see God in his flesh."[1] But of all this there is no trace in the religious beliefs of Israel, no mention in the teaching of legislator, psalmist, and prophet.

The absence of Egyptian ideas is one of the most notable characteristics of the Old Testament. The

and cannot be at rest within him under the pressure of the terrible scenes which are presented in his dream. "As the sword remains quiet in its sheath so long as it is therein," says Ewald, "so a man usually feels his spirit quietly within him as long as he feels it enclosed by the coarse covering of the body; but there are moments when it becomes too disturbed for the spirit in the midst of this coarse covering, when it longs to burst the covering from impatience, and to dare everything. The seer felt himself at that time in such a moment, and so he advances boldly to one of those who were still standing there from the scene just witnessed, one of the thousands of angels, to request from him the reliable interpretation of all that had been witnessed" (*Prophets of the Old Testament*, v. pp. 252, 253, F. Smith's trans.). On the occurrence of the same figure in the Rabbinical literature, see Buxtorf's *Lexicon*, *sub voc.* The same idea is supposed by some to underlie the very difficult sentence in Job iv. 21: "Doth not their excellency which is in them go away?" But the more probable rendering is that adopted by the Revisers in their text: "Is not their tent-cord plucked up within them?" The body is compared to a tent, and the soul to the tent-rope. As the tent collapses when the cord is pulled out, so the body is wrecked when the soul is removed from it. It is probably the same figure, certainly not the Greek idea, that is expressed in the sentence in Job xxvii. 8: "When God taketh away (literally, *draweth out*) his soul."

[1] *Book of the Dead*, lxxxix. 27, cxlv. 6. See also Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 5.

natural presumption would be that a people who lived for a long time in Egypt, under the influence of a race so dominant, of such attainments in civilisation and science, so devoted to religion, with so large a doctrine of the future life, and so capable of impressing themselves upon others as the historical masters of the Nile valley were, would carry much away with them when they secured their liberty, and could scarcely fail to take with them some definite conception of an after-existence. It is not strange that this presumption should have been thought to be made good in point of fact; that support should have been sought for it in the Pentateuch—in such things as the priestly vesture, the atoning sacrifice, the adornments of the tabernacle, the teraphim, and the golden calf; or that the divine names, *El Shaddai* and *I am that I am*, should have been taken to be of Egyptian origin or Egyptian colouring. But the resemblances are not of a kind to prove derivation; and even those students who have made most of them have been unable to carry them into that region of thought and faith in which the Egyptian mind expatiated with so large and impressive an insistence—the mystery of the future life. Advancing inquiry more and more confirms the conclusion that neither the institutions nor the religious beliefs of Israel were sensibly affected by those of Egypt, far less borrowed from them. "I have looked through a number of works," says one distinguished Egyptologist, "professing to discover Egyptian influences in Hebrew institutions, but have not even found anything worth controverting. Purely external resemblances may, no doubt, be discovered in abund-

ance, but evidence of the transmission of ideas will be sought in vain." [1]

It may be that the Old Testament has a dim and fragmentary conception of immortality. It may be that in it, for the most part, piety has its field in this world, and faith its satisfaction in present relations to God. It may be that it has little in the form of a doctrine of the future life. But what it has is something that was its own from the first, an independent doctrine, if doctrine it may be called, equally free from the gross and extraordinary ideas with which the hope of an after-existence was overlaid in some races, and from the refinements of philosophy by which it was misdirected in others.

[1] Renouf. See his *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 244, 245. He notices the remarkable fact that the Israelites left Egypt without taking with them even the Egyptian length of the year. Nothing can be inferred from the similarity of sense between *El Shaddai* and *nutar nutra*, the idea expressed being in no sense peculiar to Egypt and Israel. The argument from the resemblance between the *I am that I am* of the Pentateuch and the *nuk pu nuk* of the *Book of the Dead* also fails. The Egyptian words, as M. Renouf shows, do not contain any mysterious doctrine about the Divine nature.

CHAPTER II

POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
PREPARATION

THE Old Testament doctrine of the future life was a doctrine of few and simple elements, but elements which gave it, from its beginnings, the promise of a purer and more convinced faith than was possible elsewhere. By slow degrees it grew from little to more, from surmise to certainty, from obscurity to clearness, until its light kindled into the luminousness of the New Testament revelation. This it achieved, too, not by reasoning, but by experience; not by the application of logic to the problems of existence, but by reflection on what the heart felt and possessed; not by the chill and doubtful way of speculation, but by the impassioned and assured way of personal acquaintance with God, communications of God to the soul, unmistakable inspirations of hope and conviction from God. The meaning and message of the Old Testament, in this matter, can be understood only by following the gradual illumination of the idea of a future life, and observing how the hope of immortality advanced from simple, elementary form to magnitude and distinctness, and at last became a definite belief, yet not one complete enough in itself to be final.

The point of issue for this doctrinal process lay in certain distinctive doctrines of the Old Testament, with which the belief was vitally connected, and in certain general ideas underlying the belief, on which the Spirit of God operated. What were those doctrines and ideas?

Among the former, the first place must naturally be given to the doctrine of *God*. The possession of a definite and ethical doctrine of God—a doctrine proclaiming Him not only to be one God, but a God of grace entering into personal relations with His people and making Himself known to them by deeds of love and power, is a possession peculiar to one people among all the nations of antiquity. The Accadian hymns, the Zoroastrian books, the poetry and philosophy of the Greeks, show us how moral ideas grew in other races, how the Ethnic belief in the Divine was purified and elevated, and how it made a nearer approach to Monotheism as the thought of evil deepened into the sense of sin. But before Israel there is no instance of a people with a distinct and consistent faith in one God, the Creator of all; righteous in Himself and caring for righteousness; above the world, yet in it; visiting men, and coming into fellowship with them. And outside of Israel there is no instance of a Monotheism growing steadily through the various stages of the people's history in purity and completeness, and in access to the national and the individual conscience. "The monotheistic movement in Israel," says Professor Flint, "was one of continuous progress through incessant conflict, until a result was reached of incalculable value to humanity. That result was a faith

in God singularly comprehensive, sublime, and practical,—a faith which rested, not on speculation and reasoning, but on a conviction of God having directly revealed Himself to the spirits of men, and which, while ignoring metaphysical theorising, ascribed to God all metaphysical as well as moral perfections; a faith which, in spite of its simplicity, so apprehended the relationship of God to nature as neither to confound them like pantheism, nor to separate them like deism, but to assert both the immanence and the transcendence of the divine; a faith in a living and personal God, the Almighty and sole Creator, preserver, and ruler of the world; a faith, especially, in a God, holy in all His ways and righteous in all His works, who was directing and guiding human affairs to a destination worthy of His own character; and therefore an essentially ethical, elevating, and hopeful faith."[1]

The difference which this makes between Israel and other ancient nations is incalculable. Its significance is seen less in the case of the ruder religions than in that of the higher. It is best seen in those faiths which included the beliefs in transmigration and a Divine judgment after death, or otherwise had a comparatively definite doctrine of the future. Those beliefs promised much; but, in default of a pure doctrine of God, they failed miserably. They seemed to furnish a strong confirmation of the soul's demand for continuance, and to give a certain dignity and gravity to life. But they suffered from the fatal want of alliance with the belief in a living God, and with the faith in a moral purpose fulfilling itself on earth.

[1] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xxiii. p. 239.

There is no more impressive instance of this than the religion of Egypt. Its doctrine of a future existence, large as it was, lay apart from the recognition of a moral order of God moving on through the present to a Divine end. The result was that it became a doctrine of slavish fear. It transformed the religion of Egypt into what Ewald calls a "religion of the dead, such as nowhere else found so firm a settlement in all antiquity."[1] But where the religion of Egypt was a religion of death, a religion remote from the active, responsible interests of the present, that of Israel was a religion of life, a religion that heard the glad sound of Divine footsteps on earth, and felt the strength and joy of existence in the consciousness of a Divine order in history. It was its doctrine of God, the living God who revealed Himself to men and was present in the nation, that saved Israel from that entanglement of the thought of a future life with superstition and decaying morality which took place in Egypt. It was this, too, that made the Hebrew hope of immortality what it ultimately came to be. The belief in a living, personal God was the deep foundation for the belief in the personal continuance of man; and the belief in a God of absolute moral perfection who, in the present course of human affairs, gives witness of His zeal for righteousness, insured in due time the belief in a future life with moral distinctions.

But the second place in the account of the Old Testament idea of immortality belongs to the doctrine of *Man*, his origin, constitution, and destination.

[1] *Lehre der Bibel von Gott*, B. iii. zweite Hälfte, p. 431; *History of Israel*, ii. p. 134 (Martineau's trans.).

The Hebrew Scriptures give us only a broad and general view of man's constitution. They regard him as a being related on the one hand to God, and on the other hand to the lower creatures; and they express the former side of his nature by different terms, soul, spirit, heart, and others, according to the particular aspect under which it comes for the time.[1] They commit themselves to no theoretical division of his constitution, tripartite[2] or other; neither do they contain anything like a formal or consistent psychology. But on the subject of man's *origin* they have a clear and congruous doctrine. In their account of the beginnings of things they start with a view of man which implies a distinction in kind between him and the lower creatures. Each of the primary documents in the Book of Genesis expresses this in its own way, the one in terms of a creation in the image of God,[3] the other in terms of a distinct Divine act of communication.[4] But the idea is the same in both, and it is adhered to throughout the Old Testament.

On the one hand, man is on a level with the inferior

[1] On the distinction between *soul*, *spirit*, *heart*, etc., see Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.*, *ut sup.* p. 630; Riehm, *Alttest Theol.* pp. 188, 189; Oehler, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, dritte Auflage, pp. 232–244; also the relative sections in Laidlaw's *The Bible Doctrine of Man*; Wendt's *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch*; Dickson's *St. Paul's Use of the Terms "Flesh" and "Spirit"*; etc.

[2] Later Jewish thought accommodated itself to a strict trichotomy, which, however, was a Greek idea rather than a Hebrew. It does not appear in the Old Testament. The exchange of the main terms, *soul* and *spirit*, is sufficient proof of this. See such passages as 1 Kings xxi. 5; Ps. xlii. 11; Isa. xxvi. 9. It is more than doubtful whether it is to be recognised in any measure in the New Testament, even in the few passages like 1 Thess. v. 20; Heb. iv. 12; 1 Cor. ii. 14; Jas. ii. 26, in which traces of it are supposed to be found. See Schultz, *ut sup.* p. 630; Laidlaw, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 60–74; and the books on *Biblical Psychology*.

[3] Gen. i. 26. [4] Gen. ii. 7.

animals. Like them, he is *flesh* (בָּשָׂר), with all the weakness and limitation which that involves. In himself, therefore, he is dependent as they are. He is not inherently sinful; for the Old Testament does not speak of the *flesh* as necessarily evil. But the same constituents meet in his being as in that of the lower creatures, namely, matter (dust, earth, עָפָר, אֲדָמָה) and the Divine spirit of life (רוּחַ). In both cases it is by the entrance of this spirit that the soul (נֶפֶשׁ) rises, and the flesh is animated.[1] On the other hand, there is a distinction deeper than all this physical kinship. These two orders of being do not come into existence in the same way, although they consist of the same elements. The lower creatures, with the life or soul that belongs to them, emerge as the direct product of the earth by the Divine command.[2] They are the immediate offspring of matter under the operation of the Divine spirit or principle of life. But man's life or soul, and man himself as a living being, are the result of a special and immediate act of God Himself,[3] a direct Divine communication of the "breath of lives"[4] (נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים).

The lower creatures and man, therefore, are placed in different relations to the Fountain of life, the beast in a mediate relation, man in an immediate. Life is not the same thing to the one and to the other. There is a sacredness in man's life which is not in that of the brute—a sacredness expressed in the permission given

[1] That the *spirit* or רוּחַ is the principle of life in brute as well as in man appears by comparing the terms used in such passages as Gen. i. 30, ii. 7, with those in Gen. vi. 17, vii. 15. See also Ps. civ. 30.

[2] The Elohist and the Jehovist coincide also in this, Gen. i. 24, ii. 19.

[3] So the Elohist, or Priestly Narrative, Gen. i. 26.

[4] So the Jehovist, or Prophetic Narrative, Gen. ii. 7.

to man to shed the blood of the beast, and in the penalty connected with the shedding of man's blood.[1] Man is the special work of God, created in His image, and so made a free personality, superior to nature, called to dominion over the creatures, and to fellowship with God. As such he is qualitatively distinguished from other creatures of earth.

But this specific difference between man and beast in their origin implies a like difference in their end. There is a destiny for the one which is not for the other. This is contained in the Old Testament doctrine of *Life* and *Death*. It is not the way of the Old Testament, in its general thought and teaching, to attach man's characteristic life exclusively to the soul, neither does it speak of the soul in our modern way. But its doctrine seems to be that the *soul*, or *nephesh*, which rises by the union of the Divine spirit of life with the bodily form, and which in man is the centre of his individuality, retains its capacity of existence only so far as that spirit remains; that the distinctive life which comes to man by God's immediate gift of the breath of lives depends for its continuance on the continuance of that gift; that whatever weakens its connection with the Fountain of life weakens its powers, and whatever breaks that connection destroys its powers. This dependence on God, however, is not merely a physical dependence, but a moral dependence, and the moral connection is the first and determining thing. What makes *life* in the case of man is not simply his physical being in the unity of body and soul, but that together with this moral

[1] Gen. ix. 3-6.

relation to God. Life, therefore, is identified with God's *favour*, and with *righteousness*. Nothing that wants this spiritual element of fellowship with God is real life in the Old Testament sense.

The Old Testament view of *Death* is analogous to this. Death is in every case the withdrawal of the Divine spirit of life.[1] But in man's case it is not that alone. It is not an event of nature, but a moral effect, the consequence of sin. In the first pages of the Old Testament it is connected, not with nature or necessity, but with a breach of the moral relation to God. In the day that man entered on the path of disobedience he entered on the path of death.[2] This penal sense of death colours all that the Old Testament says of man's end. It is in its thoughts where it is not in its words. It is the background of pathetic passages in which the immediate subject is the misery or the transiency of life, rather than death itself. It gives to the thought of death as it is expressed, for example, in the Ninetieth Psalm, and to those lamentations over man's frailty and the grave's rapacity, which recur in the Psalter, and in the Prophets, in Ecclesiastes and in Job, a meaning and an elevation which such things have not in Ethnic literatures, the best of which know death only as a thing of nature, and know it not in its relation to sin and to the wrath of God.[3]

So death is not cessation of being, but penalty and reduction of being, carrying two results with it—removal from the fellowship of the living on earth, and removal from the fellowship of God. The dead man

[1] Ps. civ. 29, 30. [2] Gen. iii. 14.
[3] See Oehler's *Theology*, *ut sup.* pp. 557, 558.

does not cease to be. He passes into a condition of being inferior to that enjoyed here, and impoverished of all that makes real life. But the Old Testament means that the end designed for man by God is not this, but continuity of life in the full sense of the term. It looks on man as made for life, and it looks on the life with which he was inspired at creation as meant to persist. This is man's normal condition. A change in it is contemplated only in the event of something arising to separate him from God, the Fount of life. Existence in God's presence, in conscious dependence on Him, is that for which man is made, and the interruption of this is death.

But if the person does not wholly cease to be when he dies, where does he exist, and in what condition? The reply is, in an *under-world* and as a *shade*. The idea of a subterranean gathering-place of the departed appears in the Old Testament much as it does among the Babylonians and the Greeks. It is described by a number of terms. It is the *pit*;[1] the *lower*, or *nether parts of earth*;[2] *Abaddon* or *Destruction*;[3] the *pit of destruction*;[4] the place of *silence*;[5] the *land of darkness and of the shadow of death*.[6] Other occasional or poetical designations are applied to it. But its stated

[1] בּוֹר, Ps. xxviii. 1, xxx. 4; Prov. i. 12; Isa. xxxviii. 18, etc.; שַׁחַת, Job xxxiii. 24; Ps. lv. 24, etc. On the use of בּוֹר, see Böttcher, *De Inferis, ut sup.* § 165.

[2] תַּחְתִּיּוֹת־אֶרֶץ, Isa. xliv. 23; אֶרֶץ־תַּחְתִּיּוֹת, Ezek. xxvi. 20, etc.

[3] Job xxvi. 6, xxviii. 22; Prov. xv. 11.

[4] בְּאֵר שַׁחַת, Ps. lv. 23; or, "depth of the pit," according to Hupfeld, Ewald, Delitzsch, etc.

[5] דּוּמָה, Ps. xciv. 17, cxv. 17.

[6] אֶרֶץ חשֵׁךְ וְצַלְמָוֶת, Job x. 21.

name is *Sheol*, a term not confined to any one part of the Old Testament, but found alike in the Pentateuch, the Poetical books, the Prophets, and the Hochma writings, expressing probably the idea of the *Hollow*, and distinct in sense from the *grave*.

The idea of Sheol and that of the grave are so much akin, it is true, that they are easily interchanged, and expressions which are properly applicable only to the latter are readily transferred to the former.[1] Hence the distinction is occasionally sunk in the Old Testament, and it became confused in the later usage of the Targums. But that *Sheol* denotes a definite realm of the dead, and is not identical with the *grave*, appears from the usage of the term, and is recognised by the ancient Versions. It is to Sheol that Jacob speaks of going, to join the son whose death he mourns, but of whose burial he knows nothing.[2] It is Sheol that swallows up Korah and his company alive.[3] That a common habitation of the dead, like the Suâlu of the Babylonians, the Hades of the Greeks, the Orcus of the Romans, is meant, is indicated also by the fact that the expressions to be *gathered to one's people*, or *to one's fathers*, to *go to one's fathers*, to *sleep with one's fathers*, are used in cases like those of Abraham, Jacob, Aaron, Moses, David, and others, where the temporary or permanent resting-place was far removed from the ancestral graves.[4]

[1] But even in cases like Isa. xiv. 11, Ezek. xxxii. 23, etc., the distinction, as Oehler points out, is still discernible.

[2] Gen. xxxvii. 35.

[3] Num. xvi. 30, 33.

[4] Gen. xv. 15, xxv. 8, 17, xlix. 33; Num. xx. 24, 28, xxxi. 2; Deut. xxxii. 50, xxxiv. 5. See Böttcher's discussion, *De Inferis*, *ut sup.* § 112, etc.; also Kahle's *Biblische Theologie*, p. 37, etc.

In contrast with the upper realm of light and life, Sheol is the under realm of gloom and death. It is described as in the deeps of the earth, in the deepest deep, in the land of deeps, lower than the earth and its denizens; it is the place of desolations, as far beneath earth as earth is beneath heaven.[1] As the under-world, it is the land of darkness, where chaos reigns, and even the light is as darkness;[2] and—last horror in the old Semitic feeling toward the world of the dead! it is the land of dust—dust that speaks of the waste of things and the barrenness of the scene, that deepens the dread stillness and chokes the creeping light.[3] Personifications such as the monster with open mouth,[4] figures like that of the prison with its gates and bars,[5] bespeak the sense of its unwelcomeness and terror. It is conceived to be a locality, but no topography of it is attempted. It is simply all that the world of the living is not—the land of silence, gloom, cessation,[6] destruction, disorder,[7] unvisited by God's wonders,[8] wrapped in a sleep lasting as the enduring heavens[9].

It is the man himself that descends at death into Sheol. It is *he*, not his disembodied spirit as we think of it, that continues to exist there.[10] The Old

[1] Num. xvi. 30; Deut. xxxii. 22; Prov. xv. 24; Ps. lxiii. 9, lxxxvi. 12; Job xxvi. 5; Ezek. xxvi. 20, xxxi. 18; Isa. xiv. 13–15, etc.

[2] Lam. iii. 6; Ps. cxliii. 3; Job x. 22.

[3] Job vii. 21, xvii. 16; Isa. xxvi. 19.

[4] Isa. v. 14. [5] Job xvii. 16, xxxviii. 17.

[6] Isa. xxxviii. 11, if such is the application of חֶדֶל.

[7] Job x. 22. [8] Ps. lxxxviii. 10. [9] Job xiv. 12.

[10] It is superfluous, therefore, to offer any defence of the Old Testament way of speaking of Sheol and its inmates, as is done, for example, by Delitzsch, on the ground that, "although the spirit is not an *extensum*, it can be locally restrained." It does not involve itself in any such question as that of the ascription of locality to bodiless souls.

Testament does not speak, as is done later,[1] of the *souls* or *spirits* of the dead. The *spirit* (*Ruach*) is not said to go to Sheol, but to return to God. The *soul* (*Nephesh*) is not said to return to God, and yet the Old Testament seems to avoid saying directly that it passes into Sheol. It is the *soul*, however, that is said to return to the child whom Elijah restores ;[2] it is the *soul* that is brought up from Sheol,[3] that is delivered from the lowest pit,[4] that is rescued from dwelling in silence.[5] What survives death, therefore, and descends into the under-world, is the soul or *Nephesh*, with which the personal life is connected. But it is separated from the quickening spirit (*Ruach*) ; consequently it is bereft of its intellectual, emotional, volitional energies, and is reduced to a shade.[6]

So the living person becomes in the Beyond a dead person, retaining a negative existence, a weakened edition of his former self, his faculties dormant, without strength, memory, consciousness, knowledge, or the energy of any affection. The identity continues ; the form persists, so that he can recognise and be recognised ; the consciousness is capable of waking up in some degree out of its deep slumber.[7] But all in a way so indigent, that love and hatred and envy alike are forgotten ; work, device, knowledge, wisdom equally fail.[8] There may be a continuance or repetition of the circumstances and pursuits of earth. Kings may

[1] Book of Wisdom iii. 1 ; Heb. xii. 23 ; Rev. vi. 9.

[2] 1 Kings xvii. 22.

[3] Ps. xxx. 3.

[4] Ps. lxxxvi. 13.

[5] Ps. xciv. 17.

[6] Cf. Riehm, *Alttest. Theologie*, pp. 187, 190 ; Oehler, *Theologie des Alt. Test.*, *ut sup.* p. 265.

[7] Isa. xiv. 10 ; Ezek. xxxii. 21 ; 1 Sam. xxvii. 15.

[8] Eccles. xv. 5, 6, 10.

remain kings, and occupy thrones in Sheol. But it is the shades of kings on shadowy thrones, with the empty semblance of former dignity.[1] The colour is gone from everything; a washed-out copy is all that is left. The thin, spent, languid, void subsistence, which is all that is possible there, finds expression in the characteristic name that is given in Job, Proverbs, and Isaiah to the denizens of Sheol—the *Rephaim*,[2] *shades*, the *feeble, flaccid* folk.

This Sheol existence is heavy with chill and painful negations. Knowledge of men on earth, intercourse with them, return to them, are gone for ever. The notices of necromancy have been thought to furnish proof of a belief in the possibility of at least a temporary return. They have also been supposed to show that the people imagined the dead to have some acquaintance with human affairs. It may be that the necromantic superstition, to the vitality of which the denunciation and the scorn of the Old Testament bear witness, indicates the prevalence of another and perhaps more ancient view of the dead as the "mighty dead," to whom things are open which are hidden from

[1] Isa. xiv. 9.

[2] So the *Rephaim*, or Shades, "tremble beneath the waters" (Job xxvi. 5); the paths of the strange woman "incline unto the *Rephaim*" (Prov. ii. 18); the "congregation of the *Rephaim*" is the resting-place of the man who wanders out of the way of understanding (Prov. xxi. 16); Sheol is said to "stir up" the *Rephaim*, and the *Rephaim* are declared to be incapable of rising (Isa. xiv. 9, xxvi. 14). The word corresponds so far to the Greek σκιαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων. The same form also appears as the name of the giant races of Canaan generally, or of a particular trans-Jordanic race of ancient Canaanites; Gen. xiv. 5, xv. 20; Deut. ii. 11, 20, iii. 11, 13; Josh. xiii. 12, xvii. 15; 2 Sam. v. 18, 22; cf. also 2 Sam. xxi. 16, 18; Isa. xvii. 5. For the etymological connection of the two, see Böttcher, *De Inferis*, § 193; Ewald, *History of Israel*, i. p. 227; Kahle, *Bib. Eschatologie*, p. 199; Oehler, *Theol. des Alt. Test.* p. 268; Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 702; Hupfeld on Ps. lxxxviii. 11.

the living.[1] But, except in the case of Samuel at Endor (and, however the narrative is to be understood, it is the man himself in his familiar form that is seen there), the Old Testament knows nothing of the revisiting of earth by one who is once dead, nothing of the appearance of shade or spirit.[2] It nowhere speaks of the "wise dead"; and the idea of any return of the departed to the life of earth, whether finally or for the moment, is generally strange to it, if not absolutely so. The current thought is, that "as the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to Sheol shall come up no more."[3]

Nor does this existence in the world of shades mean only the loss of earth's interests, and separation from the fellowship of living men. It means also deprivation of the opportunities of worship, and separation from God Himself. In Sheol there is no enjoyment of divine things, no remembrance of God, no adoration of His name. The capacity and the occasion alike fail in that realm of vacancy and dumbness. Who can give thanks to God in Sheol?[4] In its darkness who can know His wonders?[5] The earth is the portion He has given to the children of men, and they that go down

[1] So Riehm, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 190.

[2] Job iv. 15 is no exception. When Eliphaz says, "Then a spirit passed before my face; the hairs of my flesh stood up: it stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof," he describes how the revelation came to him in stealthiness and terror at the dead of night. Not that an apparition surprised him; but that he had the sudden sense of something,—a movement of the air, touching his face, and a dim figure, a formless image standing before him; which made him tremble, and gave him the token of a divine communication. The "spirit" here is the *breath* or stirring of the wind that fanned his face and intimated the revelation. What is implied is "a rapid gliding motion, like wind over grass" (*Speaker's Commentary, in loc.*).

[3] Job vii. 9. [4] Ps. vi. 5. [5] Ps. lxxxviii. 12.

to the silence of the under-world cannot praise Him.[1] "Sheol cannot praise Thee," is the cry of chastened Hezekiah, "death cannot celebrate Thee."[2] The plea which His people urge with God when they cry for deliverance from death is this, that to suffer them to go down to the solitude and silence of Sheol, is to deprive Himself of their service and their praise. "What profit is there in my blood, when I go down to the pit? Shall the dust praise Thee? shall it declare thy truth?"[3]

Worst of all the miseries of Sheol, darkest of all fears in the anticipation of Sheol, is the loss of God's fellowship. His omnipotence reaches that dire realm of the dead, His eye searches it. Sheol and Abaddon are before him;[4] Sheol is naked before him, and Abaddon hath no covering.[5] If one makes his bed in Sheol, God is there.[6] Yet in Sheol there is no revelation of His grace, no access to Him, no continuance of His visitations, far less any heightening of that experience of His presence which makes the joy of His servant's life on earth. To be in Sheol is to be shown nothing of His wonders, to know nothing of His loving-kindness, His faithfulness, or His righteousness.[7] To go into the gates of Sheol is to "behold man no more with the inhabitants of the world." But, bitterest thought of all, it is not to see Jah.[8]

Sheol is the gathering-place for all mankind. It is the "house of assemblage for all the living."[9] All go down to it, without respect to rank or character. It is

[1] Ps. cxv. 16, 17. [2] Isa. xxxviii. 18. [3] Ps. xxx. 9.
[4] Prov. xv. 11, R.V. [5] Job xxvi. 6, R.V. [6] Ps. cxxxix. 8.
[7] Ps. lxxxviii. 10–12. [8] Isa. xxxviii. 11. [9] Job xxx. 23.

of the things that are never satisfied, and never say Enough.[1] "What man is he that shall live and not see death, that shall deliver his soul from the power of Sheol?"[2] Rich and poor are there, kings and vassals, the master and the slave, the just and the unjust, the circumcised and the uncircumcised. Nor is it only that all are there. All are essentially in the same condition there. The wicked and the weary, the servant and his lord, the prisoner and his taskmaster,[3] meet together. Men are there according to their families, their tribes, their nations. They are "gathered to their people" and "to their fathers"; in Ezekiel's dirge of scorn over Egypt's fall, the dwellers in Sheol are enumerated by their nations.[4] But all are on a level there. There is no effectual distinction of condition according to character, no separation of the just from the unjust. Or if anything occurs which seems to attach a moral meaning to the existence in Sheol, and to imply the distribution of lots according to merit, it is only as an occasional suggestion and in rudimentary form.

The Old Testament speaks, it is true, not only of Sheol, but of the *lowest* Sheol.[5] But in distinguishing now and again between the abyss itself and its farthest deeps, it makes no definite application of the distinction to differences of moral award. In the prophetical books, it is true, there are some descriptions of a more detailed order, which rise, as some think, above the general view. But they are few, and,

[1] Prov. xxvii. 20, xxx. 16.
[2] Ps. lxxxix. 48.
[3] Job iii. 17–19.
[4] Ezek. xxxii.
[5] Deut. xxxii. 22; Ps. lxxxvi. 13, cf. Prov. ix. 18.

perhaps with a single exception, none of them are quite relevant.

In Isaiah, for example, it is said of the righteous man who perisheth, that "he entereth into peace; they rest in their beds, each one that walketh in his uprightness." But this goes little, if at all, beyond the general idea of the grave as a place of quiet and deliverance, in contrast with the trouble and suffering of evil times.[1] In the stinging song or parable, again, which is flung out by the prophet against the pride of the Babylonian king, there is the taunt that the Day-star, the Sun of the morning, shall be "brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit." But this need not mean that in Sheol there is a separate place or darker prison for offenders of this degree. The "sides of the pit," the "uttermost parts of the pit" (R.V.), simply describe the depth of the fall as equal to the height of the arrogance. The thruster of nations, who aspired to seat himself with the gods on the Mount of Assembly, the residence of the Babylonian deities, which lifted its crest to the silver sky in the recesses of the North,[2] is himself thrust down into Sheol, into the recesses of the pit. When we come upon the further announcement that he is not to be with those who go down to

[1] Isa. lvii. 2, R.V. Professor Cheyne inclines to the opinion that the grave or under-world is itself called "Peace" here, as elsewhere it is termed "Stillness." The contrast is between the reckless living of worldly rulers and the fate of the pious prematurely cut off, and again between the fact that there is "no peace for the wicked," while the suffering righteous, if they perish, have peace in their death, and lie at rest in their graves. "Here is a glimmering of the consolation of the New Testament," says Delitzsch, "that the death of the righteous man is better than the present life, because it is the entrance into peace." So far as "compared with the unrest of this present life," the grave is peace.

[2] On the Babylonian idea, see above, p. 55.

"the stones of the pit,"[1] we are still far from the vision of a special place of penalty. What is meant is, that instead of being laid with those who receive honourable burial in vaults of stone, this proud monarch is to be tossed out like a carcase to be trodden under foot.

Neither is it very different even with the bitter, mocking funeral dirge, in which Ezekiel bids Pharaoh and his throng sink dishonoured and unpurified into Sheol. The sting of this scornful grave-elegy is in the contrast between the death that comes in peace and is followed by respectful burial, and the death that comes by violence and dismisses the slain to the under-world without the sacred ceremonial and the rites of purification and honour. It is Egypt's doom to join the unhappy host of the uncircumcised, and the herd of wretched, lawless warriors and oppressors of the nations—Assyrians, Elamites, Scythians, Edomites, crowned ones of the North. These are regarded as in the "uttermost pit," and as in a sense the most miserable. But even in this case the superior misery of those inmates of Sheol is not distinctly described as

[1] Isa. xiv. 15, 19, 20. The reference in the "stones of the pit" is otherwise taken to be to an unkingly burial in the rough grave along with the common "throng of bodies from the battlefield." "He comes to be," says Delitzsch, "in a common grave, deep below other bodies gathered from the battlefield." Jeremias, although he admits that no division of Sheol into distinct compartments can be made out in the Old Testament, thinks that this passage points to a separate place for the most abandoned. See his *Babylonisch-Assyr. Vorstellungen*, pp. 111, 112. But the Massoretic order is now generally departed from in vers. 19, 20, and the clause "that go down to the stones of the pit" is connected with ver. 20 instead of ver. 19. In which case the idea seems clearly to be that the king is not to be laid with "those who are buried in a costly tomb built of hewn stones." See Dillman and Cheyne, *in loc.*, and Professor Smith's *Isaiah* (The Expositor's Bible), i. pp. 413, 414.

incident on the descent to Sheol. It is rather the reflection of the dishonour which is connected with the mode of their death on earth. It is this shame that they bear to Sheol.[1]

Where Sheol itself, therefore, is expressly named, or is immediately in view, it appears in the Old Testament almost entirely without moral interest or colour. How the thought of the after-existence ultimately rose above this we shall afterwards see. But at present it is enough to say that in the Old Testament we get little more than a few uncertain hints of anything like reward or punishment in Sheol. The dead prophet expects the king who is rejected of God to be to-morrow with himself.[2] That "the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward," is the testimony, not of the Preacher only, but of the Old Testament generally.[3]

When it is set over against the present life, indeed, Sheol is not always a neutral place or a wholly indeterminate destiny. It is rest for those who are weary of earth. "Why died I not from the womb?" cries Job . . . "for now should I have lien down and been quiet; I should have slept; then had I been at rest."[4] In the world of the dead "the wicked cease from

[1] Ezek. xxxii., particularly vers. 18–32. Ewald thinks that the Assyrians are represented as in "the sides of the pit," or deepest hell (ver. 23), because they are the guiltiest. Smend recognises a distinction here between two places in Sheol, one for the uncircumcised who are not purged of their sins, and another for the relatively happy. His opinion is that we have here the germ of the idea of a separation between the blessed and the condemned in Sheol. See his *Der Prophet Ezechiel*, p. 257. Keil takes the point of the expression to be simply, "the higher on earth the deeper in the nether world."

[2] 1 Sam. xxvii. 19.

[3] Eccles. ix. 5.

[4] Job iii. 11, 13, R.V.

troubling; and there the weary be at rest."[1] In a remarkable passage, the exact import of which will afterwards appear, Job even prays that God might hide him in Sheol as in a shelter, and keep him secret there till His wrath be past.[2] On the other hand, to those who are cast down to it suddenly or prematurely from the quick enjoyment of life, Sheol is misery with a heavier measure and intenser meaning. To such also it is penalty in the sense that premature committal to its gloomy deeps is one of God's ways of punishing offenders; "Let death come suddenly upon them, let them go down alive into the pit: for wretchedness is in their dwelling, in the midst of them."[3]

But of itself, and in reference to a life which is neither exceptionally wretched nor unusually favoured, it is neither blessedness nor penalty; and it is the same to all, with no paradise for the righteous and no hell for the unrighteous. "Who among us," the prophet demands, "shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?"[4] But the fire which he has in view is not that of a judgment after death. It is the fire of the divine wrath which flames among men now, and searches the sinners in Sion no less than the world's wasters; and the everlasting burnings are those of the righteousness of God, eternal as Himself, before which

[1] Job iii. 17. The idea seems to be that the wicked cease from knowing trouble themselves, from the unrest of their own wickedness." "Vers. 17–19 contain the two main ideas," as Professor A. B. Davidson remarks, "first, that all, evil and good, great and small, are the same in the place of the dead; and second, that this common condition is one of profound rest. Even the wicked there are no more agitated by the turbulence of their passions." See his Commentary, *in loc.*

[2] Job xiv. 13. [3] Ps. lv. 15. [4] Isa. xxxiii. 14.

earth's evil ones, whether they be the reprobate of Jerusalem or the brutal of Assyria, cannot stand here and now. The words of terror closing the second Isaiah's prophecies of grace, speak of the judgments of God which take effect on earth, bringing destruction on His enemies, and making them a perpetual abhorrence to all flesh. The vengeance which they intimate is not one that waits men in the other world, but one that seizes them in the present world, in miserable overthrow, in the abandonment of their corpses to the wasting worm and the consuming fire in irretrievable dishonour.[1]

[1] Isa. lxvi. 24. If this passage is of too early a date, as Dillmann thinks, to admit of a reference to the horrors of the Valley of Gehinnom, the double figure of the worm and the fire may be due to the two ways of disposing of the dead, by interment and by cremation. The immediate object of the description of the worm as never dying and the fire as never being quenched, appears to be to mark the destination of those men as a perpetual witness to the consuming judgments of God, and one which all flesh may see. The incongruity of the idea of a fire burning a dead body and never going out, is supposed, however, to point to something more. Canon Cheyne, for example, while admitting that the "context naturally leads us to suppose that the reference is to the bodies of the slain lying unburied on the ground," thinks at the same time that the "details of the description suggest by their obvious inconsistency that the terms are symbolic of the tortures of the soul in Hades." He proposes to reconcile the two things by supposing that the Hebrews shared the belief held by some other races in a double consciousness, of soul and body, in virtue of which pain and dishonour inflicted on the latter were imagined to be felt by the former. But the evidence for this is wanting. The passages appealed to—Isa. lvii. 2; Job xiv. 22; Ezek. xxxii. 25—are too general and too imaginative to establish the contention, or to prove that the Hebrews had such ideas and practices as those connected with the Egyptian *Kâ*. It may be that the dead body is poetically conceived to be conscious of the pains of the worm and the fire, as Dillmann supposes. But even that goes beyond the immediate object, which is to present the men in question as a perpetual spectacle of shame to all beholders. The passage had its later applications and associations, and became the starting-point for the Jewish doctrine of everlasting punishment, as Dillmann points out. But all this is outside the historical interpretation.

The retributive action of God is sure. Nowhere is it a more confessed fact than in the Old Testament. But its field is above, not below. It is in this life, not in the other, that lot apportions itself to merit. There is no clear and certain indication that reward and punishment pass over into Sheol, far less that Sheol is their proper scene. The punishment executes itself here in the sinner's fortunes, name, and family. The reward also fulfils itself here, and in corresponding forms. Balaam's wish[1] is not for a life of blessedness beyond earth's measure, and attainable only in another world. It is that, when his hour comes, he may die as a righteous Israelite, in a green old age, in peace and honour, satisfied with length of days. The things of the future, which are the solace of godly men, when they are about to "go the way of all the earth," still remain things of this life. Even to a Jacob and a David they are the continuance of generations of their posterity, the blessing upon their children, the fulfilment of God's promises to their house and nation.[2]

This is what the *Hereafter* means for man, according to the general sentiment of the Old Testament. If it is not extinction of being, as little is it elevation of being, the emancipation of the soul, or a blessed im-

[1] Num. xxiii. 10. "Without doubt," says Ewald, "there breathes in this expression the most joyful feeling of immortality in the midst of what is mortal; somewhat similar to that which breathes in the oft-cited saying concerning Abraham, John viii. 56; but the glance of expectation is directed, as here and in Gen. xii. 1–3, chiefly to posterity; and this best suits the context, and gives exactly the drift of the saying and of the whole of Balaam's words." He translates—

"O that my soul may die as the righteous,
That my after world may be as Israel's."

See his *Old and New Testament Theology* (Goadby), p. 366.

[2] Gen. xlix. 1–27; 1 Kings ii. 1–4.

mortality. The great conception which occupies the mind of historian, psalmist, and prophet is that of a kingdom of God established upon earth, and it is within that kingdom that the reward of good and the punishment of evil are expected. The dark view of Sheol, with its universal penury of existence, was occasionally transcended, and it became so far mitigated, as we shall see, by other beliefs and anticipations. But the Book of Ecclesiastes shows us how it asserted itself again, even in the later stages of Israel's faith. For the mass of men and through most of the Old Testament, Sheol is this dull negation, this dead colourless level, with no retributive conditions, with nothing for the righteous to look for. So long as Sheol was this to Hebrew thought, even those whose rest was in the Lord, believing that He could suffer no evil to befall them, saw nothing to welcome, nothing to hope for, in the future existence. The men of simplest piety and quickest faith shrank from the prospect of it, spoke of it in terms of terror and recoil, and praised God for deliverance from it. The land of the *living* was the place where even the tried faith of a Hezekiah looked to see God; and when the king turned his face to the wall to die, he thought of the descent into Sheol as the withdrawal into an exile in which the countenance of God and the face of man were both lost to sight.[1]

[1] Isa. xxxviii. 11.

CHAPTER III

THE NOTES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT PREPARATION

IN much that is said on the subject of a future world the voice of the Old Testament is the voice that is heard in other ancient literatures. The resemblance between the Hebrew Sheol, the Homeric Hades, and the Babylonian Arallû is unmistakable. The underworld of the Accadians and Babylonians is like that of the Hebrews, a world of unsubstantial existence, with no certainty of moral distinctions, a world shut off from the land of the living by its gates and bars, repellant with its characteristic terrors of darkness and dust. There is nothing to surprise us in these similarities of idea and phrase. There is much in both instances that is only the natural reflection of the appearances of things. There is the kind of sentiment and language that might easily occur to different peoples, without contact with each other or dependence one upon another. The Hebrews may to some extent have been directly indebted to the Babylonians. And apart from this, if the Hebrew view and the Babylonian were both derivatives of the primitive belief held by the Semitic stock previous to its dispersion, their relations will be sufficiently explained.

In any case the Hebrew ways of thinking and

speaking of the future were also the ways of other Ethnic peoples, both Semitic and non-Semitic. They were much older, too, than the books in which they have come down to us. Some of the most significant terms which the Old Testament uses have the appearance of survivals from a more ancient time, and seem to be in the process of giving place to others. The thought, the sentiment, the language of the Old Testament on the subject of an after-world are to a very large extent popular, inherited modes of thinking, feeling, and speaking, common to it and other ancient literatures. So far from the Old Testament having any pre-eminence, the advantage might seem to be on the side of the Ethnic faiths. There are those who think that the Accadian conception of the after-existence, sombre as it may be, is less dreary than the Hebrew. The Homeric shades are felt to have more animation than those that people the under-world of Israel. And some do not hesitate to assert in behalf of certain Gentile religions,—the Egyptian, the Zoroastrian, the Hellenic,—that they had a more special mission than can be claimed for the Hebrew faith, in the preservation and transmission of the truth of a future life.

Is this all that can be said of the Old Testament in relation to the doctrine of Immortality? Is it only on the same plane with other great religions of the ancient world? Is it even beneath the level of some of these, less tolerable than the Greek, less ethical than the Egyptian, less adequate and certain than the Persian? Has it any distinctive note? What is there to differentiate it from the Ethnic faiths? Where does the presence of Revelation make itself felt in it? How

and in what measure was it a preparation for the Christian doctrine?

The answer is, that the Old Testament view of the future had that at its foundation which these Ethnic beliefs had not, and that the light which was in it, unsteady as it was at first, and shadowed even to darkness, moved on in a course of enlargement and advance toward the perfect day. This was its distinction; this was the witness to a special operation of God in it.

There were, in the first place, the limitless potentialities contained in the doctrine of God, which has been noticed as distinctive of Israel. This spiritual doctrine, which made the measureless difference between the religion of the Old Testament and other religions of the old world, also formed the point of issue, as we have said, for the whole Old Testament belief in a future life. The first thing and the last in Israel's faith, the reason for Israel's attitude to the future and the root of Israel's hope of immortality, was this belief in One God, the Creator of man, distinct from the world and sovereign over it, a God of all natural and moral perfections, above all a God of condescending grace, communicating Himself to His people, giving testimony of Himself as a covenant God who was to be found of them, and could never fail them. His fellowship, in its immediacy, its joy, its constancy, was their mightiest and most certain experience, and the guarantee of all that concerned them. He was the living, the eternal, the omnipotent God. Could the shelter of His wings be the place for change or destruction? He gave token of His interest in His people and of His desire for their praise and worship. Could it be but for an hand-

breadth of days? He came into relations of love and grace with men. Could these be limited to earth? The Rock of Israel was He who could say, "There is no god with me: I kill, and I make alive."[1] The earnest of a living hope was contained in the belief in a living God. The potency of a personal immortality was deposited in the faith in a personal God. The promise of a moral Future lay in the recognition of the moral action of a righteous God in the present.

There were, in the second place, the kindred potentialities of the other doctrine which we have instanced as at the basis of the Old Testament view of the after-life—the doctrine of man, the way in which and the end for which he was created. The Old Testament thinks of man as the creature, not of nature or necessity, but of God, receiving his existence by God's free and immediate act, made like Him, and so constituted a free, personal being, distinct in origin and in end from the beasts that perish. It takes it for granted that he is meant to live, because he is placed in a relation to God which is not ascribed to the brutes.

It has two ways of speaking of man, it is true, ways so unlike that they seem almost inconsistent; and the conclusion has been drawn by some, that it has two distinct and irreconcilable doctrines. It describes him now as akin to the brutes, mere "flesh" like them, weak and perishable in his nature, dust and ashes, without the power of life in himself. Again, it represents him as akin to God, with the notes of life, and royalty, and supremacy over the creatures. But it is not that the Old Testament has two antagon-

[1] Deut. xxxii. 38.

istic views of man, one attaching mortality to him in the same sense as to the brutes, regarding death as appointed for him by a simple necessity of nature on the completion of his appointed period, and thinking of it as a strange thing or a penal thing only when it surprises him before his time; and another, taking him to be immortal, and dealing with death as a thing alien to him, invading his nature only as a penalty. It is simply that it speaks of man now as he contrasts with God, and again as he contrasts with the lower creatures.

Neither does it engage itself with the quasi-philosophical questions which enter into the theology of later days. The question of a natural or a conditional immortality is not directly within its ken. It is not with the philosophy of man that it deals, but with his relation to God; not with what he is, but with what he is to God. It says nothing either of an essential immortality or of an essential mortality of nature. It does not ascribe life to him as a thing inherent in his nature, apart from the gift of God. But it certainly does not regard him as made by God inherently mortal, in the sense that under the primary conditions of nature he could not but cease to be, except for a special gift of the Spirit superadded to the endowments of creation. It regards him as made for communion with God and for life therein; not merely as destined to reach the communion and the life in the course of his history, but as having them from the beginning, and as gifted with the capacities for retaining them and for entering into their larger enjoyment. The life would have continued to be his had he continued in

the communion, and death could have come in upon him only in the train of a moral event destroying his relation to God. In short, man's normal condition, according to the Old Testament, is not mortality, with the possibility of attaining immortality by a later gift; but life in God's fellowship, with the possibility of losing it and falling into a condition of an existence which is not life.[1]

This is the view of man which the Old Testament gives when it speaks of his origin and primeval estate, and which is implied in all that it afterwards says of God's ways and purposes with him. There is no difference in this between Elohist and Jehovist, Priestly and Prophetic narrative, earlier and later doctrine. If the one sets the distinction of man's nature before us in terms of a special and more immediate act of God in the communication of life at man's creation, the other gives it, as we have seen, in terms of a likeness to God Himself, which makes man a copy within creaturely limits of the free personal nature of God.[2]

[1] In his *Voraussetzungen der christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit*, and in his *Alttestamentliche Theologie*, Professor Schultz regards man as naturally mortal in the view of the Old Testament. He says that even the Jehovist represents man as in himself a purely animal existence, in whose natural development immortality was not included. See especially the latter work, p. 634. But he grants that immortality belongs, according to the Old Testament, to the *idea* of man, though not to his *nature*. He admits that both the Jehovist and the Elohist speak of man as designed for immortality, and that what is said of the tree of life means, that if man had not sinned he would have reached immortality. He allows, too, that the same is implied in Gen. vi. 1–4, the passage indicating that the Divine Spirit might have ruled for ever in man, in which case he would have lived; and that, as far back as we can go in the Old Testament, we find the presuppositions of immortality, and the view that life belongs to the *idea* of man. See pp. 641–645.

[2] That what is meant by the "image of God" in the Old Testament is not a mere moral quality, but something inalienable, belonging to man's

The same idea of man is contained in the statement of the test to which he was subjected. The words, "in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," [1] taken in connection with the possibility of living for ever which is connected with the continuance in Eden,[2] are not the announcement of a doom which was to consist only in the hastening of an inevitable event of nature. Neither is this idea of man contradicted by the terms of the judgment on his disobedience. The words, "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return," [3] do not describe death as a thing inherent in man's original constitution, but state why the sentence on his sin was to fulfil itself in the way of a dissolution of the body.

The same view of man's being and destiny is expressed in other forms in other parts of the Old Testament,—in the association of righteousness and life, which is characteristic of the Book of Proverbs; in the dignity which is celebrated in the eighth Psalm, making man only a little lower than God; [4] in the rule

distinctive constitution, appears from the fact that in Gen. ix. 6 it is ascribed to man in his present condition. Schultz points out that the Elohistic narrative, in the forefront of which is placed the creation of man in the image of God, says nothing of man's Fall. Many Protestant theologians have erred in limiting the "image of God" to an ethical character, a condition of moral perfection which was lost by the Fall. The Biblical view has been happily restored of late. Calvin defined it well when he said: "Patere Dei effigiem ad totam præstantiam, qua eminet hominis natura inter omnes animantium species" (*Instit.* xv. 3). So Oehler describes it as the "whole dignity of man, in virtue of which human nature is sharply distinguished from that of the beasts." See Laidlaw's *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, pp. 99–112; Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube*, i. 326; Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis*, i. pp. 287, 288; Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, i. pp. 221–243; Riehm, *Altt. Theol.* p. 170.

[1] Gen. ii. 17. [2] Gen. iii. 24.

[3] Gen. iii. 19. Oehler, *Theologie des Alten Test.*, Dritte Aufl. p. 246.

[4] The idea is essentially the same as in Gen. i. 26–28. Hence Ps.

of God's Spirit in man;[1] in instances like those of Enoch and Elijah, which indicate that life is guaranteed by a perfect walk with God, and that death and Sheol are not inseparably connected with man's nature.

viii. 5–8 is described as a "flash into the darkness of creation," a commentary on the Elohist's account of the formation of man in God's image, a lyric echo of the Mosaic narrative of his origin. A single thought inspires the whole music of the psalm. It is the marvel that man, insignificant as he is and so distant from God as compared with the heavens, has received a nature and a sovereignty which make him little less than divine, and show him to be a higher revelation, a better representative of God, than sun, or moon, or stars. The R.V. rightly follows Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, and Jerome in adopting the rendering, "little lower than *God*," instead of the "little lower than the *angels*" of the LXX., the Syriac, the Vulgate, the Targum, the A.V. For, apart from 1 Sam. xxviii. 13 (where the word *Elohim* may be used of supernatural beings generally, or may express simply a "divine, God-like form"), the *angels* are nowhere called "Elohim," but "sons of Elohim" (never "sons of Jahveh"), or "sons of gods" (*Elim*). Hupfeld thinks that in the *Elohim* of Ps. viii. we have an instance of the common employment of plural forms to denote abstract ideas, and would render it, "little lower than the *Godhead* or the *Divine*." But the question is whether this particular plural is ever used elsewhere in this abstract sense. Here, too, as always in the Old Testament, the dignity of man is introduced, not as a ground for boasting, but as a reason for humility, wonder, and praise.

[1] Gen. vi. 1–4. Professor Hermann Schultz attaches great importance to this passage, which he calls "die *erste* Geschichte des Eindringens des Todes." He proposes to change the position of the Zakkeph, and to drop the כִּי. The sense then would be, "My spirit shall not always rule in man in their erring; he is flesh, and so his days shall be an hundred and twenty years" (see his *Altt. Theologie*, *ut sup.* pp. 691, 692). The transposition of the בְּשַׁגַּם is favoured also by De Wette and Bunsen. But it is inconsistent with the emphasis which seems to rest on the term. The rendering of the LXX., the Peschitta, the Vulgate, and of the Targum, "because he also (like other earthly creatures) is flesh, therefore his days shall be an hundred and twenty years," gives a good sense, and is adopted, not only by Jewish interpreters of note, but by the A.V., Delitzsch, Hofmann, etc., and is retained in the text of the R.V. But, apart from the doubtful application of the "also," this presupposes that the proper vocalisation is בִּשְׁגַם, and that the בש stands for בַּאֲשֶׁר; which is perhaps to anticipate later usage. The difficulties of the exegesis are well understood. See, in especial, Dillmann's careful statement, *in loc.* Some points, however, are tolerably clear. The phrase, "My spirit," refers to the Divine spirit, or principle

It was the operation of these two great doctrines of Revelation, as they were applied to the consciousness of Israel, as they came in contact with the popular, inherited notions of the future, as they were fortified by the personal experiences of pious men, and as they were confirmed in course of time by the positive teaching of the prophets, that enlarged and illumined the Old Testament view of an after-life. In this way the truth that was latent was brought to view, and was carried forward from stage to stage, until it became a permanent contribution to man's hope. These two doctrines, with all their potentialities, made an essential difference between the Old Testament attitude to the future and the Ethnic. It is a difference that existed from the beginning, that discovered itself in many things, and became deeper and more patent as Israel's history advanced toward the fulness of time.

It is seen, for example, in the conception of Sheol itself. Much as the Hebrew idea resembled the Babylonian

of life communicated by God. The יָדוֹן cannot well be rendered "dwell," "abide," as the ancient versions put it, but must mean either "judge," "rule" (Delitzsch, Schrader, Schultz, etc.), or "humble itself," "be abased" (Dillmann, Tuch, Ewald, etc.). The בְּשַׁגַּם is to be taken as in the margin of the R.V., "in their erring." The most probable rendering, therefore, is, "The spirit of life given by me shall not for ever be abased in man; by reason of their offence (or erring) he is flesh, so shall his days be an hundred and twenty years." The idea, according to Dillmann, is, that the conditions under which God placed the human race at creation are broken by the sin referred to in ver. 1; that God's purpose is to arrest this, and not suffer the spirit of life that He gave to man to be subjected for ever to the service of sense and sin to which man debased it; and that, by the withdrawal of this spirit of life, man's powers are to be weakened and his existence limited to an hundred and twenty years. The important point is, that whatever the difficulties of the interpretation may be, it is fully recognised by Schultz, as well as others, that in this passage death is represented as a judgment, a thing opposed to man's real personality, and connected with a perversion of his intended course.

and Greek conceptions, it stood apart from them at certain points, and one of these was of great significance. The Ethnic faiths had separate deities for their underworld. The Babylonians had their Allat or Nin-ki-gal, the Greeks their gloomy Pluto and Persephone. But the absolute monotheism of the Old Testament recognised no special deity for Sheol, no withdrawal even of the dark under-world from the presence and the rule of God. There is no approach to the heathen view. "Thou wentest to the king with ointment," says the prophet, "and didst increase thy perfumes, and didst send thine ambassadors far off, and didst debase thyself even unto Sheol."[1] These are words, it is true, which have been supposed to betray the existence of the Gentile sentiment. But even this solitary passage, if it speaks at all of the service of infernal deities, speaks of it as something foreign to the faith of Israel. It is doubtful, besides, whether the words amount to more than the expression of a servility which is ready to stoop to the lowest depth.

[1] Isa. lvii. 9. Looking to what is said of the fear of man in ver. 11, Delitzsch thinks that vers. 9, 10 speak of Israel as making mighty efforts to obtain allies, travelling to the king with oil and abundance of spices, sending messengers to distant courts, and bowing not only to earth but to Sheol itself in the extremest servility, in order to court favour and help. Cheyne, too, Orelli, and others, prefer to take the phrase as a figure for abject servility. There are eminent names, however, on the other side. Böttcher (*De Inferis*, §§ 449, 452) holds that there is more than a metaphor here. He indicates three things which may be referred to—the service of infernal deities, like Nibhaz and Tartak, of whom the Avites made themselves gods (2 Kings xvii. 31); the worship of strange gods in subterranean caves, of which there was an instance in the rites of Mithras; or the wailings for the dead, noticed by Aelian and Plutarch, which were conjoined with certain idolatries, and were practised in pits. Ewald, who regards the whole section as quoted from another prophet of Manasseh's time or thereby, thinks that what is in view here is the offering of costly gifts to all kinds of foreign and remote gods, to Moloch, and to the gods of the under-world. Dillmann also rejects the

There is a king of terrors; there is a shepherd that herds the wicked dead, who are said to be "appointed as a flock for Sheol."[1] But it is death personified. It is Sheol itself that is moved to meet the Babylonian monarch, and that "stirreth up" the great dead to greet the new-comer.[2] Sheol is God's domain. His presence penetrates it; if one makes his bed in it, God is there.[3] His eye sees through it; Sheol is naked before Him, and Abaddon hath no covering.[4] His power fills it or empties it; He bringeth down to Sheol, and bringeth up.[5] His hand searches it; though the idolater and the oppressor dig into Sheol, that hand shall take them thence.[6] His righteousness reaches it; the fire of His wrath burns to the lowest Sheol.[7]

The difference is seen again in the idea of the *good of existence*, whether for the individual or for the nation. In the view of the Old Testament, *life* and *good* are one and the same thing, as are also their

metaphorical interpretation of the clause, "Thou didst debase thyself even unto hell," and the reference to political alliances. He does this on the ground that הִשְׁפֵּיל does not mean to *bow down* or *stoop low*, and that vers. 5–8 deal with idolatrous service. He concludes that the passage contains a denunciation of efforts to win the favour of heathen gods, even those of the most distant lands; and not such efforts only, but others equally vain to secure the help of the deities or denizens of Sheol itself. This interpretation has its own difficulties. It takes the מֶלֶךְ, not in the sense of a king among men, but in the sense of a great god, a king among gods,—*Bel*, according to Knobel; *Moloch*, according to Ewald; *'Anam-melekh*, according to Hitzig; the supreme heathen god, according to others. In any case, it is not a native Hebrew practice or belief that is in view, but a heathen practice to which corrupt Israel yielded.

[1] Job xviii. 14; Ps. xlix. 14.

[2] Isa. xiv. 9.

[3] Ps. cxxxix. 8.

[4] Job xxvi. 8.

[5] 1 Sam. ii. 6. This remarkable sentence expresses the power of Israel's God over life and death, the power to grant or to deny deliverance. Whether it is Hannah's word, or part of an ancient ode or war-pæan, as Stade and others fancy, it expresses nothing more than this.

[6] Amos ix. 2.

[7] Deut. xxxii. 22.

opposites, *death* and *evil*.[1] "Life" (חַיִּים) is the sum of all earthly blessings, and nothing makes "life" that is not "good." But both "life" and "good" are moral or religious ideas. "Good" is not mere temporal prosperity, although the one thing is associated with the other. Neither is "life" mere existence, however favoured, if the favour is limited to material enjoyment and success.

"Life" or "good" means for the individual man a career like that of the patriarchs, the sum of such desirable things as length of days, the gift of children, the possession of one's heritage, fertile fields, corn and wine in abundance, a green old age, the expectation of the continuance of one's name and the blessing of one's house. "Death" or "evil" means for the individual the opposite of these—a shortened existence, childlessness, unfruitful seasons, exile, the extirpation of one's name, the misfortune of one's house. For the nation the one means a people dwelling secure, in the enjoyment of peace, plenty, and victory over enemies; and the other means famine, disturbance, defeat, bondage, dispersion.[2] It is never these things in themselves, however, that make the good of existence or *life* in the large Old Testament sense, but these things with the grace of God. Neither nation nor individual, however prospered, sees good that does not also see God and have experience of His favour. Those desirable things of earth are the seals of His favour; but "life" and "good" are in the favour, not in the mere seals. That God Himself is the life of man and nation, that apart from Him there is no good, that happiness is

[1] Deut. xxx. 15. [2] Deut. xxxiii. 26–28.

found only in His nearness, is the teaching at once of Law-book, Psalm, and Proverb.[1] This association of all weal with God Himself could not but carry the Hebrew belief in an after-existence beyond its own initial stage, and far beyond what was possible in religions which knew not a God like Israel's God.

The difference shows itself further in the Old Testament view of the *Ethics* of life, its moral order and its moral adjustments. There is an order in life working to righteousness, and the secret of that order is the will of God. Reward for the righteous according to their righteousness, and punishment for the unrighteous according to their unrighteousness, are assured. It is a fundamental principle of the theology of the Old Testament, that God is to man as man is to God. It is of the essence of the Law that God will "walk contrary unto those" who "walk contrary unto Him"; that if His people "move Him to jealousy with that which is not God," and "provoke Him to anger with their vanities," He also will "move them to jealousy with those which are not a people," and "provoke them to anger with a foolish nation."[2] It is the teaching of the Psalmist[3] that with the merciful God shows Himself merciful, that He is perfect with the perfect man, pure with the pure, froward with the perverse.

This moral equation completes itself on earth. The man who is in fellowship with God looks for good here; while the man who estranges himself from God has his punishment here, in the disasters that pursue his life, or in the stroke that suddenly teminates life.

[1] Deut. xxx. 20; Ps. xvii. 2; Lev. xxvi. 11; Prov. iii. 2, iv. 10, vii. 35.
[2] Lev. xxvi. 23, 24; Deut. xxxii. 21. [3] Ps. xviii. 25, 26.

The adjustment of fortune to merit may not be immediate. Wickedness may run its blind career with impunity for a time, and piety may suffer. But at last the moral return comes to each, and it comes in the events of the earthly existence, or in its end. Good obtains its perfect reward, and evil its just penalty. But it is before the man goes down to Abaddon, where piety and folly meet on equal terms.

This doctrine of retribution takes its form from the central idea of a kingdom of God established upon earth. It has been grievously misunderstood. Men of different schools, looking at it especially as it appears in the positive and unqualified statements of the Mosaic books, have made it one of their strongest reasons for an unfriendly judgment of the Hebrew religion. The authority of the Old Testament was seriously impaired, as the old Socinians thought, by its ignorance of the doctrine of future awards, and its failure to give the promise of eternal life. The morality of the Old Testament was repudiated as selfish and utilitarian, destitute of any higher inspiration than the hope of earthly reward and the dread of earthly loss. Even men like De Wette spoke of the Pentateuchal doctrine of retribution as an infatuation of the Hebrew nation, an unwholesome, narrowing idea of life, in which the Jew contrasted unfavourably with the Greek. The English Deists fixed upon it as the vantage ground in their assaults upon the religion of the Old Testament. Thomas Morgan charged Moses with wordly designs;[1] and the silence of the Mosaic books on the subject of future awards was a stock argument

[1] *Moral Philosopher*, iii. 111.

with the Deistical school. We gather from Warburton's statements, indeed, that this was more the case than the extant writings of the Deists themselves indicate.

This peculiarity of the religion of the Law was made so much of by these writers, and caused such difficulty to the Churchmen of those days, that a special defence was felt to be needed, and Bentley's "man of monstrous appetite and bad digestion" undertook to furnish it in his *Divine Legation*. Warburton's Apology aimed at turning the contention of the assailants of the Mosaic religion into a demonstration of its truth. Assuming that the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is in itself, and in the general sense of mankind, vital to the welfare of society, and allowing further that it has no place in the Mosaic system, he argued that only the supposition of a divine origin and supernatural sanction[1] could account for the phenomenon known to history as the Jewish dispensation,—a defence rightly described as an "attempt to support one gigantic paradox by a whole system of affiliated paradoxes."[2]

[1] Warburton throws his argument into this form :—

I. Whatever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

The Jewish religion and society had no future state for their support.

Therefore the Jewish religion was supported by an extraordinary Providence.

II. It was universally believed by the ancients, on their common principles of legislation and wisdom, that whatsoever religion and society have no future state for their support, must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

Moses, skilled in all that legislation and wisdom, instituted the Jewish religion and society without a future state for its support.

Therefore Moses, who taught, believed likewise that *this* religion and society was supported by an extraordinary Providence.

[2] Leslie Stephen's *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, i. 355.

Nor was it by any means only among the English Deists that this peculiarity of the Mosaic religion was misunderstood and turned to hostile use. Kant stumbled at the same singular fact, and refused to allow the name of *Religion* to the Jewish faith, so far as it lacked the essential element of belief in a future life. He thought, at the same time, that Moses himself had the belief, but intentionally withheld it from the people.[1] Others, including even rigid, orthodox theologians like Hengstenberg, followed Kant in his view of the case, and in the attempt to meet it by the hypothesis of a secret doctrine known to the great men of the Old Covenant, but not communicated to the people.[2]

But this is to miss the spirit of the Old Testament, and to look only at the shell of the Mosaic system. It is not because there was little or no religion in the Jewish dispensation, as Kant imagined, that the moral awards of a future life were so surprisingly ignored. It is because there was so much religion, and because the religious interest so absorbed the Jewish mind. The revelation which came from Sinai, from "the secret place of thunder," bore witness of a God whom no eye could see, and who was to be worshipped in His pure spirituality without the aid of sign or likeness.

[1] Kant expresses himself thus: "Da ohne Glauben an ein künftiges Leben gar keine Religion gedacht werden kann, so enthält das Judenthum als ein solches in seiner Reinigkeit genommen gar keinen Religionsglauben." On the second point he writes thus: "Dieser Glaube drängt sich kraft der allgemeinen moralischen Anlage in der menschlichen Natur Jedermanns von selbst auf. Es ist also gewiss absichtlich geschehen dass der Gesetzgeber dieses Volkes, ob er gleich als Gott selbst vorgestellt wird, doch nicht die mindeste Rücksicht auf das künftige Leben habe nehmen wollen" (*Relig. innerh. d. Grenzen der bl. Vernunft*, p. 178).

[2] *Beitr.* iii. 574.

It seemed to the polytheists of the nations a religion without a God. But it was a religion all God. To the Hebrew people it became the intuition of a God who was so real although invisible, so near although unapproachable, that they felt His goings to be among them, and saw that His righteousness was shaping their lives. All else was sunk in the overmastering consciousness of the immediacy of God and the sense of His just work on earth. The silence of the Old Testament, especially in the Law, on the subject of an after-life has its reason in this. "Not from want of religion," says Dean Stanley, "but (if one might use the expression) from excess of religion, was this void left in the Jewish mind. The Future Life was not denied or contradicted; but it was overlooked, set aside, overshadowed, by the consciousness of the living, actual presence of God Himself. That truth, at least in the limited conceptions of the youthful nation, was too vast to admit of any rival truth, however precious."[1]

Nor is it that the morality of the Law or the Prophets was a mercenary morality, and the motives of obedience mere earthly hopes and fears. In this theory of rewards and punishments administered in the limited form of temporal good and temporal evil, all began and ended with God. At the heart of the Mosaic doctrine of retribution there was an idea which was older than the doctrine itself, and gave it its meaning, an idea which the sacred history carries back to Abraham and to Noah—the idea of a covenant between Israel and God. A view of duty, ruled by

[1] *Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church*, i. pp. 154, 155.

this great conception of present personal relations and mutual engagements between God and His people, was something far removed from a narrow utilitarianism. A view of life, in which the first thing was the recognition of God's claims, the sense of God's grace, the confession that His fellowship was the secret of all good, and His hand the explanation of all success, made the doctrine of a temporal retribution a new thing. It ennobled the very patriotism of the Hebrew, and purged it of the passion of national glorification. "In the history of other nations," says Herder, "there are indications that they designated here and there a small piece of their soil as made sacred by the presence of their God; but I know no people whose poetry, like theirs, has made the poverty of their country exhibit the fulness of God, and consecrated its narrow limits as a theatre for displaying the majesty of Jehovah."[1] The doctrine of retribution which referred all to God, and confessed Him as the Author alike of the triumphs which enriched and the disasters which chastened, rose high above any mere Hedonism, and was certain to enlarge its bounds.

The enlargement took place, and we can so far follow its course. We can see the ripening of the seeds of a living hope which were in the soil of the Old Testament revelation from the first. We can understand how the religion which, in the form given it in the historical books, has been stigmatised as the rudest of all religions, on account of its complete disregard of a future life,[2] proved nevertheless to be the only religion that

[1] *The Spirit of the Hebrew Poetry*, by Marsh, i. p. 236.

[2] Speaking of the Jewish religion, as it appears in "Genesis and all the

moved on to a vital and enduring faith in immortality. The potentialities of that faith lie open to the eye, even in the oldest sections of the historical records; and the other books enable us to follow the process by which "in divers portions and in divers manners" it gradually asserted itself. We see how the primitive conception of the state of death was re-shaped in the course of ages by the secret energies of the thought of God and the experience of His converse with men.

Two things contributed to the transfiguration of the popular ideas of Sheol, and to the discovery of the better hope that was in the heart of the Old Testament religion. On the one hand, there were the intuitions, ventures, and forecasts of devout souls in moments of deepest experience or keenest conflict; and, on the other hand, there were the deliverances of the great spiritual teachers of Israel. These are not to be thought of as entirely distinct. The assured communication of the teacher came often out of the sanctuary of the wrestling soul. Neither can it be said that they issued in a complete doctrine. But each added something, and together they gave what hope could hold by until Christ came.

These things have a history which can be read with some measure of certainty. It has many points of interest. One of them is the influence which was exerted by *events*, especially by national disasters and the defeat of national expectations, upon the development of the belief. Another is the gradual displacing

historical books to the end of Chronicles," Schopenhauer characterises it as "die roheste aller Religionen, weil sie die einzige ist, die durchaus keine Unsterblichkeitslehre, noch irgend eine Spur davon hat" (*Paral.* i. p. 137).

of the larger unit of the nation by the smaller unit of the individual, in the Old Testament view of the future. In primitive religions generally the deity worshipped was the deity of the tribe or people. This was the case in its own way with the religion of Israel. The first relation of God was with the community rather than the individual. The first thought was that of the kingdom of God and its fortunes. The first principle was that of national privilege, national responsibility, national reward or punishment. The individual life was not distinct from the social life. The promises and threatenings of the law were addressed to collective Israel, and had regard to national obedience. The God of Israel was the God of the Israelite, and the individual had his reward in the prosperity of the nation. So the hope of the Hebrew was in the first instance a hope for the community, for the visible Theocracy. The future which he looked to was a future for the nation, rather than for himself or his own soul. It was the perpetuity of the people that he inferred from the eternity of God. The saint who fainted under his own pain sank his own case in the larger thought of the afflicted community, and made the changelessness of God an argument for the continuance of the children of His servants, and for the establishing of their seed before Him.[1]

But the time came when the thought of the individual asserted itself, and the sense of personal responsibility sharpened, and the principle that "the soul that sinneth, it shall die"[2] was placed alongside

[1] Ps. cii. 27, 28. [2] Ezek. xviii. 20.

the proverb which spoke of the fathers eating sour grapes, and the teeth of the children being set on edge. The doctrine of a divine retribution which fulfilled itself in judgments falling primarily on the nation, and on the individual as a part of the nation, obtained a new extension. In this the teaching of Ezekiel marks an era. The responsibility of the individual was not wholly overlooked, indeed, in the earlier period. There are passages all along the line of the Old Testament writings in which it comes more or less clearly into view.[1] But it forms no very distinct or prominent element even in the counsels of the eighth century prophets. The great ideas remained those of corporate guilt or merit, corporate reward or punishment; and the instructions of the prophets continued to be addressed to the house of Israel as such, until the preacher of the Chebar asserted the personal responsi-

[1] In the historical and legal books the instances referred to are chiefly these: Abraham's plea in Gen. xviii. 25; Jehovah's answer to Moses in Ex. xxxii. 33; the cry of Moses and Aaron on the occasion of the punishment of Korah and his company—"shall one man sin, and wilt Thou be wroth with all the congregation?" (Num. xvi. 22); the Deuteronomic statement of the principle of the Second Commandment (Deut. vii. 10); the further principle of the Deuteronomic legislation—"The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own sin" (Deut. xxiv. 16); David's confession and appeal, "Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly; but these sheep, what have they done?" (2 Sam. xxiv. 17); Joash's recognition of the principle that every man shall suffer only for his own sin (2 Kings xiv. 6). In the prophetic books, the passages mainly in question are these: Isa. iii. 10, 11, xxxiii. 15; Jer. xii. 1, 2, xvii. 5–10, xxxii. 18, 19. Stade thinks there are no traces of anything but corporate responsibility and collective retribution in the pre-Exilic literature. But this is an extreme opinion. Stade questions the genuineness of Jer. xii. 1, 2, xvii. 5–10, xxxii. 18, 19. Kuenen affirms their genuineness, and holds Isa. xxxiii. 15 to be pre-Exilic. While Wellhausen and Stade deny the pre-Exilic date of Deut. vii. 10, Kuenen maintains it. See also Mr. C. G. Montefiore in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1890.

bility of the Israelite over against the collective responsibility of Israel.

As this truth penetrated the conscience of the people, new thoughts of the Future arose; and as at the same time their experience of fellowship with God became the subject of reflection with devout souls, there came the presentiment of individual immortality. Various influences, instructions, and changes of fortune, no doubt, had their part in this. But nothing did more to forward the alteration and advance than the great event of the Exile, which broke the nation and shattered the national hope.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE POETICAL BOOKS

THE Poetical books help us to understand how the first of the two contributions which have been named was made, and what it amounted to. They bring us into the laboratory of the personal, spiritual life, when they introduce us to the cries and conflicts of faith,—a faith distracted by the inequalities of things and by the difference between the expected working of the divine righteousness and stern, obtrusive fact. The contradictions of existence may not have made themselves felt at once. The first attitude of the Hebrew mind to the enigmas of life and the mystery of death may have been childlike and unquestioning. Primitive Hebrew piety may have been able simply to accept death, satisfied with life as it was lived when it saw its natural length, content with the experience of God's fellowship which was enjoyed in the land of the living, craving nothing beyond but the continuance of family and people. But it could not rest there long.

Faith had to face the problems of life which met it in the nation and in the individual. It was disconcerted by the thought that, on to the end of the active earthly career, the righteous might miss the

reward of their righteousness, and the wicked escape the penalty of their wickedness, and then sink both together to the same dead level of Sheol. As faith wrestled with the questions forced upon it by the failure of correspondence between the Mosaic doctrine of retribution and intractable fact, its horizon widened, it had its visions, it drew its inferences, it stretched dim hands beyond Sheol. In moments of rare elevation things came to it which enriched it and expanded it, things which were the inspirations of that Spirit, who makes "groanings which cannot be uttered" the prophets of truth and hope.

The enlargement of the perceptions of faith to which the Poetical books bear witness, follows more than one direction. At times it takes the form of an anticipation of relief from Sheol, a half-articulate assurance that the blank under-world which cuts man off from the presence of God cannot be meant for the godly. The fact of Sheol, with all that it implies according to the common belief, is acquiesced in, while the thought that this can be the end of God's saints, even His afflicted saints, is banished for the time. In the fateful crises of life the soul has its ecstacies, and becomes prophetic. God's holy ones have their moments of rapt experience when their converse with God, the living God, is felt to be incapable of being cancelled by death, and the presentiment rises of something better than Sheol. The pressure of the dark enigmas of existence, the terror of unlooked-for dangers threatening life, bring such moments with them; and faith has its forecasts.

These forecasts, it is true, are not always large or

certain. Often the feeling does not go beyond the immediate occasion, and all that comes to utterance then is the anticipation that there will be deliverance from the impending peril, that God will avert death until His servant's time is finished and his vocation is fulfilled. Thus it is, for example, with the martial psalm, the Huguenot "song of battles," which celebrates the victorious ascent of the God of Israel with the train of captive enemies of His people, and magnifies Him as the "God of deliverance," to whom "belong the issues from death."[1] So is it, too, with the psalm in praise of the "city of the great King," inviolable through Jehovah's presence, when it closes with the note of confidence in the everlasting guidance of this God who is "our God for ever and ever."[2]

But it appears to be different with the assurance

[1] Ps. lxviii. 20. The verse is variously rendered, *e.g.* "God who is our God to show help; and Jahve the Lord has for death ways of escape" (Ewald); "He, God, is a God of deeds of deliverance, and Jahve the Lord hath ways of escape from death" (Delitzsch); "God is unto us divine in saving acts; yea, unto Jehovah belong escapes from Death" (Cheyne). An inference is drawn, as is rightly observed, from what God is to Israel. But it does not go beyond the thought of God's ability to rescue from the descent to Sheol even those who seem in instant peril of death.

[2] Ps. xlviii. 14. Ewald, following the LXX., renders, "He is God our God for ever and ever; He will guide us into eternities." Others (Mendelssohn, Stier), following the Syriac, and overlooking the usage of the preposition עַל, translate it, "He will be our guide beyond death." The עַל-מוּת, however, is perhaps only a musical note occupying an unusual position at the end of the psalm. So Delitzsch renders it, "That such an one is Elohim, our God for ever; He will us guide"; and Professor Cheyne, "That there is Elohim, our God, He it is that shall lead us for ever and ever." There is nothing more definite here than trust in the unfailing guidance of God. In Ps. iv. 8, too, Oehler finds at least a transition to the larger passages in which faith negatives death and Sheol. But the closing sentence of that reposeful evening prayer expresses nothing beyond the thought that the man who has Jehovah's favour and protection can lie down without guard or companion, and sleep at once secure, unharassed by care or fear.

which is expressed in the *Sixteenth Psalm*. There we have a plea for preservation, and that because of a relation with God which gives the pleader a claim to the Divine protection. The suppliant makes his confession to God that in this relation he has found all his weal, and has seen that apart from God he has no good. He declares his delight in Jehovah's saints, the true nobles of the land, and disowns association with those who exchange the glad service of the Lord for the vain offerings of strange gods. He avows anew the pure satisfaction which has been his in Jehovah his Portion, who gives him practical guidance and counsel in converse with Himself. From this quick sense of the security which is found in fellowship with God he looks into the future, and rises to the conviction that there, too, he shall be safe with a Covenant God; that there, too, soul and flesh, himself in his entire living being, shall continue secure; that he shall be shown the way in which life is found, and shall have in the presence of God a joy both full and everlasting.

He seems to be face to face with some dire peril, due perhaps to the enmity of a recreant, idolatrous party in the land; and the terms in which he pours out his heart, taken in the letter, might not convey more than a confident expectation of rescue from that peril. But the danger, if such is at all what is in view, is in the background. The sense of it is lost in the deeper sense of life secure in communion with God; and the singer's faith is lifted to the heavenlies when it assures itself that God will not give his soul to Sheol, nor suffer his flesh to see the pit.

There is more here than the expectation of deliver-

ance from the terror of a particular occasion. There is not so much, however, as the distinct and definite belief in a blessed immortality, far less the hope of the resurrection of the body. The *principle* of that hope, no doubt, is in the far-reaching words. But it is not in the Psalmist's ken. His thought is not of the leaving of his soul *in* Sheol, nor of the fate of the disembodied spirit, but of the surrender of his soul *to* Sheol, in the sense of dying. When he speaks of his "flesh" also dwelling "in safety" (R.V.), he thinks of the living body and the possibility of its becoming the tenant of the grave, not of the dead body and its subjection to decay. But there is the intuition of a security in God which nothing in the threatening present or in the unknown future can touch. Hope stretches for the moment beyond its limit, and mounts to assurance. There is the sense of a joy and energy in the life hid in God, which must be stronger than death and all that destroys. This fellowship with God, in which his heart is glad and his glory rejoices, is felt to guarantee its own continuance, and to be incapable of being dissolved by the destructions of Sheol. The Psalmist has sight of the truth that life with God cannot sink to the measure of the underworld existence, which is not life ; that Jehovah cannot but make some way of escape for His "beloved one" from the pit in which His face is unseen and His praise is silent.[1]

[1] The interpretation which limits the words to the confident expectation of deliverance from some impending mortal peril, is not unreasonable. Each of the rich sentences in which the Psalmist's hope is expressed, if taken by itself, will suit that interpretation sufficiently well. It is favoured also by the general level of faith seen in the Psalter, and by

The *Seventeeth Psalm* probably furnishes a similar instance of the far perceptions of faith, although the point and range of the terms are by no means certain. It has a general affinity with the Sixteenth Psalm, and a particular resemblance to it in the lofty strain of hope with which it closes. But while in the one case the sense of the danger is lost in the assurance of security in Jehovah's fellowship, in the other the danger is in the foreground, and the hope is the final note. In this psalm one speaks who is in mortal peril. His danger is from men in whose thoughts there is no place for God and the things of God. Conscious of his righteousness, he looks painfully at the mystery of

the fact that terms equally mystical and far-reaching are elsewhere used of occasions which are plainly of temporal interest. In one form or other it has been accepted, therefore, by Riehm, Hofmann, and others. Hofmann, for example, connects the psalm with David, and understands it to express his assurance that God will not suffer death to overtake him before his mission is finished, and it is made certain that the kingship will not die when he dies. See the *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 507. Most interpreters, however, including those of very different schools, agree with Hupfeld in thinking that so to limit the psalm is to empty it of its highest meaning. Whether the psalm is to be referred to David (Hitzig, Delitzsch, etc.), to the Exile (Ewald), or to post-Exilic times (Cheyne, etc.), the interpretation is not materially affected. The question of the date of the psalm, and the question of the ideas of the psalm, are sometimes mixed up, but they are in the main independent of each other. The allusions to religious dissensions, to libations, to the "excellent," and the "holy ones," are enough, in Professor Cheyne's opinion, to prove it to be post-Exilic. He takes it, therefore, to be "the fruit of that long weaning from the world begun in Babylon, and perfected under another foreign yoke in Israel's recovered home" (*The Origin of the Psalter*, p. 197). It is true that if the doctrine of the resurrection of the body were definitely taught in it, that might be a weighty argument for placing it later. But, as Delitzsch observes, the idea of a future for the body might appear as a "bold postulate of faith" even in a Davidic psalm. In point of fact, however, the Psalmist's antithesis, as Professor Cheyne puts it, "is not this world and the next, but life with God and life without God." See also Kirkpatrick's *The Psalms*, Book I. p. 78; W. R. Smith's article in the *Expositor*, 1876, vol. iv. etc.

a righteous God permitting himself and his fellows to be driven to the death by rancorous enemies. On the ground of his just cause and the sincerity of his prayer, he appeals to the loving-kindness of the Lord for a way of deliverance, and cries for Jehovah's sword to overtake these pitiless foes. But at last his thoughts rest on a contrast deeper than time. These "men of the world" have their portion in this life, in its treasures, in its children, and have nothing beyond. But as for him, Jehovah Himself is his possession, and there is a presence of God which comes by righteousness. In this he knows a higher and more lasting satisfaction. His hope soars to the enduring joy of a fellowship in which Jehovah speaks mouth to mouth with His servant, and gives him to behold His face. He is assured of the beatitude of a vision of God, which outlasts life and outweighs earth's fulness.[1]

On other occasions the same enlargement of faith assumes the form of an overpassing of the common doom, a denial or ignoring of the prevailing idea of death. Sheol is taken to be something else than the

[1] In this psalm, as in the preceding, the idea of immortality is implicit rather than explicit. The main thought lies in the contrast between two kinds of good—an unreal and fugitive good apart from God, and a real and enduring good in His fellowship. The *beholding God's face* seems to express the idea of a real vision of God, a communion with Him as actual and as familiar as that enjoyed by Moses according to Num. xii. 6–8. The question of the magnitude and definiteness of the hope depends largely on the sense of the phrase "when I awake," which is unhappily so disputable. It is variously taken to express the experience of the morning after the natural rest of night (Ewald, etc.; a "lean and hungry sense," according to Perowne); deliverance from the night of calamity (Calvin, etc.); the joy of daily communion with God (Kirkpatrick, etc), or "every morning when I awake," as H. Schultz puts it; the *waking sight* of God, as contrasted with the dream or vision, which is supposed to be suggested

popular belief makes it, or it is simply negatived. This current of thought is best seen in the *Forty-ninth* and *Seventy-third Psalms*. These are among the great passages of the Old Testament which struggle with the unexpected and anomalous in the moral order of the world. The latter psalm, Savonarola's psalm, and that of many a large and burdened soul, is the voice of one of God's holy ones, who has been stung into doubt and driven to the verge of apostasy by the insolent prosperity of the wicked, a prosperity which seems in painful conflict with the Law's doctrine of God, the righteous Judge, who does justice on earth. It is the problem which is faced elsewhere, in the Thirty-seventh Psalm and the Book of Job,—a problem staggering beyond measure to the Hebrew mind. For the Hebrew, knowing nothing of laws of nature, but referring all things to the sovereign will of God, looked for direct interpositions of His hand, and felt baffled when He did not intervene in the interest of righteouness.

In this noble Asaphic psalm that problem is disposed of in two ways. The first solution which is offered is

by the passage in Numbers: the waking out of the sleep of this life ("when life's short morning is past," as Professor Cheyne gives it); the waking out of the sleep of death (Delitzsch, Perowne, etc.). Most of these renderings obviously limit the thought to an experience of God on earth. The last of these interpretations has most to commend it, although the Psalmist's prayer in vers. 8–14 looks to deliverance from the death then threatening, not to anything beyond death. Even taking the sense, however, to be that of an awaking out of the sleep of death, it does not follow that the doctrine of a resurrection appears here, or that there is anything more than the "postulate of faith" for which Delitzsch contends, an anticipation which "flashes upon his consciousness of fellowship with Him." In this consciousness death is not contemplated as final. The certainty of a satisfying relation to God which must continue beyond death is grasped for the time.

the one which is given in the Thirty-seventh Psalm. It is the patience of faith. It is the thought that it is only for a time that God allows the triumph of the wicked, and that at last He will in each case establish righteousness on earth. The Psalmist looks for the swift destruction which shall be the recompense of the ungodly, and he looks for it on earth. But instead of speaking of any compensation for the godly in the shape of material prosperity, he rises above his first solution, and grasps a second and worthier. His hope mounts higher than earth and its inequalities. He recalls how God has holden His right hand even in the discontent and terror of his doubt. He gives himself anew to Jehovah's guidance, and expresses the certitude that He will "receive him to glory" (or "take him in honour"), and will be his rock and portion when nature fails.

His theodicy stops far short of the New Testament doctrine of the compensations of an "eternal weight of glory" in the heavenly life. Neither the world beyond the grave nor the moral mystery of earth is made clear to him. But it does become clear to him again that the presence of God makes the blessedness of existence whether on earth or in heaven. The revived sense of this presence gives wings to his hope, and bears it above the dark contradictions about him. Heart and flesh, all that makes the living man, may seem to perish. But he has a life in God's fellowship which must endure beyond death, and have a future other than Sheol. Faith makes its bold venture, negativing the thought of severance from Jehovah, overleaping the inane under-world, and looking to God to "take".

His saint, as He "took" Enoch, who "walked with" Him.[1]

The hope which finds expression in the *Forty-ninth Psalm* is of the same order. The theodicy of this rich Korahite psalm, which is given in terms as remarkable for their difficulty as for their bold vigour, amounts to a sharp statement of the parting of the ways between the man who trusts in his wealth and him whose confidence is in God. With different fortunes they go the common way of existence upon earth. But at last they part at death, and they part absolutely there. The end of the boastful rich is that they perish like sheep, and leave their abundance to others. The thought of such men is that their "houses are for ever." But Sheol waits them, their inevitable habitation; death becomes their shepherd, and pens them within its drear vacuity. No redemption opens for them from the desolate underworld, no escape for their proud forms from the wasting of the pit. But the righteous man looks for a better end than to become the prey of Sheol. God ransoms him from its hold, and "takes" him above it to Him-

[1] Most interpretators infer from the use of לָקַח in this psalm (ver. 24), as also in Ps. xlix. 15, that the speaker has in view the case of Enoch's translation (Gen. v. 24). Professor Cheyne finds the point of the verses in question in Ps. lxxiii. to be this, that the Psalmist's "experience of that loving-kindness, which was better by far than what men call life, being incomplete, he postulated a fuller communion with God after death" (*Origin of the Psalter*, p. 389). "The future," says Delitzsch, "is dark to him, but it is illuminated by the assured confidence that his way beyond the grave will lead, not downwards, but upwards (Prov. xv. 24; cf. xii. 28), and that the issue of his earthly existence will be a glorious solution of the riddle. . . . Here, as elsewhere, it is faith that breaks through not only the darkness of his present life, but also the night of Hades. In these days there was not yet extant any divine word regarding the triumph in heaven of the Church militant here below; but for faith the name of Jahveh had already a profound yet transparent depth of meaning, which carried the thoughts of the poet away beyond Hades into eternal life."

self. The first answer of this great didactic psalm to the vaunting confidence of the godless rich, is the impoverishment to which they are doomed, the penury of death and Sheol. But its second is the anticipation in behalf of the righteous of a home with God Himself. Here, too, hope, grasping its present experience of Jehovah's fellowship, and sustaining itself on the recompense of Enoch, reaches the assurance of a way upward through death to God. It is still *hope*, however, the expectation of an illumined faith. It is not inculcation, doctrine, or certain knowledge.[1]

These are the clearest and most relevant passages in the collection of Israel's praises and prayers. Others are sometimes cited, which are of doubtful application. The mystic psalms in general, and the "Guest psalms" in particular, are interpreted by some as witnesses to the hope of immortality. The expressive terms which speak of "beholding Jehovah's face" (Ps. xi. 7), of being "set before His face for ever" (xli. 13), of His "right

[1] The idea in ver. 14 is understood by most to be that of the wasting of the rich, with the whole beauty and bravery of their outward man, in Sheol,—the decay that reduces their "form" to a shadow, for which there is no habitation. So Jerome renders it *figura eorum conteretur in inferno*, and the R.V., "Their beauty shall be for Sheol to consume, that there be no habitation for it." Delitzsch, too, gives it so, "Their form, falling a prey to the wasting of Sheol, becomes without a habitation." The צוּרָם and מִזְּבוּל, however, of this verse are among the great difficulties of the psalm. Ewald renders it, "Soon—so must their beauty rot, hell becomes their abode"; and Professor Cheyne, "Death is their shepherd, and their form shall waste away; Sheol shall be their castle for ever." The 15th verse is given thus by Professor Cheyne, "Nevertheless, God shall set free my soul; from the hand of Sheol shall He take me"; and Ewald renders it, "God will redeem my soul from the hand of hell when it seizes me." But if the case of Enoch is allowed to be in view, the ordinary rendering is most in point. The יִקָּחֵנִי is best understood of a taking *to* God, not a taking *out of* Sheol.

hand upholding" one (lxiii. 9), of the "fountain of life" being with Him (xxxvi. 9), of "abiding in His tabernacle" (xv. 1), of "dwelling in His house for ever" (xxiii. 6), of "ascending into His hill" (xxiv. 3), are understood to transcend the thought of the earthly house of the Divine presence, and all earthly experiences of God's nearness, and to rise to the conception of the eternal life and a heaven beyond earth. But this is to give them a definiteness which does not originally belong to them. They mean that in converse with God the saint found the fulness and certainty of life; that the highest and most enduring joy conceivable to him was in the access to God of which he had experience in the sanctuary. They mean that the loftiest and securest hope which he had for his own future took the form of an anticipation of the continuance of that access. But to make them express a more distinct and articulate conception of immortality, is to read our own ideas into them.[1]

The same enlargement of belief, however, took a third form, that of the suggestion or surmise of a restoration from Sheol. This is seen particularly in the *Book of Job*. In this book, in which all the great enigmas of piety seem to be touched, we come upon

[1] On these psalms see especially Professor Cheyne's *Origin of the Psalter*, pp. 385–388, 429. He admits that in passages like Ps. xi. 7, xli. 12, the idea may simply be that of enjoying God's favour, but contends that it may also be the idea of a fuller communion with God, implying "everlasting life." He pleads for a deeper mystical meaning even in expressions like those in xxi. 4, xlv. 3, lxxii. 4, although he allows they may be only hyperboles. He is disposed to regard the "fountain of life" in Ps. xxxvi. as denoting more than the source of prosperity and happiness, —as meaning, indeed, the fountain of "immortal life," and as approaching the figure of the "water of life" in Rev. xxii. 1. So with the words "by Thy light do we see light," and other phrases of these "inward" psalms.

the thought of the possibility of the dead being brought up out of the under-world into a larger life. Faith ventures the desire, it leaps even to the conclusion, that the stay in Sheol may be only temporary, and that the righteous may return from it in their righteousness. One of the most notable passages of this kind, a passage remarkable at once for the abruptness of the utterance, its momentariness, and the height to which it soars, is the one already referred to in Job xiv. 13–15. "Oh that Thou wouldest hide me in Sheol," cries the distracted sufferer, "that Thou wouldest keep me secret, until Thy wrath be past, that Thou wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me! If a man die, shall he live *again*? All the days of my warfare would I wait, till my release should come. Thou shouldest call, and I would answer Thee: Thou wouldest have a desire to the work of Thine hands" (R.V.). The sense of his feebleness, the impression of the frailty, misery, and shortness of his life, the thought of the irreparable loss brought by death, oppress him. Before the terrible power of God he is like a driven leaf or dry stubble. Can God exert His awful might to add to the sadness and mockery of a life which is already so helpless and painful? Might He not at least give him rest for the few days which are his ere he flee away like a shadow? The tree, though its stock dies, scents the quickening waters, and sprouts again. But man sinks swiftly into Sheol, and till the eternal heavens be no more there is no return for him, no knowledge of the upper-world, no manifestation of his innocence.

The heaviest thought is this, that when he dies all

is over with him for ever, not only with his life, but with his righteousness. His heart rises in revolt against the anticipation. He breaks away from it with a passionate cry to God that it may not be so, but that He may make Sheol a temporary hiding-place for him, and cover him till the wrath exhausts itself which has broken the Divine fellowship wherein is life. The wish that Sheol might prove to be this prompts the conclusion that, though a man die, he may live again. The possibility of this relieves his gloom, and all is seen in a new light. How patiently would he then endure the time of his warfare, whatever its pains and its mysteries of suffering rectitude! How joyfully would he answer when God, in the language which He has for His child, at last calls him back to His fellowship!

This takes us higher than anything we have hitherto had. In the great passages from the Psalms we had an appeal against the finality of death and Sheol from men who enjoyed God's fellowship on earth, and who drew from that the inferences which faith and feeling were capable of drawing. Here we have the same appeal from one who felt himself cut off from that fellowship, one to whom the calamities by which he was smitten in spite of his conscious rectitude were witnesses to that awful fact, and who yet rose to the demand for release from death and Sheol, and to the intuition of a future of restored life with God. It is only an impassioned cry; it is but a momentary vision which has darkness behind it and before it. But it is a foregleam of the light of eternal life.[1]

[1] "The thought," says Ewald, "which here first suddenly comes to light takes its place in the imagination as merely a distant wish, there to be

The same idea, in somewhat broader form, comes to expression again in Job's reply to Eliphaz (chap. xvi. 18–xvii. 9). The estrangement of God is followed by the estrangement of man. The faces of his friends are turned away from Job; the sympathy and the pity which he craves are denied him. Nothing is left him but his own rectitude. He can hope for no restoration of his life, for no justification of his cause

fully recognised and realised in the first place. In this its first conception in the imagination, it does not attain to full certainty. The speaker who is surprised by it, at first simply considers how beautiful and glorious the case would be if it were reality. But inasmuch as the thought contains a truth which has really its proper place here, it can never be lost again, but when more closely followed must become increasingly certain." See his *Job*, *in loc.* This is the key to the passage. It is the new idea that Job's rectitude, for which there seems no prospect of a vindication in this life, may perhaps be destined to secure its acknowledgment in another life. So there is the cry to be hidden in Sheol as a shelter for the time that God's wrath endures. Behind this is the demand to be judged and vindicated, and this prompts the thought, here put in the form of a question without reply (ver. 14), of an after life. In the words which follow in vers. 16–20, and which recall the pitilessness of God's dealings with weak man on earth, and the blankness of the under-world in which the dead man is left, ignorant of his kindred, and alone with his own pain and mourning, Ewald thinks that Job "falls back from the bright picture, which had suddenly come as from another world, and suddenly vanished again, into the dark valley." Others (Dillmann, Davidson, etc.) take them to be spoken in support of the cry in vers. 14, 15, the things of terror being mentioned anew in order to give force to the plea for an after life. "We should be wrong," remarks the latter, "to say that he contemplates a purely spiritual vision, and further wrong to say that he contemplates being invested with a new body when he shall see God. Neither thought is present to his mind, which is entirely absorbed in the thought of seeing God. The ideas of Old Testament saints regarding the condition of man after death were too obscure to permit of any such formal and precise conception as that which we call a spiritual sight of God. Besides, as the kind of half-ecstasy under which Job here speaks has fallen on him when a living man, it is probable that, like all persons in such conditions, he carries over with him his present circumstances into his vision after death, and seems to himself to be such a man as he is now when he sees God" (*The Book of Job*, Cambridge Series, pp. 295, 296). See also Dillmann's discussion, *Hiob*, pp. 175–179.

on earth, though his friends vainly speak of that. He looks death in the face,—death certain and near, death looming in its most awful aspect, with the reprobation of God and the moral condemnation of men. But that this should be God's lot for him is again a thought intolerable to his conscious innocence. His soul appeals against it; he carries his case from man to God; he carries it beyond even that: he takes it from God back to God, from the God who *is* to the God who *shall be*, from the God whose wrath now overwhelms him to the God whose longing shall again be to the work of His hands. He adjures earth to leave his innocent blood uncovered, that it may call unceasingly for reparation (ver. 18). He lifts his despairing face above, and discovers a "witness" for himself in heaven when he fails to find one in this world. He looks to a "Sponsor" on high who will see that right is done him (ver. 19). At last he names this "Sponsor." It is God Himself, the God of the aftertime, when His wrath is overpast. To Him he cries with tears for justice, entreating Him to become his Surety, and making the fewness of his years, the sorrows of his life, the provocations of his friends, the arguments for an answer to his piercing appeal. What Job's eye fastens on here is not some adjustment that may possibly appear before he dies. He expects not merely to die, but to die in the midst of those inflictions which are the seals of God's wrath. Out of his abandonment and despair he reaches for the moment beyond wrath to love, beyond a reparation denied before death to a reparation which is possible after death.

The venture of faith, which has expressed itself so far as a wish rising almost to a demand for another and completer life, comes to its highest certainty in the memorable words, in the heart of Job's reply to Bildad, which make at once the most difficult and the loftiest passage in the book (xix. 23–27). A double crisis is reached in this reply, the crisis of deepest despair, and the crisis of rapturous conviction. A stranger to his own kindred, condemned and cast off by his friends, Job turns finally from man to God, from the dark finalities of the present to the possibilities of the future. One thing remains to him—the sense of his rectitude. To that he clings with the intenser passion, and from that last refuge he looks out beyond. He has protested his innocence, and craved the recognition of his friends. But they continue incredulous and apathetic. Men of other times may prove more generous judges, and his longing is to hand down his cause to them. He cries for an imperishable record, of book or rock, to preserve his protestations for later generations—

> "Oh that my words were now written!
> Oh that they were inscribed in a book!
> That with an iron pen and lead
> They were graven in the rock for ever!"
> (Vers. 23, 24, R.V.)

But the publication of his innocence to an audience of the future is cold and distant comfort. He reaches anxious hands after something better, and it comes to him in an inspiration which lifts him above the cold imputations of friends, and above the strange wrath of the God of the present, into the clear vision of the God of the future, his Vindicator and Restorer. The

"witness" whom he looked for in heaven[1] is seen. The pledge of a future life, which he sought when he prayed God to "put him in a surety" with Himself,[2] is given him. He had had the fear that the reparation, which he could not imagine to be refused for ever, might come too late, when he was dead and incapable of knowing it.[3] The terror that God might delay His righteous act until it were vain to seek Him on earth and vain to think to witness the vindication which must come, gives place to the wish that there might be a way out of Sheol, a life and a judgment after it. The desire that Sheol may be but a transient sojourn, the surmise that there may a life after death, leaps now into assurance; and the vindication which has been sought with painful insistence, and sought in vain, from God and from man, becomes a prophetic intuition.

> "But I know that my Redeemer liveth,
> And coming after me, He shall stand upon the dust;
> And after this my skin is destroyed,
> Yet without my flesh I shall see God:
> Whom I shall see for myself,
> And mine eyes shall behold, and not another.
> My reins consume within me."

At last Job can speak with the note of certainty. He *knows* that there is a Redeemer for him. He himself must die; but he has sight of One who lives after him, and with whom he is safe. A Defender is revealed who will make his cause good by Himself appearing and doing him justice. His Deliverer comes after him,[4] and though not now, yet in the aftertime,

[1] Job xvi. 19. [2] Job xvii. 3. [3] Job vii. 8, 21.

[4] Ewald and H. Schultz give אַחֲרוֹן the force of *Nachmann*, *Afterman*, making it synonymous with the *Goel* or Vindicator. But it is truer

He will stand forth for him upon the dust[1] in which he shall be laid. Skin shall perish, flesh shall waste,[2] he shall himself vanish from earth. Yet after the destruction of the grave he shall see his Vindicator. For that Vindicator is God.[3] *Him* he shall see! The God who has hidden His face, the God whose presence he can no more expect to enjoy before death — this God his own eyes shall behold after death, this God he

both to usage and to the idea of the verse to render it "one who comes after"; not, indeed, in the sense that God is the *Last* as He is the *First* (for Job is not looking to the end of all things), but simply in the sense of coming after another, and so acting after the other is gone.

[1] Of the various meanings and shades of meaning given to the עָפָר, the choice must be between the broad sense of *earth* and that of *dust*. The former has the support of Gesenius, Hitzig, and others, and is followed by the R.V. in its text. The objection is that the word seems never to occur in the book (except in chap. xli. 25—A.V. xli. 33) in the sense of *earth* as contrasted with *heaven*. The latter interpretation gives by much the better sense, is most in harmony with the idea of the אַחֲרוֹן, as well as with that of the following verse, and is accepted by Ewald, Delitzsch, Dillmann, Davidson, and many more.

[2] The difficult and broken terms in which *skin* and *flesh* are spoken of in ver. 26 probably mean nothing more than "when skin and flesh no longer subsist," "after disease and death have done their worst with me." The זאת makes a special difficulty, both in itself and in its position. The sense is given, no doubt, with sufficient fidelity by "this my flesh." But the term is probably best taken δεικτικῶς—"and after my skin is destroyed—even this!"—the speaker being understood to point to his body. The R.V. (margin) favours the rendering, "after my skin has been destroyed, *this shall be*," which seems to have no support in usage. Some, including Delitzsch, prefer the rendering, "after my skin has been *thus* destroyed."

[3] Only at this point does Job name God as his Vindicator. The point of the *seeing* is, of course, in the fact that to *see* God is to know Him to be gracious. To hope to *see* Him, therefore, is to hope for the removal of what comes between Him and His creature, and for the cessation of His wrath. The sight of God presupposes the vindication of Job. Not a few, and among them Gesenius, Reuss, and H. Schultz, strangely take the words "and not another" to refer to God—"whom, and not as one estranged, mine eyes shall behold." But the point is Job's rapture at the prospect of a direct vision of God, and of witnessing with his own eyes his own vindication. See Appendix, Note H.

shall at last see then in His grace, doing right for him, establishing his innocence. The sudden hope, the vivid vision, overmasters him. He faints at the transporting prospect. His "reins consume" within him.

The poetical books rise to no loftier height or steadier light than this. It is the clear foresight and irresistible conviction of a life beyond death. But it is this in large and undefined form, without the distinctness, the precision, or the permanence of the later faith. It is the undeveloped thought of a future for the *man*. It is neither the reasoned idea of an immortality for the *soul*, nor the distinct conception of the rising of the body. It knows nothing of an "undying soul" or a "spiritual vision" of God, as we use such terms. It knows as little of a "resurrection of the body." The *how* of the after life, the relative futures of the soul and body, are not in view. All begins and ends with the great assurance of a vision of God after death—a vision which the sufferer himself shall enjoy, though he knows not *how* and does not pause to ask.

This is the vision of a moral adjustment, but not one that implies a grasp of the Hereafter as the scene of moral awards. It looks to an adjustment which the dead sufferer is to see, but it is an adjustment which takes effect on earth, in the restoration of his honour in the sight of men who scorned it. It is not a permanent possession. It makes its impression, and that impression is seen, perhaps, in the greater calmness of Job in all that is said after it.[1] But at a later stage he

[1] So Dillmann.

speaks again of Sheol as if the old ideas reasserted themselves. It is a sublime, sudden, rapturous faith. But it is a dim, unformed faith. It is not "immortality brought to light." Far less is it the "sure and certain hope of a joyful resurrection."

CHAPTER V

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PROPHETS AND ECCLESIASTES

THE poetical books, therefore, carry us so far. But another section of the Old Testament literature takes us beyond what we find in them. The deliverances of the prophets supply the more positive contributions which are wanting in the sublime visions and rapt experiences of Job and the psalmists. It is in the prophetical books that we best see how the thought of an after life, which lay from the first in the heart of the Old Testament revelation, came to unfold itself, and how it advanced to the magnitude of a distinct faith,—a faith not only in a future life, but in a resurrection. It was connected with the Messianic hope, and this connection was the most effectual aid to its confirmation and increase. The Messianic hope was the great stay of righteousness in Israel, the mightiest support of confidence in the sure march of God's work on earth and in its final triumph. It threw the eye of faith forward more and more to the long future of the people of God, to the certainties of that future, to its satisfactions and its righteous adjustments.

The Messianic hope, however, contained two things, the hope of the establishment and triumph of the

kingdom of God, and the hope of a Messianic king. Of these two constituents of the hope, the former is the earlier and the larger. This fact is the very hinge of the attitude of the Old Testament, and scarcely less of that of the New Testament, to the things of the future. Hebrew faith looked for the realisation of the kingdom of God upon earth. It was to be seen in a regenerated world. There was to be a transformation of the seat of Jehovah's worship and the abode of Jehovah's people. There should be no hurting nor destroying in all His holy mountain.[1] Nature was to be regenerated when Israel was restored. Jehovah was to create new heavens and a new earth. The times of patriarchal longevity and the primeval bliss of life were to be renewed.[2]

As Israel's day waned more and more, faith was taught to cling with an intenser grasp to this expectation of a consummation of the Divine kingdom, and to the prospect of a coming of Jehovah Himself to reign on earth. The message of prophecy became in increasing measure the announcement of a future which God had for the theocracy, in which right should finally be done to His people, justice executed upon His enemies, and hope fulfilled. As the vision of the Messianic era became larger and clearer, the whole conception of the future shared in the expansion and illumination. The thought of the destiny of the individual rose upon that of the nation. The hope of Israel carried with it the hope of the Israelite. The idea of a fellowship with God enduring beyond death grew into the idea

[1] Isa. xi. 9 ; cf. ii. 2 ; Zech. xiv. 10.
[2] Isa. lxv. 17–26 ; cf. lxiii. 19, li. 16.

of a destruction of death. The large hope of being continually with God and seeing His face, became the more definite hope of a waking out of sleep, a rising to life, a going into His presence. A restoration was to be effected at last by the work of Jehovah's righteous Servant, and by the descent of Jehovah Himself to earth. In this all must have their part, the dead members of the theocracy no less than the living.

In this way the occasional intuitions which flash out in other books of the Old Testament, became the steadier convictions and more certain deliverances which burn in the words of the prophets. Above all, it was in this way that the ideas of a *Resurrection* and a *Judgment* came to be proclaimed. These two great truths stand in intimate relation to each other; and they are both closely connected with the Messianic hope. To what do they amount? To what extent can the Old Testament be said to have a doctrine of resurrection and judgment? In what sense can it be said to reveal these things, or to exhibit them as matters of belief? What are the limits of the Old Testament faith on these subjects? These are questions of great interest and no little difficulty. But they are not without an answer. We can follow so far the course of prophetic belief and teaching on these topics. We see how these truths came above the horizon. We can also see how far they remained short of the magnitude and the elevation of the New Testament revelation.

The idea of a *Resurrection* attaches itself first to the nation as such. In its simplest form it is the idea of a revival of Israel. This appears in those words of Hosea,[1]

[1] Hos. vi. 1, 2.

in which the people acknowledge their chastisement to be from their God and express their conviction that, if they come back to Him from their erring ways, they shall live again in His sight. They are the words, perhaps, in which we have the basis of Ezekiel's allegory of the dry bones. Here Israel's encouragement to return to the Lord expresses itself as springing from the assurance that He is the Healer who will bind up, after two days reviving them, and in the third day raising them up.

The same idea appears again as the annihilation of Death and the abrogation of Sheol. So it is in the great chapter in which Israel, the wayward Baal-worshipper who was drifting to death, is met with the promise of deliverance from the hand of the grave, and Sheol is challenged as an ineffectual power: "I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death. O death, where are thy plagues? O grave, where is thy destruction?"[1] It is the same in the sublime hymn in which the prophet of Isaiah xxv. magnifies Jehovah for His judgments. On the completion of these judgments the Messianic consummation enters, and it means the destruction of the veil of mourning and mortality which is spread over all nations, and the swallowing up of death for ever.[2]

[1] Hos. xiii. 14 (R.V.), where "grave" is, of course, Sheol, and death and Sheol make one idea. The rendering according to which the declaration of ransom from Sheol is followed by a challenge addressed to Sheol, is superior, both in point and in grammar, to the rendering of the Vulgate, which is adopted by the A.V., Gesenius, etc.; and still more to the rendering, "from the hand of Sheol should I ransom thee, from death should I redeem thee?" Sheol is represented as having the hand filled with plagues and pestilence, which have become powerless.

[2] Isa. xxv. 7, 8. Professor Cheyne renders it, "And He shall annihilate in this mountain the covering which covereth all peoples, and the web which is woven over all nations; He shall annihilate death for ever." It is possible that the individual may be in view here as well as the nation.

The thought becomes more definite in Ezekiel's vision of a new life for Israel. The prophecies of restoration, which occupy one of the main sections of the book, begin with the place of the *prophet* and the *ruler* in the preparation for that event.[1] They pass on to the anticipation of the rescue of the land from the heathen hands that had held it.[2] They close with the prospect of a reawakening and reconstruction of the people, in which Judah and Ephraim shall be one.[3] The sublime scene with which the thirty-seventh chapter opens shows us the final stage in the promised restitution. It is the reanimation of the nation itself. The national life is extinct, the national hope gone. The people confess it. "Our bones are dried, and our hope is lost; we are cut off for our parts." The mass of bones, bare and bleached, which Ezekiel sees scattered over the face of the valley, is the natural image of a people dead beyond all possibility of revival. The prophet has no answer to the question, whether such can live. But at the word of the Lord he speaks to them, and, as he prophesies, *behold a rushing!*[4] The bones, so many

The "individualising reference" in the last clause, 'and the Lord Jehovah shall wipe away tears from all faces,' leads Professor Cheyne to conclude that this promise "belongs, not only to the Jewish nation (as Hos. xiii. 14) as a community, but to all its believing members." See his *Prophecies of Isaiah, in loc.* Dillmann notices how this promise goes beyond all other prophecies regarding death. Others, *e.g.* Isa. lxv. 20, 22, Zech. viii. 4, speak only of length of life like the patriarchal measure. This one speaks of the final, everlasting cessation of death.

[1] Ezek. xxxiii., xxxiv. [2] Ezek. xxxv., xxxvi. [3] Ezek. xxxvii.

[4] The idea in this clause of ver. 7 is probably that of the rushing sound of the bones coming together. The R.V., which gives the word the sense of *rushing* in chap. iii. 12, renders it here less fitly an *earthquake*. The form of the vision no doubt may be suggested by the word that was in the people's mouth, "Our bones are dry, and our hope is lost" (ver. 11). But, as Smend observes, it is still *intuition*, not *reflection*, that we have here. See his *Prophet Ezekiel*, p. 287.

and so dry, come together; sinews and flesh return; skin covers them; the spirit of life is breathed into them; the dead live. It is a vision of a resurrection, but not the resurrection of the individual. It is the resurrection of a dead people. It is a nation, once destroyed and dissolved, now raised from its grave and reconstituted. "These bones are the whole house of Israel."

Still greater definiteness and certainty are reached in the sublime prophecy, a prophecy, however, of unsettled date, which is given in the Twenty-sixth chapter of Isaiah. The allegory of Ezekiel becomes here the more direct expression of a great and joyful hope. The vision of a resurrection for dead Israel becomes the proclamation of a resurrection for departed Israelites. The passage is an extremely remarkable one, not only by reason of the imaginative force of its terms and the abruptness of its introduction, but also on account of the loftiness of the hope to which it rises, and the individualising direction which it takes. Two things are set over against each other — the natural fate of the dead, as the people had pictured it from immemorial times, and the triumph of deceased members of the Israel of God over that fate. There is first the stern finality of death. It is declared as an absolute, irremediable fact. *The dead live not; shades rise not!* The sentence of God is upon the dead. The Lord Himself has *visited and destroyed them, and made all their memory to perish.*[1] Dead

[1] Ewald and Hitzig understand the fate of idolatrous Israelites to be in view. Others take the verse to be an expression of sadness or resignation with reference to the many Israelites who fell by the heathen sword. Dillmann's opinion is that these *dead* are the heathen kings who, as he interprets ver. 13, long lorded it over Israel, but with whom it is now all over by the visitation of Israel's God.

men *are* dead, and remain dead for ever. Yet God has promised a future for Israel, an increase for His nation, an enlargement for His land; and His chastenings have brought the people, over whom other lords have reigned so long, to own Himself alone as King.[1] Can it be that the deceased members of His nation shall know nothing of that glory?

So there rises this second thing over against that other—the thought, the wish, the assurance, of a resurrection for the dead members of Israel, to complete the restoration of the nation, and share in its future. Death is the endless doom of others. But these, Jehovah's people Israel's members, must live. "*Thy* dead shall live; *thy* dead bodies shall arise."[2] This is the proclamation of restored Israel, who in the rapture of her faith calls upon her dead children to awake and sing. The power of her God will perform the impossible. Like the dew which comes from the supernal world of light and bears increase with it, His creative might will bring life out of the sapless dust of Sheol, and make the pit give back its spent and hapless ones to joy and energy. *Awake and sing, ye dwellers in the dust. For a dew of lights is thy dew, and the earth shall bring forth the shades!*[3]

[1] This seems the general drift of the difficult line of thought in vers. 15–18.

[2] Dillmann takes ver. 19 to be the expression of a wish, and that on the part of the people. Professor Cheyne understands it as a promise on the part of the prophet. Delitzsch and others interpret it as the word of the people, but a word of confident hope. As regards the change of pronoun, "*Thy* dead," "*My* dead bodies," it is perhaps best (with Dillmann) to understand the first to refer to Jehovah as addressed by Israel, and the second to Israel as the speaker.

[3] This is substantially Dillmann's view of the passage. The idea, according to him, is that of Jehovah's omnipotence, which creates life in

The theme of this great passage, therefore, is a personal resurrection, not a corporate. The national resurrection is accomplished, and this is the restoration of her dead members to revived Israel. There is nothing to match this in the post-Exilic prophets. Zechariah's vision of the Messianic age holds by the ancient conception of a return of the patriarchal fulness of life and length of days.[1] Malachi connects the idea of a return of the departed to earth with the advent of the "day of the Lord," but only in the form of a reappearance of the translated Elias.[2] Even this memorable testimony of Isaiah to the hope of individual immortality does not affirm a universal resurrection. It leaves it uncertain, indeed, whether the resurrection is for all who are of Israel, or only for the righteous in Israel.[3]

But in a book which belongs to the apocalyptic literature rather than to the prophetical, a larger extension still is given to this truth. Daniel speaks of those in Israel who in the terrors and profanations of the future "do wickedly against the covenant," and of those who in the same crisis "know their

nature, and can restore life as well to the dead. Schwally gives up the phrase rendered "dew of lights" as hopeless. He rejects, at the same time, the attempt to explain it by Persian ideas. For the Persian *haoma* is not dew, but a drink; and the haoma-plant is not something of heavenly nature or origin, but something which grows in the deeps of the sea Vourukasha. See his *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 115. "The wonder of dew," says Professor G. A. Smith, "is that it is given from a clear heaven, and that it comes to sight with the dawn. If an Oriental looks up when dew is falling, he sees nothing to thank for it between him and the stars" (*Isaiah*, i. p. 448).

[1] Zech. viii. 4.

[2] Mal. iii. 23, 24 (iv. 5, 6).

[3] The more limited application must be recognised, if the "dead" mentioned in ver. 14 are understood to be either idolatrous Israelites, or the heathen oppressors of Jehovah's nation.

God," and "shall be strong."[1] The fates of those two classes of Israelites in the distress of the end, when Michael stands for the people of God, are declared in terms which go beyond anything else in the Canon of the Old Testament. "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt (*abhorrence*, R.V.). And they that be wise (*the teachers*, R.V.) shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."[2]

This is the most definite, the most literal, the largest expression of the hope of a resurrection. It is the resurrection of the individual; it is the resurrection, not of the righteous only, but of the just and the unjust. It is a resurrection with distinct moral issues, and a resurrection to an everlasting lot. Large and lofty as it is, however, it is still a limited hope. It is attached to the anticipated overthrow of Antiochus, and if it embraces all Israel, it is at least confined to Israel. It is not the doctrine of a resurrection wide as humanity itself.[3]

[1] Dan. xi. 32. [2] Dan. xii. 2, 3.

[3] That the resurrection of Gentiles is not in view, appears from the way in which all is connected with Israel's consummation, and from the context generally. So it is understood by Ewald, Schultz, and Old Testament scholars generally. Whether all Israel is included depends, of course, on the view taken of the "many." This is understood by some to limit the universality of the statement even as regards Israel. It is supposed, *e.g.*, to refer only to the "many" who are particularised in chap. xi. 33, or to those Jews, on the one hand, who should die staunch, and to those, on the other, who should prove faithless in the great conflict of the end. But probably no contrast is meant between "many" and "all." As Schultz suggests, all that is expressed is the general idea of the *multitude* of the risen. "Those who are here intended," says Ewald, "are spoken of as *many* only in comparison with the still more innumer-

The passage of Daniel, however, presupposes a *Judgment*. In the faith and teaching of the Old Testament this great idea has a history like that of the belief in a resurrection, and one not less interesting. Like the latter belief, too, the belief in a Judgment is intimately connected with the Messianic hope, and finds in that connection the chief stimulus to its enlargement. It remains to ask how it stands with this truth.

On the one hand, the Hebrew Sheol, as it has appeared, is not a scene of moral distinctions and moral judgments. There are at the best only meagre suggestions of reward or penalty within it. On the other hand, the idea of retribution pervades the Old Testament from beginning to end. But for the most part it is a retribution which marks the distinction between the good and the evil in this life. Further, the Old Testament speaks largely of a Judgment. But for the most part it is a Judgment which is pronounced on earth and takes effect on earth.

A day of Divine decision is one of the most constant themes of the prophets. They predict a "day of the Lord," the day of His anger, His "great and terrible day," a day "of trouble and distress," a day of "darkness and not light."[1] It is a day of judgment and sifting for Israel, and a day of judgment and destruction for the Gentiles. The judgment of Israel is sometimes represented as taking place together with

able heathen." He adds that the question of a resurrection also of the heathen to judgment is not touched on here, "the only thing that has here to be insisted on" being that "in the case of Israel a resurrection will certainly not fail to come, yea, will be general in its case."

[1] Joel i. 15, ii. 1; Mal. iv. 5; Zeph. i. 15; Amos v. 18, etc.

the judgment of the heathen, sometimes as anticipating it.[1] The judgment of the nations, however, is the most frequent subject. It is the great theocratic judgment, which means the triumph of the kingdom of God. It is a judgment in the future, a final judgment, a world-judgment. But it is always expressed in terms of the immediate terror or particular oppression of the time,—Edomite, Assyrian, Babylonian, or other. It fulfils itself in event after event, and is still looked for. When Babylon is judged, the judgment still proceeds; for the Day of Jehovah covers a series of judicial acts.[2] It is a judgment executed by Jehovah, the scene of which is earth, the form of which is the overthrow of the enemies of His kingdom. Even in the large terms of later prophecy it is a shaking of "the heavens and the earth," in which Jehovah is to "overthrow the throne of kingdoms," and "destroy the strength of the kingdoms of the heathen," and "overthrow the chariots and those that ride in them."[3]

The idea of a Judgment is also a familiar idea in the Book of Psalms, and it is essentially on the same level as the prophetic doctrine. It appears in different forms, and in some cases it is not easy to say whether it is a present judgment or a future that is meant. The Psalter opens with the assertion of a judgment in which sinners shall not stand. In the Fiftieth Psalm we have a judgment in connection with a Theophany. Whether psalms like these express the Divine judgment

[1] The former seems to be the case in Zeph. i.; the latter, in Ezekiel's vision of a judgment which begins with the sanctuary (chap. ix.), in Amos's prophecy of the judgment of the ten tribes (chap. ix. 8, etc.), and in other passages.

[2] So especially in Joel.

[3] Hag. ii. 6, 21, 22.

which fulfils itself from time to time in the career of nation or individual, or point to a conclusive judgment in the future, in either case it is a judgment which is realised on this side of death in external rewards and punishments.[1] Most frequently the judgment is the theocratic judgment, expressed in terms of a coming of Jehovah to overthrow. It has then its largest sense as a judgment of the earth, a judgment of "the world with righteousness," and of "the people with His truth."[2] But if it is a world-judgment, it is a judgment in the world, and specifically a judgment in the form of a destruction of Jehovah's enemies, "He shall judge among the heathen."[3] It cannot be said with certainty that expression is given anywhere in the Psalms to the idea of a judgment of all men after death.[4]

The Book of Ecclesiastes occupies a different, though somewhat obscure, relation to this question. In the midst of its uncertainties and blank negations it perhaps marks an advance towards the larger and more spiritual faith. That advance may be only doubtfully indicated in the Preacher's reflection, "I said in mine heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked; for there is a time there for every purpose and for every work."[5] For the words affirm the certainty of

[1] The "judgment" spoken of in Ps. i. 5 is understood by some to be the world-judgment, by others (*e.g.* Professor Kirkpatrick) to be "every act by which Jehovah separates between the righteous and the wicked, and vindicates His righteous government of the world."

[2] Ps. xcvi. 13; xcviii. 9. [3] Ps. cx. 6, etc.

[4] Professor Cheyne thinks it not unlikely that "some of the greater psalmists had a real, even if somewhat vague, presentiment" of a "judgment of individuals both good and bad after death." He appeals to such psalms as the forty-ninth.

[5] Eccles. iii. 17, R.V.

a judgment, but leave its nature and its time unexplained.[1] The same may be said of the counsel in which Koheleth urges a sober enjoyment of the springtide of life, in view of the judgment to which all are brought—"Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth; and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart and in the sight of thine eyes: but know thou that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment."[2] The setting, however, which these statements have in the reflections of the book on the moral enigmas of life and on the delays or failures of the Divine righteousness in this world, may make them of larger purpose than the terms in themselves express.[3]

Still more is this the case with Koheleth's final reason for a righteous life, "This is the end of the matter; all hath been heard: Fear God, and keep His commandments: for this is the whole duty of man (or, this is the *duty* of all men). For God shall bring

[1] As to chap. iii. 17, the sense is substantially the same, however the שָׁם is taken, whether as verb or as adverb, whether as a note of the future time or as pointing to the past. Ewald understands the idea to be, that there is a time for everything, and also a judgment for everything *there*, *i.e.* in the past. Delitzsch also takes it to be the general idea of the certainty of a Divine judgment, late or soon. "God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done sometime, although not so soon as one might wish it and think necessary; for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision."

[2] Eccles. xi. 9.

[3] This passage, which is strangely interpreted by some as the counsel of an asceticism which speaks in irony, and by others as a caution against asceticism, is best described by Delitzsch as an "advice to enjoy, with a *nota bene*." Though it says nothing of what the judgment is, yet the things dealt with, the unequal distribution of lot, and the assertion of a judgment alongside the admission of the fact that wrong does not appear to be always punished on earth, lead not a few interpreters to the conclusion that Koheleth has here in view, however indistinctly, a moral adjustment in the far future, even beyond death. So Plumptre, Wright, etc.

every work into judgment, with (or, concerning) every hidden thing, whether it be good or evil."[1] The Preacher's conception of the period and the order of this judgment may still be indefinite. But it is the conception of a personal, individualising judgment, a final judgment solving those moral contradictions of earth which have formed one great subject of reflection in the book. The probability, therefore, is that it is a judgment after death.[2]

[1] Eccles. xii. 13, 14, R.V.

[2] Those who hold that Ecclesiastes is radically sceptical, the book of the bankruptcy of all belief in a future life and a personal retribution, naturally regard all three passages (iii. 17, xi. 9, xii. 14) as late additions to the text. So Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 105. Professor Cheyne agrees with Renan in questioning the originality of xii. 14. He is also of opinion that the sentence, "But know that for all these things God will bring thee into judgment" (xi. 9), is an insertion, "Rabbinic in expression as well as in thought." He admits, however, that to take the judgment as one after death gives the better meaning. See his *Job and Solomon*, pp. 224, 234. Professor Driver thinks all three passages capable of being interpreted of temporal judgments. The choice, according to him, is between this interpretation and the view that all three verses are additions to the text. His argument is, that if the truth of a final judgment after death had been a "certainty to Qoheleth ('and *know* that for all these things,' etc.) as it was, for instance, to the author of the Book of Wisdom, it seems impossible but that the allusions to it would have been more frequent and distinct, and, indeed, that the general tenor of the book must have been different"; see his *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 5th ed. p. 448. Delitzsch, on the other hand, speaks of the certainty of a future, personal judgment as the "Ariadne-thread by which at last Koheleth brings himself out of the labyrinth of speculation." He sees faith here postulating a final judgment, though "without any clear idea of time and manner"; not only a final, but an individual judgment, and that as a better solution of the moral anomalies of life than the idea of a judgment on societies. It is the opinion of Nowack-Hitzig (*Kurzgef. Exeg. Handb., in loc.*) that, in view of the general conception of the future which is characteristic of the book, it is too much to say that in xii. 14 we have the beginnings of the belief in a final judgment after death; but it is recognised that the Preacher holds fast by the faith in a righteousness of God that is certain finally to adjust and compensate, without expressing himself on the manner of this judgment, or being himself clear on the subject.

By slow steps the doctrine of a corporate, temporal retribution moved on to larger things. The faith in a recompense for the righteous and a judgment for the wicked on this side the grave, is the general and certain faith of the Book of Psalms.[1] It is no less the faith of the Book of Proverbs.[2] In the Book of Deuteronomy,[3] in the prophecies of Jeremiah,[4] and more positively in Ezekiel,[5] the idea of separate, personal responsibility appears. In occasional intuitions of the poetical books,[6] and in those few utterances of the Preacher, hints are discovered of the conception of a final judgment for the individual. The preparation is thus made for the ampler doctrine. At last that doctrine takes form in the Book of Daniel, which presupposes a judgment after death, and declares final moral awards for the individual, everlasting life for one class, everlasting abhorrence for the other.[7] The principles of this were hid in the original, distinctive doctrines of Old Testament revelation. By this long way they came to light, fulfilled their course, and reached their end.

But even so the Old Testament faith is not that of

[1] Among others, see such psalms as the 9th, 34th, 37th, 145th.

[2] See such passages as iii. 33, xi. 31, xiv. 11, xix. 16.

[3] xxiv. 16. Dillmann, however, questions whether this sentence belongs originally to the Deuteronomist.

[4] xxxi. 29. [5] xviii. 20, etc. [6] Possibly in Job xix. 25–27.

[7] Dan. xii. 2, 3. The first occurrence of the phrase "everlasting life" is here. The wise teachers of the people have a special reward. The term expressing the penalty of the evil denotes abhorrence, and does not point to annihilation. It is found also in Isa. lxvi. 24, and may perhaps have been suggested by it. The passage is further remarkable as applying the term *sleep* to the intermediate state. The awards of which it speaks are in each case "everlasting." The life is thus as enduring as the Messianic kingdom to which it belongs; and the duration of the "abhorrence" corresponds with this.

the New. The Old Testament doctrine of Judgment is, in the first instance, the doctrine of a triumph of the kingdom of God. Jehovah Himself is the Judge. The earth, to which He descends, is the scene of His judgment. The overthrow of His enemies is the form of His judgment. The judgment embraces also Israel, His folk, His nation, and sifts the false from the true in it. The limits of His judgment gradually expand. It becomes the judgment of individuals, both good and evil, in Israel. Through most of the Old Testament teaching it is a judgment done in this life. But at last it becomes a judgment after death. Yet even in Daniel, Israelites, and only they, are the subjects of the awards which are declared. The Old Testament does not attain either to the doctrine of a universal resurrection, or to that of a universal judgment.

We might have expected the Old Testament to speak with a larger and more certain voice than this. What have we discovered the measure of its teaching on Immortality to be? On the one hand, we have found the Pentateuch almost entirely silent on the subject of a future life. We have found the Old Testament, as a whole, pervaded by the conception of a chill, shadowy under-world, like that to which the Babylonian and the Greek looked, and did so without hope or satisfaction. We have found the individual and his lot sunk for the most part in the nation and its lot, and we have found no clear or sufficient faith in the existence of a moral order or judicial awards after death. On the other hand, we have found hints of higher things; half-articulate, divine voices breaking through the silence even of the Mosaic books; words

of sublime suggestion, like those regarding Enoch, which point far behind the documents in which they rest, and far above the common belief. We have found faith asserting its prerogative as the "substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen," cleaving to God and to the certainty of His fellowship in the heavy present and in the dark Beyond, snatching glimpses of a gracious future, negativing death, and forecasting life by assuring itself of the communion of the Eternal. And with this we have seen the gradual emergence of a more positive and constant belief, given in the deliverances of the prophets, and rising at last to the hope of a resurrection to life.

We might have looked for something much clearer and more definite than this. It is contrary to all our natural expectations that darkness should prevail so long and in such degree over the problems of an after life; that immortality should not be more distinctly taught and more certainly anticipated; that from the beginning to the end of the Old Testament there should be so little that can be called a *doctrine* of the Last Things. It cannot but seem strange at first that, even far on in the long march of Revelation, the attitude to death and the future should be what it is in Ecclesiastes or in Hezekiah's elegy; that the belief in a resurrection should appear only at a late stage; and that even in the last period only an approach should be made to the faith in a general Judgment.

This is all so strange, that because of it the higher religions of the Gentiles have sometimes been pro-

nounced superior to the religion of Israel. But the strangeness is due to our imperfect ideas of God's methods of education and inspiration. It is according to the Divine plan of a progressive Revelation that these things are so, and the difference between the Hebrew religion and the Ethnic faiths remains a radical difference. The views of life which are characteristic of the one and of the other are sufficient to make this plain. In the one case life is clung to for itself, and for what it yields of pleasure and action. In the other case, life, whether it be here or hereafter, is prized for the converse which it offers with God. And everywhere beneath the surface of the Old Testament great and fertile principles, different from those of the Ethnic religions, are at work, which are at once the earnest of a larger faith and the safeguard of its purity. Christ's own use of the Old Testament is a witness to this. He discovered the spirit in its words, the law of life in it that looked to be fulfilled; and when He had to speak to the cavils of the Sadducee on the resurrection of the dead, He referred him, not to the occasional sayings which seemed most direct and explicit, but to words of more ancient date and larger scope, which bore the answer in their heart, not on their face.

It is true that the eye of the Old Testament is fixed on the present and looks clear into it, while it is clouded and unsteady in its vision of the future. Yet the faith of the Old Testament is a faith that rises to hope—a hope gradually enlarging its reach and increasing its strength. Other religions live fondly in the past, in a golden age lost in dim antiquity. The Hebrew religion makes so little of its vanished Paradise,

that some have stumbled at the fact. It is so essentially a religion of hope, that it scarce glances back upon its Eden, but looks steadily forward to a future which is ever extending its limits.[1]

If the doctrine of the Old Testament is a limited doctrine, it must be said again that it is an original doctrine. Its independence has been challenged, as its unique worth has been disputed. The little that it has of a doctrine of immortality has been taken over, it is asserted, from Ethnic faiths which were in advance of it. In this it is a heavy debtor, it is said, to Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Greece. But this goes far beyond what the facts at present in our possession warrant. The ideas of one religion are not to be pronounced borrowings from another religion, unless there are unmistakable lines of derivation, and unless the characteristic principles and ancient thoughts of the religion are insufficient to explain its later developments. But in the case of the Old Testament we find enough within itself to account for all that is most distinctive in the various stages in which its sentiment and its teaching on the subject of an after life appear.

A Persian origin is claimed for the mystical hopes and assurances of the Psalms;[2] and the later Hebrew doctrine of a resurrection is referred to the

[1] "The lost Paradise lying in the past," says Gustav Baur, "is not further regarded by the religion of Israel, which forgets what is behind and reaches forward to what is before, pursuing the aim of a *future* and blessed communion with God, which is placed before it; instead of idly mourning over the lost golden time, it rather strives, filled and prompted and strengthened by the Spirit of God, to regain Paradise." See Oehler's *Old Test. Theology* (Day's edition), p. 157.

[2] So Reville, D'Eichthal, etc.

same source.[1] The Old Testament ideas of the soul, everlasting life, and judgment, are traced back to Egyptian, Accadian, or Hellenic[2] thought. But nothing amounting to certain derivation has been established. Coincidences—in some cases remarkable coincidences—undoubtedly occur. But coincidence and dependence are very different things. The ideas of other nations that Israel came to know may have acted in some degree in stimulating and directing the Hebrew belief, and foreign influences may have told to some extent upon its form. But alike in its foundation and in the essential points of its development, it has the stamp of originality. The Old Testament doctrine of God is of itself enough to explain the entire history of the Old Testament conception of a future life.[3]

With this all begins in the Old Testament, and to this all comes at last. Its faith is a faith in a living God, and therefore a faith in everlasting life. It came

[1] So Mills and others.

[2] *E.g.* by Lieblein, etc., as regards Egypt; by Halévy, etc., as regards Babylonia; by Montet, Pfleiderer, etc., in the case of Hellenism.

[3] "We ought never to assume," says Professor Cheyne very justly, "that ideas of an advanced religion have been altogether borrowed, until we have done our best to discover any germs of them in the native religious literature." He discounts the Greek influence of which so much has been made of late. He denies that any direct historical connection has been proved between the religions of Egypt and Judah. He recognises the difficulties that are in the way of an affirmative answer to the question, Did the Jews borrow their ideas of the future life from Babylonia? And with respect to the Zoroastrian faith, he admits that for a large part of the Persian period the relations of Israel to Persia did not favour the acceptance by the former of the views of the latter. He holds that the spirit of the Psalter is independent of Parseeism, and that the germs of the later Hebrew doctrine were in the earlier. He does not regard them, however, as sufficient in themselves to explain the development of the Old Testament view of the future life, and holds that Zoroastrian influences assisted that development. See his *Origin of the Psalter*, pp. 268–272, 281–284, 423–431.

far short of a final revelation of immortality. But its limitations were not altogether loss. There was strength in its weakness. It caught but occasional flashes of the light of an after life. But it had the more vivid vision of God in the present life. It brought men only momentary gleams of eternal life. But it was not without its heaven—a heaven no less real than that for which we hope, and one nearer at hand. In the magnitude which the Christian Revelation has given to the future life, our temptation is to look to a remote heaven, and to have a slacker hold of the immediate heaven which is found in the fellowship of God here. In the scantier light of the earlier revelation of everlasting life, the believer clung with the intenser faith to the God who was found on earth, and he had his heaven in that. He looked for the perfection of life in this world, and his expectation turned less to the other world.

In this lay the limitation of Hebrew faith. In this, too, lay the imperfection of the Old Testament Revelation—an imperfection that the Old Testament gradually moved beyond, and which was finally done away in Christ. But there were compensations for it, and the gain was not altogether on the side of the faith to which the completer truth was given. The heavenly blessedness which the New Testament has unveiled was hidden from the Old Testament believer. But the earthly blessedness of the Divine presence was understood and realised by him, perhaps, in greater measure. The Old Testament knew not the place which Christ went to prepare. The things which are unseen and eternal, the inheritance of the saints in

light, the transcendent glory of the heaven to which Christ has risen, were not among its certainties. But God, His nearness, His fellowship, the joy of life and the highest weal in Him, were its first and most assured realities. In these is eternal life. And the Old Testament revelation of these things was a revelation of immortality and heaven, though its heaven was on earth.

BOOK THIRD

Christ's Teaching

It is therefore the mother speech of religion which Jesus uses. And He uses this speech with a purity and perfection that makes His mode of communication quite incomparable. It is distinguished not only from all speech of science, but also from that speech of religious contemplation which meets us in the writings of the apostles. It is distinguished from it, as the living source is from the fresh and clear flowing brook ; it is all directness, living perception, pure genius ; everything in it flows, not from any mediated or artificial world of ideas, but from native spiritual wealth, from the fulness of His inner life. . . . His word is therefore in the highest sense testimony, viz. testimony to the Divine which lives and moves in Him. "Verily I say unto you" is the constant expression of an inward certainty which can count on the willing or unwilling inward assent of His hearers.—Beyschlag.

He varies His teaching without end to suit the particular class of hearers. It is sometimes the briefest and most reserved, at others it flows forth in calm fulness and wealth, entering into details and proving every point at length ; sometimes it presupposes nothing but a knowledge of the everyday world, and a sound understanding on the part of the hearer, teaching by a gradual ascent from the things closest at hand ; while at other times it touches on the deepest mysteries of things without reserve, and solves the most tangled questions ; now it is merely suggestive and highly stimulative of further thought, and then again it teaches absolutely and asserts with the force of authority ; or it is now the most gentle and crushing. But in every kind and style it is uniformly perfect, telling, and exhaustive. . . . It is the perfect, true religion which here at last makes itself understood to men in their own language with such directness and such persuasiveness, and yet with such mighty force, that nothing superior to it can be conceived.—Ewald.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

THUS far we have been engaged with the twofold preparation for the Christian doctrine of Immortality. Ethnic thought and Hebrew faith had each its contribution to make, the one furnishing the contribution of sentiment and reason, the other that of experience and inspiration. Following the historical course of those two contributory tides, we found that in each there was a gradual increase in the volume of the stream. In the Ethnic religions we saw how the simple belief in some sort of continued existence was the point of departure for great and varied developments, as the quenchless instinct of life continued to assert itself against the mystery of death, and as intellect strove more strenuously to sustain the prophetic voices of the soul. We discovered, too, that in most cases the belief in a retributive future in any adequate sense was of comparativcly late construction.

We found that the belief had run a similar course in the instance of Hebrew faith; with the material difference, however, that from the earliest period known to us from historical records the Hebrew people possessed the unique gift of the knowledge of one God,

a living, personal, righteous God, who entered into relations of grace with men, and along with that a doctrine of man which held him different in origin and end from other creatures, the bearer of God's image, a being made for fellowship with God, and for life in the deepest sense. We noticed in what way and to what result those truths operated on the common conceptions of an under-world and a shadowy after-existence which was not life. We saw what gain came to humanity from the positive revelation contained in the Old Testament, and in what sense the foundations were laid there for a doctrine of immortality, higher than was possible in Ethnic religion, as regards purity, completeness, certainty, and moral power.

We proceed now to the New Testament doctrine. And here we have first to satisfy ourselves as to what Christ's own teaching on the subject was. "There is no study of theology," it has been well said, "which is likely to exercise a more elevating influence on the individual, or a more healing one on divisions of opinion, than the study of the words of Christ Himself. The heart is its witness to them; all Christian sects acknowledge them; they seem to escape or rise above the atmosphere of controversy. The form in which they exhibit the gospel to us is the simplest and also the deepest; they are more free from details than any other part of Scripture, and they are absolutely independent of personal and national influences. In them is contained the expression of the inner life of mankind and of the Church; there, too, the individual beholds, as in a glass, the image of a goodness which is not of

this world."[1] When we ask, then, what Christ's own teaching on this subject was, we approach the question on which all others must turn. This being so, it is of vital moment that the inquiry be made in accordance with the historical conditions of the case; not under the influence of the theological ideas of later times. There are considerations of a general kind, therefore, which require to be noticed at the outset.

Allowance must be made, for example, for the fact that the form in which our Lord's teaching on the subject of the Future is given is, to so great an extent, not only figurative, but figurative in the sense of the large, hyperbolical order which is so much more natural to the Eastern mind than to the Western. The imagery which He uses, whether simple or of richer order, is always imagery embodying living ideas, but ideas which are not to be reached by following the methods that are in point with professed didactic discourse. It is to be read in the large, free way that is appropriate to all popular, parabolical speech. The key to much of it, especially in the descriptions of the Second Coming, the Judgment, and the final moral issues, is to be found in the bold, pictorial phraseology, and the terms, often too large, as we might deem them, for the event, which are characteristic of the Old Testament prophets in their announcements of calamity or judgment. There is nothing of the language of the metaphysician or theologian in our Lord's discourse on the things of the end. He speaks of life and death, of the everlasting and eternal, of heaven and hell. But

[1] Jowett's *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Romans, and Galatians*, ii. p. 556.

He gives no definition of these terms. He leaves them to tell their own tale and make their own impression. His words are never of the school. They are not for science in the first instance, but for faith ; not for the Rabbi, but for mankind.

Regard must also be made to the way in which Christ's teaching comes to us. As the Gospels do not follow the plan of a continuous history, and contain only a selection of our Lord's words and works, they furnish no complete or symmetrical statement of His teaching. They nowhere profess to provide us with a constructive account of it. Neither does it appear from them that it was Christ's object, in any circumstances, to give an orderly or finished statement of the great questions of the future life. He spoke words of limitless fulness, and our debt to the evangelists is incalculable for preserving the record of these matchless sayings. But we have them just as they were uttered on the promptings of different occasions, without the connection and proportion of systematic discourse. It is never claimed for them that they give an exhaustive disclosure of the last things. On some of the graver issues of the future our Lord said but little. It was seldom that He spoke of the resurrection of the unjust. The entire sum of His recorded teaching on the problems of the other world is a comparatively small part of the whole. Even what He did say was communicated little by little, with regard to the capacities of His hearers, in a certain methodical adaptation to circumstances, the partial and incipient revelation gradually becoming larger and more adequate as men were found able to receive it. It was

misunderstood at first by His most intimate disciples, and the fact should be a counsel of modesty to us.

It is even more necessary to understand that all that Christ said or taught on the subject of the Last Things was given in practical relation to present life and duty. It has often been objected to the Christian doctrine that there is a certain remoteness in it which makes it incapable of exerting a direct and effective influence on the conduct of life. But however true this may be of some of the theologies into which Christ's words have been cast, it is not true of those words themselves. It was with a view to immediate practical questions and to the regulation of life that they were spoken. It was of the very essence of our Lord's teaching to bring the future and the present into relation. He made it everywhere plain that the object of the Divine revelation of another life was not to satisfy curiosity, or answer all the questions that might be put, whether by head or by heart, but to enforce the vast responsibilities of the life that now is. His teaching did not concern itself specifically with the after-existence, neither was it characterised by the other-worldliness with which it is sometimes mistakenly charged. On the contrary, one of the chief things which it did was to take from the current ideas of immortality the vague futurity and remoteness which made them ethically feeble, and to give them the reality and moral force of the immediate and actual. We shall approach the consideration of it wrongly, therefore, if we expect to find in it answers to the many questions of speculative interest which belong to a philosophy of the Future.

While in much it has a reserve which makes it stand out in the strongest possible contrast to the unbridled dogmatising propensities of the Judaism of the time, it has the note of certainty which was everywhere lacking, as well in the theorising of the Jewish Rabbi as in the speculation of the Greek philosopher. There is that in it which compels and constrains. Nothing is more characteristic of it than its authority, the power with which it makes itself felt and obtains assent. It is the teaching of One who knows the life of which He speaks, and has it in Himself. "That which gives it its right and its power over us," it is observed, "is that coming from without, it seems to be the voice of all that is purest within, that the truth which it declares is, in fact, our own truth, the truth which we are longing to find and to utter, the truth that we need. It was this 'Divine voice' for which a Socrates was seeking, that upon it as a 'secure vessel' he might make his journey without peril, and for lack of which he was obliged to content himself with the 'best of human words,' trusting to it, as to a raft, for the voyage of life."[1] It went home to the minds of those who first heard it in a way unknown to the doctrine of the scribes. It goes home to men's minds still with the same power, because it seeks and finds its witness within ourselves.

Like every other form of teaching, however, it must be taken in connection with the beliefs of the age and the country. Its originality has been challenged. Some have been bold enough to profess to account for it by the environment of opinion and

[1] Perowne's *Hulsean Lectures*, pp. 93, 94.

phraseology within which it appeared and took shape. Elaborate attempts have been made to explain it simply as the finer product of Rabbinical thought. But one of its most obvious characteristics is its antagonism to the dominant Judaism; and whatever external resemblances may be recognised between our Lord's words and those of other Jewish teachers, the spirit and purpose of His teaching are wholly alien to the genius of Rabbinism. The source of much that is found in our Lord's discourses has also been sought in Hellenic thought, especially in its Alexandrian form and as represented by Philo. But evidence is yet wanting that Greek ideas penetrated into Galilee and Judæa to an extent to make this a reasonable assertion. On the contrary, most things go to show that the natural exclusiveness of the Palestinian Jew was too rigid to admit of any infusion of Gentile thought large enough to materially affect his religious life, or seriously colour his religious belief.

Nor have those been more successful who have thought to prove our Lord a debtor to the Essenes. Imperfect as our acquaintance yet is with the history, the opinions, and the practice of those mysterious solitaries of the Dead Sea, we know enough to be able to say that there could be little or no affinity between Christ's teaching and the strange mixture of severe Pharisaism, rudimentary Gnosticism, and foreign mysticism which seems to have been the peculiar note of Essenism. What likeness is there between the words of Christ on this life or on a future life and those of the Essene with his esoteric doctrine, his sun-worship, his stringent asceticism, his stupendous angelology, his magical charms, his theory of the malig-

nity of matter, his affirmation of a bare immortality of soul, and his denial of the resurrection ?

In point of fact, capable inquirers make short work of this supposed connection between Christ's teaching and the Essene ideas. Hausrath, for example, reduces it to little or nothing, and shows how radically our Lord's whole view of the world separated Him from it. "This world," as he puts it, "was not to Him impure, but the perfected creation of the heavenly Father, and therefore He did not think of escaping its contact by prudent solitariness and anxious asceticism, and compensating for its contamination by still more frequent washings, still stricter fastings, and for this purpose adding a new order to those already existing. In the great market-place of life was the gospel to be preached, for the light had not been given in order to be put under a bushel. Thus, too, He had no secret doctrine to communicate, like the masters of the Essenic Covenant; no long registers of angels and strange revelations of the other world, which were confided to the adepts as secrets under the seal of awful oaths. His fundamental principle was the exact contrary; that which had been heard in the darkness was to be spoken in the light; that which had been spoken in the ear was to be proclaimed upon the house-tops; for the light ought to be set on a candlestick, and not put under a bed. All that can be truly said of any friendly relations to the Essenes, of whom the rationalistic age had so much to narrate, is, that whilst the Sadducees and Pharisees are directly attacked by Jesus, towards the Essenes He observes a benevolent silence, and indirectly, perhaps, He recognises some of the prin-

ciples by which they lived. . . . But this exhausts all His relations to the Essene Covenant." [1]

But while the originality of Christ's teaching remains, and all attempts to account for it simply by its environment fail, it has its points of contact with the beliefs of the time. Its source, so far as it has a source outside Himself, is the earlier revelation in the Old Testament. But its form owes something to the current Jewish thought and to the religious vocabulary of the time. This is true of His words on the Last Things to a larger extent than of any other section of His teaching.

Between the period when the last of the Old Testament prophets spoke and the Christian era opened, there had been a remarkable development of belief. The conditions under which this took place are only partly known to us. But the results are seen in the literature of the period. From that it appears that, though Jewish thought was far from uniform, the point at which the things of the end had been left by the psalmists and prophets had been passed. On some subjects belief had become more positive; on most it had wandered into rash and fruitless speculations entirely unknown to the Old Testament. Along with this some of the familiar Old Testament terms had undergone a change of meaning, and new modes of speech had been introduced. Christ's teaching had a necessary relation to this. It took its form and its colouring so far from it. It cannot be understood apart from it. One of the most difficult tasks of the interpreter and the theologian is to determine what this relation was, and to distinguish the accidental

[1] *New Testament Times*, ii. p. 163, Eng. trans.

from the essential, the vehicle of truth from the truth itself.

But while we speak of Christ's teaching on the subject of immortality, it is not to be overlooked that, divinely authoritative as it is, and of worth beyond estimate, this teaching is not all. It is a just remark that "the truth He came to reveal is to be found in His history as well as in His teaching"; that "the life of Christ may contain revelations of truth and revelations of infinite value, to which He Himself never gave definite form in language."[1] In this, as in all else, He is Himself the supreme Revelation. His deeds make that Revelation no less than His words. He is Himself the Resurrection and the Life. In Him the life which is above all life, the life which is from the beginning, the life which is behind all that is phenomenal, "the eternal life which was with the Father,"[2] was manifested. The final reply to our demand for immortality is this historical manifestation of God and of life in the person and work of Christ. His teaching unfolds the significance of His own appearance in history It is upon this that the whole doctrine of the New Testament proceeds. It is this that produced the new faith, the new life, the new attitude of mind to this world and to the other world, of which the Gospels and the Epistles are the record and the result. The manifestation is prior to the doctrine. Christ's teaching is His own exposition of the Divine life which was historically revealed in Himself. For this reason, were there no other, we should go first to that teaching, and study it in its most original form.

[1] Dale's *The Atonement*, 1st ed. pp. 45, 47. [2] 1 John i. 1–3.

Criticism, however, has much to say about this most original form, and how and where it is to be found. Critical questions confront us which are very variously answered. Different theories of the origin and the relations of the Gospels are current. Different tests are proposed of what is primary and what is secondary, and different critical methods are followed. The methods and the tests necessarily differ according to the theory. Some scholars account for the phenomena of the synoptical Gospels by supposing that at the foundation of these records there is an apostolic writing, the *Logia*, a collection of Christ's words, or of His words and deeds, which is the most faithful representation of the earliest tradition; that Mark is the oldest of the three, depending on direct apostolic tradition, and used by both Matthew and Luke; that these latter two are independent of each other, both founding on the *Logia*, but each in his own way; that Matthew's Gospel uses the *Logia* more literally and completely than Luke, and is made up of this writing along with the help of Mark; and that Luke is made up of the *Logia*, Mark, and other reliable sources referred to in the opening verses of the Third Gospel. If we accept this theory, as it is applied by Professor Bernhard Weiss, the critical process will take a corresponding form. We shall have to say, with its chief exponent, that where Matthew and Luke agree apart from Mark, we possess the very words of the *Logia* or "apostolic source"; that where they differ, we verify the original by applying the principle that "that form is secondary the motive for which is still recognisable"; and that where all three agree, regard must be had to the circumstance that

"the form in Matthew, as well as in Luke, is often owing to that of Mark."[1]

Others explain the phenomena of the four Gospels by affirming three main sources for the evangelic narratives; the Gospel of Mark, from which both Matthew and Luke have drawn,—a Gospel based on earlier narratives which were not composed on a strictly chronological plan; the *Logia* of Matthew, to which also the first and third Gospels are indebted; and another written source, proceeding from the hand that wrote the First Epistle of John, and forming the groundwork of our Fourth Gospel. If we adhere to this theory as it is stated by Professor H. H. Wendt, we shall have to follow a somewhat different method; and, among other things, we shall have to recognise Mark's report as the more original in all those passages in which Matthew and Luke, separately or in concert, form parallels to Mark.

It is needless to enter into the endless intricacies of these things. It is impossible to have respect to all the complicated criteria which are proposed for distinguishing between the earlier and the later in the records of our Lord's words. In point of fact, it will be found that the result is in the main the same, whichever of the critical theories now in the ascendant may be favoured, and whichever of these tests may be used. The substance of Christ's teaching remains the same, and the gravest of His declarations on the things of the future come back to us at the end of any one of these critical operations. There is enough, it is admitted, that is critically certain, enough

[1] Weiss, *Biblical Theology*, i. p. 55, Clark's trans.

to test and generally to guarantee what remains.[1] Even as regards the version of our Lord's discourses in John's Gospel, with all its peculiar stamp and impress, it is acknowledged that there is "no reason to doubt that the substance and spirit of what Jesus actually said are essentially preserved."[2] The marked difference, however, between the form given to Christ's teaching in the Fourth Gospel and that which it has in the first three calls for separate treatment of the two. We shall therefore take the synoptical account of His teaching by itself as presumedly the earlier, and shall compare it with the report given in John's Gospel.

Now, in the synoptical Gospels Christ's teaching moves for the most part round the great idea of the kingdom of God. This is emphatically the case with all that He says on the problems of the Last Things. His whole disclosure of the future has its central point in His doctrine of that kingdom and its consummation. In this He attaches Himself to the Old Testament, and speaks as one who came to fulfil the law and the prophets in this as in other things. He takes up the Old Testament way, too, and carries it further.

We found that, so far as the Old Testament has a doctrine of immortality, it is a doctrine confessedly incomplete, and pointing beyond itself. But we saw it also to be a doctrine which is best described as felt out, rather than reasoned out or definitely stated. It takes much for granted, and it has largely the form of presentiment, intuition, anticipation, the inference of faith, the prophetic vision of the triumph of the Divine kingdom. It knows nothing of arguments like those

[1] Weiss, *ut sup.* i. p. 56.

[2] Wendt, *ut sup.* i. p. 26.

of Plato. It never attempts to philosophise. It has nothing akin to those ways of thinking to which it was congenial to speak of the soul as indivisible and therefore immortal. It does not draw its conclusions from the constitution of nature. It is only in a broad sense that it recognises even the moral arguments for a future life, and it employs them in another way than ours. It makes small use of the analogies of natural things. It follows the logic of the heart and of experience. What it offers is not a dogma of immortality, but the expression of a communion with the living God which involves immortality. Instead of speaking of endless life or the after-existence of the soul, it speaks of a relation of the man to a Covenant God, which implies not only the survival of the soul, but the final perfection of the whole man. Above all, it links its doctrine of the future with the Messianic hope, and that hope was, first, the hope of a kingdom, and second, the hope of a Messianic King.

Christ follows the same way. He passes by all theoretic questions regarding the soul's endlessness. He gives no proof of the certainty of a future existence; He presupposes that existence. He does not speak of immortality, but rather of *life*, as man's destiny. He dwells upon the broad truths, the foundations of hope, the certainties, which are contained in man's relation to God the Father, the new birth, the union with Himself. He communicates His doctrine of the Future neither in the way of reasoned statement nor as something which can be taken apart from other truths, but by unfolding the issues of that Divine kingdom, the expectation of which had been the strength of the Old Testament hope.

This kingdom is presented in different aspects in the Gospels and throughout the New Testament. Christ Himself offers no definition of it. He deals with it as a thing familiar to those among whom He moved. In His parables He exhibits it in its ideal, while He illustrates also its nature, its laws, its history, and its goal. He frees it from the coarse material notions which had become connected with it. It had been secularised, externalised, and debased. He rescues it, and calls it back to its Old Testament idea, and having brought it thither, He carries it beyond even the Old Testament vision. It is a dominion or authority which is to be fully and effectually recognised. But it is also a realm or a society in which that recognition is to take place. Under the Old Testament it would have been impossible to think of it except as taking concrete form, and on Christ's own lips it seems to have essentially the same meaning. It is an ideal, yet never to Him a mere ideal, but one that has a realisation. "To an actuality which even partially corresponds to the idea," says Dr. Stanton, "He will give the name of kingdom, but never merely to the abstract idea. Again, connection with the Old Testament preparation and Jewish hopes furnishes a complete answer to those who would translate it 'reign,' instead of 'kingdom of God.' Kingdom includes both ideas, that of His royal authority and of the realm over which He rules; and both should be included. The conception to which the whole previous history led was that of a realm of men in which God's will would be done, and upon which His blessing would rest. It must, at the same time, be always borne in mind that Jesus never speaks

of the kingdom as something which men could constitute for themselves; it must come to them."[1]

This kingdom is a present thing, and that in a two-fold sense. It is present, in so far as Christ brings it with Him, and embodies it in Himself; and it is present in so far as it has a true, though partial, realisation in those who attach themselves to Him, and in their lives give instance of the righteousness which makes the kingdom. The first gains of the kingly rule, the beginnings of the society, are seen in them.

But it is also a thing of the future. In its present form it has but a partial and relative realisation, which looks to a consummation. Now it is in the process of enlargement; hereafter it will come to its goal.[2] A

[1] *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, pp. 217, 218. The term βασιλεία may express either of two ideas which are near akin and always apt to shade the one into the other, the abstract idea of kingly rule and the concrete idea of the kingly sphere. Both occur in the Gospels, the former, *e.g.*, in Luke xxii. 29, xxiii. 42; the latter, *e.g.*, in such phrases as "least in the kingdom of heaven," "inherit the kingdom prepared." Beyschlag, while admitting that in many passages it is difficult to say which idea is in view, concludes that the abstract sense is the rarer, and that the concrete is so much the more usual sense that it should be preferred in doubtful cases (*New Testament Theology*, i. p. 41, Clark's trans.).

[2] "The whole life of the discourses and thoughts of Jesus with regard to the perfected kingdom of God," says Ewald, "centres in the profound unity and certainty of the two propositions, that it is already with Himself present on earth, and that it will come with Himself: two propositions which appear at first sight irreconcilable, but both of which He incontestably maintained from the first beginning of His Messianic or public labours, and in the inner unity of which lies the whole great new truth which He brought into the world" (*History of Israel*, vi. 201, Smith's trans.). It is impossible to limit the "kingdom" in our Lord's teaching to the eschatological idea, as is attempted, *e.g.*, in Schmoller's *Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes in den Schriften des N.T.* and J. Weiss' *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*. While it is a future thing in such passages as Matt. vii. 21, xxv. 34, xxvi. 29, Luke xxi. 31, it is certainly a thing of the present in such passages as Matt. xi. 11, xii. 28, xx. 31, Luke xvi. 16, xvii. 21, as well as in the Mustard Seed, the Leaven, the Seed Growing Secretly, and other parables of the kingdom. Neither is the existence of these two views of

double aspect is given to the kingdom, which has caused some needless difficulty. Two classes of sayings lie side by side in the Gospels, even in the Synoptists, one representing the kingdom as a thing of gradual growth, and another representing it as established by a great catastrophe. Some of these sayings seem to take us into a world of ideas very different from the ethical view of the kingdom which is given in others. Even critics like Keim make much of this, and there are many who exaggerate the contrast between the two forms of expression.

But the idea of a gradual extension and the idea of an ultimate triumph identified with some signal event, are surely not contradictory ideas; and there is no inconsistency in describing the kingdom as the subject of both these fortunes. Neither in the parables, nor in any of the non-parabolic sayings in which Christ speaks of the future of the kingdom, is it affirmed or even suggested that, in the orderly march of the progress of the kingdom all evil shall be overcome, and every wrong righted, and no place left for any final act of sifting or overthrow. On the contrary, several of the

the kingdom to be explained by supposing a development of the subject in Christ's own mind, or by saying that He began with the idea of the kingdom as at hand, was encouraged by the first success of His ministry to think of it as present, and again was led by the pressure of His rejection to think of it as future. Neither class of passages is confined to any one period of His ministry. The idea of the kingdom as present "breaks out," says Ewald, "as it could not otherwise be, precisely at the beginning with the greatest depth and strength, but remains in the later period of this earthly career of Christ always the same; and even amid the pains of death it is still testified to by Him as the most certain truth of His whole life" (*ut sup.* p. 202). To the Old Testament prophets the kingdom of God was something that was to come in the future, and to come then all at once. Its progressiveness is recognised along with its inner ethical nature in our Lord's teaching, and this perception, as Beyschlag remarks, carried with it the distinction of a present and a future kingdom (*New Testament Theology, ut sup.* i. 53).

parables clearly indicate an extension which is to be followed and finished by a conclusive judgment and separation. And the co-operation of continuous inner development and sudden outward event towards one great end, is surely nothing so abnormal or unheard of. "Our actual experience of the general history of human society shows how the two may be combined. For the most part, there has been a slow but real improvement in the condition of human society. But the world has passed also through great crises, and, on the whole, that which was sound and good in human institutions has been preserved through these crises, and has in consequence of them attained to a freer development."[1]

This idea of a new order in which God should be sovereign, and His holy will perfectly honoured, was the central point in Christ's teaching. It was not a new idea, but one taken over from the Old Testament. It was not an idea strange to the Jew, but one with which he was most familiar, although in a form miserably debased. In speaking of it Christ used the terms to which the people were accustomed, and the object of much of His teaching was to raise it from the degradation into which it had sunk, to purify and elevate the popular conception of it, and to carry it beyond the point at which it had stood in Old Testament prophecy. The old idea thus became transfigured; the current Jewish idea thus became an essentially new thing in His teaching. With this central doctrine of the kingdom He connected all that He communicated to His disciples on the subject of the Future—His Return, the Resurrection, the Judgment, Heaven and Hell.

[1] *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, p. 223.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINE OF THE RETURN

THE first point in Christ's teaching on the Future is the doctrine of His own *Return*. In the Old Testament the erection of the Divine kingdom was made dependent on God's descent on earth. In certain prophecies it was also connected with the appearance of an ideal king, the agent of Jehovah. So Christ teaches that the completion of the kingdom which He proclaims and founds requires a new interposition, and that for this He is Himself to come again. The time of His Return is not declared. The day and hour of that event are known only to the Father. But as in Old Testament prophecy the institution of the kingdom and the completion of the kingdom had been given in conjunction, and the former had been realised by Christ's first Advent, so in His announcements of the future, the consummation of the kingdom is connected with His second Advent. He accepts the term used by the disciples in their inquiries about the coming of the Son of Man and the end of the world, and speaks of His Return as a Parousia, a Presence or Coming.[1] He describes it as an *event*, a visible manifestation. It is to be of the nature of a sudden,

[1] Matt. xxiv. 3, 37, 39.

catastrophie oeeurrence. Yet the times must first be ripe for it, and certain events must first take place before it ean eome to pass. In the Old Testament the Coming of the Lord is often represented as heralded by portents, and in the Apocalyptie literature of the Jews these things oeeupy a large plaee. In a similar way Christ speaks of His Return as intimated by certain prelusive tokens, while yet it is near. His declarations on the subjeet are given on several oeeasions, and it is impossible, by the application of any of the great critical tests, to separate their main burden from the most primitive reports of His teaching.

Above all, the solemn event with which the whole issues of the future are eonneeted, obtains a large space in the great eschatologieal diseourse which oeeupies Matt. xxiv., xxv. Critieism has raised questions of no ordinary moment regarding the construction of this discourse and its unity. It is by no means an easy task to interpret it eonsistently throughout. One of the chief difficulties is the circumstanee that the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world seem to be described as coincident events, and that Christ speaks of both as certain to be witnessed by the men of His own generation. Mark and Luke, it is true, are less definite on this point in their version of Christ's prophecy of the end. But they, too, record the saying, "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass till all these things be done"; "Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away till all things be accomplished." On other occasions, too, words of similar meaning are reported, as when He says to the Twelve, "Ye shall not have gone through

the cities of Israel, till the Son of Man be come"; and to the disciples, "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father, with His angels, and then shall He render unto every man according to his deeds. Verily I say unto you, There be some of them that stand here, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom." [1]

Some admit that these announcements came from Christ's own lips, and simply conclude that He was mistaken. This is the explanation which comes easy to men like Strauss and Renan. It is given also, however, by some, such as Keim, Weizsäcker, and Dr. Samuel Davidson, who have a different regard for the mental and moral stature of the Christ of the Gospels. But it raises the serious question of the kind and measure of the nescience or misconception which may consist with moral perfection.[2] Others meet the difficulty by asserting that Christ's words were misunderstood and misreported; so that these predictions have not come down to us as they were really spoken by Him, or have had a meaning given them quite apart from His intention.[3] But this is to save Christ's credit by sacrificing that of the evangelists. Recourse has also been had to the theory of a double Coming, one near and invisible, taking effect in the destruction of Jerusalem; and another remote and visible, realising itself at the judgment of the world. There is nothing impossible in this, so far as the words go. In the language of the Old Testament, great national calami-

[1] Mark xiii. 30; Luke xxi. 32; Matt. x. 23, xvi. 27, 28; cf. Mark viii. 38, ix. 1; Luke ix. 26, 27, R.V.

[2] See Pünjer's discussions in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift*, 1878.

[3] So Baur, Colani, De Wette, Holtzmann, etc.

ties are described in terms of a Coming of the Lord. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to break up the discourse into parts, so as to be able to say where the one event is in view and where the other. Various verses are selected as the point of transition from the one to the other.[1] But the result does not satisfy. Neither is the case met by assuming that there is but one subject throughout, and that subject the destruction of Jerusalem. The language, especially in chap. xxv., is too large for that. Both events appear to be in the discourse; and they lie together in it in a way which defies their formal disjunction.[2]

[1] *E.g.* xxiv. 13, 29, 36, 43, xxv. 14, 31. The most reasonable of all is xxiv. 29. But there is still the difficulty of the εὐθέως. See the Commentaries *in loc.*, especially Meyer's.

[2] The different forms in which Christ's eschatological discourse is given in the Synoptical Gospels, the resemblance between parts of it and the known methods and style of the Jewish apocalyptic writing, and the special difficulties caused by the way in which the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world seem to be connected, have led not a few to question its unity. Colani suggested that it included a Jewish-Christian Apocalypse, and that a possible key to it might be found in the statement made by Eusebius about the warning given to the Christians to leave Jerusalem. (See his *Jesus Christ et les croyance messianiques de son temps.* The passage in Eusebius is in the *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 5, 3.) In various ways the theory of a Jewish-Christian Apocalypse has been favoured by Keim, Pfleiderer, Wendt, Vischer, Weiffenbach, etc. The last-named attempts to make out three distinct parts in this supposed original. (See his *Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu.*) Weizsäcker suggests a Jewish Apocalypse, belonging probably to a lost section of the Book of Enoch (*Untersuchungen*, pp. 121–126). These are attractive, but uncertain conjectures. The resemblances to the Jewish Apocalypses can be explained by intelligible likeness to the prophetic and apocalyptic passages of the Old Testament, especially the Book of Daniel, and by an equally intelligible use of the current Jewish forms of thought and speech. The difficulties of the exegesis are best met otherwise. Beyschlag holds that, in speaking of His Coming, Christ has in view the return to His own and the presence with them which were to begin at the Resurrection, to be deepened at Pentecost, and to continue a spiritual effect for ever (*Leben Jesu*, i. pp. 357–364). Those who hold that our Lord's words about His Coming were made good in connection with the fall of the Jewish state, naturally regard

But this is only in accordance with the nature of Biblical prophecy, and in this our Lord again attaches Himself to the Old Testament. Events which history shows to have been widely separated, are brought together in what is described as prophetic perspective or "timeless sequence," or in causal connection, or as if the one formed part of the other. In the great prophecies of judgment or of deliverance distinct and separate occurrences are often given in one figure. In the eighth and ninth chapters of Isaiah, for example, the deliverance from the Assyrian invader and the rise of the great light or the Prince of Peace are described as if they were synchronous or one and the same event. In the announcements of judgments which are made by Zephaniah and Obadiah, the final judgment and the preliminary partial acts of judgment appear to be identified. The deliverances and chastisements of the near future are interpreted as the Coming of Jehovah or the advent of His kingdom, and are regarded as embracing all future deliverances or judgments. The end of Israel's history was the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, and at every stage in that history that kingdom was coming. In the long procession of redemptive and judicial acts which made up that history, the prophets recognised in each such act

the Parousia as in itself a dispensation or spiritual presence, not an event (so, *e.g.*, in Warren's *The Parousia*). In England, Dr. J. S. Russell's *The Parousia* is the best exponent of the view which limits all to the destruction of Jerusalem. Dr. Briggs, who admits that the term "this generation" must be taken in its ordinary sense, meets the difficulty of the "immediately" by taking εὐθέως in the sense of the prophetic קרוב, indicating that "the event was certain, but the time uncertain" (*The Messiah of the Gospels*, pp. 155, 156. See his whole discussion, pp. 132–165, on the *Apocalypse of Jesus*; also his *Messianic Prophecy*, p. 52, etc.).

a real and relatively decisive advent of God and His kingdom. In His eschatological discourses Christ recognises, as Old Testament prophecy did, the partial and preliminary manifestation of the kingdom as involving the final. He speaks of the two as one, and declares before the Council that *henceforth*, from the then present time, they should "see Him sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven" (R.V.).[1]

In their scope and form, therefore, Christ's announcements of the future resemble those of the great prophets of the eighth century and their successors. Those prophets preached the hope of a new order of things, in which Israel was to be at one with its King, and the glory of life was to be given to it, and through it to the Gentiles. They also preached the necessity of a withdrawal from the unworthy past, implying a great act of judgment and chastisement. They set forth this hope, as in different ways it touched both Israel and the nations, in a rich imagery, which varied according to the occasion. And in this imagery they connected the institution of the new condition, the judicial work, and the final restoration, with the things of their own time—with the Assyrian invasion in the case of Isaiah, with the Babylonian exile in that of Jeremiah, with the fall of the Greek kingdom in that of Daniel.[2] In the same way, Christ's predictions of the future combine the end of the theocracy and the end of the world. Both events belong to the Return

[1] Matt. xxvi. 64, ἀπ' ἄρτι—*henceforth*, not merely *hereafter*.

[2] See Oehler's article, "Messias," in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.*; W. R. Smith's article, "Messiah," in the *Ency. Brit.*; Kuenen's *Religion of Israel*, chap. xii.; etc.

or Coming of which He speaks. And that Return or Coming is an objective event of the future. The terms in which Christ speaks of it, according to the synoptical records, cannot be resolved into imaginative descriptions of a triumph of principles merely, or into elaborate figures of the passing away of old forms of religion. Nor is this the case only with the Synoptical Gospels.

It is essentially the same with John. The Return, it is true, is a less prominent subject in the Fourth Gospel, where the coming of the Spirit has a larger place. But it is there. When Christ speaks, for example, of going to prepare a place for His disciples, He speaks of that act as if it were itself but a preparation for His return to take them to Himself. The same idea of His Coming appears in the appendix to the Fourth Gospel;[1] and in the great Epistle, which

[1] John xiv. 3, xxi. 22. It cannot be said that success has attended the attempt to establish a difference between the Synoptical Gospels and the Fourth Gospel on the subject of Christ's Coming. Names of the highest eminence, no doubt, are found on the side of those who hold that the Fourth Gospel recognises only a dynamical Coming. But even where that Gospel speaks of the sending of the Paraclete, it distinguishes between the Paraclete and Christ; and a just exegesis can scarcely fail to admit that, in the passages referred to above, Christ speaks of His own Coming, and of that in the same way as in the Synoptists. Neander and Lücke restrict the sense of xiv. 3 to Christ's spiritual return and the reception of His own into His full spiritual fellowship. Scholten sees in it only a statement of the fact that Christ's Spirit will remain, though Christ Himself departs. Ebrard restricts the sense here to Christ's resurrection. The analogy of the vision of the martyred Stephen leads others to say that what is in view is Christ's Coming to the believer at death. Even Godet concludes that the "I come again," refers to His Coming in the Spirit, and the "will receive you to Myself" to the union of the believer with the glorified Christ, which is effected by the gift of the Spirit. Forgetting the analogy of Old Testament prophecy, he comes to this conclusion on the ground that the promise here spoken by Christ is made not to the Church generally, but to the disciples personally, to com-

admittedly gives us the same reflection of Christ's life and teaching as the Fourth Gospel, the Lord's Parousia or Coming is again presented as a definite event, and as the very centre of Christian expectation.[1]

The first point in Christ's doctrine of the future is thus the announcement of the great objective event of His Return; an announcement given under the analogy of the Old Testament anticipations of the consummation of the kingdom of God, and under the condition of His own express declaration that "of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."[2] But while this is the case, there is a wide difference between His teaching on the subject and that with which the Jews of His time were familiar. We know what the popular

fort them in their present trouble. Others, for example Alford, and in a less extreme way Westcott, embrace under the one statement in xiv. 3 all the different events—the resurrection of Christ; the work of His Spirit in the life of His disciples; His reception of the believer at death; and His glorious judicial return; all which may be described as Comings of the Lord. "Christ," says the latter interpreter, "is, in fact, from the moment of His resurrection ever coming to the world and to the Church and to men as the Risen Lord" (*Speaker's Commentary, in loc.*). But however true this may be, it is apart from the question of the immediate sense of the passages in view. That these refer to His objective Second Coming is recognised by the best of the Fathers and Reformers, and in more recent times by Meyer, Hofmann, Luthardt, Holtzmann, Hilgenfeld, Ewald, and many more. Those who, like Dr. Samuel Davidson, think that Christ's words have been misrepresented, admit that, as we have them, they mean an objective, and not a simply dynamical Return. "Der Weggang," says Holtzmann in his exposition of John in the recent *Handcommentar*, "ist eine Vorbedingung der Wiederkunft. Letzere selbst scheint hier zunächst noch rein eschatologisch." Meyer remarks that, in ver. 2 of the 14th chapter, Christ has "provided beforehand for the words (in ver. 3) being understood of His actual return, and of local fellowship with Him."

[1] 1 John ii. 28.

[2] So it is in Mark xiii. 32, R.V. It is the same in Matt. xxiv. 36, even in the T.R., where the *Son* is not expressly mentioned indeed, but the knowledge is limited to the Father. But the R.V. gives the true text.

ideas of the Jews of that period were by the literature which was current among them, the curious literature of pre-Christian Judaism, including such products of Jewish thought and the Jewish theology as the *Book of Enoch*, the *Assumption of Moses*, the *Sibylline Oracles*, the *Psalms of Solomon*, and others.[1] The grasp which these ideas had of the Jewish mind may also be gathered from the place which they continued to have in the Jewish literature of the early Christian period, in the *Fourth Book of Esdras*, for example, and the *Apocalypse of Baruch*.[2]

The eschatology of these books is detailed, highly-coloured, often grotesque. It is largely occupied with mystic numbers. It tarries among the "signs" of

[1] The Book of Enoch is generally admitted to consist of several distinct pieces of different dates, and to be coloured to some extent by Christian views and phraseology, even in its oldest sections. But the bulk of it may be accepted as of pre-Christian origin. A few (Hofmann, Philippi, Weisse) have held it to be throughout a Christian composition. Most agree that a large part of it belongs to some period in the second century B.C., the earlier Maccabean period, the time of John Hyrcanus, or that of Alexander Jannæus. The section which is of greatest interest as regards Messianic beliefs, that known as the "Similitudes" or "Allegories," is ascribed by some to a Christian author, by most to the later pre-Christian period. The Assumption of Moses is referred to dates ranging from the very beginning of the first Christian century to the second century of our era. Of the Sibylline Oracles the most reliable portion is the Third Book, which is assigned to various points within the Maccabean period. Its most probable date seems to be about 140 B.C. The Psalms of Solomon are referred by some to the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, by others to that of Herod, but by most to a date shortly after Pompey's conquest of Jerusalem.

[2] It appears to be certain that both the Fourth Book of Esdras and the Apocalypse of Baruch could not have been written before the conquest of Jerusalem by Titus. The former, which seems to have been the most popular of all the Jewish Apocalypses, is referred by some (Ewald, etc.) to the time of Titus, by others (Hausrath, Renan, etc.) to Nero's time, but by most (Dillmann, Reuss, Schürer, etc.) to the reign of Domitian (A.D. 81–96). The latter may, perhaps, be most safely referred to a date not long after the fall of Jerusalem.

the end, and painfully elaborates the preclusive portents. It makes Jerusalem the centre of its future, and enlarges in literal descriptions of the gathering of the scattered Jews to their native land. But in Christ's words there is nothing of the forced chronologies which meet us in the *Assumption of Moses*, with its two hundred and fifty "times" or weeks of years, as they may mean; or in the *Book of Enoch*, with its seventy shepherds, its binding of the angels under the hills for seventy generations till the last judgment, its division of the first age into ten weeks. There is nothing of the adoration of stones, the worship of unclean spirits and demons, the casting forth of the fish of the Dead Sea, the salt found in fresh water, the blood trickling from wood, and the other omens and woes which made the Rabbinical doctrine of the "birth-pangs" of Messiah.[1] There is nothing of the setting up of the "new house"; nothing of the destruction and renovation of Jerusalem;[2] nothing of the monstrous story of Leviathan and Behemoth;[3] nothing of the many similar eccentricities which appear in the earlier literature of Judaism, and run, in course of time, into the wildest extravagances of the Rabbis.

These things were the Jew's refuge from the relentless pressure of the law. His religion had become a work, the work of painful, scrupulous attention to the

[1] See, *e.g.*, Book of Enoch xcix. 4–9; Fourth Esdras v. 1–13, 54, 55, vi. 7–28, viii. 63–ix. 6.

[2] Book of Enoch xc. 28, 29; Fourth Esdras ix. 23–x. 55; Apoc. of Baruch iv.

[3] On this see Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, chap. xxi.; Hilgenfeld's *Jüd. Apok.* p. 178; Gfrörer's *Jahrhundert des Heils*, ii. 33, etc.

complicated, formal prescriptions of the law. The lofty and gracious idea of Israel's relation to God, which had been taught by the prophets, had given way to that of a hard and entangling legal covenant. Everything in the Jew's life was directed to making him a servant of the law, and the law itself had become a vast casuistry. Jurisprudence had usurped the place of morality, and duty had become an endless chain of minute, external observances. The Jew's motive for obedience was the hope of reward; and as the scantiness of his present recompense for all this heavy work of the law became more painfully evident to him, he looked more and more away to the future. "At every step," says Professor Schürer, "at the work of his calling, at prayer, at meals, at home and abroad, from early morning till late in the evening, from youth to old age, the deadening formula followed him. A healthy moral life could not flourish under such a burden; action was nowhere the result of inward motive; all was, on the contrary, weighed and measured."[1] The work of the law and the hope of the future were the two things which made up his religion, and the one was his retreat from the other. As the former became more rigorous and emptier of human reward, he turned more fondly to the latter, and snatched an unhealthy satisfaction from elaborate speculation on future things, their nature, their portents, their material compensations. Christ's purpose was to redeem the hope of the consummation of the Divine kingdom from these ineptitudes; and to arrest

[1] *History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 125, Clark's trans.

the propensity to eschatological dreaming, which meant a decay of the moral life. In His teaching there is a significant reserve at the very points where popular fancy and the finesse of the scribes ran riot.

His doctrine lies no less apart from the *Chiliastic* idea of the Future. The dogma of a Millennium, which took possession of Christian thought at so early a date and with so strong a grasp that it has sometimes been reckoned an integral part of the primitive Christian faith, had its foundations in Jewish notions. The secular imagination of Judaism fastened upon the Old Testament prophecies of the final triumph of the kingdom of God on earth, and out of them wove the dream of a material dominion for Israel and a visible reign for the Messiah. The Old Testament spoke of the Messianic kingdom as an everlasting kingdom. But Jewish reflection, distinguishing between Jehovah's dominion and Messiah's, proceeded in course of time to assign a limited duration to the latter. In the Psalms of Solomon and in the Sibylline Oracles, the Old Testament conception of the endless duration of Messiah's kingdom continues.[1] But in the Fourth Book of Esdras a definite space of four hundred years is allowed to Messiah's reign;[2] and later Rabbinism, interpreting the words of the prophets in its own peculiar way, revelled in curious calculations of the duration of Messiah's kingdom. Forty years, sixty, seventy, three hundred and sixty-

[1] *E.g.* "He will smite the earth with the word of His mouth for ever," Ps. xvii. 39; "Then will He raise up a kingdom for ever over all men," Sibyll. iii. 765–776. So, too, the Apocalypse of Baruch, chap. xl., "His dominion shall stand for ever, until the world of corruption be ended."

[2] vii. 28.

five, four hundred, seven thousand, and other terms of years, were given as the limit of Messiah's days.[1] Among these figures the period of a thousand years has a place, but only a late and subordinate place. On the principle that with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, it was inferred from the sentence in Isa. lxiii. 4, "The day of vengeance was in mine heart" (R.V.), that Messiah's reign was to be for a millennium. This reign, too, though of universal extent, was believed to have its seat in Jerusalem.[2] And founding, perhaps, on the statements in the Book of Daniel regarding the destruction and restoration of the city,[3] the idea arose that a new Jerusalem was to be built upon the ruins of the old, as the home of the returning Jews and the centre of Messiah's rule.

These ideas passed over into Christian thought, and took the definite form of belief in a visible reign of Christ on earth lasting for a thousand years, ending in a great apostasy, and to be followed by the final consummation. The roots of this millennial doctrine lie in the Jewish soil. But even in Judaism the ideas in question are neither universally prevalent nor of very early date. The general view seems not to have recognised any considerable interval between the Messiah's Advent and the final Consummation. The doctrine of Messiah reigning for a definite period

[1] See examples of these calculations, and the principles on which they were made, in Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, pp. 315–318.

[2] In the Psalms of Solomon, *e.g.* xi. 6, 7, Jerusalem is the centre of the Messianic future. In the Book of Enoch, Messiah, under the figure of the white bull or steer, is said to live "in the house of the Lord," which appears to be Jerusalem. In other books, Mount Sion is Messiah's seat.

[3] Dan. ix. 24-26.

before the end of the world does not emerge distinctly till the Christian period, as in the Fourth Book of Esdras. It is not found in the Old Testament. Still less does it form any part of Christ's teaching.

Our Lord adopts certain vivid apocalyptic figures which were probably in common use among the Jews when they spoke of the end. He speaks of sitting at the table with the forefathers of Israel, sitting on thrones judging the tribes, drinking of the fruit of the vine, eating of the Passover in the kingdom of heaven.[1] But it is for another purpose than to take over any Jewish or Chiliastic definition of His kingdom that He employs such imagery. The whole strain of His teaching is inconsistent with the millenarian conception of the Future, both in its terms and in its spirit. He gives no hint of a millennium or any measured period between His Advent and the Consummation. He speaks of an apostasy, but of that as preceding His Coming, not at the close of a thousand years. He says nothing of a limited duration for His kingdom, nothing of a personal reign on earth for a definite period, nothing of a literal restoration of Israel to its ancient land, nothing of a new Jerusalem in which the kingdom has its seat. He speaks only of one Coming in the future, and the object of that is never said to be the gathering of His saints around Him in an earthly dominion.

[1] Matt. viii. 11, xix. 28, xxvi. 29 ; Luke xxii. 16.

CHAPTER III

DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENT

THE second point in Christ's teaching on the Future is His doctrine of a *Final Judgment.* He gives this as the object of His Coming, and it has a large place in His recorded words. It is important to understand how His teaching on this subject is related to the Old Testament and to the Jewish ideas of His time.

We have seen how far and in what form the Old Testament has a doctrine of Judgment. The general conception of the Hebrew Scriptures on this subject is that of a triumph of God's kingdom, expected on earth, and taking effect in an overthrow of the enemies of Jehovah's cause and people. To this was added the idea of Jehovah Himself sitting as Judge.[1] A judgment is predicted for Israel. More frequently a judgment is announced for the nations. But it is one that is finished upon earth. There is the large and definite conception of a world-judgment. But it is a judgment which takes place *in* the world, and is executed on the living adversaries of God's people and kingdom. The doctrine of a judgment after death has

[1] Joel's prophecy of the valley of Jehoshaphat, the "valley of decision," is of interest in this respect. There Jehovah Himself is Judge. Judah and Jerusalem are to abide, but Egypt is to be a "desolation," and Edom a "desolate wilderness" (Joel iii. 9–21).

but a small and uncertain place in the Old Testament. It is an occasional postulate of faith, as in Job ; or an occasional inference of reflection, as, perhaps, in Daniel. Not till near its close does the Old Testament revelation rise to the conception of a personal judgment after death. The loftiest surmises of faith affirm the certainty of a judgment, but leave its nature and its date indeterminate. For the most, too, the subjects of the judgment are nations, not individuals. When at last Old Testament faith and teaching attain to the expectation of an individual judgment beyond the present life, they still limit it to the Israelite. Nowhere have we the clear intimation of a personal judgment of all men, Jew and Gentile, quick and dead, at the end of things. Only the preparation for it is laid in the broad conceptions of the responsibility of Israel to a Covenant God, the righteousnesss of that God, and His sovereignty over the nations.

The doctrine of a *judgment* is a frequent subject in the non-canonical literature of the Jews. In some of the books it is taught in immense detail, and with many novel and fantastic elements. The general Old Testament belief is continued. But there is also an advance to the conception of a universal, individual judgment. The Old Testament idea of a judgment in the form of a destruction of living, hostile powers appears in the *Assumption of Moses*[1] and the *Book of Enoch.*[2] It retains its position at a later date, as is seen from the *Apocalypse of Baruch*[3] and the *Fourth Book of Esdras*,[4] and it persists even to the

[1] Chaps. iii., iv.
[2] xc. 18, 19.
[3] lxxii. 6.
[4] xiii. 14, etc.

time of the *Targums*. The judgment is usually placed at the beginning of Messiah's reign. But in those books which ascribe a limited duration to that reign, the judgment is placed at the end of the Messianic period. The Messiah is the agent in the judgment or overthrow, according to the frequent, though not the universal, testimony of the literature.[1] But a forensic character is given to the judgment, and the idea of an overthrow of enemies passes over into that of a solemn act of adjudication; while the judgment is extended to embrace all men, and not men only, but angels.

The *Book of Enoch*, both in its earlier and in its later sections, speaks largely of a final judgment in this forensic sense, although the other idea of the destruction of hostile powers is not altogether strange to it.[2] It uses a number of terms in describing it: "The great day," "the righteous judgment," "the great judgment," "the great day of judgment," "the day of the great judgment," "the last judgment," "the judgment for all eternity."[3] It is in the oldest section of this book that we find what is probably the first distinct statement of a general, individual judgment after death. The statement is given with large forensic detail in the later portion of the book. A throne is set; it is occu-

[1] This is the case, *e.g.*, with the oldest section of the Sibylline Oracles, iii. 652. The same view is given in the Psalms of Solomon, in Philo, in the Apocalypse of Baruch, the Fourth Book of Esdras, and in the Targums. See Schürer, *ut sup.* ii. 2, pp. 166–168, who notices also the Talmudic doctrine that the destruction of the hostile powers was the task, not of the Messiah proper, but of a subordinate Messiah, the Son of Joseph.

[2] In chap. xlvi. 4–6, lii. 4–9, the Son of Man is represented as breaking the teeth of sinners, thrusting kings from their thrones, etc.

[3] x. 6, 12, xvi. 1, xix. 1, xxii. 4, 11, xxv. 4, xc. 20–27, xci. 15, xciv. 9, xcviii. 10, xcix. 15, c. 4, ciii. 8, civ. 5.

pied by the Lord of the sheep; the sealed books are opened; the wicked angels, represented by the figure of the fallen stars, are placed before Him, and sentence is passed; the shepherds or heathen powers (as the figure is usually understood, though the interpretation is not free from doubt) are next sentenced; the blinded sheep or apostate Israelites are also judged; while the faithful who suffered are brought into the New Jerusalem. The names of the righteous are written in heaven; the evil of the wicked is also open there, and every sin is recorded daily.[1] The same ideas of heavenly books of record, a universal judgment, and a final decision pronounced in each man's case according to his deeds, appear in the later literature.[2] In what form, then, is the doctrine of a future judgment given by Christ Himself, and how does it stand related to all this?

There are few subjects on which He speaks more frequently, or at greater length. He employs many of the terms which were current, while He relieves the popular beliefs of all that was gross, fantastic, or trivial. He brings to the Old Testament conception the extension and the certainty which it needed. The spiritual principles of His teaching, and the things which it adds to the Hebrew faith on the subject, make the old doctrine a new one.

The position which is claimed for Himself in the Judgment is perhaps the first thing that arrests attention. He is Himself the Judge. In this His

[1] xlviii. 7, 8, liv. 7, xcviii. 6–8, civ. 4, 7, etc.

[2] *E.g.* Apocalypse of Baruch li. 4, 5; Fourth Book of Esdras vi. 2; Book of Jubilees iv., v., ix., x., xxiv.; and in the Rabbinical literature, for which see Weber, *Altsyn.-paläst. Theologie*, p. 371, etc.

teaching goes beyond that of the Old Testament, and beyond the general, if not universal, conception of the Judaism which prevailed before His time. The judicial office, in the sense of a final arbitrament of men's lives, is not ascribed to the Messiah or ideal King in the Hebrew Scriptures. The Messiah, it is true, appears as the agent of God in the Consummation and in the preparation for it, and the expectation of a great Davidic King is connected with the hope of the triumph of the kingdom.[1] But while this is a frequent combination of ideas in prophecy, it is by no means the general doctrine. In many of the prophecies the expectation of the glory of the latter days stands quite apart from the anticipation of a Messiah or Davidic King. No mention is made of the figure or the function of this King by Amos, Hosea, Zephaniah, Joel, Haggai. The same is the case with the distinct prophecies in Isa. xxiv.–xxvii. and Zech. xii.–xiv. In the Second Isaiah we have the figure of the Servant of Jehovah. In Malachi, Jehovah Himself is still the God of Judgment, and Elijah is Jehovah's forerunner.[2] Nor is it certain that it is otherwise even with the great passage in the Book of Daniel. For the sublime figure of a "Son of Man," which is introduced in the seventh chapter, is perhaps most correctly interpreted, not of a single Messianic person, but of the people or kingdom of God as contrasted with the great world-powers.[3]

[1] So it is in Isa. ix., xi., etc.; Micah v.; Jer. xxiii., xxxiii., xxxiv., xxxvi.; Ezek. xxxiv., xxxvii.; Zech. ix.–xi.

[2] Matt. iii. 1, iv. 3.

[3] That this is the original intention of the Davidic figure, whatever applications came to be made of it in later Judaism or in the New Testament, is suggested by the connection in which the emblem of a "Son of

It is only in certain prophecies, therefore, that the hope of the future kingdom is definitely connected with the hope of a future King. The work of the Davidic Prince or Messiah occupies a frequent, but by no means a constant, place in the vision of the Consummation of the Divine kingdom, and nowhere in the Old Testament is His work represented as that of Judge in the final Judgment. Judgment in the sense of rule or administration is ascribed to Him, but not in the sense of final, judicial decision. In Daniel's picture of the thrones, the setting of judgment, and the opening of the books, it is still God Himself, the "Ancient of days," who sits as Judge.[1]

We have essentially the same ideas in the non-canonical literature. The general doctrine is that Jehovah Himself is Judge, whether the judgment in question is the overthrow of living enemies or the great decision of the last day. Where Messiah is introduced, it is as Jehovah's instrument. Where judicial functions are assigned to Him, it is in connection with the former order of judgment, never, as it seems, with the latter. In the *Assumption of Moses*, Messiah does not appear. In the older section of the *Book of Enoch*, Messiah does not come till *after* the judgment, and the judgment is given by God Himself

Man" is placed with the emblems of the beasts, which are shown to mean kingdoms. It is confirmed by the explanation given in vii. 27. That the figure is to be understood of a personal Messiah, is strongly argued by Hengstenberg, Oehler, Hilgenfeld, and others. A detailed statement and examination of the reasons given in support of that interpretation will be found in Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, vii. See also Wendt's *The Teaching of Jesus*, i. pp. 61, 62 (Eng. trans.); Stanton's *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, pp. 109, 110.

[1] Dan vii. 9, etc.

after He has overthrown the heathen nations.[1] More usually Messiah is represented as coming *before* the judgment, and as executing it.[2] But the judgment is still the overthrow of the hostile powers in existence at the time. It has been supposed that a different conception distinguishes the *Psalter of Solomon*. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Psalms of this remarkable book are of the utmost interest—not only for the description which they give of the Messianic kingdom as both a destroying and a restoring power, but also for their testimony to the expectation of a *personal* Messiah.[3] In these Psalms much is made of the quality of justice in the rule of the Messiah. When He administers judgment His words will be "as the words of angels." But the judgment in view seems still to be limited to that which takes effect in the overthrow of hostile powers. His mission is to subvert the power of unjust rulers, and to destroy the ungodly nations with the word of His mouth.[4] It is only in the later section of the Book of Enoch, that of the *Parables* or *Similitudes*, where Christian influence may have been at work, that we see the Messiah assuming anything like the character of Judge at the last day. Even

[1] xc. 18, 19, 37.

[2] So, *e.g.*, in the earliest Sibyllines, iii. 652; and later in the Apocalypse of Baruch xxxix.–xl., etc.

[3] "Here for the first time in *Palestinian* literature the idea of a *personal* Messiah is unequivocally stated. The passage in Daniel (chap. vii.), which offers a possible exception, is of much disputed interpretation, and the only other Palestinian writing of a date anterior to our Psalms that makes any reference to a personal Messiah [*i.e.* the First Book of Enoch (chap. xc. 37, 38), a document written perhaps about 120 B.C.], employs in its description the vague mythic style of apocalyptic language" (Ryle and James, *The Psalms of the Pharisees*, p. lvi).

[4] xvii 25–51. Even Keim (ii. p. 298, Eng. trans.) seems to miss the distinction between the two judgments.

there the description of the office is somewhat indefinite.

It appears, therefore, that in the pre-Christian literature of the Jews, Messiah is not looked to as the Arbiter at the great day; while the whole conception of a Final Judgment is deficient in certainty, completeness, and spirituality. In Christ's own teaching on the subject all is different. Not only does He declare the fact of a future Judgment with solemn and emphatic reiteration, but adopting the title "Son of Man" which is used in the Book of Enoch,[1] He announces Himself as the Judge, the absolute and final Judge of men. It is among the most stupendous of His claims, and it is of scarce less moment that it should have been accepted by others than that it should have been made by Himself. The New Testament writings abundantly show that, though the Messiah is not known as the Judge of the quick and the dead, either on the soil of the Old Testament revelation or on that of the popular Jewish belief, this tremendous office was attributed to Christ by His disciples.[2] Their proclamation of Him as the Judge of the world confirms the narrative of the First Gospel,[3] in which this Divine prerogative is asserted, and witnesses to the uniqueness of His personality—a personality which, instead of being influenced by the ancestral prepossessions of those around Him, or making its impression by yielding to their inherited ideas, cut athwart

[1] In passages which proceed at least from a Jewish writer, if not from the original author. So Schürer and others, as against Hilgenfeld, Keim, etc., who ascribe them to a Christian interpolator.

[2] Acts x. 42, xvii. 30, 31; Rom. ii. 16; 2 Cor. v. 10; Jas. v. 8, 9, etc.

[3] Matt. xxv. 31, etc.; cf. John v. 22, 27.

all their most rooted and venerable notions, and remodelled their whole belief and life.

The judgment which He declares to be in His hand is a *universal* and *individual* judgment. The individualising operation of the judgment is implied, not only in the great prophecy of the end in the First Gospel, but elsewhere. When, in the parable of the Marriage Supper in Matthew,[1] for example, Christ speaks of the king coming to see the guests, He seems to have in view the scrutiny of the last day, though perhaps other sifting judgments may also come within the scope of His words; and the singling out of the man without the wedding garment indicates in the most pointed way the personal character of the judgment. The universal sweep of the judgment seems implied in the teaching of those parables, which draw the broad distinction between the righteous and the unrighteous,[2] and in the statement that He "shall reward every man according to his works."[3]

These truths, however, are taught most distinctly in the eschatological discourse in Matthew's Gospel. In this prophecy all is depicted "with a simplicity and beauty so original," it is well said, "that there is the less reason for imagining that this discourse about the judgment is the product of the apostolic period.[4] Here "all the nations" are represented as gathered before the Son of Man,[5] and a separation is made into two classes. It is true that the interpretation of this

[1] Matt. xxii. 1–14. [2] *E.g.* Matt. xiii. 36–42, 47–50.

[3] Matt. xvi. 27.

[4] So Meyer, who justly criticises the views of Hilgenfeld, Keim, and others.

[5] Matt. xxv. 31, etc.

section of the discourse is by no means free of difficulty. Some see in it only an extended period of judicial administration.[1] Others understand only the judgment of Christians to be in view.[2] Others restrict the judgment to those who shall be alive at Christ's advent.[3] But it is scarcely possible to escape the impression that a judgment of all mankind is meant, especially when the whole discourse is read in connection with the preceding parables. Even those who limit the assize which is here announced to the case of Christians, admit that the universality of Christianity, or of the preaching of the gospel, is presupposed.[4] Even should the words "all the nations" be limited to the Gentile peoples (for which much can be said), the note of universality remains. For if the judgment of the heathen is specially affirmed in this section of the discourse, that of the Church in its various members, worthy and unworthy, with large or small opportunity, and with all degrees of responsibility, is set forth in the associated parables of the Virgins and the Talents.

It is alleged that the representation of Christ's teaching on this subject, which is given in the Fourth Gospel, is essentially different from that of the Synoptists. In this more spiritual Gospel, it is

[1] *E.g.* Bush. [2] Jerome, Grotius, Meyer.

[3] So Meyer says of the words "all the nations," that they are not intended to limit the reference expressly to the Gentiles, but are to be taken as assuming the realisation of the *universality of Christianity* by the time of the *advent*, when all the nations of the earth will have heard the gospel and (to a proportionate degree) received Christ.

[4] So Meyer. Some place the judgment at the end of the *millennial* period. But while there may be two *scenes* in the judgment, there is nothing here or elsewhere in Matthew's Gospel about two distinct judgments separated by a millennial interval.

said, Christ seems to express Himself in another strain, when He uses such words as these, "God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through Him. He that believeth on Him is not judged; he that believeth not hath been judged already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God."[1] A view of judgment quite unlike that of the Jesus of the first three Gospels is implied, it is thought, in such declarations as these, "And if any man hear My sayings, and keep them not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth Me, and receiveth not My sayings, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I spake, the same shall judge him at the last day."[2] Here, it is explained, "the process is not a solemn outward act which Christ performs at His second coming, but a subjective one, developed within himself by each individual."[3]

There is undoubtedly a difference between the two methods of statement; but there is no inconsistency. The Fourth Gospel certainly speaks of the judgment more as a present process, and looks to its spiritual aspects and relations. The judgment which is in view in the first of the two passages is a probation of character which each man is experiencing now, a subjective judgment he is passing upon himself.[4] But

[1] iii. 17, 18, R.V. [2] xii. 47, 48, R.V.

[3] Dr. Samuel Davidson's *The Doctrine of Last Things*, p. 98.

[4] "Though judgment was not the object of Christ's mission," says Bishop Westcott, *in loc.*, "judgment is, in fact, the necessary result of it. This judgment is self-executed, and follows inevitably from the revealed presence of Christ."

this present judgment which is ascribed to Christ in John's Gospel does not preclude the future judgment which is ascribed to Him in the synoptical records. In the second of the two passages quoted mention is made of "the last day"; which, indeed, is a phrase peculiar to John. The sayings refer to two distinct prerogatives claimed by Christ, and they state that the prerogative of judgment is not the primary one. They speak also of the word of Christ as the principle and ground of the judgment, and of the heart or conscience as the witness to the justice of the judgment. But in all this there is nothing inconsistent with what He says of the Judge and the assize in Matthew; and in another Johannine writing[1] we have a doctrine which is clearly the same as that in the synoptical report—a doctrine connecting the judgment with Christ's Second Coming.[2]

A just exegesis finds no contradiction between Matthew and John in this matter, nothing in the more subjective view of judgment in the latter that is necessarily exclusive of the more objective view in the former. It does not permit us to say that Christ limits Himself to the inward, continuous judgment which proceeds in life and in conscience, and makes no announcement of a future, final, open judgment. It may be difficult to imagine this decision of the

[1] 1 John ii. 28, iv. 17.

[2] Meyer rightly points out how such terms as those in chap. v. 27, 28 make it impossible to say that in the Fourth Gospel the judgment is always an *inner* fact. "The saying, 'The world's history is the world's judgment,'" he adds, "only partially represents John's view; in John the last day is not without the last *judgment*, and *this* last judgment is with him the *world*-judgment." See his commentary on John v. 28–30.

last day, and difficult to interpret Christ's words on judgment. But these words, as they come to us in the four Gospels, are more than a large symbolism for the verdicts of history and men's moral consciousness.

CHAPTER IV

DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION

THE third point in our Lord's teaching on the future is the doctrine of the *Resurrection.* This is essentially connected with the former. That all may be judged, there must be a restoration of the dead to life. This seems to be the connection in which the doctrine is given in the Book of Daniel. Judgment appears there as a moral postulate in the instance of the heathen nations. It takes effect in their destruction, and the prophet pursues their case no further than their fate on earth. But what of the dead members of suffering Israel? Is there no reward for the faithful who perished in the cause of the Divine kingdom? And is there no punishment for the false who died in their infamy? These questions make the occasion for the final announcement of the book, that Israel's dead shall come forth from the dust of earth in order to receive the awards of righteousness.

The doctrine of a bodily resurrection, we are sometimes told, is not an integral part of Christ's own teaching. It is said to be a borrowed conception, foreign to the spirit of Christian truth. Its source is sought in Mazdaism.[1] It certainly appears in that

[1] Graetz, *e.g.*, takes this position, as he also refers the doctrine of im-

faith, at least in its later stage. It has but a doubtful place in the Avesta,[1] but it is found in developed form in the Bundehesh. There we find the belief that a great crisis awaits the world, when iniquity shall be dominant for a season; that a great prophet, Sosioch, shall arise as the conqueror of death and the judge of men; that the dead shall be raised, first the protoplast Kaiomorts, and then all mankind; that it shall be given them to drink of the Haoma juice, by which comes immortality; and that the joy of recognition will be followed by the pain of separation, when Sosioch passes sentence on just and unjust.[2] This is the later Zoroastrian conception of the future, which is said to have been taken over by the Jews during the period of their contact with Persia. In this way, it is argued, a dogma which was alien to Hebrew thought, and still more alien to Christian thought, passed from Zoroastrianism into Judaism, and through Judaism into Christianity.

But this doctrine, as we have seen, instead of being foreign to the genius of the Old Testament revelation, is related to its fundamental principles, and contained in its distinctive teaching on God, man, and life. Along the course of that revelation things appear

mortality to the influence of Neo-Platonism, *Geschichte*, ii. 2. Dr. Mills pronounces for the dependence of the Hebrew doctrine on the Zoroastrian.

[1] It may be implied in the prayer in *Yasna* lx. 11, "In order that our minds may be delighted, and our souls the best, let our bodies be glorified as well, and let them, O Mazda! go likewise openly (unto heaven) as the best world of the saints." In one of the *Miscellaneous Fragments* this sentence occurs, "Let the dead arise (unhindered by these foes), and let bodily life be sustained in these now lifeless bodies." The *Zamyad Yast* (xv. 89) speaks of the time "when the dead will rise, when life and immortality will come, and the world will be restored at its wish." Dr Mills thinks there is "some indication of the doctrine even in the Gâthas." See *Sacred Books of the East*, xxiii. p. 307, xxxi. pp. 32, 312, 391.

[2] See above, p. 110.

which indicate that the conception of a restoration to life was not strange to it. In the psalmists and the prophets there are intimations of a limitation of the power of death, an annihilation of death, a return from Sheol, a life superior to death; and at last in Isaiah and Daniel there is the declaration of an individual resurrection. And as regards the alleged dependence upon Persian beliefs, it must be said that positive statements are at least premature in the present condition of our knowledge. Scholars are by no means agreed as to the period in the history of Zoroastrianism to which the dogma of a resurrection belongs, or as to the date and integrity of the documents in which it appears.[1] The dogma itself, too, is of very mixed character. It contains noble elements; but mingled with these are things gross and puerile, which make it very different from what we have either in the Old Testament or in the New.[2] At the most it may have had some influence on the form and development of the Biblical doctrine.[3] But there is no reason to say that the Biblical doctrine is derived from it.

In the Old Testament itself the hope of a resurrection, which took first the form of a belief in the reanimation of the dead nation, and then that of a

[1] Professor Cheyne holds it open to little or no question that the doctrine of a resurrection is as old as the Achæmenid period of Zoroastrianism. He thinks Jewish beliefs cannot have been uninfluenced by the Persian doctrine, but that their essential originality is left untouched. See his *Origin of the Psalter*, p. 401, etc.; also *Expository Times*, vol. ii. p. 244, etc. Professor Graetz referred the Persian influence to a later date. M. Harlez denies the high antiquity of the Persian dogma.

[2] See above, p. 111, etc.

[3] "The germs," says Kuenen, "which lay hidden in Judaism were fertilised by contact with a religion in which they had arrived at maturity" (*History of the Religion of Israel*, iii. p. 63).

belief in the return of deceased individuals to life, did not go beyond the case of Israel. It did not become the expectation of a universal, personal resurrection. In the period between the close of canonical prophecy and the Christian era, the belief had a varied and interesting history. It underwent certain enlargements, and became more established. But it developed at the same time some doubtful elements, and remained subject to some uncertainty.

The *Book of Enoch*, for example, furnishes evidence of the activity of the belief. The faith is definitely expressed in terms like these, "The righteous shall rise from sleep";[1] and it is presupposed in what is said of the judgment. In comparison, however, with the large place which is given to the general doctrine of a future life and a judgment, the doctrine of a resurrection is much in the background. It is doubtful, too, whether there is anything in this book that goes beyond Daniel's statements.[2] The same is the case with the *Psalms of Solomon*. These Psalms repeatedly affirm the *fact* that the righteous shall rise again at the time of "the visitation of God," but they say little or nothing beyond that.[3] The *Second Book of Maccabees*,[4] again, dwells with special frequency and distinctness on the hope of the resurrection. "The King of

[1] xci. 10, xcii. 3.

[2] Whether it is a resurrection of Israelites only, or of all mankind, turns largely on the view which is taken of the seventy shepherds in the vision of judgment. In the first part of *Enoch* we find the idea that the righteous are to rise, and also the idea that certain sinners shall not be raised; see xxii. 12, 13, etc. Schodde (*The Book of Enoch*, p. 139) thinks that a universal resurrection is meant in li. 5, and is not excluded in lxi. 5. This is also the opinion of Schultz, *Alttest. Theol.* p. 765.

[3] iii. 16, xiii. 9, etc.

[4] Dating before the destruction of Jerusalem.

the world," says the second of the seven martyred brothers, "shall raise me up, who have died for His laws, unto everlasting life." The fourth brother expresses his belief thus: "It is good, being put to death by men, to look for hope from God to be raised up again by Him; as for thee, thou shalt have no resurrection to life." And the mother speaks of the Creator of the world as certain to give to her sons "breath and life again of His own mercy."[1] In another section it is said of "that noble Judas," that he was "mindful of the resurrection," and that "if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead."[2] By our Lord's time this doctrine had become one of the chief tenets of the Pharisees, and the accepted belief of the majority of the Jewish people. It is continued in the Sibylline books,[3] the Apocalypse of Baruch,[4] the Fourth Book of Esdras,[5] and the later Jewish literature.

It was not, however, the universal belief. In some of the apocryphal books the negative view prevails, and the old popular conception of Sheol still asserts itself. This is the voice, for example, of *Ecclesiasticus*:[6] "Who shall praise the Most High in the grave, instead of them which live and give thanks? Thanksgiving perisheth from the dead, as from one that is not: the living and sound in heart shall praise the Lord"; "Why art thou against the pleasure of the Most High? there is no inquisition in the grave,

[1] vii. 9, 14, 23.
[2] xii. 43, 44.
[3] i. 440, ii. 274, 275, iv. 228, 229, etc.
[4] xxx. 1–5, l. 1, li. 6.
[5] vii. 32.
[6] Dating, perhaps, about B.C. 190–170.

whether those have lived ten, or an hundred, or a thousand years."[1] The *Book of Baruch*[2] belongs to the same order of thought: "The dead that are in the graves, whose souls are taken from their bodies, will give unto the Lord neither praise nor righteousness."[3]

The *Book of Wisdom*, again, witnesses to the existence of another type of belief, in which the resurrection of the body gives way to the immortality of the soul. It is said, indeed, that there is no reason to infer that the doctrine of the book is limited to the survival of the soul;[4] and it may be allowed that there is nothing in it positively excluding belief in a bodily resurrection. But the latter doctrine is nowhere expressed, and the atmosphere of the book is certainly unfavourable to it. On the other hand, the former is taught in terms remarkable at once for their beauty and for the strength of conviction which they breathe: "God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of His own eternity (or, peculiar nature)"; "But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them: in the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their departure is taken for misery, and their going from us to be utter destruction: but they are in peace; for though they be punished in the sight of men, yet is their hope full of immortality"; "He being made perfect in a short time, fulfilled a long time; for his

[1] xvii. 27, 28, xli. 4.

[2] Of uncertain date; but later than Daniel, and referred by some to Vespasian's time, more generally to the later Maccabean period.

[3] ii. 17.

[4] So Churton, *The Uncanonical and Apocryphal Scriptures*, p. 226.

soul pleased the Lord; therefore hasted He to take him away from among the wicked"; "But the righteous live for evermore; their reward is with the Lord, and the care of them is with the Most High"; "To know Thee is perfect righteousness; yea, to know Thy power is the root of immortality."[1] The doctrine of immortality thus nobly expressed appears to be that of a spiritual immortality. It is also connected, as it seems with the theory of the pre-existence of the soul.[2]

The doctrine of an incorporeal immortality is also found in the *Fourth Book of Maccabees*,[3] which repeats the praises of the seven martyred brethren and their mother. It speaks of the brothers as "running in the way of immortality"; of the mother as "again giving birth to the entire number of her sons for immortality"; and of them and her as "assembled together to the company of their fathers, having received again pure and immortal souls."[4] The same idea of a simple immortality of soul seems to be all that is in view, or at least all that is actually expressed, in the *Book of Jubilees*.[5]

This was the condition of belief when Christ came. The doctrine of a bodily resurrection was denied by the aristocratic party of the Sadducees. It was displaced by the doctrine of a bare immortality of soul among the Essenes, according to Josephus,[6] and among the Jews who were influenced by Alexandrian ideas. The

[1] ii. 23, iii. 1–4, iv. 13, 14, xv. 3. [2] viii. 20; see above, p. 180.

[3] Dating, perhaps, about the time of Josephus.

[4] xiv. 3, xvi. 12, xviii. 23.

[5] Belonging, perhaps, to the middle of the first Christian century. See Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, pp. 373, 374.

[6] *Antiq.* xviii. 1. 4; *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 11.

old belief in Sheol also continued to some extent to hold its ground. But the doctrine of a resurrection had entered into the thought of the mass of the people. To what extent and at what date the conception of a resurrection of Israelites had widened its limits, it is not easy to say. Opinion seems to have varied on certain questions, including those of the *subjects*, the *purpose*, and the *period* of the resurrection. The older and more general belief looked to a resurrection only of the just;[1] the later belief embraced the rising of the just and unjust.[2] The object of the resurrection, according to one view, was participation in the glories of the Messianic kingdom; according to another, it was judgment. The time of the resurrection was thought by some to be immediately before the Messianic era; by others to be at its close.[3] How did Christ deal with the subject in relation to this condition of belief?

He gave the doctrine a distinct place in His teaching, and one in harmony with the great principles of the Old Testament revelation. In the synoptical Gospels He says less of it than we should, perhaps, have expected. There is no direct mention of it in the eschatological discourse in Matt. xxiv.–xxv., although it is presupposed in the announcement of the Judgment. But it is affirmed in His reply to the entangling question of the Sadducees; and the report of the words spoken on that occasion belongs to the stream of narrative which is common to the three Gospels.[4] Others

[1] So in the Psalms of Solomon iii. 16, xiv. 2, etc.

[2] As in the Apocalypse of Baruch xxx. 1–5, etc.

[3] The Book of Enoch li. represents the former view; the Apocalypse of Baruch and the Fourth Book of Esdras the latter.

[4] Matt. xxii. 23–33; Mark xii. 18–27; Luke xx. 27–40.

of His sayings, read in the light of current Jewish opinion, will be found to imply it; as when He describes the many who shall come from the east and west and "sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven."[1]

The doctrine of a resurrection, therefore, forms a real part of Christ's teaching in the synoptical Gospels, and it is the doctrine of a *bodily* resurrection. He never speaks in terms of an Essene or Hellenic immortality of soul. He describes the life of the risen, it is true, as being like that of the angels. But by that He means nothing more than that they shall be lifted above the conditions which are created by change and death in the earthly existence. His words make it clear that, in harmony with the Old Testament conception of man and of life, He does not think of a purely incorporeal existence as real life in man's case. When He reasons with the Sadducees that God "is not the God of the dead, but of the living," He points in the way of the Old Testament faith to the relation between God and man as guaranteeing the continued life of the latter, and that in his entire self, not in a half of his personal being.

There is nothing in the synoptical Gospels to limit Christ's words to a purely spiritual resurrection. Nor is the case essentially different with the Fourth Gospel. The spiritual aspects and immediate relations of the doctrine, it is true, are the main subjects in John's report; and our Lord's words to Martha have a meaning which goes beyond the resurrection of the last day which she has in view.[2] Hence it is thought that

[1] Matt. viii. 11; Luke xiii. 28, 29.

[2] John xi. 21–26.

when He says, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself," [1] His words may be only a hyperbolical description of a spiritual renovation, an Eastern way of expressing the rise of a new life under the power of His truth. But these words cannot be taken apart from the still more definite statement which is immediately connected with them, "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." [2] Impartial interpreters, even those who contend that the whole

[1] John v. 25, 26.

[2] It can scarcely be said that, in speaking of the "greater works" in John v. 20, Christ has the literal resurrection and the judgment of the last day in view throughout the paragraph, v. 21–29, although Ewald agrees with the Fathers in thinking this to be the case. This is inconsistent with the *present* tenses in vers. 24, 25. On the other hand, the language in vers. 28, 29 does not fit the purely ethical interpretation which Schweitzer, Reuss, and a few more endeavour to continue there. There is a remarkable agreement of opinion, therefore, among modern commentators in recognising both the ethical sense and the literal in the passage. Meyer's view is that Christ speaks first of the operation of His power in the *ethical* sense, but that at vers. 28, 29, He "subjoins the *actual* and *universal* awakening of the dead as the completion of His entire life-giving and judicial work as the Messiah." Westcott finds in ver. 24 a restatement of the "general ideas of all life and all judgment in connection with the Son"; in vers. 25, 26, an application of these to the present order; in vers. 28, 29, an application of them to the future order, "the partial spiritual quickening and judgment" being "consummated in a universal quickening and judgment." See his *Comment.*, *in loc.* Holtzmann (*Handcommentar zum N.T.* iv. p. 81) thinks that the terms "in the graves" and "shall come forth," etc., show that the idea of an actual eschatological resurrection is intended. Substantially the same view is taken by Lechler, Weiss, Hilgenfeld, Godet, etc.

Church has been in error in connecting the New Testament term for "resurrection" with the future of the body, and hold that nothing more is expressed than the rising of the soul or shade from the under-world of the dead, admit that the writers of the Gospels had a bodily resurrection in view, and that the idea of a purely spiritual renovation or restoration will not satisfy all the conditions of the exegesis, even in the Johannine passages.[1]

Is the doctrine limited, however, in Christ's teaching to a resurrection only of the righteous? It is said that the mention of the "elect" in the eschatological discourse in Matthew, the comparison with the "angels of heaven" in the answer to the Sadducees, and the express mention of the "resurrection of the just,"[2] are the key to His meaning, and that in all that He says, whether directly or indirectly, on the subject of a resurrection, He limits Himself to the future of the righteous. This is certainly the case, it is affirmed, with the synoptical report of our Lord's teaching. Even the passages which speak of the possibility of the whole body being cast into Gehenna, and of soul and body being destroyed in Gehenna,[3] it is thought, do not warrant the inference that the unjust shall be raised in order to suffer the penalty of their impiety. It is admitted that there are words which seem to make for the larger view. But these are supposed to be accounted for by "the fact that the final judgment which is to be held at the return of the Messiah, will fall upon the present generation even during its life-

[1] So, *e.g.*, Dr. Samuel Davidson, *The Doctrine of Last Things*, p. 39.
[2] Luke xiv. 14. [3] Matt. v. 29, 30, x. 28.

time."[1] But this is surely a far-fetched explanation. The synoptical record of Christ's doctrine of a future judgment implies a general resurrection, and the very phrase, the "resurrection of the just," suggests its own antithesis. In the Fourth Gospel, moreover, He expressly contrasts a "resurrection unto life" with a "resurrection unto condemnation," and speaks of a reawakening of the dead in connection with the final judgment, in terms which imply the universality of both. And this resurrection of good and evil He refers to the last day. Neither in the Synoptists nor in John does He speak of the resurrection of the just as an event distinct from that of the unjust, and separated from it by any space of time.[2]

This is the measure of Christ's own teaching on the subject of the resurrection. In His words we have the seminal doctrine which was to grow to larger dimensions in the teaching of the apostles. Aspects of the doctrine, which are shown in their completeness in the apostolic writings, are seen only by glimpses in the Gospel records of Christ's own words. Things which are afterwards given in explicit statement and developed form in the teaching of the

[1] So Weiss, *Biblical Theology*, i. p. 157 (Clark's trans.).

[2] Meyer thinks that Christ's own teaching on the subject is in harmony with the Jewish idea of a twofold resurrection, and that when He speaks of those who have done good coming forth "unto the resurrection of life," He refers to the *first* resurrection. He admits, however, that in the passage in the Fourth Gospel the universality of the resurrection is expressed. "No doubt," he adds, "the sinners of the past ages are also to receive their final sentence in the Messianic judgment (Matt. xi. 22, 24; Luke x. 12, 14); but since their souls are in Scheol, and it is the fate of souls which is in question at this final decision, a resurrection of these does not by any means follow."

apostles, are not indeed excluded by our Lord's own teaching, but are left unexpressed in it.

The nature of the resurrection body, for example, seems to have been a subject of curious interest, often debated. We can infer this, not only from the New Testament itself, but from the non-canonical literature. The *Apocalypse of Baruch*,[1] for instance, discusses the question of the condition of the risen,—whether they shall receive again the bodily form they had on earth, or undergo some physical change; and there is no reason to suppose that these questions were new to the time when that book was written. But Christ gives no doctrine on the nature of the resurrection body and kindred topics, beyond what is implied in the comparison between the condition of the risen and that of the angels. The same is the case with the question of the transformation of those who shall be alive at His Coming. Nothing is said of that; no hint of it even is given, unless it be in the statement regarding the gathering together of the elect "from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other."[2] The question of the renovation of the world, which had so large a place in Jewish belief, is similarly dealt with. It is referred to in what is said of the "world to come," as distinguished from "this world." It is also recognised in the mention of "the *regeneration*, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of His glory."[3] But there is nothing more definite or circumstantial on this aspect of the Messianic hope.

[1] Chaps. xlix.–li.

[2] Matt. xxiv. 31.

[3] Matt. xix. 28. The παλιγγενεσία is the making old things new, the restoration of the world to its perfection, the *restitutio ad integrum*, as Meyer puts it, which was to be one of the effects of the coming of Messiah.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERMEDIATE STATE

THE *fourth* point in Christ's teaching on the Future is His silence on the subject of the *Intermediate state.* The Old Testament, as we have seen, is pervaded by the belief in an under-world, a belief having many points of contact with the ideas which prevailed among the Ethnic peoples, especially the Babylonians and the Greeks. But the Sheol of the Old Testament is not an *intermediate* state. Those who go down to its dreary depths have no hope of release from its darkness, its reduced existence, its severance from living man and from God. It is the final abode as well as the common meeting-place of all men.

But this belief passed through a change. The faith of saints at times negatived the existence of Sheol, or overleaped it; and at last Old Testament prophecy taught the hope of a resurrection to real life. The non-canonical literature also shows us how the idea of Sheol became modified. It gives us at the same time some insight into the unfixed condition of opinion on the subject.

The apocryphal books do not speak with one voice of the condition of the dead. In the majority, the old popular idea of Sheol survives in one form or other.

It is seen perhaps with least alteration in Ecclesiasticus.[1] Much the same is the case with Baruch[2] and Tobit;[3] while the First Book of Maccabees adopts the Old Testament phrases, "gathered to his fathers," "added to his people."[4] But in others of these books a different view presents itself. The Wisdom of Solomon, for example, in which the lot of the righteous is described not as a resurrection to life, but as *immortality* or *incorruptibility*, seems to regard Sheol as a place of punishment for oppressors of the people of God.[5] The Second Book of Maccabees, too, in which the resurrection to life is the reward of the pious, and the loss of the resurrection the penalty of the impious, appears to have a similar idea of Sheol as a place of relative moral recompense.[6]

In the apocalyptic literature the process of change is more distinctly seen, while it is also evident that opinion continued to vary. At times, though at a comparatively late period, we come upon the idea of an immediate entrance into glory after death, at least in the case of exceptional saints.[7] But the common conception of Sheol in these books is that of an intermediate state, with a relative reward for the good and penalty for the evil. In the Book of Enoch, for example, Sheol is a temporary abode in which both the righteous and the unrighteous have a foretaste of their final condition. The fallen angels are represented as

[1] See xvii. 28–30, xli. 1–4.

[2] ii. 17.

[3] iii. 6, 10, xiii. 2.

[4] ii. 69, xiv. 30.

[5] Compare such passages as iii. 1–10, v. 1–14, vi. 18–20, xvii. 13, etc., with others like iii. 7, 18, which speak of the "day of visitation," the "day of trial."

[6] vii. 9, 11, 14, 29, xii. 43–45, xiv. 46, 30.

[7] So apparently in 4 Esdr. xiv. 9.

bound under the hills for seventy generations, until the day of judgment.[1] The souls of dead men are described as in "a long sleep,"[2] and as occupying abodes in the west until the final decision. These intermediate abodes are of four distinct kinds, destined for four different classes of men; one for the righteous who die of oppression, and a second for the rest of the pious dead; one for sinners who have not been judged by injustice or persecution in their lifetime, and another for those who upon earth have paid in part the penalty of their offences.[3] In similar terms the Book of Jubilees, a book of uncertain date, but belonging, as we have said, probably to the middle of the first Christian century, speaks of the fallen angels as bound in the depths of the earth until the day of the great judgment; and of a realm of the dead in "the darkness of the deep," which is a place of punishment for the wicked.[4]

In the Fourth Book of Esdras and the Apocalypse of Baruch it is said of the souls of the wicked that between death and judgment they know and understand the punishment which is reserved for them at the last day. "Why do we mourn," it is asked, "over those who die? Or why do we weep over those who depart into Hades? Let our lamentations be reserved for the beginning of that future torment, and our tears be laid up for the coming of that time of destruction."[5] In these books,

[1] x. 12, 3. [2] c. 5.

[3] See especially chap. xxii., also c. 5, ciii. 7, etc. In the section of the Parables wicked men and angels are both condemned. But it is to destruction by fire, and there is no Gehenna. See Schodde, *The Book of Enoch*, p. 55.

[4] v. 243, vii. 248, xxii. 21, xxiv. 27, xxxvi.

[5] 4 Esdr. [vi. 59], vii. 75*, 80* (Churton); Apoc. of Baruch lii. 1–3.

too, we have the idea of storehouses or *promptuaria* of souls, in which the departed are kept till Messiah's coming. In the former book the inquiry is addressed to "the sovereign Lord," whether the dead are "guarded in peace" until the renewal of creation, or are tormented from that time forward? The reply is that for seven days after their death the souls of those who have "kept the way of the Most High" shall be at liberty; that they shall then be gathered into these storehouses; and that they shall see the glory of the Most High, and rest in seven ways until the judgment at the end of the world. But those who are of the number of the scorners, and who have not kept the way of the Most High, shall not enter these storehouses, but shall be in punishment, and suffer affliction in seven ways.[1] In the latter book it is said that the souls of the pious are guarded until Messiah's return in glory; that the storehouses in which they have been kept shall then be opened; that they shall come forth together, and "the earlier shall rejoice, and the later shall not be sorrowful"; while the souls of the impious, when they see these things, shall "pine away the more."[2]

In the Rabbinical literature we have a similar variety and development of view, but in a more pronounced form. Sometimes the dead are represented as all going down to Sheol, and as all destined to rise hereafter; sometimes the pious are described as ascending at once, while the souls of the wicked wander about their graves, and find no rest for twelve months, and

[1] See chaps. iv. 35, 41, vi. 49–76, vii. 32, 75*–101* (Churton).

[2] Chap. xxx. See also Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, pp. 375–380.

then go to the place of the uncircumcised. The belief in an immediate entrance of the perfect few into heaven continues. But the dead in general are regarded as unripe for heaven, and in this connection there comes in the conception of an intermediate purgatorial state, between death and eternal life. But that is for Israel only. The theology of the Talmud and Midrash does not appear to teach a universal resurrection. It concerns itself with the case of Israel, and the resurrection at the beginning of Messiah's reign. So it speaks of the resurrection as a privilege of God's people. The godless are regarded as dead in the under-world. The judgment of the heathen, and that of Israelites who have made themselves heathen, are represented as taking place in their descent to Gehenna, and their endurance of penalty within Gehenna. In this theology there seems to be no clear distinction between Gehenna and Sheol; and the abode which is called by these two names is a place of punishment for the heathen and of purification for sons of Israel. At a later period Sheol came to be regarded as consisting of two distinct sections, a place of preliminary reward and a place of preliminary woe.[1]

It appears, then, that the idea of Sheol had become different from what it had been. New ways of thinking of it had sprung up in course of time. No single conception of it, indeed, obtained universal acceptance; but it had come to be regarded as a definite *stadium* between death and judgment, with preliminary penalties, and, in some forms of thought, with moral

[1] On this see especially Weber, *System der altsyn. paläst. Theologie*, pp. 323–330.

processes. The idea of an intermediate state took a larger and larger place in Judaism, and in this matter Christian theology to a great extent served itself heir to Jewish theology.

But all this is in the strongest possible contrast to Christ's own teaching. His words fix our thoughts on the present life and the final issues. They know nothing of the speculations of later Judaism on the condition between death and the resurrection. They know nothing of the immense structure of doctrine which certain schools of Christian theology have erected on this infirm foundation. They give little or no place to the thought of an intermediate state.

The question whether it is recognised at all in His teaching turns mainly upon the use of the two terms *Hades* and *Paradise*. The former, which in classical Greek means, first, the king of the invisible world, and then the nether realm over which he rules, is adopted in the New Testament, but is not of frequent occurrence there. In our Lord's own recorded sayings it is found only thrice, and in two of the cases it is obviously employed in a metaphorical sense. He declares of Capernaum, that, as it is "exalted unto heaven," so it "shall be brought down to Hades";[1] which is simply a figurative expression for an overthrow or humiliation, corresponding in the measure of its completeness to the measure of the previous greatness and pride. Again, He says of His Church, that "the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it";[2] in which a familiar figure taken from Oriental city custom is used to express the idea of security. Feeble in its beginnings, the Church

[1] Matt. xi. 23. [2] Matt. xvi. 18.

shall yet be strong enough to defy the most invincible power, and shall remain proof against death and destruction.

The third instance, that in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, is the only one which is applicable to the intermediate state. The imagery of the parable in some respects resembles the description which the Book of Enoch gives of the place of souls between death and judgment, with its terrors and its impassable divisions. It has been thought to teach the existence of two distinct compartments within Hades, in which the righteous and the unrighteous exist near each other, and yet absolutely apart, experiencing in some degree the happiness or misery earned by their career on earth, and waiting the final award. But this is to be too precise. It is uncertain to what date the conception of such a division of Hades can be assigned in the history of Jewish thought.[1] To suppose it to be our Lord's object here to give a doctrine of the intermediate state, is entirely to misunderstand the parable. As is the case with the parable of the Unjust Steward which precedes it, the purpose of this discourse is a certain moral lesson; and that moral

[1] Eisenmenger holds the Rabbinical belief to have been that Sheol was divided into two compartments, Gehinnom and Paradise, the latter being distinguished as the *lower* Paradise from the heavenly Paradise. This was certainly a view of Sheol which prevailed in the later Judaism, and it is the view of mediæval Judaism; but how much further back it reaches is not clear. According to Weber, the older doctrine knew only a *Gehinnom* for the wicked, and a *Gan-Eden* for the righteous. It is customary to credit the Jews of Christ's time with the later opinion, and most interpreters suppose it is reflected in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus. But Weber questions this, and points out the difference between the impassable gulf in the parable and the kind of separation which the later Judaism supposed between the two sections of Sheol. See his *System der altsyn. paläst. Theologie*, p. 327.

lesson is one touching the meaning of conduct in the present life, the broad and simple lesson of the penalty of a selfish life. This is the real interest of the parable, to which everything else is subordinate. Our Lord's words about Lazarus in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment in Hades, occurring as they do in a parabolic discourse, and not belonging to the central purpose of the parable, cannot be charged with a distinct doctrinal meaning. If they teach anything on the subject of the interval between death and the resurrection, it is only the broad lesson that the Divine righteousness pursues men after death, and that the estimates of men here and the conditions of men here may be reversed by the moral decisions of the hereafter.

The term *Paradise*, again, expresses an idea which appears in many Ethnic faiths—the idea of an earthly home of innocence and peace. The Arabs have had their dream of the garden of bliss in the East on the summit of the hill of jacinth. The Indians have their vision of the golden mountain of Meru, the abode of Indra, the seat of the tree and the river of immortality. The Chinese, the Iranians, and ruder races have had similiar conceptions of a terrestrial Eden. The word *Paradise* itself has a somewhat indeterminate sense in the few passages of the New Testament in which it occurs. It is probably of Median origin,[1] meaning

[1] A Babylono-Assyrian origin is proposed by some. See especially Delitzsch's *Wo lag das Paradies*, p. 95, etc. But Schrader thinks we have no evidence that the Assyrians formed parks like those laid out by the Persian kings in Palestine, and considers it impossible that the word was brought to the Holy Land "by an Israelite engaged in commercial pursuits at Nineveh." He adheres therefore to the theory of a Perso-Indogermanic origin, and holds that "hitherto neither a Semito-Assyrian

originally a "park," such as was the delight of Persian kings, and then a pleasure-ground or garden generally. In its Hebraised form it is found in the later books of the Old Testament with this sense of a park or garden;[1] and it was selected by the Septuagint translators as their term for the Hebrew garden of Eden.

Thus it came to mean the home of the blessed life for man, but with applications wavering between the lost Eden of the past and an Eden looked for in the future, between an earthly Eden and a heavenly. In the Book of Enoch mention is made of Paradise; but it seems to be the literal garden of Eden, to which Enoch himself was translated, and in which some few exceptional souls tarry till the great day. It is something distinct from the general abode of righteous souls in the period between death and resurrection.[2] The Fourth Book of Esdras names the Paradise which the right hand of God planted for Adam "before ever the earth came forward"; and probably it has the Paradise of the future in view, in its vision of the "twelve trees laden with divers fruits," and the fountains flowing with milk and honey, and the "seven mighty mountains whereupon there grew roses and lilies," whereby Jerusalem's children were to be filled with joy.[3]

In the Rabbinical literature the term has various

nor an Akkado-Sumirian etymology for the name has been made out." See his *Cuneiform Inscriptions of the Old Testament*, ii. p. 71, Eng. trans.

[1] Neh. ii. 8; Eccles. ii. 5; Song of Sol. iv. 13.

[2] Enoch lx. 8, lxi. 12, lxv.

[3] 4 Esdr. iii. 6, ii. 16–19. But chap. ii. belongs to the portions which are generally considered to be additions by a Christian hand.

senses, and much is made of it. Sometimes it is the general abode of the righteous dead; sometimes the happy side of Sheol; sometimes the home of the specially privileged few, the abode of those who have never seen death, the place where Messiah Himself waits for the time of His manifestation. Sometimes it is located in the distant East; sometimes it is identified with the third heavens; sometimes a distinction is drawn between a heavenly Paradise for the perfect and a terrestrial Paradise for the imperfect. In later Judaism a complete topography of it was attempted; "Abraham's bosom" was defined to be the place of highest honour in it; and strongly coloured descriptions were given of its gates of rubies, its sixty myriads of angels, the 800,000 kinds of trees which flourished in it, and the way in which every one who entered it was renewed during the three night-watches.[1]

The ideas, therefore, which the Jewish mind associated with the word *Paradise* seem to have been various and uncertain. The refinements of the Rabbinical schools, however, probably meant little for the people generally. The broad popular conception prevalent at our Lord's time may have been something like that which Josephus ascribes to the Essenes—that of a happy abode vaguely regarded as lying beyond the ocean, where was neither rain nor sun nor cold to trouble the life of righteous souls.[2] In any case, it is to the popular idea, rather than the Rabbinical speculation, that we have to look in inter-

[1] Weber, *System der altsyn. palüst. Theologie*, pp. 326, 330–333; Stanton, *The Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 382; Gfrörer, *Das Jahrhundert des Heils*, pp. 43–49; Hamburger, *Real-Encycl.* ii. 892–897.

[2] *Bell. Jud.* 8. 11.

preting the Biblical applications of the term. In the New Testament it is found only in figurative or apocalyptic passages, never in professedly didactic connections. Its exact sense, therefore, is difficult to determine. Paul's employment of it leaves it uncertain whether it is to be identified with or distinguished from "the third heavens."[1] As it occurs in the Epistles to the Seven Churches it is understood by some to refer to the heavenly Paradise, by others to reflect the idea, which is adopted by some of the Fathers, that the Eden of the Old Testament still exists somewhere beyond and above earth.[2] There is the greatest possible difference, however, between the sparing and restrained employment of the word in the New Testament, and the inordinate use which fancy makes of it in the Apocryphal Gospels, especially that of *Nicodemus*.

Christ Himself never employs it in His public teaching or in His intercourse with His own disciples during His ministry. The material associations connected with it perhaps made it unsuitable. He selects the great term "the kingdom of God," or phrases like the "marriage supper," where the word *Paradise* might have been in point. He uses it only in His promise to the penitent robber on the cross,[3] and the nature of the case perhaps explains this one departure from His usual practice. It was probably the word with which this rough criminal was most familiar, and which was most level to his understanding; and Christ adopts it

[1] 1 Cor. xiv. 4.
[2] Rev. ii. 7; Bleek, *e.g.*, takes the latter view.
[3] Luke xxiii. 43.

as the one best fitted to give him in his despair the hope which he needed and could understand—the hope of rest, the hope of a translation to a scene of life and peace like Eden.[1] Whether Christ thought of it as the heavenly Paradise or as the better side of Sheol, is beside the question here. It cannot be pressed beyond the large and general sense which His purpose then required, and which alone was appropriate to the occasion.

These two terms, therefore, *Hades* and *Paradise*, each of them occurring only in a single relevant instance, give us no ground for saying that Christ taught any doctrine of an Intermediate State. Neither is there any other saying of His that either expresses it or certainly involves it. It has been thought to be latent in one or two of His largest words—those which speak of Him as come to "seek and to save the lost," as going "to prepare a place" for His disciples, as declaring that there is no forgiveness for a certain sin, "neither in this world, neither in the world to come."[2] But the words are too large to justify the inference. His teaching rather overleaps that period in man's story which intervenes between death and the risen life. He speaks of those who have entered it as in *sleep*. But He uses the word for purposes of hope and comfort, not to indicate a space of unconsciousness. Far less does He give any intimation of a detention of souls in an intermediate state.

On the other hand, some of His words point rather

[1] See the articles on Paradise in Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible*, Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*, and Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*.

[2] Luke xix. 10; John xiv. 2; Matt. xii. 32.

to the hope of an immediate entrance of the righteous dead into His Father's glory. Of this order are the words, "In My Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so I would have told you. For I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go to prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also."[1] To the same class belongs His prayer, "Father, I will that they also whom Thou hast given Me be with Me where I am; that they may behold My glory, which Thou hast given Me."[2] Words like these, it is true, do not positively exclude the idea of an intermediate state. They do not declare the time, whether it be at death or at the judgment, when the righteous shall enter the place prepared for them and see His glory. But they say nothing of an intermediate state, nor do they suggest such a state. Rather do they indicate that

[1] John xiv. 2, 3. The point is that in the dwelling-place of God, which is spoken of in terms of the earthly temple with its many chambers, there is room for all the disciples. The *preparation* of the place is introduced as a confirmation of this. The best supported reading, "*For* I go to prepare a place for you," makes this plain. The fact that He goes for such a purpose is a proof that there certainly is a home for them in that future which is open to His eye. It presupposes the existence of the "many mansions"; the idea being, as Meyer puts it, that "having Himself attained the fellowship of the Divine glory, He purposes to prepare the way for their future glorification with God." The *coming* of which He speaks is clearly His return to glory. But this bears as little upon the question of an intermediate state as the mention of the "many mansions" bears on the doctrine of different degrees of glory in heaven. The one thing in view is the certainty that His disciples will have a place with Himself in the glory of the heavenly sanctuary. This He affirms for their comfort in the prospect of His departure. "Christ reminds His disciples," says Bishop Westcott, "that as He has told them tidings of sorrow, so He would not have withheld anything from them. But as it is, His departure in fact carries with it the promise of their reception."

[2] John xvii. 24. Even Godet supposes that the intermediate state may be at least partly in view here. But Meyer rightly concludes that it is the completed fellowship in glory that Christ intends in this prayer.

there is nothing between the pious departed and the immediate presence and glory of their Lord. They give us no reason to say that He who spake these words had anything in His own vision of the future but the final home of His disciples. However it may be with the condition of men and the ways of God between death and the last judgment, Christ Himself gives no doctrine of an Intermediate State.

CHAPTER VI

DOCTRINE OF FINAL DESTINIES

THE *fifth* point in Christ's teaching on the Future is His docrine of the *final destinies* of men. What do His words convey as to the things which follow the resurrection and the judgment? Do they indicate that men enter then upon a fixed and final condition, or on a terminable condition, capable of change? In the last issues does He point to the restoration of all, the annihilation of some, or the everlasting punishment of any?

The answer to these questions turns, first, though by no means exclusively, on the use of the word *Gehenna, Hell.* This word, which has become one of such solemn moment, is originally the *Ge Hinnom*, the valley of Hinnom, a deep, narrow gorge near Jerusalem, of old the place where idolatrous Israelites offered their children in sacrifice to Moloch; an object of horror to the Jews after Josiah's pollution of it, and used as a receptacle for refuse, the bodies of animals and criminals, bones, and all unclean things.[1] The fires which are

[1] *Ge Hinnom*, "the valley of Hinnom" (Neh. xi. 30); "the valley of the son of Hinnom" (Josh. xv. 8, xviii. 16; 2 Chron. xxviii. 3; Jer. vii. 32); "the valley of the children of Hinnom" (2 Kings xxiii. 10, according to the *Kethîb*). It is interpreted by some as the "valley of howling," or "the valley of lamentation," the Chaldee form being גֵּהִנֵּם, and the

said to have been kept burning in it perpetually, in order to consume the foul and putrid mass, made it a ready figure of dire evils or dreadful punishments. In this sense it may be in view, though it is not mentioned by name, when the Second Isaiah says of the returning Israelites that they "shall go forth" from Jerusalem "and look upon the carcases of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh."[1] This is the picture at least of an absolute overthrow, an irreversible punishment overtaking the rebellious. At a later period the word was used to designate the place of future retribution. The Talmudic theology, indeed, spoke of the mouth of hell as being in the valley of Hinnom. "There are two palm-trees," it was said, "in the valley of Hinnom, between which a smoke ariseth . . . and this is the door of Gehenna."[2]

What was the exact sense borne by the term *Gehenna* in this last transference? In the Jewish Apocalypses it appears to be applied to the place of punishment at the great Day of Wrath. So far as these books speak of a separation of the just from the unjust between death and the resurrection, they think of it as a preliminary separation. They speak, therefore, of the place of a final punishment in the case both of angels and of men. The Book of Enoch, as we have seen,

הִנֹּם being taken from נְהֵם, or rather from an obsolete הנן. But the common opinion is that the *Hinnom* is a personal name. See Böttcher, *De Inferis*, p. 80, etc.; Dillmann, *Das Buch Henoch*, p. 131, etc.; Hamburger, *Real-Encycl.*, article "Hölle."

[1] Isa. lxvi. 24, R.V.

[2] Barclay's *City of the Great King*, p. 90.

represents the fallen angels as "bound under the hills for seventy generations." But it also refers to the place of their final punishment as ready. Enoch sees it, and describes it as a "great abyss in the earth, with columns of heavenly fire . . . the place of the consummation of heaven and earth . . . a prison for the stars of heaven and for the host of heaven."[1] The same book gives an account of another journey of Enoch, in which he is shown the place of punishment in reserve for men. His course takes him to the middle of the earth, where he sees a blissful region of mountains and valleys. But between those holy hills, which make it evident that Jerusalem is in view, his eye is arrested by the vision of an accursed valley, where "shall be gathered together all those who speak with their mouths unseemly words against God, and speak impudently of His majesty."

The description points to Gehinnom, and it is said of it: "Here shall they gather them together, and here is their place of punishment. Now in the last time will the spectacle of a righteous judgment upon them be given before the righteous for ever and ever."[2] In another section of the same book we read of the blinded sheep being all judged and found guilty; and the place of punishment into which they are cast is described as a deep "in the midst of the earth, which was full of fire."[3] These passages in the Book of Enoch are probably the first in which Gehenna occurs in the sense in question. To the same effect, but in more explicit terms, the Fourth Book of Esdras speaks of the Most High as calling on the peoples who

[1] xviii. 11–16. [2] xxvii. 2, 3. [3] xc. 24–26.

are raised from the dead on the Day of Judgment to witness the joys and delights that are before them on the one side, and the fire and torments on the other. And this is prefaced by the statement that "the gulf of torments shall appear, and opposite to it the place of rest"; that the "furnace of Gehenna shall be revealed, and opposite to it again the paradise of pleasure."[1]

In the Rabbinical literature the usage is more variable. In the theology of the Talmud and Midrash, as already stated, Gehinnom and Sheol seem to be identified. Gehinnom has seven names in that theology, and the first of them is Sheol.[2] In the later theology, certainly in the mediæval Cabbalism, Gehenna is the penal side of Sheol. Further, in certain sections of Rabbinism, earlier and later, it became at once a place of punishment for the heathen and a place of detention for the imperfectly righteous, where they suffered purgatorial pains, and did expiation for longer or shorter periods. In this phase of Jewish belief Gehinnom, strictly speaking, was not meant for Israel. If Israelites, by reason of the imperfection of their legal obedience came into it, it was in order that they might come out of it again. It was not to be supposed that those who had the mark of the Covenant with God could be separated for ever from the great body of His people. Gehenna could be but a purgatory for them, and their circumcision would ensure deliverance from it.[3]

[1] [vi. 1–4]; vii.* 36, etc. (Churton).
[2] Weber, *System der altsyn paläst. Theologie*, p. 327.
[3] *Ibid. ut sup.* pp. 327–331.

Though in later usage, therefore, the word meant sometimes a temporary purgatory, and sometimes a place for the wicked at death, the older idea, the one represented in the class of literature which brings us closest to Christ's time, was that it was the scene of retribution after Judgment. How is it used then by our Lord Himself?

It is not found in John's Gospel. But in the synoptical Gospels it occurs eleven times, and in these different phrases: "in danger of the Gehenna of fire"; "to cast into Gehenna"; "to go, or be cast, into Gehenna"; "in Gehenna"; "the damnation of Gehenna"; "the child of Gehenna." The word is common to all the three Synoptists, and on one of the occasions of Christ's use of it we have the parallel narrative of Matthew and Mark.[1] Criticism will not easily negative its claim to belong to the original report of Christ's words; and the connections in which it occurs make it clear that the final condition is in view. To be "cast into Gehenna" is contrasted with to "enter into life"; and the latter phrase, as Dr. Stanton rightly observes, "according to all analogy, must describe, not the condition of the blessed dead in Hades, but participation in the bliss of the world to come after the Messiah's appearing."[2] Further, in the Discourse of Judgment in the First Gospel, though the word Gehenna is not used, the thing itself is suggested by the imagery of the "everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels."[3] There can

[1] Matt. v. 22, 29, 30, x. 28, xviii. 9, xxiii. 15, 33; Mark ix. 43, 45, 47; Luke xii. 5. Matt. xviii. 9 and Mark ix. 45 are parallels.

[2] *Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 331. [3] Matt. xxv. 41.

be no doubt that, attaching itself to the older usage, Gehenna means on Christ's lips the final retributive scene or condition, not any intermediate place, whether of penalty or of purification, between death and the resurrection.[1]

In pointing, however, to the retribution which follows the last judgment, does this word *Gehenna*, in itself or in its associations, express the *permanence* of the penal condition? A question of such awful moment demands the most careful consideration. In the discussion of the subject an important place must naturally be given to the testimony of Jewish thought and Jewish usage in our Lord's time. We have first to ask, therefore, What light comes from this source?

The question as to what was the prevalent Jewish belief on the subject of the nature, and more particularly the duration, of the final recompense of the wicked, has been greatly disputed. Its difficulties are not to be concealed. But it has been confused by inattention to the dates of certain developments of thought, by neglecting to distinguish the speculations of individuals or schools from the current popular belief, and by overlooking those established ideas of

[1] Some take Gehenna to refer simply to the penal side of Hades. So, *e.g.*, in Grimm's *Wilkii Clavis*. Preller is more correct in saying that "it is used in distinction from *Hades* when either the torments of hell itself or the idea of a hellish torment are to be expressed." He adds that "the passages of the New Testament show plainly that the word 'Gehenna' was a popular expression for 'hell,' of which term some of the apostles made use; but it would be erroneous to infer that Jesus and His apostles merely accommodated themselves to the popular expression, without believing in the actual state of the lost." See the article in Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* So Meyer concludes that the name of the hated locality on the south of Jerusalem was "transferred to the subterranean abode of the damned," and has always this sense in the New Testament. See on Matt. v. 22.

the under-world and the condition of things there, which underlie all forms of Jewish opinion on the final destinies of man. The broad facts, however, are sufficiently clear; and they are of great, if not decisive, significance.

One thing which at once appears is, that the class of literature which is the most relevant witness to the state of Jewish belief in Christ's time, shuts us up to a choice between annihilation and a penal immortality as the prevalent conception of the future of the impenitent. In certain cases the words may be of somewhat doubtful construction as between those two alternatives; but they have no place for the idea of a universal restoration of the perverse. In the Apocryphal books the passages which speak most clearly of the final lot of the wicked, affirm its permanence, not only unambiguously, but at times, indeed, in the harshest terms. "Woe to the nations that rise up against my kindred!" cries Judith in the thanksgiving which she sang in all Israel; "the Lord Almighty will take vengeance of them in the day of judgment, in putting fire and worms in their flesh; and they shall feel them, and weep for ever."[1] In the Fourth Book of Maccabees two of the martyred brethren thus contrast their lot with that of the tyrant whose tortures they bore: "For we indeed, through this suffering of evil and patience, shall obtain the reward of virtue, and shall be with God, in whose cause we are suffering: but thou, for thy foul and tyrannical murder of us, shalt undergo from the Divine vengeance eternal torture by fire."[2] In the same book the third brother, on his way to death, addresses his

[1] Judith xvi. 17.

[2] ix. 8, 9.

persecutor in similar terms: "Thou, for thy impiety and bloodshedding, shalt undergo interminable torments."[1] In the Second Book of Maccabees the statement is more general. The tyrant is declared to have no resurrection to *life*.[2] But elsewhere in this section of literature we come upon statements which, either in express terms or in their context, convey very definite ideas. Thus in the Fourth Book of Esdras, not only is the "furnace of hell" contrasted with the "paradise of delight," but it is said of those who have been despisers of the Most High, that at death "their spirits shall not enter into dwelling-places, but shall wander about, and be henceforth in torments, always in pain and anguish of seven kinds."[3]

Subject to the abatements which his alleged Hellenising disposition may demand, the testimony of Josephus may be said to be to the same effect. He affirms, both of the Pharisees and of the Essenes, that they believed in everlasting punishment. The former, he says, taught that the souls of bad men are "subject to eternal punishment," and that they who have lived viciously in this world are to be "detained in an everlasting prison." He speaks of the latter as believing that the souls of evil men go to a certain dark and cold cave, full of ceaseless punishments.[4]

Nor is it different with the *Pseudepigraphic* books. Occasionally these books may seem to speak with a doubtful voice. But it is more in seeming than in reality. In the Psalms of Solomon, for example, there are some

[1] x. 10. [2] vii. 14.

[3] vii. 36, 79, 80; these verses forming part of the section omitted in the old Latin version, and recovered by the late Professor Bensly.

[4] *Bell. Jud.* ii. 8. 11, 14; *Antiq.* xviii. 1–3.

things which are thought to convey the idea of annihilation. There are statements such as these: "The destruction (or, perdition) of the sinner is for ever"; "Whoso doeth wickedness is guilty of his own soul to destroy it"; "But sinners shall be taken away into destruction (perdition), and the memorial of them shall no more be found"; "Let the sinners be destroyed from before the face of the Lord together"; "The sinners shall perish in the day of God's judgments for ever."[1] Much is made of these passages. But they are to be taken along with others in which *Hades* is expressly mentioned; as when it is said of those "who remembered not God," that "therefore is their inheritance hell and darkness and destruction (perdition)"; or that "the inheritance of sinners is destruction (perdition) and darkness; and their iniquities shall pursue them as far as hell beneath."[2] The words in question are to be read in the light of the popular ideas of Sheol. So read, they mean that the godless have no real *life* in the after-world, but not necessarily that they have no existence. They may express the belief that sinners have no deliverance from Sheol; they do not necessarily imply belief in the absolute extinction of sinners. This is confirmed by the contrasts in which the lot of the wicked is placed with the "inheritance of life in gladness," and the remembrance of the good in the day of mercy with the fact that sinners shall then be forgotten.[3]

[1] iii. 13, ix. 9, xii. 8, xiii. 10, xv. 13. [2] xiv. 6, xv. 11.

[3] In their valuable edition of the Psalms of Solomon, Professor Ryle and Mr. James express the opinion that the terms leave us in doubt whether a doctrine of annihilation is intended. They would infer that "religious opinion on this subject was probably not yet fully formed."

The same is to be said of the Book of Enoch, and with less reason for any difference of opinion. At times it uses terms which might not express more than the ancient Hebrew conception of a temporal retribution; as when it says of "the chosen," that for them "there will be light and joy and peace," and they shall "inherit the earth," while "for the impious there will be a curse" — an "everlasting curse."[1] There are also occasional phrases which, taken by themselves, might not mean more than extinction; as when it speaks of *burning* and *destroying* as the condemnation of sinning angels and impious men,[2] or when it describes the wicked as "killed in hell."[3]

But such expressions are to be measured by others which are more positive and more explicit. The terms, for example, in which the condition of souls between death and the judgment is described, imply the continued existence of the dead. It is said of the wicked who are in Sheol, that those who have so far been judged on earth shall be left in Sheol, while others shall come forth and suffer a greater doom. The statement is made, with regard to those who are detained in their appointed places in the under-world, that the last day will be a "day of judgment and punishment and affliction upon the revilers to eternity."[4] Michael is instructed to announce to "Semjâzâ and to the others who are with him," that "in the days of judg-

But they add, as we think with good reason, that "perhaps we should be right in concluding that our Psalmist denied 'a resurrection to life' in the case of the wicked, though he did not call in question the continuity of their personal existence" (*Psalms of the Pharisees*, p. 51).

[1] v. 5, 6. [2] x. 13, xc. 24, 25, xcviii. 3. [3] xcix. 11.
[4] xxii. 4–11.

ment they shall be led to the abyss of fire," and that "in torture and in prison they shall be locked for all eternity."[1] It is said again of "the watchers of heaven who have left the high heaven," that they "will petition to eternity, but mercy and peace will not be unto them."[2] The "accursed valley" is declared to be for those "who will be cursed to eternity," and there "in the latter days there will be the spectacle of a just judgment upon them in the presence of the just, in eternity for ever."[3] These things and others of like kind belong to the groundwork of the book. The impression which they produce is that the writer viewed the destiny waiting the impenitent after judgment, not as extinction of being, but as lasting, conscious retribution.[4]

The language of the later apocalyptic books is sometimes indeterminate, so that it is possible to interpret it as pointing now to annihilation, and again to a punishment limited in duration. The Fourth Book of Esdras, for example, says of the day of judgment that "its duration shall be as it were a hebdomad of years,"[5] and describes the wicked as doomed to be *destroyed*.[6] The Apocalypse of Baruch in like manner says of the souls of the impious, that they know that their "punishment is come, and their destruction has arrived."[7] But here, again, the "destruction" is to be taken in connection with the Hebrew view of Sheol, and alongside

[1] x. 11–14. [2] xii. 3–6. [3] xxvii. 2, 3.

[4] "It is throughout implied," is Mr. Drummond's conclusion, "that the judgment introduces the final and unalterable condition of things, and no hope is held out to the wicked when once they have passed from their mortal life" (*The Jewish Messiah*, p. 337).

[5] vii. 30–(vi.) 16. [6] viii. 52–62. [7] Chap. xxx.

these expressions we have others which are more definite. *Gehenna* is the doom of the unrighteous, as *Paradise* is the reward of the just;[1] and the Apocalypse of Baruch teaches that in the judgment and after the mutual recognition the aspect of the wicked shall become worse, and they shall see the exaltation of the righteous and be grieved, and then shall depart to be tortured.[2]

The testimony of the *Rabbinical* literature occupies a somewhat different position. But this holds good rather of the later centuries than of our Lord's own time. An uncritical use is often made of this literature, and a stress is laid upon it which is warranted neither by the kind of thought it represents, nor by the date to which so much of it belongs.[3] Extreme statements are given about its tenor by men who have a name for Rabbinical learning, and who are followed too readily. The late Mr. Deutsch, for example, in his famous article on the Talmud, gives this version of the case: "There is no everlasting damnation, according to the Talmud. There is only a temporary punish-

[1] 4 Esdr. vi. 1–3, 59.

[2] See chap. xliv. 15, and the section xlix.–li. On the whole subject consult also Pusey's *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?*, Gfrörer's *Das Jahrundert des Heils*, etc. Schürer's conclusion is that the condemnation to Gehenna "is, as a rule, regarded as everlasting" (*The Jewish People, ut sup.* ii. p. 183, Eng. trans.). Dr. Stanton admits the force of Dr. Pusey's argument, but thinks he quotes many passages "as if they necessarily meant everlasting punishment, which are (to say the least) compatible with the idea of annihilation" (*The Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 356). We are not concerned to defend Dr. Pusey's interpretation in the case of every passage which he advances. But it seems to us that in this matter he is more in the right than Dr. Stanton, whose careful statement takes too little account of the common Jewish conceptions of the under-world and of *existence* as distinguished from *life*.

[3] This must be said of the use made of it by Archdeacon Farrar in his *Mercy and Judgment*.

ment for the worst sinner. 'Generations upon generations' shall last the damnation of idolaters, apostates, and traitors. But there is a space of only two fingers' 'breadth between hell and heaven.' The sinner has but to repent sincerely, and the gates of everlasting bliss will spring open. No human being is excluded from the world to come. Every man, of whatever creed or nation, provided he be of the righteous, shall be admitted into it."[1] But, like much else to which this ingenious scholar and brilliant writer gave his name, this means less than it seems to mean. It begs the question as to the sense of such phrases as "generations upon generations." It is not consistent with things to which we shall have to refer in the Rabbinical books. It is at once too sweeping and too vague. It is true that "the sinner has but to repent sincerely, and the gates to everlasting bliss will spring open." It is true that "every man, of whatever creed or nation, provided he be of the righteous," shall be admitted into the world to come. But these are not the points at issue.

The language used by the Rabbis is often open to more than one interpretation, and opinion undoubtedly varied considerably among them. But it is easy to understand how this might be the case with the theories of dogmatic schools and professional theologians. So far as the evidence at our disposal goes, and as it is interpreted by experts in Rabbinical literature, it shows that these divergent views belong mostly to times later than our Lord's ministry. The conception of Gehenna as a purgatory; the theory that all

[1] *Literary Remains*, p. 53.

shall at last be restored; the deliverances which seem to imply that annihilation is the final destiny of sinners like those of Sodom; the statements that after the great judgment the heathen shall be swept out of existence, and earth made the dwelling-place of the righteous alone, are all of this kind. Even most of these are subject to qualification. If there is a purgatory, it is limited to imperfect Israelites. To the Gentiles Gehinnom is a place of punishment. Even certain classes of Israelites, adulterers, those who injure their neighbours, and the like, are excluded from the hope of rising out of Gehenna. Even when different views were taken of the judgment of the heathen, everlasting punishment seems still to have been thought to be the destiny at least of some.[1]

It was perhaps in the second century of the Christian era that the most peculiar opinions circulated. There were at least some at that time who taught that it was the fate of the godless to be consumed by an external or internal fire, and that there was no hell. In the third century we find the doctrine of punishment, not simply of extinction, again prominent. But as regards the first century the evidence goes to show that the generally, if not universally, accepted belief was neither restoration nor annihilation, but eternal retribution. The words of the great Rabbis of the period bear this out. Rabbi Jochanan ben Saccai, for example, "the light of

[1] The passages collected by Weber appear to show that at least at a certain period in the history of Rabbinism both views of the lot of the heathen, extinction and everlasting punishment, were taught. Where the last judgment and the renewal of the world are specially dealt with, the heathen are described as destined to be destroyed that the earth may be left for the righteous. *System*, *ut sup.* pp. 371, 380.

Israel, the right-hand pillar, the mighty hammer," when he was on his deathbed, contrasted the wrath, the fetters, the death which are in the hands of an earthly sovereign with the eternal wrath, the eternal fetters, the eternal death which belong to God and His final judgment. What is known of the teaching of the two great schools of Shammai and Hillel, belonging to the time immediately preceding the Christian era, points to the same conclusion.

The latter school, it is true, magnified the mercy of God, and made much of a temporary punishment in Gehenna. Hillel taught that sinners of the heathen and apostate Israelites go down to Gehinnom, and are punished for the limited space of twelve months; after which body and soul are consumed, and the wind scatters their ashes beneath the feet of the righteous. But there were certain classes of sinners for whom a different fate was thought to be reserved. The Minim, the Epicureans, who deny the Divine origin of the Torah and the truth of the resurrection, those who sin like Jeroboam the son of Nebat, and all such, "go down to Gehinnom, and are punished there to ages of ages."

The former school taught that there is an intermediate class of men who "go down to Gehinnom, and moan, and come up again"; but that the fate of all others is sealed for ever at the judgment. The perfectly righteous are "immediately written and sealed to eternal life"; the perfectly wicked are "immediately written and sealed to Gehinnom." The great proof passage cited in support of this is Daniel's prophecy of the resurrection, when some shall come forth to

"everlasting life," and some to "shame and everlasting contempt." However they differed, therefore, in their ideas of the mercy of God and the number of the condemned, both schools affirmed eternal punishment as the doom of certain sinners.

This is borne out in particular by the passage referred to above from the *Rosh Hashanah*, which is held by all parties to be of great value, and is described as the "classical passage of the Talmud" on the subject.[1] It is as follows: "The sinners of Israel in their body, and the sinners of the nations of the world in their body, go down to Gehenna, and are punished there for twelve months; after twelve months their body is consumed, and their soul is burned, and the wind scattereth them under the feet of the righteous, as it is said, 'and ye shall trample on the wicked, for they shall be dust under the soles of your feet';[2] but heretics (*i.e.* Christians), and traitors,[3] and Epicurus,[4] who have denied the law, and who have denied the quickening of the dead, and who have departed from the ways of the congregation, and who have put the fear of them in the land of the living, and who have sinned and caused others to sin (as Jeroboam, son of Nebat, and his companions), go down to Gehenna, and are punished there to all generations, as it is said, 'and they shall go forth and look on the corpses of the men who have sinned against me.' Gehenna faileth, and *they* fail not, as it is said, 'and

[1] So by Dean Plumptre, *The Spirits in Prison*, p. 52.

[2] Mal. iv. 3.

[3] The *Minim*, explained by Rashi to be "the disciples of Jesus the Nazarene, who have turned the words of the living God to evil."

[4] Used, as it seems, as a name for Christians.

their beauty shall consume in the grave from their dwelling.'"[1]

There is nothing inconsistent with this in any of the Rabbinical sayings which are oftenest quoted in modification or denial. There are some which speak as if all men were certain to return from Gehenna. But the most positive of them expressly except certain classes from the promise of this restoration. The one that is cited perhaps with the greatest confidence gives a list of the excepted, naming the adulterer, the man who puts his fellow-man publicly to shame, and him who gives an evil name to his neighbour.[2] The teaching of Rabbi Akiba is also appealed to, sometimes as if it were enough of itself to decide the question. His system seems to have had the charm of novelty, and his influence to have been remarkable. Accounts which have come down to us speak of the number of his hearers as twelve thousand, or twice twelve thousand. Discounting such half-mythical exaggerations, we have probably still enough to bear out the statement that he had many disciples,[3] and that the theological ideas

[1] The passage is quoted according to the rendering given by Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?* p. 92. It is cited by Dean Plumptre (*ut sup.* p. 52) in the translation given in M'Caul's *Old Paths*, p. 410. See also Farrar's *Mercy and Judgment*, p. 201, and especially Weber, *System*, *ut sup.* p. 375, and Edersheim's *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, ii. pp. 440, 791. The last-named writer says of this passage, that "it proves, beyond the possibility of gainsaying, that both the great schools into which Rabbinic teaching at the time of Christ was divided, held the doctrine of eternal punishments. This, of course, entirely apart from the question, who—how many, or rather, how few—were to suffer this terrible fate?"

[2] On the passage in question (Baba Mez. 56*b*), see Weber, *System*, *ut sup.* p. 320, and Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, p. 791.

[3] One of these was Aquila, the Greek translator. The connection between Akiba and Aquila makes itself felt in the latter's version of the Old Testament.

which were taught first by himself and afterwards by his successor, the celebrated Rabbi Meir, gained extensive acceptance. But an altogether exaggerated importance is claimed for Akiba's doctrine; and his words are made to cover much more than they were intended to mean.

One of his characteristic sayings, we are told, was about five things which lasted for twelve months: "The judgment of the generation of the Deluge twelve months; the judgment of Job twelve months; the judgment of the Egyptians twelve months; the judgment of Gog and Magog in the time to come twelve months; the judgment of the wicked in Gehenna twelve months; as it is said, 'And from one new moon to another.'"[1] In another equally fantastic passage,[2] which some, however, greatly belaud,[3] he is represented as speaking of the wicked being "delivered out of Gehenna on account of the Amen which they answer out of the midst of Gehenna"; and of Michael and Gabriel as going and opening the forty thousand gates of Gehenna, and bringing them out of the midst of it, washing and anointing them, healing them of the wounds of hell, clothing them in good garments, holding them by the hand, and bringing them before the Face of the Holy and Blessed One in the presence of all the righteous.[4]

But, apart from the question whether all this is

[1] Isa. lxvi. 23.

[2] In the Othjoth, if, indeed, it is rightly ascribed to him.

[3] Especially by Archdeacon Farrar.

[4] See the passage as given by Pusey (*What is of Faith*, etc., *ut sup.* pp. 83–85), with all its fanciful details about the Holy One sitting and preaching in the Garden of Eden, and about each Gehenna being "300 long and 300 broad and 1000 farsa's thick, and 1000 farsa's deep," etc.

new doctrine, dating not earlier than seventy or eighty years after our Lord's Ascension, as Dr. Pusey contends, and, apart also from the artificial character of Akiba's system generally,[1] there is nothing to show that these sayings had regard to all mankind. It seems clear that in the former Akiba looks only to the case of Israel, and proceeds on the principle that circumcision assures salvation, early or late. In the case of the latter, two classes of men appear to be in view, but only two, "the wicked of Israel," and "the righteous of the nations of the world." Whether the latter include righteous Gentiles generally, or only proselytes to Judaism, may be doubtful. But nothing is said of the *un*righteous heathen.[2] It is understood that their

[1] He followed his teacher, R. Nachum, in interpreting the law on the principle that nothing is *form*, but everything *essence* in the sacred language, and, consequently, that the *particles* in the text were a chief source of doctrine. See Graetz, *Geschichte*, iv. p. 22, etc.

[2] Those words of Rabbi Akiba, and similar Rabbinical statements, are naturally appealed to by writers who favour the doctrine of annihilation, or that of terminable, purgatorial punishments. Archdeacon Farrar makes an extreme use of them in his *Mercy and Judgment*. He looks at them too much in the light of the views of mediæval and modern Jews. It may be useful to quote the opinions of Dr. Pusey and Dr. Edersheim, who were students of Rabbinical literature at first hand. Of the one passage Dr. Edersheim says: "If on the other side the saying of Rabbi Akiba should be quoted (Eduj. ii. 10), to the effect that the judgment of the wicked in Gehenna was one of the five things that lasted for twelve months, it must be remembered that, even if they be taken seriously (for it is really only a *jeu d'esprit*), it does not necessarily imply more than the teaching of Hillel concerning that intermediate class of sinners who were in Gehenna for a year, while there was another class the duration of whose punishment would be for ages of ages" (*The Life and Times of Jesus, ut sup.* p. 791). Of the passage given by Eisenmenger (ii. 361, 362) from Othjoth R. Akiba, Dr. Pusey concludes that "instead of contradicting," it "implies the belief in everlasting punishment for all the *un*righteous heathen, all those of whom St. Paul speaks in his terrible description in the first chapter of the Romans" (*What is of Faith, ut sup.* p. 86). Schürer and others also see that in the statement which is supposed to be most explicit it is only Israelites that are in view. Arch-

doom is fixed and endless. Akiba himself is stated to have added to the list of those who were excluded from the world to come. All that are of Israel have a portion in it, except him who denies the quickening of the dead, him who says there is no law from heaven, an Epicurus, and, as this Rabbi taught, him also "who readeth foreign books and who muttereth Exodus xv. 26 over a wound."

Little need be said of the testimony of the Targums. Even those of Onkelos and Jonathan B. Uzziel are assigned by most modern critics to a comparatively late date.[1] This holds good of the form finally given them by their presumed editors, and leaves it uncertain how far back much of their contents may go. They employ the term "Gehenna" as the name of the place of "everlasting burnings" after the great judgment. They contrast the casting of the wicked into Gehenna with the gathering of God's own people, and the descent to Gehenna with the vision of the glory of the Shechinah. They also make frequent use of the phrase, "the second death," setting it over against "life eternal," and interpreting it as the death of the soul in the world to come.

The late date of the Talmud makes it still more precarious to rely upon it as a witness to the beliefs

deacon Farrar's object is to prove that the Jews themselves never held that "an entrance into Gehenna was necessarily identical with an endless doom." He admits, however, that Jewish opinion varied, and was "at liberty, if it chose, to hold the doctrine of annihilation, or even of endless torments" (*Mercy and Judgment*, p. 214).

[1] Mr. Deutsch, *e.g.*, ascribes the former, as we have it, to the end of the third century, or the beginning of the fourth; the latter, to a date a little later than that of Onkelos, or about the middle of the fourth century A.D.

which were current in Christ's time.[1] But even as regards it, the doctrine of a limited punishment in Gehenna does not appear to be given as the general belief, or as a doctrine concerning all mankind. In it no less than in the earlier literature, two classes, and only these, are in view when restoration from Gehenna is in question, namely, sinners of Israel, provided they do not apostatise, and righteous Gentiles. In it, too, the old doctrine is taught, that for those who apostatise, and for others who are guilty as against the Jewish religion, there is no deliverance from Gehenna. The broad conclusion to which the evidence most pertinent to the question of the Jewish belief in Christ's time carries us is this: that while there may have been certain variations of opinion, especially in the direction of annihilation, and while exception was made of certain classes as classes assured of restoration from Gehenna and of entrance into "the world to come," or into "eternal life," the belief prevailed in an irreversible retribution in Gehenna for the wholly wicked, the unrighteous among the Gentiles, and those of Israel who became like them.[2]

[1] Luzzato has the credit of establishing the fact that the contents of the Talmud must have existed for a length of time in oral form, and were not brought together in one written collection till the sixth century A.D. Luzzato's date, about 550 A.D., is accepted by Graetz and others.

[2] Dr. Stanton, who inclines to find the idea of annihilation in passages which do not bear it out, when it is remembered that the hereditary Jewish conception of "destruction" was by no means the same as absolute extinction of existence, thinks the evidence too scanty to justify any positive conclusion. He admits, however, that at least by our Lord's time the belief in a general future punishment of the wicked of all generations was "acquiring definiteness." He is of opinion that the doctrine of everlasting punishment was "never held with that clearness and consistency among Jews which it has assumed among Christians." But, again, he admits that "no prospect was held out that the punishment for those who

With this in view, then, we have to ask what Christ's own words on this grave question mean. His teaching is not to be measured by the opinions of His time. In most cases it was the corrective of these opinions, if not their confutation. Even if Jewish ideas were different, it would not necessarily follow that His words did not intimate the perpetuity of the penalties of the after-life. But the condition of belief, and the import of the terms in use among the people to whom His message was addressed, are things that cannot be overlooked in the interpretation of His doctrine.

If, with this before us, we study His teaching where it touches the things of the end, it will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that it points to a future without hope for the sinner who passes in his sin into the other world. If we have regard to the sense attached to the term *Gehenna* by the ordinary Jew of His time, and to the fact that no Jewish party spoke of deliverance from Gehenna for the utterly wicked, can we say that, in the solemn declarations of the Sermon on the Mount on murderous and adulterous dispositions, He places before men's view nothing more than a terminable, purgatorial pain? When He speaks of the malignant anger which brings the danger of the *hell of fire*,[1] or

were consigned to it at the judgment-day would be a temporary one," the only question being whether annihilation might be the end of all. *The Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 338. Dr. Edersheim's conclusion is that "since the schools of Shammai and Hillel represented the theological teaching in the time of Christ and His apostles, it follows that the doctrine of eternal punishment was that held in the days of our Lord, however it may have afterwards been modified"; and further, that the same doctrine "seems to have been held by the Synagogue throughout the whole first century of our era" (*The Life and Times of Jesus, ut sup.* p. 789).

[1] Matt. v. 22. The application of the commandment forbidding murder had been limited to the *act*. Christ carries it back to the disposi-

of the offence which may cast the whole body into *Gehenna*, does not the awe of His words lie in the fact that they point to an issue which is penalty, and penalty from which there is no release?[1] Can He mean less when He takes upon His lips the stern word of the Baptist,[2] and demands of the Pharisees—whom He describes as "serpents," "a brood of vipers"—how they can escape the judgment which condemns to Gehenna?[3] Is it otherwise when He warns His disciples to fear Him who is able to commit both body and soul to the destruction of Gehenna, or when He condemns the proselytising zeal of the Pharisees, as making its subject twofold fitter for Gehenna, and more certain to come to it?[4] Or if it is felt to be possible to retreat from the awful suggestions of these sayings, does the possibility remain when He identifies the hell of fire with "the eternal fire," and contrasts being cast into this "eternal fire" with entering "into life,"[5] and speaks of going into Gehenna as going into "the unquenchable fire,"[6] and describes it as the place "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched"?[7]

tion, and teaches the guiltiness of the feeling, especially as expressed in harmful speech. He appears to speak of three degrees of guilt, with three corresponding degrees of penalty, when He mentions first the *judgment*, then the *council*, and at last the *hell of fire*—in other words, the local Court, the Sanhedrin, and Gehenna. Whether we understand all three terms to express temporal punishments, here used as figures of different degrees of future punishment, or take the first two to denote Divine judgments in temporal form, and the third to refer to the Divine judgment of the future, the *Gehenna of fire* here is a final penalty—one, as Holtzmann puts it, "daraus es kein Entrinnen giebt." See his *Handcommentar*, *in loc.*

[1] Matt. v. 29, 30.
[2] Matt. iii. 7.
[3] Matt. xxiii. 33.
[4] Matt. x. 28 ; cf. Luke xii. 5.
[5] Matt. xviii. 8, 9, R.V.
[6] Mark ix. 43.
[7] Mark ix. 48. According to the *Textus Receptus*, Christ repeats this

It is argued, no doubt, that the phrase "eternal fire" is not conclusive, because the Greek term rendered *eternal* does not mean *endless*. Of the use of *αἰώνιος*, and the attempts to strip it of the notion of duration, or to restrict it to the expression of limited duration, we have afterwards to speak. It is enough at present to say that the phrase, however understood, conjures up a sufficiently appalling picture of the retributive future, and that in using it Christ Himself gives no hint of a termination of the penalty meant by it. It is urged, too, that His reference to the *undying worm* and the *quenchless fire*, taken as it is from Isaiah's picture of the carcases of the vanquished enemies of Jehovah left to dishonour and waste in the valley of Hinnom, does not go beyond the idea of a temporal punishment, and comes far short, awful as it sounds, of suggesting an endless retribution beyond the grave.

But though the terms carry us back to the terrible conclusion of the prophecies of the Second Isaiah, it does not follow that they are limited to the use which is made of them there. The subject in connection with which they are used by Christ is so different that their application is necessarily and essentially different. They become figures of a retribution of another order than any that takes effect on earth.[1] The enigmatical words, "For

inexpressible woe three times over. But the R.V., following the best textual critics, rightly eliminates vers. 44 and 46. The sentence therefore is introduced as the climax of the entire statement of the peril and retribution attaching to the offences in question.

[1] Mark ix. 48. "A figurative designation," says Meyer, "of the extremely painful and endless punishments of hell (not merely the terrors of conscience), in accordance with Isa. lxvi. 24." He refers also to Ecclus. vii. 17 and Judith xvi. 17. So Holtzmann takes the

every one shall be salted with fire," which follow in Mark's narrative, confirm this. They indicate the ground on which the certainty of this retribution rests. It is the relation of God to Israel. That covenant-relation must assert itself in the case of the offending, no less than in that of the righteous. In it lies the assurance of reward for the obedient; in it, too, the assurance of judgment for the disobedient.[1]

There are some words of Christ which it is strange to see appealed to as witnesses to the doctrine of a terminable penalty. They are words which are wholly irrelevant to the question, or which make for the contrary conclusion. One of these is the declaration that the "servant, which knew his lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his

terms as "Bilder der Höllenstrafe." The words, however, are not to be pressed beyond this broad and general sense. There is no reason to say that Christ meant by the "worm" the pangs of conscience, and by the "fire" the punitive righteousness of God, or anything so specific.

[1] In the face of the documentary evidence the second clause, "and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt," cannot be retained. The words, "for every one shall be salted with fire," stand alone, therefore, in all their sententious brevity, and they are introduced in support of the preceding statement. Baur, Hilgenfeld, Weizsäcker, and others give different reasons for discrediting the entire verse. But, though there is nothing like it elsewhere in the Gospels, "its enigmatical peculiarity," as Meyer allows, "tells in favour of its originality." It is needless to mention the various explanations which have been proposed. Most of them are unsatisfactory, making the sentence a mere figure of the purifying process of self-surrender, or otherwise reducing its significance. The idea probably is that to every one who passes into Gehenna its fire will be what the salt was to the Jewish sacrifice. The salt was the sign of the binding obligation of the covenant, and the covenant-relation had its terrible side to the faithless as well as its gracious side to the faithful. "It was precisely because of the unalterable relation of the Jew to Jehovah that he might suffer, and even perish, if he rejected the kingdom of the Messiah; and, in the broader field, it is precisely because of the eternal and necessary relation of man to God that he must suffer without end if he finally rejects God from being his God" (W. N. Clarke, *Commentary on the Gospel of Mark, in loc.*).

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will, shall be beaten with many *stripes*; but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few *stripes*."[1] It is said of this that the phrase "many stripes" is a feeble description of an endless punishment, and the "few stripes" a form of speech entirely inconsistent with a judgment so awful. But the question in view in this passage is not the *duration* of the final judicial awards, but their righteous adjustment to different degrees of culpability.

Another is the saying about the prison, out of which no deliverance is possible until the last farthing is paid. It occurs first in the Sermon on the Mount, in this form: "Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art with him in the way; lest haply the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou have paid the last farthing."[2] It occurs a second time in a different connection and with a slightly different form in Luke's Gospel: "For as thou art going with thine adversary before the magistrate, on the way give diligence to be quit of him; lest he hale thee unto the judge, and the judge shall deliver thee to the officer, and the officer shall cast thee into prison. I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence till thou have paid the very last mite."[3]

This passage, which is used by Roman Catholic theologians in the interest of the dogma of purgatory, is thought by others to favour the Restorationist doctrine, or at least the idea of a terminable penalty. The reason which they give for so construing it, is that

[1] Luke xii. 47, 48. [2] Matt v. 25, 26, R.V. [3] Luke xii. 58, 59.

it contemplates reparation or the discharge of the debt as a possibility. But if these grave words are applicable at all to the question at issue, their point surely is the helplessness of the man when once in the prison, the finality of his condition there, the hopelessness of discharging his debt. On both occasions, and perhaps even more unmistakably on the second than on the first, our Lord's intention in giving this is to throw into relief the responsibility of the individual and the man's inability to deliver himself after a certain stage. It points to a position which he can never reach. It speaks of a justice which is inexorable, a law of retribution which he cannot avert, a peril which cannot be stayed.[1]

A third saying which is cited in this interest even more frequently and with a still more surprising confidence, is the one on the sin for which there is no forgiveness. The genuineness of this saying is guaranteed, not only by the place which it has in each of

[1] The way in which this saying, as given in Matthew's Gospel, is connected with the words on the danger of the Gehenna of fire, and the necessity of reconciliation, is the main reason for recognising in it a wider meaning than that suggested by the immediate occasion. In any case, the great idea conveyed by it is that of danger, the certainty and absoluteness of a final reckoning. Its terms point to a "tragic closing act," as Meyer rightly reads them, "the ἀποδιδόναι, that is, the removal of the guilt of sin, is for him who is in *this* φυλακή an impossibility." Dean Plumptre (*The Spirits in Prison*, p. 60) says of this passage that the words "could not fail to seem to those who heard them to be almost an echo of those which taught that some souls might descend into Gehenna, and remain there for a time in mourning for their evil deeds, and then rise up again." But in his *Commentary*, *in loc.*, he takes the "till *thou* hast paid" to exclude the thought of staying "the full action of the law of retribution," and observes that "the whole tone of the passage is that of one who seeks to deepen the sense of danger, not to make light of it; to make men feel that they *cannot* pay their debt, though God may forgive it freely."

the three Synoptists, but by its own peculiar tenor, and its appropriateness to the several connections in which it stands. In Matthew it is reported to have been spoken by Christ with reference to the attitude of the Pharisees to Himself and His works. There it is given with this solemn reiteration and fulness of statement, "Therefore I say unto you, Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever shall speak against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come."[1] In Mark it appears in briefer form, but with the remarkable definition of the sin as an "eternal sin." "Verily I say unto you, All their sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and their blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme: but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin."[2] In Luke, where it is introduced in connection with the duty of confessing Christ and with the warnings against hypocrisy, it takes a still shorter, though not less positive form: "And every one who shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit, it shall not be forgiven."[3] It is a word which seems to have been spoken on more than one occasion. Is it possible to mistake the impression which it must have produced, and was meant to produce?

[1] Matt. xii. 31, 32, R.V. [2] Mark iii. 28, 29, R.V.
[3] Luke xii. 10.

It is said that the idea in the phrase, "neither in this world nor in that which is to come," is only that of terminable periods, and that, while the words exclude the possibility of forgiveness in the *æons* or ages named, they do not carry us to final issues.[1] The circumstance, too, that "the world to come" is mentioned as it is in connection with the denial of the possibility of forgiveness for a single specified sin, is thought to authorise the inference that, in the case of other sins, remission missed before death may be hoped for after it. But the expression cannot be so handled. To the Jew before Christ the terms "this world" and "the world to come" meant the age before and the age after the Messiah's advent. On Christ's lips they meant the period before and the period after His Parousia.[2] They naturally took an extended sense in accordance with the change in circumstance.[3] But they expressed in each case the entire history of the kingdom of God.

The phrase in question is an absolutely exclusive phrase. It means that neither in the present nor in the future, neither in this dispensation nor in what follows it, neither before nor after Christ's Coming, is there forgiveness for this sin. It is difficult to see how the irremediableness of the condition could be more distinctly expressed. Even if it were possible to reduce the sense of Matthew's terms, even if they could be made to

[1] Some attempt to limit the expression "world to come" to the period between death and judgment—a sense foreign to the term, whether in Hebrew or in Greek.

[2] Cf., *e.g.*, Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49, xxviii. 20; Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30, xx. 35.

[3] So, *e.g.*, in the question of the disciples, Matt. xxiv. 3, and, in the apostolic writings, Eph. i. 21, etc.

yield inferences so foreign to the occasion, there would still remain Mark's description of the blasphemer as having *never* forgiveness, and as being bound by an *eternal sin*.[1] The words are uttered with reference to the demerit of the sin which at present obtrudes itself upon the notice of the Speaker. Their purpose is not to be extended beyond that, in one interest or another. They are not spoken with regard to the heathen, the ignorant, the irresponsible, or those of imperfect opportunity. We cannot draw conclusions from them touching things beyond their immediate scope. But with regard to the sin which occasions them, they give an unequivocal negative to the question of its pardonableness. They mean that there is no point at which forgiveness is possible.[2]

[1] Mark's οὐκ ἔχει ἄφεσιν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα is as distinct a negative as can well be uttered. The displacement of the Syrian reading κρίσεως by the ἁμαρτήματος of ℵ B L Δ and other very ancient authorities, is of interest as indicating the reason why there is never forgiveness for this sin, namely, that the sin itself persists eternally. The act becomes a state, and the state of final hardening is a state of final guilt and penalty. Holtzmann interprets the phrase ἔνοχός ἐστιν αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος as = "ist schuldig . . . eines niemals zu sühnenden, über den Tod hinauswirkenden Vergehens" (*Handcommentar, in loc.*). Of the sentence in Matthew, Meyer observes that "the thought of endless punishment must not be in any way softened down."

[2] Omitting the grosser misapplication of these sayings, we may take Dean Plumptre's interpretation as an example of the better order, which, nevertheless, goes beyond the historical and exegetical occasion. "Our Lord's words, it may be noted," he says, "clearly imply that some sins wait for their full forgiveness, the entire cancelling of the past, till the time of the 'age to come' which shall witness the great and final advent. Does this imply that repentance, and therefore pardon, may come in the state that follows death? We know not, and ask questions that we cannot answer, but the words at least check the harsh dogmatic answer in the negative. If one sin only is thus excluded from forgiveness in that 'coming age,' other sins cannot stand on the same level, and the darkness behind the veil is lit up with at least a gleam of hope" (*New Testament for English Readers*, on Matt. xii. 32). But is there anything to suggest that Christ Himself has anything in view here but the case im-

It cannot be said, therefore, that our Lord's own teaching favours the doctrine of a terminable penalty for the worst of sins, or a final recovery of all sinners. On the contrary, it is in His teaching that we find the most absolute and unambiguous statements of the retributions of the future life which the New Testament offers. It throws into the foreground the large and unmistakable principles of the penalty of sin in the after-world, man's individual accountability, the summing-up of the life of mankind in a final crisis of judgment, the determination of the eternal lot by the existence in time. If it were the fact (as it is not) that the Jews of Christ's time believed in the release of all from Gehenna, it would only add to the decision and awe of His words.

The finality of destiny could scarcely be more unequivocally expressed than it is when Christ concludes His discourse of judgment with the last contrast: "And these shall go away into eternal punishment: but the righteous into eternal life."[1] With this He sums up all that He says of the end of things and the moral issues of life. The sense which this last announce-

mediately before Him, or intends those whom He addresses to have anything else in view? And is it not His purpose to make the terror and hopelessness of that case unmistakable? Dean Plumptre himself admits that, at least as regards the particular sin spoken to, there is no forgiveness here or hereafter. He understands it to mean "the ultimate state of antagonism to God and to His truth, when the clearest proofs of the Divine power and goodness are distorted into evidence that the power is evil"; and of this he says that "human nature in that extremest debasement has identified itself with the devil nature, and must share its doom." But this is all the question. It is not what or how many sins may be adjudged to endless punishment, but whether there is such a thing as a character past repentance and beyond forgiveness—such a thing as an "eternal sin," and so an eternal retribution.

[1] Matt. xxv. 46, R.V.

ment bears upon its face, and which it must have conveyed to the common understanding, cannot but be the true sense. Christ's words never entangle themselves with niceties in the use of nouns or adjectives. Least of all is it conceivable that on an occasion like this He could have made His meaning turn upon distinctions in the application of the term "eternal," or upon ideas attaching to the term for "punishment" in the Greek philosophies. To say that the adjective *αἰώνιος* has one sense in the first half of the sentence and another in the second, is the counsel of despair. There is no real analogy between this case and things which are sometimes quoted as parallel to it. Sayings like "Let the dead bury their dead" are examples of what is neither uncommon nor unintelligible—the employment of the same word in its literal sense and in its figurative sense in the same connection. But such gnomic sentences at once declare themselves as such. In the present case, on the other hand, we should have the same word used first in a qualified or secondary sense and then in its unrestricted or primary sense, and with nothing in the form of the sentence to give warning of the change. Could Christ, speaking not to theological or linguistic experts, but to the untaught men who formed His audience on the occasion, have intended by one and the same descriptive term to affirm one thing of the "punishment" and another thing of the "life"? If the word expresses duration, can it be that the "punishment" is described by it as of measured continuance and the "life" as of unmeasured?[1]

[1] Canon Row fankly confesses the difficulty, and takes another way of

Neither will it avail to plead that the noun κόλασις means something else than "punishment." That can be urged only on the basis of etymology; or on that of classical precedent.[1] But in the life of words, usage rules, not etymology; and classical precedent, even if admitted, holds but in part. It is true that the Greek philosophers distinguish κόλασις from τιμωρία understanding the former to relate to the case of him who suffers, and thus to be disciplinary or corrective; the latter to relate to the case of him who inflicts, and

surmounting it than that of making the same term speak with two voices in one breath. "I fully admit," he says, "that the word αἰώνιος, when united with ζωή, life, must have the same meaning as it bears when it is in the same sentence united with the words κόλασις or πῦρ. But there is this difference between the two cases. When the æon or æons, denoted by the word αἰώνιος, are coming to a close, all holy beings will still be able to look up to Him who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty, as the unchangeable Father of mercies and the God of all comfort, and as, in His essential being, love; and their '*abiding in love*, causing them to abide in God and God in them, affords the strongest ground for trust that their life with God will never end." He then speaks of the righteous dead as living through the æons of the future in the state of hope and trust in which the saints of Old Testament times had to live, and did live, not a few of them, in assured faith. He asks why the inheritor of the perfected kingdom of God should not be "satisfied with the same assurance as supported his Jewish brother during the age in which he lived, that God, who is unchangeable in His perfections, will never desert them that love Him throughout all the ages of the future, when, to use the words of the apostle, 'God will be all in all.' This is an assurance on which we may rely with far more fulness of conviction than on a word which varies so greatly in meaning as the word αἰώνιος, 'eternal'" (*Future Retribution*, pp. 266, 267). Whatever one may think of placing the "inheritors of the perfected kingdom" thus on a level with Old Testament believers, the admission that the term must be identical in sense in the two clauses is worth notice.

[1] The chief passage is the well-known one in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (i. 10): διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ τιμωρία, τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ. Cf. *Ethic. Nicom.* iv. 5; Plato's *Protagoras*, 323 E, 324 A, etc. The distinction is so far valid, that even in the Biblical occurrences, as Trench acknowledges, "in κόλασις the relation of the punishment to the punished, in τιμωρία to the punisher, is predominant" (*New Testament Synonyms*, p. 24). See also Webster, *Syntax and Synonyms of the Greek New Testament*, p. 218.

thus to be penal or retributive. But the distinction is not absolute, even in non-Biblical Greek ;[1] and the usage of classical Greek is neither our only nor our surest guide to the usage of New Testament Greek. Its use in the Apocryphal books and elsewhere makes it clear that in Hellenistic Greek κόλασις denoted *punishment* ; and it has the same meaning in early Christian literature.[2] The antithesis to "life" confirms the penal sense of the saying, which carries with it the solemn and deliberate emphasis of the last word in the parable of judgment.

But this is by no means the only word which a faithful exegesis finds it impossible to relieve of this awful significance. In the same discourse, "the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world" has for its contrast "the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels."[3] It is but to play with the words to say that it is the *fire*, not the *punishment*, that is described as *eternal*. The "fire" is the figure of a punishment undefined, and it is this that is said to be eternal. Could there be any more absolute expression of the fate of the "cursed" than this, which makes it one with that of demons ? Is there anywhere in our Lord's recorded teaching any hint that in the

[1] Plutarch uses the noun in the retributive sense, and the verb of the penalties of the after-life ; *De sera num. vind.* §§ 9, 11, 25.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Wisd. xi. 14, xvi. 2, 24, xix. 4 ; 2 Macc. iv. 38 ; Philo, *De Vita Moys.* i. 16 ; Clem. Rom. 2 Cor. vi. 7 ; Justin, 1 *Apol.* 43, 2 *Apol.* 8 ; Testam. XII. Patr., Reuben 5, Lev. 4. Akin to this is its use in the LXX. (as = *offendiculum*) Ezek. xiv. 3, 4, 7, xviii. 30, xliv. 12. Compare also the use of the verb κολάζειν in Wisd. iii. 4, xi. 5, xvi. 1, xviii. 11, etc.; 1 Macc. vii. 7 ; 2 Macc. vi. 14 ; 3 Esdr. viii. 27. In 2 Pet. ii. 9, κολαζομένους clearly refers to those who are in a penal state, in reserve for final judgment.

[3] Matt. xxv. 41, R.V.

case of the latter the fire is a limited, purifying fire, any hope of a final recovery of Satan or Satanic spirits?[1]

The same impression of finality is conveyed, more or less distinctly, by all Christ's sayings on the issues of God's kingdom and of man's life. He turns the eye of hope to the perfection of the kingdom, but He speaks of that as coming by the way of a decisive separation at the end, as well as by the process of a gradual development. The tares and the wheat grow together for a period, but at last there is the time of harvest, when the former shall be bound in bundles for the burning, and the latter shall be gathered into barns; and the parable is explained by Himself to mean that at "the end of the world" they who do iniquity shall be cast into "the furnace of fire."[2]

[1] Some interpreters have much to say of certain differences between the terms in which the two classes are respectively addressed. Little can be made of any difference which turns upon the anarthrous κατηραμένοι, in face of the uncertain reading. Something is suggested by the unqualified "ye cursed," in contrast with the "ye blessed *of My Father*," and by the fact that the kingdom is said to be prepared for those blessed ones *themselves*, while the fire is said to be prepared, not for these cursed ones, but for the devil and his angels. The effect of all, however, is not to soften the announcement of doom, but to represent that doom more positively, as inevitable and of the men's own determining.

[2] Matt. xiii. 24–30, 37–43. The originality of the parable itself is surely beyond question. The originality of the explanation in vers. 37–43 is challenged by some (including Weiss), particularly on the ground of some supposed difference between it and the parable. But there is nothing in the explanation that is not in substance, and almost in terms, in the parable. The phrase συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, "the consummation of the age," which is peculiar to Matthew's narrative, points to the Second Coming and the Judgment; as in 4 Esdr. vii. 43, we have the statement, "dies enim judicii erit finis temporis hujus et initium futuri immortalitatis temporis." It is an apocalyptic phrase. The "furnace of fire" and the "weeping and gnashing of teeth," figurative expressions as they are, surely denote a penal condition, and that condition is connected here with the end of the whole present order of things.

In Christ's own words the last issues of life are given with a notable frequency, in different forms of discourse, and sometimes in outline, sometimes in larger representation. They have a significant place in His more direct utterances, as well as in His parabolic teaching. In speaking of them He uses a remarkable variety of terms, adapted to the different kinds of sin which are immediately in His view. Exclusion from the kingdom, banishment from Himself, is the end of those who have the language of faith but not its fruits;[1] repudiation is the sentence of those who deny Him before men.[2] Inability to enter the kingdom of heaven is the judgment of the mercilless and the ambitious;[3] weeping and gnashing of teeth, that of the selfish.[4] The doom of the unfaithful is to be cut asunder and have a portion with unbelievers;[5] the outer darkness is the destiny of the unprofitable.[6]

The terms are many. They differ according to the occasion; but they all carry with them the sense of finality, and suggest nothing beyond the issues which they state. Nor is this confined to sayings which are associated more or less definitely with the thought of the future judgment. The same impression is conveyed by many of His words which are of larger and more general meaning—those which speak of losing one's soul or forfeiting one's life,[7] of perishing,[8] of dying in one's sins,[9] of its being good never to have been born;[10] those, too, in which, leaving the exclusion of

[1] Matt. vii. 21–23. [2] Matt. x. 33; Luke ix. 26.
[3] Matt. xviii. 3, 35. [4] Matt. xiii. 43. [5] Matt. xii. 40.
[6] Matt. xxv. 30. [7] Mark viii. 36. [8] John iii. 16.
[9] John viii. 21, 24.
[10] Matt. xxvi. 24; Mark xiv. 21. A popular or proverbial saying cer-

the opposite class to suggest itself, He declares eternal life to be for him who believes ;[1] and those in which, giving both aspects of the spiritual condition, He says, of him who believes that he "is not judged," but of him who believes not that he "hath been judged already."[2]

Christ's own teaching, we must conclude, gives the significance of finality to the moral decisions of the present life. If there are possibilities of change, forgiveness, relaxation of penalty, or cessation of punishment in the future life, His words at least do not reveal them. He never softens the awful responsibilities of this life even by the dim adumbration of such possibilities. His recorded sayings nowhere suggest the provision of ministries of grace, whether new or continued, in the after-existence. They nowhere speak of a place of repentance unto life in the other world. They nowhere open the prospect of remedial discipline in the disembodied state, or of terminable award in the

tainly, and to be taken with the limitations proper to all such sayings ; yet pointing to a position terrible enough to make non-existence preferable to existence.

[1] John iii. 15.

[2] John iii. 18. "Wie also," says Holtzmann (*Handcommentar, in loc.*), "das ewige Leben schon gegenwärtiger Besitz, so das Gericht gegenwärtiger Vorgang, innere Thatsache." The last judgment is the revelation and confirmation of this present moral judgment, which the rejector of Christ practically passes upon himself. There is no inconsistency between the two ideas of judgment, nor any lack of harmony between the different statements of the Fourth Gospel on the subject. Christ speaks here to a teacher in Israel, who knew how Old Testament prophecy connected judgment with the Day of the Lord and the fulfilment of Messianic hope. "Nicodemus is to know," says Luthardt, "that this judgment is to remain a thing of the future. The presence of the Son is for the salvation of the world. Yet that future judgment is already decided internally by the relation which each man assumes towards the person of Jesus, and towards His self-revelation" (*Commentary, in loc.*, Clark's trans.).

condition which follows the great day. They bring the two events, death and judgment, into relation, and give no disclosure of an intermediate state with untold potentialities of Divine love and human surrender. They never traverse the principle that this life is the scene of opportunity, and this world the theatre of human fates.

The truths of the resurrection, the judgment, and the last awards, by which faith has held through all the Christian centuries, are all recognised in their broad features in Christ's own words. Much that is adventitious has been associated with them. They have been subjected to a hard literalism of interpretation, in which the spirit has sometimes been lost in the letter. They have suffered at the hands of a high mysticism and a forced spiritualism which have negatived all that is objective in them. Extravagant applications have been made of them; ruthless conclusions have been wrung from them. Theology has often mistaken the proportion which is assigned to the different parts in the Gospels themselves, and given an exaggerated prominence to the more sombre aspects of these truths. But the truths themselves are in Christ's teaching.

This is the testimony which an unprejudiced exegesis has to offer, as it examines His words in the light of our present knowledge of Jewish beliefs and ideas. Theologians have tried many ways of mitigating the force of His declarations on the retributive order of the future life and the finality of its awards. They have urged that even His most decisive sayings put only a hypothetical case;

that they are spoken only for regulative purposes, with less behind them than they seem to imply; that they point to penalties which may be eternal, but which will lessen in degree as sin lessens and character changes in the other world; that the most solemn of them are uttered with a view to conditions which precede the last arbitrament of lives.[1] But these are vain expedients. The testimony of the Gospels, read with an open eye in the light of the history of Jewish thought, remains what we have found it to be; and there are but two ways of disposing of it, short of frank and reverent acceptance. One way is to take it as the record, reliable so far as that goes, of imperfect recollections of Christ's words, and honest but partial and mistaken apprehensions of Christ's meaning—a record of the mind of the evangelists as ascribed to Christ, rather

[1] Rothe, *e.g.*, attempts to show that most of those words of our Lord which are usually understood to bear upon the final recompense of the wicked, speak only in general terms of the retributions falling on those who die outside the pale of grace, or on those who are found alive at His *Parousia*, without reference to the last judgment and the conditions subsequent to it. He admits, however, that there are passages which cannot be thus disposed of. He confesses there are some which certainly deal with what follows the judgment; although he thinks little can be made of these, because they are largely figurative, or have classes and generations of men in view rather than individuals (Matt. x. 15, xi. 22–24, xii. 41, 42; Luke x. 12–14). He makes the further acknowledgment that there are also some (of which John v. 28, 29 is an unambiguous example) to which even these qualifications do not apply. He supposes, however, that these last speak of penalties which work themselves out in the gradual extinction of the existence of their subjects. See his *Dogmatik*, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheil. § 47. Professor H. H. Wendt, again, does not indeed deny that the doctrine of a final judgment appears in Christ's words; but he limits the application of what Christ says of His own judicial function in Matt. xxv. to those who shall be found on earth at His return. *The Teaching of Jesus*, ii. p. 279, Clark's trans. Dr. Samuel Davidson thinks that much must be allowed for the fact that we cannot be certain whether in each case we have the genuine saying of our Lord, the writers often attributing to Him their own conceptions of things, His words being also subject to modification as they were rendered

than of Christ's mind as reported by the evangelists. The other is to take it as a true account of Christ's words and a just representation of His meaning, and seek relief from it by assuming a philosophical superiority to it, and treating it as a provisional form of truth, or an accommodation to the limited ideas of the period and the country. Either way is a confession that Christ's teaching, as it comes to us in the evangelical narratives, contains those solemn truths of the Divine judgment of men and the eternal awards.

Yet Christ's words are words of grace, and His doctrine is a revelation of life. If the voice of the Old Testament was the voice of hope, much more are hope and the grace of life the primary message of

from Aramaic into Greek. He acknowledges, however, that these and other "apologetic remarks are insufficient to expel the idea [of the eternity of future punishment] from Christ's words." Unable to dissociate the doctrine from Christ's teaching, he explains it away as an accommodation to popular ideas, a thing which formed no part of His "fundamental conceptions"; and, with regard to the broader question, he pronounces it "inconsistent with His loving spirit to limit the possibility of salvation to the few years of this life" (*The Doctrine of Last Things*, pp. 113–115). The conclusions reached by Professor Beyschlag in his *Neutestamentliche Theologie* (i. pp. 201–211) may also be noticed. He denies that Matt. xxv. 31–46 is the pictnre of a final, universal judgment of mankind, and takes it to be simply a larger statement of the general principle which is expressed in Matt. x. 42, that no deed of love done to Christ's disciples in men's service of Him in this world shall lose its reward. He speaks of the accepted doctrine of the things of the end as an impracticable doctrine, and argues that many of our Lord's words favour the idea of limited penalties, the continuance of opportunity, the possibility of change of character after death. But he confesses that all this fails to eliminate from Christ's teaching the doctrine of a final determination of men's destinies. He admits, also, that our Lord never affirms an ultimate restoration of all; that, however His words regarding the worm that dieth not, the man for whom it would be good that he had not been born, and the sin against the Holy Ghost, may be qualified or explained, He regards it as possible that freedom may be so used and sin so indulged as to result in a final rejection of grace, a final incapacity to yield to the Divine love.

Christ. To set the crown of completeness on the partial and measured revelation of the future which came by the Old Testament, to give certainty to the dim aspirations, the glad surmises, the far anticipations of psalmist and prophet, to illumine and justify the witness which man's life bears within itself to its own immortality—this is the burden and the purpose of His doctrine. "The belief in a future life," it is said, "is not derived from revelation, though greatly strengthened by it. It is the growing sense of human nature respecting itself. . . . . And this sense of a future life and judgment to come has been so quickened in us by Christianity, that it may be said almost to have been created by it. It is the witness of Christ Himself, than which to the Christian no assurance can be greater. He who meditates on this Divine life in the brief narrative which has been preserved of it, will find the belief in another world come again to him when many physical and metaphysical proofs are beginning to be as broken reeds. He will find more than enough to balance the difficulties of the manner 'how' or the time 'when'; he will find, as he draws nearer to Christ, a sort of impossibility of believing otherwise."[1]

This is true. Yet it is not the sense of a mere metaphysical immortality that He has created. It is the assurance of eternal life. His gift to men is not the inculcation of the truth of an endless existence, not any dogma of the soul's deathless perpetuity, but the revelation of a higher life, and the inspiration of a

[1] Jowett's *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*, i. pp. 122, 123.

hope stronger than all speculation, sacredly governing conduct, and accessible to the humblest soul. He has made this ours by His teaching. But He has made it ours in larger measure by the historical manifestation of Himself. In Himself, in His life and in His resurrection, all that Ethnic thought and Old Testament faith reached after has become real. His Divine life on earth is the final evidence of immortality, and not of that only, but of a perfection of being for man in that immortality. The certainties of being, the light of eternity, the completions of the future, the achieved ideal of the Divine kingdom, the recompense of service, the vision of God, the pleasures at His right hand, are the primary and immediate purpose of His teaching. Life, eternal life, the great reward, the kingdom, the existence like the angels, the inheritance, the throne, the glory, the treasure in heaven, the joy of the Lord, the place prepared, the Father's house,—this is that of which all His words, whether of hope or of awe, are meant to give assurance.

BOOK FOURTH

The General Apostolic Doctrine

The doctrine of Christ was not to be given to man as a stiff and dead letter, in a fixed and inflexible form, but, as the word of the Spirit and of life, was to be proclaimed in and by its life in living variation and variety. Men enlightened by the Divine Spirit caught up these doctrines and appropriated them in a living manner, according to their respective differences in education and life. These differences were to manifest the *living* unity, the richness and depth of the Christian spirit according to the various modes of human conception, unconsciously complementing and explaining each other. For Christianity is meant for all men, and can adapt itself to the most varied human characters, transform them and unite them in a higher unity. For the various peculiarities and fundamental tendencies in human nature are designed to work in and with one another at all times for the realisation of the idea of humanity, the presentation of the kingdom of God in humanity.—NEANDER.

The Holy Spirit prepared these men to receive the truth of God, purified their desire for the ministry of the word, and thus prevented errors of thought and action, which might have compromised the cause they were called to serve ; they, on their part, placed at the service of this same cause their natural faculties, and the peculiar powers of their mind, their understanding, learning, eloquence. . . . Even among the writers, one possessed a more practised pen than another, and there were among them marked differences of style. One rose into the region of speculation, while another found his sphere in popular and practical exhortation. The various phases under which the inexhaustible treasure of the gospel presented itself were not all discovered at once, nor were all appropriated with equal readiness. The pole which attracted the magnet of the conscience or the reason did not occupy, in relation to all, the same point in the circle of revelation. All these influences gave a distinct individuality to each of the sacred writers. Systematic theology may be under the necessity, and may have the right, of seeking above all these shades of difference the unity of the ray of Divine light of which they show the various hues as in a prism ; but historic theology has quite another task ; it is bound faithfully to note and record every varying shade that characterises the apostles as men, as writers, and as thinkers.—REUSS.

CHAPTER I

THE APOSTOLIC DOCTRINE AND THE NON-CANONICAL LITERATURE

FROM Christ's own words on the Future, we proceed naturally to those of His apostles. The Pauline doctrine, however, requires separate treatment. Its magnitude and its comparative completeness make that necessary. We speak at present, therefore, of the apostolic doctrine generally, meaning by that the truths to which expression is given in the various New Testament writings, exclusive of the records of our Lord's words and the discourses and epistles of St. Paul. Christ's own teaching is the primary fount of all Christian theology. But that teaching does not stand absolutely alone, apart in its own Divine authority and originality, and unrelated to aught before it or after it. It is in living connection both with what precedes it and with what follows it, the fulfilment of the one and the inspiration of the other. If its roots are discovered in the thought of psalmist and prophet, its increase is seen in the teaching of evangelist and apostle. It gives a new form to the ideas of the Old Testament, and furnishes the point of issue for the doctrine of Gospel and Epistle.

"It is hard to imagine," says Professor Jowett in

his well-known essay on "Atonement and Satisfaction," "that there can be any truer expression of the Gospel than the words of Christ Himself, or that any truth that is omitted by Him can be essential to the Gospel. 'The disciple is not above his Master, nor the servant greater than his lord.' The philosophy of Plato was not better understood by his followers than by himself; nor can we allow that the Gospel is to be interpreted by the Epistles, or that the Sermon on the Mount is only half-Christian, and needs the fuller inspiration of the Epistle to the Hebrews. There is no trace in the words of our Saviour of any omission or imperfection; there is no indication in the Epistles of any intention to complete or perfect them. How strange it would have seemed in the Apostle St. Paul, who thought himself unworthy 'to be called an apostle, because he persecuted the Church of God,' to find that his own words were preferred in after ages to those of Christ Himself!"[1] So is the case put by the late Master of Balliol when, pointing to the inconsiderable place which the idea of "sacrifice" has in Christ's own words as compared with the use made of it by Paul, he argues that the confessional doctrine of the Atonement is an unchartered doctrine or a dogma possessing merely a rudimentary and provisional value. And the principle involved in this is given as one of universal application.

But this is to take a very partial view of Christ and His words. There is a distinction between Christ's teaching and that of His apostles, the distinction be-

[1] *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*, ii. p. 555.

tween the original and the derived; and the student has to inquire whether the latter is in complete accordance with the former. But Christ was not a mere teacher. His primary mission was not to publish so much new truth; neither are His words the only things to be taken into account in interpreting His gift to mankind. His miracles, His sufferings, all the deeds that He did, the things to which He submitted, His personality, His life, His death, His resurrection, and not His teaching alone, make the revelation we have from Him and express the truths He communicated. His words themselves, too, if on some subjects they are few in number, are of such limitless reach that those of the apostles are in part a disclosure of what is implicit in them, and in part an application to particular circumstances of the principles which are embodied in them.

There is a sense in which the apostolic doctrine is supplementary to Christ's. We have no reason to suppose that our Lord's entire teaching is contained in the words which the Gospels have preserved for us. It was the great object of His ministry to train the apostles for their future work; and it is the testimony of Luke that this was not confined to the time before His death, but was continued during the period between His resurrection and His ascension. In these forty days—days which must have been rich beyond all our imagining in results giving shape to the future, He was engaged in opening "their mind that they might understand the Scriptures" and in "speaking the things concerning the kingdom."[1] But the terms in which

[1] Luke xxiv. 5; Acts i. 3.

He did this are left almost wholly untold. His own teaching was also limited by regard to His audience. He had to accommodate Himself and His words to the capacities of His hearers, for whom a large preparatory education was necessary. His teaching was further limited by the fact that the things which made the revelation of life given by Him, did not all fall within the space of His active ministry in Galilee and Judæa. There was an advance in His communication of truth, which moved accordant with the several stages of His work. The complete doctrine of what He was, what He taught, and what He brought to humanity, could only be given when that work was finished, and when the whole revelation of grace and truth in Him was crowned by His resurrection. The apostles base their teaching on the knowledge which they had of the person and words of Christ. They base it also on the communication of the Spirit, who had been promised to "teach" them all things, and to "bring to their remembrance" all that He had said to them.[1] Under these conditions their doctrine is in some things a more developed doctrine.[2]

There is this first difference, therefore, a difference due to the historical conditions under which His mission was accomplished and His teaching given. There is a further difference, due to the circumstance

[1] John xiv. 26; Acts i. 22, 33; 1 John i. 1 and ii. 27.

[2] On this see Weiss, *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, i. p. 47, Eng. trans. He points out how inadmissible it is "to measure the truthfulness of the more fully developed apostolic teaching by its being already found in the teaching of Jesus." This is true, so far as to "measure the truthfulness" of every point in the doctrine of the apostles by the question whether it is found in *definite and expressed form* in Christ's own recorded teaching, is to subject it to a mistaken test.

that His doctrine of the kingdom was addressed to the Jews, while that of the apostles was directed to audiences of other types, Gentile more than Jewish. There is something, too, in the *form* that distinguishes the teaching of the apostles from that of Christ—the more reasoned method of the former, the more intuitive order of the latter. "The more the personality of the Lord was unique in its kind," it is well said, "the more unique also His mode of teaching. . . . Hence in all His many-sidedness of expression, there is no analysis, no mere conceptions, no use of subtletics; all is concrete and intuitive. This form of teaching could not pass on to the apostles; they were compelled to adopt a more conceptional and argumentative line of teaching; and hence the individual differences, which all the illumination of the Divine Spirit failed to remove."[1] But these differences do not imply any lack of harmony between the apostolic teaching and Christ's; neither do they mean that the developed doctrine of the other New Testament books goes beyond the principles of the doctrine of Christ, as these are gathered from the record of His sayings in the Gospels. His teaching is the "light which breaks forth in different colours," in that of the apostles.[2]

It is not necessary to entangle our inquiry with the many questions of literary criticism which are connected with the apostolic writings. It is enough to look at these writings broadly, as representatives of different types of New Testament teaching, and of different stages in the history of those types. Apart

[1] Schmid, *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, p. 332, Clark's trans.
[2] Oosterzee, *The Theology of the New Testament*, p. 66, Eng. trans.

from all questions of authorship, some of these writings may be fairly taken as reflections of the earlier type of Christian doctrine; others, of the later. Some will represent the form that is most characteristic of Peter and the Petrine circle; others, the form peculiar to John and the Johannine circle; others, a form still more distinctively Jewish. There are differences to be recognised between different groups of writings, differences arising from the individualities of the writers. But these do not imply the existence of contradictory, or even of heterogeneous, elements in these writings. There are critical questions, too, affecting the apostolic literature, to which regard must be had in their proper place. But there are books, sufficient in number and rich enough in contents to form a satisfactory basis for our inquiry, which are practically outside the surge of criticism. Others, for which the same certainty of date and origin cannot be claimed, are so far in harmony with these, that they can be dealt with as of the same apostolic circle and the same type of teaching.

The apostolic doctrine, as it lies in these books, is seen at a glance to have many points of affinity with the ideas of the Old Testament. But it is also seen to have much to distinguish it from these ideas. In the case of some of the books, the Epistles of John, for example, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, there is a difference which makes itself felt at once, between their style and that of the prophets. In these writings generally there is much that speaks of the modification of ancient Hebrew faith and phraseology which had taken place. It is of the utmost consequence that

we should know how far this modification went, and what the popular ideas had come to be after the close of Old Testament prophecy. In the case of our Lord's teaching we have found it necessary to get at the beliefs, opinions, and forms of expression which were current in His time, and which made the basis of His doctrine, or the medium through which it had to be given. In the case of the apostolic teaching, it is even more necessary to understand the beliefs and opinions of those days, and the Jewish ways of speech. For the impress of these things is deeper in that teaching.

Fortunately we have a considerable body of literature bearing more or less directly upon the process of change, and making us acquainted with the ideas with which the people were conversant. It is not so complete as we could wish, when we think of its original extent. One of the latest of the pseudonymous writings speaks of seventy books of its own order. Statements of this kind are obviously rhetorical exaggerations, which must be taken with great abatements. But they point at least to the existence of a very large literature, much of which has perished. Most that remains of it requires more exhaustive study than it has yet received. This literature not only colours the apostolic writings, but is at times quoted in them. We have made frequent use of it in interpreting our Lord's teaching. It must be kept no less carefully in view in interpreting the teaching of the apostles.

It must be used, however, with discretion, and with due regard to the fact that it is neither all of one piece, nor all equally relevant to our present purpose.

Excluding the writings of Josephus and Philo, from which less is obtained than might have been expected, this literature falls into three distinct divisions, the *Rabbinical*, the *Apocryphal*, and the *Pseudepigraphic*.

There is a disposition to turn first to the *Rabbinical* books—Mishna, Talmud, Midrash, and Targums. But these are in the main only of secondary value. The *Mishna*, the oldest extant collection of Jewish tradition, gives the pronouncements of men belonging to the period from about 70 A.D. to 200 A.D. It does not appear to have been put together till near the end of the second century. The *Tosephta*, another compendium of legal tradition, is the work of the third century. The *Palestinian* and *Babylonian Gemaras* are referred, the one to the middle of the fourth century, the other to the middle of the sixth. The older commentaries or *Midrashim*, *Mechilta*, *Siphra*, *Siphre*, do not go farther back than the second century of our era. The oldest *Targums*, those of *Onkelos on the Pentateuch* and *Jonathan on the Prophets*, have been thought to belong to the beginning of the Christian era. But it is now seen that, in their revised and edited form, they cannot be earlier than the third or fourth century. All these books embody older traditions. But it is difficult to separate the older from the more recent, and to say how far back their contents carry us. Too much is made of this literature. It is a literature of a scholastic rather than a popular character. In its present form it must be assigned to a comparatively late date. An undue confidence is placed in it, when it is appealed to as a

primary witness to the Messianic beliefs in general, and to the eschatological ideas in particular, which were current among the Jews when Christ and His apostles taught.

The *Apocryphal* literature, again, has the disadvantage of reflecting less the conditions of opinion and belief which were common to the Jewish people as a whole, than those which were characteristic of one great division of the race. Written as it is in Greek, or by Græcising Jews, it represents Hebrew faith as modified by Hellenic thought. Its earlier books are coloured by the Platonic philosophy; its later betray the influence of Stoic ideas. In it, too, the Messianic hope retreats into the background. Nevertheless it is always of interest, and often of great value, in relation to our subject. One of its most remarkable pieces, the *Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach*, rather creates new problems, it is true, than helps us to follow out the course of the enlargement of Jewish faith. Written originally in Hebrew, and belonging to about the period 190–170 B.C., it has a singular place in the literature of the Jewish sages; and no less singular a position in the history of the doctrine of a future existence. It lay so near the religious life of those early days that it has been described as "the 'Church Book,' first for the Jews and then for the Christians, their 'Whole Duty of Man,' their 'Imitation.'"[1] Yet it cannot be called more than the book of acquiescence in man's mortality. A few things in it—certain references to Samuel, Elijah, and Enoch—have been supposed to suggest more than this; and one or two passages have even been thought

[1] Stanley's *Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church*, iii. p. 267.

to point to the hope of a resurrection.[1] But it is extremely doubtful whether any such meaning belongs to them. In what it says of the future, the book, as a whole, is of the spirit of Ecclesiastes rather than of the spirit of Job or the Psalms. There is nothing in it that speaks of an objective immortality, far less of the hope of the resurrection. The immortality which it looks to is the name which the departed leave behind them, and the life which they live in their children.

This is the burden of Ben Sirach: "O death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that liveth at rest in his possessions, unto the man that hath nothing to vex him, and that hath prosperity in all things; yea, unto him that is yet able to receive meat! O death, acceptable is thy sentence unto the needy, and unto him whose strength faileth, that is now in the last age, and is vexed with all things, and to him that despaireth, and hath lost patience! Fear not the sentence of death, remember them that have been before thee, and that come after; for this is the sentence of the Lord over all flesh. And why art thou against the pleasure of the Most High? there is no inquisition in the grave, whether thou have lived ten, or an hundred, or a thousand years."[2] The absence of the note of faith in an after-life on the part of a Jew of this period, who was instructed as the writer of this book appears to have been, is certainly a singular fact. It is all the more so because he represents him-

[1] These are xlvi. 12, xlviii. 11, xlix. 10. The late Professor Grätz thought it possible that xlviii. 11 might refer to the resurrection.

[2] xli. 1–4. Churton.

self as giving rather the wisdom of those who preceded him, than anything of his own.[1]

It is different with the Hochma book, which we owe to a devout Jewish sage, belonging to the period between the Son of Sirach and Philo. The faith in a future life, which gives character to the *Wisdom of Solomon*, it is true, is in many respects unlike that which inspires the apostolic writers. It is abstract and reasoned. It sustains itself on argument rather than on experience of God and the Divine life, and it lacks the concrete form of a future for man in the complete integrity of his being. But the definiteness of its faith in immortality, the strength of conviction with which the doctrine of an after-life is expressed, the Hebrew and Hellenic elements which meet in it, the lofty assurance of the final reward of righteousness which beats in it, give it an exceptional value. There are other things which add to the interest of this remarkable product of Alexandrian Judaism. There is the Messianic faith, which is to some extent recognisable in it. There are also remarkable resemblances which appear at certain points between it and the apostolic books, especially the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistles of John, and the Epistle to the Romans. Ewald thinks it entitled to a place in the Messianic literature, and not to be classed merely with the Greek

[1] "If Ben Sira was such a student of Scripture," asks Professor Cheyne, "how is it that the higher Scripture teaching on the future did not penetrate him?" This is the difficulty which he thinks is created by Ecclesiasticus. He solves the difficulty by supposing that if any of the Psalms or other parts of the Old Testament, which expressed the higher view, were in existence when the book was written, they were either not known or not interpreted in the fulness of their sense. *Bampton Lectures*, *ut sup.* p. 410.

imitations. He calls attention to the "magic words and thoughts heard for the first time out of this Greek book, which reminds us strikingly of the New Testament," and speaks of the "deep glow which, with all its apparent tranquillity, streams through its veins." "But for such books," he says, "there are many things which it would be difficult to understand in a Paul, a John, and their contemporaries. In the nervous energy of his proverbial style, and in the depth of his representations, we have a premonition of John, and in the conception of heathenism a preparation for Paul, like a warm rustle of the spring ere its time is fully come."[1]

Of equal or even greater interest are the *Books of Maccabees*, which give so vivid a view of the beliefs and aspirations of the Jewish people in the period between the middle of the second century before Christ and the first century after Christ. Important as the *First Book* is for the light which it casts upon the history of the years 175–135 B.C., it has not the value of the *Second Book* as a witness to the faith in immortality. Where the former is silent, the latter is eloquent on the certainties of immortality; rich in the expression of a faith in the blessedness of a future life, which made men and women superior to the terrors of the most cruel martyrdom. This Second Book surpasses all the earlier Apocryphal writings, not only in the magnitude which is given to the belief in a resurrection and a judgment, but in the distinct and enlarged form in which these truths are exhibited. Its spirit reappears in the so-called *Fourth Book of*

[1] *History of Israel*, v. pp. 484, 485, Carpenter's trans.

Maccabees, a composition of a rhetorical style and a more scholastic method, which belongs probably to about the time of Josephus, and seeks, by its glowing descriptions of the compensations and felicities of the after-life, to fire the Jewish people with courage to suffer for their Law.

It is no inconsiderable contribution, therefore, that is made by these books to our knowledge of the condition of belief. They are an important aid to the interpretation of the apostolic writings. A still richer field, however, and a more pertinent testimony, are furnished by the *Pseudonymous* or *Pseudepigraphic* literature. Of this literature the section which yields us most is that which includes the various Jewish Apocalypses. Among these special importance belongs to the *Book of Enoch*[1]—the curious composition so frequently referred to in early Christian writings, and so strangely lost sight of till Bruce's discovery of the Ethiopic version in Abyssinia in 1773; the *Fourth Book of Esdras*, written possibly at Rome near the end of the first century of our era, and

[1] Much has been done of late to help us to understand this curious book, and more may be looked for at no distant date. Mr. Joseph Halévy is understood to have in hand a new critical Hebrew translation on the basis of Dillmann's text. Considerable fragments of the Greek text, discovered in Egypt, are published by M. Bouriant in the ninth volume of the *Mémoires publiés par les membres de la Mission archéologique française au Caire*. We have an emended edition by the late Professor Dillmann in the *Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Preuss. Acad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin*, 1892. Dr. Goldschmidt attempts a retranslation of the book in his *Das Buch Henoch aus dem Æthiopischen in die ursprünglich hebräische Abfassungssprache zurückübersetzt*, 1892. Pastor Lods has given us a useful edition under the title *Le Livre d'Henoch, Fragments grecs, découverts a Akhmîm, publiés avec les variantes du text Ethiopien, traduits et annotés*. The very complete and valuable edition by Mr. R. H. Charles, M.A., of Exeter College, Oxford, issued by the Clarendon Press in 1893, is the best for the English student.

known to us now in a number of versions, Latin, Ethiopic, Arabic, Armenian, Syrian, and fragmentarily in Greek; and the *Apocalypse of Baruch*, a book almost wholly unknown till Ceriani's publication of it some twenty-six years ago.

Other writings, more or less akin, also deserve notice. Among these is the *Book of Jubilees*,[1] which founds upon the historical books of the Old Testament, as the Apocalypse of Baruch follows the pattern of the prophetical. It is Essene in spirit, with an extravagant doctrine of the Sabbath, and with an eschatology which dilates on the doom of rebel angels, and their detention in the depths of earth until the day of judgment. Another, the *Assumption of Moses*, is of interest for its doctrine of the four hours which precede the end of things. A third, the *Ascension of Isaiah*, in which the Lord's Second Coming seems to be regarded as impending, has the special interest of being perhaps the oldest non-canonical Christian writing. With some probability it is referred to a date a little before the destruction of Jerusalem. A fourth, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, belongs to a somewhat later period, perhaps to the first decade of the second century A.D.

But of much greater interest are those curious Jewish-Christian productions, the *Sibylline Oracles*, which are quoted so often and with such reverence

[1] To Mr. Charles, who has done so much for the *Book of Enoch*, we are indebted for both a translation of the *Book of Jubilees* (contributed to the *Jewish Quarterly Review*) and an important edition, published quite recently under the title, *The Ethiopic Version of the Hebrew Book of Jubilees, containing Texts, Documents, and Extracts, chiefly from MSS. in the Bodleian and other Oxford Libraries.*

by early Christian writers. The oldest section of these remarkable poems is probably that extending from line 114 to line 807 (Greek text) of the third book; and it happens that the part which exhibits the Messianic hope, and is therefore of most value in relation to our subject, is included within the last few hundred lines of this third book. Unfortunately these Sibyllines have come down to us only in the most confused and uncertain form. "The curse of pseudonymous authorship," says Professor Schürer, "seems to have prevailed very specially over these oracles. Every reader and writer allowed himself to complete what existed after his own pleasure, and to arrange the scattered papers now in one, now in an opposite manner. Evidently much was at first circulated in detached portions, and the collection of these afterwards made by some admirer was a very accidental one. Hence duplicates of many portions are found in different places. And the manuscripts which have come down to us exhibit great discrepancies in the arrangement."[1]

To these must be added the *Psalter of Solomon*, although it is a prophetic rather than an apocalyptic composition. This interesting collection is in many respects one of the most important memorials of Jewish belief during the period in question. It has had a strange history. "It is a singular irony of fate," it is justly said, "that, while the Book of Baruch

[1] *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, iii. p. 276, Clark's trans. Professor Milton S. Terry has recently furnished us with a complete English translation of the Sibylline Books in heroic blank verse. He has thus supplied a long felt want, Floyer's imperfect version having been for a length of time inaccessible.

should be received into something like canonicity, the Psalter of Solomon has never been placed even in the position of quasi-canonicity assigned to First and Second Esdras."[1] Although it was printed by the Jesuit De la Cerda early in the seventeenth century, and has been published several times since, it is only of late years that it has obtained the attention which it deserves.

Important additions may be expected to this curious but instructive literature. An earnest of this is the recent discovery of a large portion of the *Apocalypse of Peter*. This book, which was found only some eight years ago in an ancient burial-place at Akhmîm, in Upper Egypt, by the French Archæological Mission at Cairo, may belong, it is thought, to the end of the first century of our era, and may thus rank as the oldest, with one exception, of the Christian Apocalypses. Hitherto it has been known only by occasional mention made of it in the Muratorian Fragment (if we can trust the text), and in the writings of Clement, Methodius, Eusebius, and others on to Nicephorus. Now that it is in part recovered, it is seen to have many points of interest,—in the influence, for example, which it seems to have had upon parts of the Sibylline Oracles, the Apocalypse of Esdras, the Apocalypse of Paul, and through this last upon Dante's *Divina Comœdia*; in the use which it makes of certain sections of the Synoptical Gospels; and in the coincidences between it and such writings as the First Book of Clement or the Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ, the History of Barlaam and Josaphat, the Acts

[1] Thomson's *Books which influenced our Lord and His Apostles*, p. 423.

of Thomas, the Apocalypse of the Virgin, and the Apocalypse of Zosimus.

But it also treats largely of the last things. It has an eschatological discourse, a vision of Paradise, and an Inferno. It paints in glowing colours the position of the righteous in the great space outside our earth, illumined by radiant light and blooming with unfading flowers, which makes the world of their glory. It describes in terrible terms the place of squalor over against this, in which different classes of the wicked pay the penalties of their several sins, the blasphemer hanging by his tongue, the perverter of righteousness tormented in the lake of flaming mire, the murderer stung by reptiles, the false witness rolling fire in his mouth, the pitiless rich tossing on red-hot pebbles sharper than swords or than any spit.[1]

This pseudepigraphic literature, so far as it is relevant to the present question, extends over a space of about a century and a half before Christ and a century after Christ. Large use has been made of it in connection with Christ's own teaching. No less regard must be had to it in studying the apostolic doctrine. Of all our witnesses, it is the one that is most occupied with the Jewish eschatology, and that takes us most directly into the heart of the ideas on the end of things which

[1] M. Bouriant's transcription of the text in the *Mémoires publiés par les membres de la Mission archéologique française au Caire*, tome ix^me^, 1^er^ fascicule, has already been followed by a number of publications. Among these we may refer to Harnack's *Bruchstücke des Evangeliums und der Apocalypse des Petrus*; the two Lectures by Messrs. Robinson and James on "The Gospel according to Peter," and "The Revelation of Peter"; Gebhardt's *Das Evangelium u. die Apokalypse des Petrus*. Much curious matter is given in Albrecht Dieterich's *Nekyia: Beiträge zur Erklärung der neuentdeckten Petrusapokalypse*.

were current among the Jewish people in Christ's time and in that of the apostles.

It is not possible here to examine the apostolic doctrine in all its details. The field which it covers is too extensive and varied for that. It will be found, however, that the same large truths appear, though in different degrees of magnitude, in all the writings; while certain books exhibit aspects or applications of these truths which are more or less distinctive. It must be enough to touch rapidly on the general character of the forms in which the apostolic doctrine is given in the different writings, and concentrate attention more particularly on the few things which are peculiar to certain sections of the literature, and most disputed.

CHAPTER II

THE TEACHING OF JAMES, JUDE, HEBREWS, AND THE APOCALYPSE

THE *Epistle of James* comes first to our hand as the work of the head of the mother-Church of Jerusalem, and an unmistakable expression of Jewish Christianity. Its claim to be the earliest of the writings in question would be indisputable, were it certain that its mention of the "assembly,"[1] and its statements on the subject of justification, carried it back to a period before the Pauline doctrine was known to its readers, and before the Church was definitively separated from the synagogue. So far, however, as concerns our present subject, the interpretation of the teaching is unaffected by the question of the date of the Epistle. The letter is remarkable for its sententious style, the simple vigour of its imagery, the frequent echoes of the Sermon on the Mount which are heard in it, the entirely practical view which it takes of faith and of religious service, its conception of the gospel as law, the "perfect law of liberty," the "royal law" of love, and many things else.

But it is comparatively silent on the whole subject of immortality. It has but a few allusions to the

[1] Chap. ii. 2.

things of the end. These suffice, however, to indicate its agreement with the general New Testament doctrine. It moves within the circle of simple Christian duty. It finds the truth of worship in practical charity and personal unworldliness.[1] It regards the grace of the gospel as a *salvation* or a *life* which, by the will of God, becomes ours by regeneration with the word of truth.[2]

It does not limit its view of that grace, however, entirely to the present. It looks to a future for the life which comes by the new birth. It points to a *crown of life* which shall be the reward of temptation endured,[3] and to a *kingdom* promised by God to them that love Him, of which the poor of this world, rich in faith, are the heirs.[4] It speaks of a *hell* from which the tongue has its fatal, inflammatory power.[5] It has repeated references to the Divine judgment, the equivalence of its awards, their certainty and their nearness. There is a Judge who already "standeth before the doors."[6] His judgment will be without mercy to the merciless, but to the merciful it will be tempered with mercy.[7] That judgment will be heavier where there is larger responsibility.[8] Its retributions are for the warning of the oppressive rich; its recompenses are for the encouragement of the Christian brother in endurance.[9] The closing words of the Epistle point to the eternal penalty of sin.[10] But the truth which it states most

[1] Chap. i. 27. [2] i. 18. [3] i. 12. [4] ii. 5.

[5] Chap. iii. 6. The only instance of the occurrence of γέεννα in the Epistles. In speaking of the tongue as "set on fire by Gehenna," James means, as Huther expresses it, that "as ἐπιθυμία (or more precisely ὀργή), whose most direct organ is the tongue, has its origin from the devil, it is thus from hell."

[6] v. 9. [7] ii. 13. [8] iii. 3. [9] v. 5, 7.

[10] In the sentence "shall save a soul from death," the term *death* cannot

definitely is the "coming of the Lord." This *Parousia* of Christ is represented as "nigh at hand." All judgment is associated with it. The expectation of it is the motive for patience, and the argument against all murmuring.[1]

In no section of the New Testament do we find so many exceptional phenomena crowded into narrow space as in the *Epistle of Jude*. It is assigned to various dates between 54 A.D. and 80 A.D. But it may most reasonably be placed earlier at least than 70 A.D. Though in all probability the composition of the younger brother of James, it is singularly unlike his Epistle. On the other hand, there is an affinity between the ideas of Jude and those of Second Peter, which makes it natural to take the two Epistles together. One of the most peculiar things in these writings is the place which they give to the judgment of angels. This is a prominent subject in the apocalyptic literature; in which literature it is founded on the Old Testament paragraph relating to the "sons of God" and the "daughters of men."[2]

It appears, for example, in the Book of Jubilees,[3] and in the Apocalypse of Baruch,[4] where the fallen angels are described as "tormented in chains." But it is treated at greatest length in the Book of Enoch.

be limited to its ethical meaning. The distinction between the tenses (ἐπιστρέψας, σώσει) indicates that the *saving from death* is not identified with the *conversion*, but is regarded as the issue of that. The θάνατος appears to have the large sense which it has in chap. i. 15 and in such Pauline passages as Rom. vi. 23—"the opposite of the ζωή which God has promised, and will give to them who love Him, *eternal* death" (Huther). It is the deprivation of all that makes the reality and joy of life, here and hereafter.

[1] v. 8. [2] Gen. vi. 1–4. [3] v. [4] lvi. 10–13.

There the fall of the angels, the destruction ordained for them by God, and the purgation of the earth, are described.[1] A commission is given twice to Enoch to go and announce their impending judgment. He is shown the places of their punishment, the "void place, awful and terrible," in which they are confined, and the place more terrible, "bounded by a complete abyss," which is "the prison of the angels; and here they are held to eternity."[2] They had a leader, Azâzel, who is doomed to be bound hand and foot in darkness, to have rough and pointed rocks laid upon him, and to be covered with darkness until the great day of judgment, when he will be cast into fire. The penalty of those who have followed him is to see the destruction of their loved ones, to be bound for seventy generations, and at last to be locked in the abyss of fire for ever.[3]

The New Testament has nothing comparable to those amorphous inventions of the apocalyptic imagination. It makes but the scantiest reference to the fall or the punishment of angels. The Epistle of Jude, however, gives three examples of Divine judgment, and evidently mentions them as things with which the readers are familiar. The second of these typical instances of the retributions of God is a class of angels who "kept not their own principality, but left their proper habitation." Their punishment is that they are kept "in everlasting bonds under darkness unto the judgment of the great day."[4] With exception of the corresponding statement in Second Peter, this is the only passage in the New Testament in which fallen angels are described as at present in

[1] vi.–x. [2] xxi. [3] x. [4] Ver. 6, R.V.

bonds.[1] This doom is only the prelude to something still more awful, the final judgment. But it is described as one from which there is no release, and as having its scene under the densest, blackest darkness.[2] The Petrine passage, which also includes the case of fallen angels among its three signal examples of the Divine judgment, speaks of the punishment of those angels in similar terms ; but with this peculiarity, that it uses the heathen term for *hell* and applies it to the intermediate scene or condition of penalty.[3]

Otherwise both books look to the return of Christ as the decisive event of the future at once for the righteous and for the unrighteous of men. They speak of "the promise of His coming," of "the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," of "the presence of His glory," as the hope of the former.[4] On the one hand, they proclaim the future recompense of the

[1] A fate *prepared* for the devil and his angels is mentioned in Matt. xxv. 41. On the question of the offence which is in view in our Lord's words there and in Jude here, see the writer's exposition of the Epistle of Jude in *The Pulpit Commentary*.

[2] The fact that these are bonds from which there is no escape, is expressed by the peculiarly strong adjective ἀΐδιος. This adjective occurs but once again in the New Testament, viz. in Rom. i. 20, where it designates the "*eternal* power" of God. The "darkness" is also expressed by a term of peculiar force, ζόφος, a word which is rare so far as the New Testament is concerned, but which is applied both in Homer and in the Apocryphal books (*Wisdom*, xvii. 2) to the darkness of the nether world.

[3] 2 Pet. ii. 4. The R.V. renders it, "for if God spared not angels when they sinned, but cast them down to hell, and committed them to pits of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." It might be given with even greater precision thus: "for if God spared not angels when they sinned, but casting them into Tartaros committed them to pits of darkness in reserve unto judgment." *Tartaros* in Homer is the dark abyss, as deep beneath Hades as heaven is high above earth, into which Zeus cast Kronos and the Titans. Later it is used of the nether world generally or of that section of it to which the grossest offenders were consigned. See the writer's exposition of Second Peter in Schaff's *Popular Commentary*.

[4] Jude 24 ; 2 Pet. i. 16, ii. 4.

good, describing it as "eternal life" and an "eternal kingdom."[1] On the other hand, they declare with large insistence the certainty and finality of the doom of the evil, pointing to Sodom and Gomorrah "as examples, suffering the punishment of eternal fire." They recall at the same time the words of the Book of Enoch on the Lord's coming to "execute judgment upon all," and describe the unrighteous as kept under punishment unto the day of judgment."[2] The ultimate doom of the errorists who make the special subject of these Epistles is expressed by the terms *destruction* and *darkness*,—"swift destruction," a destruction that "slumbereth not," "the blackness of darkness," a darkness "reserved for ever."[3] The statement of the doom which is thus *reserved* takes its form, no doubt, from the figure of the "wandering stars," which is used of the men themselves. But it marks that doom as inevitable, hopeless, irreversible.

In the *Epistle to the Hebrews* we have a form of doctrine in affinity with Paul's, and with much that is found in Luke's Gospel and the Book of Acts, but in still closer affinity with the older apostolic type of

[1] Jude 21; 2 Pet. i. 11. In the latter passage, this "eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" is the final expression of the future reward of the man who carefully adds grace to grace and makes his "calling and election sure." The passage is remarkable as being the only one in the New Testament in which this "kingdom" has the adjective "eternal" (*αἰώνιος*) applied to it. When it speaks also of the entrance "ministered abundantly" or "richly supplied" into this "kingdom," the idea is not exactly that of different degrees of reward in the future life (though not a few take it so), but rather that of the *kind* of entrance—an entrance certainly assured, richly granted, joyously accomplished, the opposite of what is meant by being "saved; yet so as by fire."

[2] Jude 7, 14; 2 Pet. ii. 6, 9, R.V.

[3] 2 Pet. ii. 1, 3, 17; Jude 13, R.V.

teaching. Ideas and phraseology which are familiar to us in the Pauline writings appear again in this great Epistle, but with other shades of meaning. Old Testament doctrine is the basis of its teaching, but that doctrine has now a new and more developed form. Methods of reasoning and representation are followed, both on Old Testament topics and on Pauline ideas, which are the writer's own. The whole composition has the distinct note of originality. The place and the treatment which are given to the things of the end have this quality of originality. Addressed to a body of Jewish Christians of the second generation, who belonged perhaps to some section of the Eastern Dispersion, and whose conversion had taken place many years before, this remarkable Epistle is not a distinctively eschatological Epistle. The large-minded, though unknown Hellenist who writes it, reasons with men who once had been strong in faith, though subject to persecution in the form of reproach, loss, and imprisonment. The heavy hand of trouble is again upon them, apparently from their own countrymen. But they have no more their old constancy, and are in danger of falling away. The glory of the Christian faith, the superiority and finality of the covenant under which they live, are urged as the irresistible incentives to steadfastness.

The majesty of that which they have, therefore, rather than of that which they look for, is the subject of the Epistle. A contrast is drawn between two *æons* or dispensations, and Christ is the Heir and Head of the "world to come."[1] A "rest" is provided for the people of God; a "*sabbatismos*" remaineth[2] for them.

[1] ii. 5, vi. 6.

[2] iv. 1, 9.

But neither the "world to come" nor the "rest" is presented distinctively as of the future. The things of the future, nevertheless, have their place. They are dealt with as things familiar to these Christians, things in which they were instructed from the beginning. The doctrine of "resurrection of the dead" is once mentioned, and it appears to be the doctrine of a general resurrection. The doctrine of "eternal judgment" is also introduced. But both these articles of belief are described as belonging to "the first principles of Christ," of which it should be unnecessary to speak.[1] The judgment again is represented as coincident with Christ's return,[2] and the thought of "the day drawing nigh," is given as a reason for provoking one another to love and good works, for fellowship and mutual edification.[3] But the Judge is God Himself, not the Son. When Christ appears the second time it is to "them that wait for Him," and His object then is "salvation."[4] But *God* is "the Judge of all," to whom we come; the Epistle to the Hebrews agreeing in this with the general Old Testament view.[5] The destruction of death, the bringing to nought him that has its power, is one of the purposes of Christ's death;[6] in this and other things the same supreme significance being ascribed to death in this Epistle as in the Pauline Epistles.

In connection also with the great idea of a *covenant*, a large doctrine of *recompense* is delivered. A comparison is drawn between the "just recompense of reward" under the Mosaic dispensation and

[1] vi. 1, R.V. [2] ix. 28. [3] x. 24, 25.
[4] ix. 28. [5] xii. 23, x. 30, 31. [6] ii. 14.

that which is given under the Christian.[1] The penalty of the unrighteous is described as "judgment," fierceness of fire," "perdition."[2] The eye of these tossed and wavering believers is directed to a *heaven* which is made real to them as the place into which their High Priest and Forerunner has passed.[3] The hope of the righteous is "that which is within the veil."[4] It is an "eternal inheritance," an "enduring substance," "the promise," a "better country," a "city prepared" of God, a "kingdom which cannot be moved," which also is received in measure now.[5]

It is impossible to launch out upon the deep sea of the *Revelation of St. John*, a book which has suffered many things from the strained ingenuity of the dogmatic interpreter. The difficulties of the literary and critical questions which are connected with it are confessed. Yet the intractable obscurity which has been supposed to overhang its purpose and its meaning, vanishes to a very large extent when the understood principles of historical exegesis are applied to it. With the exception of the opening section which gives the epistles to the churches, it is consistently apocalyptic in form and purpose, and the well-known analogies of apocalyptic composition are the key to its interpretation. But while it is constructed on the usual plan of the ancient Jewish Apocalypses, it is very different in tenor. It has the accents of certainty and definiteness, which are less audible in these. The Messiah to whom it looks is the Messiah of history,

[1] ii. 2, 3, x. 28, 29.
[2] x. 27, 39.
[3] iv. 4, vi. 20.
[4] vi. 19.
[5] ix. 15, x. 34, 36, xi. 18, xii. 28.

the Messiah who is known to have suffered, died, and risen. Jewish ideas and modes of expression are everywhere transfigured by Christian faith.

The combination of these two things, the Jewish form and the catholic belief, makes one of the most remarkable peculiarities of the book. There is the Jewish way of regarding the world and the heathen world-powers. But the legalism of the Jew does not assert itself in it. The ideas and terms of the Hebrew Scriptures appear in it throughout, and furnish the instruments of its counsel. But they are the ideas and terms of prophecy rather than of the law. The type of doctrine which it presents, therefore, is neither Judaistic nor Pauline, but a remarkable fusion of the two. The form is Jewish, the spirit is catholic. The Christ whom it expects is more than the Messiah of Israel. It makes nothing of the law, nothing of the old distinction between Jew and Gentile, nothing of privilege for any people or class, unless it be for the martyrs of Christ.

On the great doctrines of God, the person of Christ, the sacrifice of Christ, the power of grace, its teaching is essentially that of the apostolic writers generally. But it is distinctively the book of the future, and of the near future. The figure of Christ possesses it from the beginning to the end. But it is the figure of Christ in His kingdom, Christ in His relations to the suffering Church and the guilty world, rather than Christ in His personal relation to the Father. It has a large eschatology, the central point of which is Christ's coming. That coming is occasionally referred to as an event in the course of history, a spiritual manifestation of His

power and presence.[1] But generally it is the objective, visible return, which is to mark the end of the world. Round this the entire doctrine of the book on the subject of the Future moves. That doctrine recalls the visions of Israel's ancient prophetic teachers, especially Ezekiel, Zechariah, and Daniel; and it has for its vesture the strange symbolism of the Jewish Apocalypses. But its general import is not rendered uncertain by the doubts which cling to the interpretation of its darker signs and obscurer trains of imagery.

The decisive event of the future is still the *Parousia*. Its date is regarded as unrevealed,[2] but it is looked for as nigh. Christ's word is that He comes quickly, and it is the prayer of the writer of the book that He may come even so.[3] If His living saints long for His coming, His dead saints are in waiting for it. In the period between they are in life, in conscious life, and in part possession of their reward. They have rest and blessedness, and their works follow them. But they wait for a final decision. That adjustment cannot come until the sufferings of their fellow-servants are fulfilled.[4] But when Christ appears He brings His reward with Him, to give every man his due; and having the keys of death and Hades He can bring up His departed ones from the under-world.[5]

His *Parousia* is to be in glory, and for judgment. He comes with clouds, and the people wail because of Him.[6] The judgment itself is at once Christ's and God's. The day of Christ's return is the great day of

[1] ii. 5, iii. 20. [2] i. 7. [3] ii. 17, iii. 11, xxii. 12, 20.
[4] vi. 9–11, xiv. 13. [5] xxii. 12, i. 18. [6] i. 7.

His wrath, the wrath of the Lamb.[1] But again God Himself is the Judge before whom the dead, small and great, shall stand.[2] The reward of the righteous is described by a variety of figurative terms due mostly to the Old Testament,—eating of the "tree of life" in the midst of the paradise of God, the gift of "the crown of life," the "hidden manna," the "new name," the honour of a "pillar" in the temple, the reign with Christ, the place before the throne, the inheritance of all things, the entrance into the city, the vision of God's face.[3] The retribution of the unrighteous is expressed by varied terms of terrible suggestion,—"great tribulation," killing with death, burning with fire, being "without."[4]

Two terms, however, stand out among all others that are used in this connection by the Book of Revelation. These are "the second death,"[5] and "the lake of fire,"[6] or, as it is also designated, "the lake of fire and brimstone,"[7] "the lake that burneth with brimstone"[8] "the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone."[9] They are peculiar to the Apocalypse among the Biblical writings, though they have their points of contact with Old Testament expressions. The idea of a "second death" had a place in Egyptian thought; and it had probably been made so far familiar to the Jew of the apostolic age by its use in the Rabbinical theology. It has a place at anyrate in the Targums as we have them. It is applied to those

[1] vi. 16, 17. [2] xx. 12.
[3] ii. 7, 10, 17, iii. 12, 21, vii. 15, xxi. 7, xxii. 4, 14.
[4] ii. 22, 23, xviii. 8, 9, xxii. 15. [5] ii. 11, xx. 6, 14, xxi. 8.
[6] xx. 14. [7] xx. 10. [8] xix. 20, R.V.
[9] xxi. 8.

who are adjudged to Gehenna. Onkelos employs it as the opposite of eternal life. The Targumist on Deut. xxxiii. 6 explains it as "the death whereby the wicked die in the world to come." Jonathan, as Kimchi understands him, means by it the "death of the soul in the world to come."[1] The companion expression, "the lake of fire," which is also a Rabbinical phrase, has its foundation no doubt in certain ideas and terms of the Old Testament. Those suggest themselves, for example, which appear in the picture of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrha,[2] in the description of the doom of Korah's company,[3] and in Isaiah's figure of Topheth as made ready for the Assyrian, "deep and large, the pile thereof is fire and much wood; the breath of the Lord, like a stream of brimstone, doth kindle it."[4]

But the more definite idea of an "abyss of fire" finds repeated expression in the Book of Enoch. In the vision of the "prison for the stars of heaven and for the host of heaven," Enoch sees a "great abyss in the earth with columns of heavenly fire." The prison of the angels, in which they are "held to eternity," is described as a "complete abyss," into which "great columns of fire" were allowed to fall. The judgment of the "stars" (the fallen angels) is again declared to be this—that they were "thrown into an abyss filled with fire and burning and filled with pillars of fire." The seventy shepherds (the Gentile rulers) are said to be cast into this same abyss of fire; and the blinded sheep (the renegade Israelites) are thrown into an

[1] See Wetstein; Düsterdieck's *Offenbarung Johannis*, *in loc.* ii. 11; Pusey's *What is of Faith*, etc., *ut sup.* p. 69.

[2] Gen. xix. 24. [3] Num. xvi. 35. [4] Isa. xxx. 33, R.V.

abyss like this, opened in the middle of the earth, and "full of fire."[1]

The two expressions are so related that to taste the death is to be cast into the lake. The pains dimly, but terribly, imaged by the figure of the "lake of fire" make "the second death."[2] In the Rabbinical literature the latter term may not have had a perfectly fixed sense. It may have connoted sometimes extinction, and sometimes continuous, conscious punishment. But as it was synonymous with the doom of Gehenna, it seems to have been used, like other phrases of the same kind, to express the lasting retribution which the Jewish theology affirmed to be in reserve at least for certain classes of the godless.[3] In any case in the Apocalypse it means more than annihilation. The "lake of fire" in which this "second death" is experienced, and into which the devil, the beast, and the false prophet are cast, has its torments "day and night for ever and ever."[4] It is exclusion from "the marriage supper of the Lamb," from "the holy city," from the fellowship of God in His "tabernacle with men." It is the death that is beyond all other death. It means existence without the resurrection of life and the crown of life,[5] the existence that is eternal loss and dying.[6]

[1] xviii. 11, xxi. 7–10, xc. 24–42.

[2] xx. 10.

[3] See Weber, *System*, *ut sup.* pp. 374, 375.

[4] xx. 10.

[5] ii. 10, 11.

[6] "The second death, the intensified death," says Gebhardt, "is the coming of sinners to the eternal death from which there is no resurrection, or to perdition (comp. xvii. 8, 11), which consists not in the 'destruction of the wicked,' but in the definite loss of happiness, in eternally restless pangs, and perpetual consciousness of consummated death" (*The Doctrine of the Apocalypse*, p. 291, Clark's trans.). Trench

In its anticipations of the future the Apocalypse follows in most respects the Jewish view of the end of things. It speaks in figures, pictures, and symbols which have a strong Jewish colouring. But its doctrine is far removed at the same time from the conventional descriptions, the gross materialism, the insipid circumstantiality, which astonish and weary us in the ordinary Jewish Apocalypses and in the Rabbinical literature. The restitution and compensation of the righteous, the defeat of their enemies, the punishment of the godless, are inculcated, as we have seen, not only very definitely, but in terms as varied as they are strong and suggestive. But all is given in a very different way from that of the Book of Enoch or the Apocalypse of Baruch, and in another spirit. John's Apocalypse dwells, like other products of the same class, on the signs and events preceding the end. It keeps in the main by the usual Jewish order. It speaks of tribulations for the servants of God, the overthrow of their persecutors and troublers, and the coming of God's Anointed One. It appears to give both views which prevailed in later Judaism on the subject of the events which were to follow Messiah's advent; on the one hand, the last judgment and the final reign; on the other, a limited reign, a final outburst of evil, and then the last judgment. But it indulges little in those calculations of the end, in many cases so laboured and fanciful, on which the popular books of Judaism spent their futile ingenuity.

observes that Philo, though he does not use the phrase "second death," describes the punishment of the ungodly in terms of it, thus—*ζῆν ἀποθνήσκοντα ἀεί, καὶ τρόπον τινὰ θάνατον ἀθάνατον ὑπομένειν καὶ ἀτελεύτητον.* See his *Commentary on the Epistles to the Seven Churches*, p. 104.

The *Book of Enoch* describes the angels who defiled the earth as bound for "seventy generations till the day of their judgment and consummation, till the judgment which is for ever and ever is consummated." It speaks of the world lasting for ten weeks of seven generations each; of which weeks seven are referred to the past and three to the future. The eighth of the succession is declared to be the week of righteousness, when "sinners will be delivered into the hands of the righteous"; the ninth week is to be that in which the "world will be written down for destruction"; and in the "tenth week in the seventh part there will be the great eternal judgment . . . and the first heaven will depart and pass away, and a new heaven will appear. After which there will be many weeks without number for ever in goodness and righteousness, and sin will no more be mentioned for ever." [1]

Other reckonings are given elsewhere. According to the *Assumption of Moses*, for instance, the time from Moses to the judgment is to extend over two hundred and fifty jubilee periods.[2] The *Sibylline Oracles* speak of eleven generations, in the tenth of which the judgment is to take place.[3] The *Apocalypse of Baruch* employs the figures of a cloud of white and black waters and a series of twelve floods. These floods, of which eleven are past and the twelfth is coming, mark the interval between the beginning of things and their end. So the *Fourth Book of Esdras* divides the whole period into twelve

[1] x. 12, etc., xci. 12–17, xciii. See Charles' edition, *sub. loc.*

[2] x. 29, etc.

[3] iv. 47, the MSS. give the *tenth*. But Bleek and many others correct this into the *eleventh*.

parts, of which ten are past. Messiah's days are reckoned to be four hundred. Then He dies and all men with Him; the earth is empty for seven days; and thereafter come the resurrection and the judgment.[1] In the *Ascension of Isaiah* a reign of three years seven months and twenty-seven days is given to Berial, the angel of the world. Then the Lord is to come from the seventh heaven after 1335 days and cast Berial and his army into Gehenna; after which the dead are to be raised, and the fire is to consume the wicked.[2]

The Talmudical books have many calculations of a similar kind, all fantastic and differing greatly one from the other in the numbers. The world or age is said to be destined to endure six thousand years, and to be destroyed in a thousand. It is reckoned to be waste in two thousand years. It is stated to have passed two thousand years in emptiness and two thousand years under the law, and to have two thousand years of Messiah. Again, it is said to last not less than eighty-five jubilees; and the days of Messiah are declared to be now forty years, now seventy, now three generations, and again three hundred and sixty-five years, four hundred years, six hundred, one thousand, two thousand, seven thousand, and so forth.[3] But the periods in John's Apocalypse are more akin to the symbolism of the Old Testament,—the seventy years of Jeremiah, and the seventy sacred weeks of Daniel, and the extravagance of these Jewish books is avoided.

[1] xiv. 11, 12. [2] iv.

[3] See Briggs' *Origin and History of Pre-Millenarianism* (*Lutheran Quarterly Review*, April 1879); Drummond's *Jewish Messiah*, pp. 35, 144, etc.; with the references to the *Babylonian Talmud*, *Synhed*, 97A, 99A, etc.

The Apocalypse of St. John runs in the essential antitheses between good and evil, in the eternal contrasts between the Church and the world, between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Satan, between Christ as the final expression of good and the world-forces as the final expression of evil. It looks to the issues of the necessary conflict between the Church and anti-Christian, Satanic power. The coming of Christ is the expectation which beats in it, the keynote to all its music, solemn and joyous. This coming is not merely an event of the end. For to John historical acts of judgment or chastening, as in the cases of the seven churches, are identified with the Lord's coming.[1] But there is also a final objective coming, which has the judgment of all in view. This is described in pictorial language which recalls the imagery of the Old Testament prophets.[2]

Along with the hope of a perfected society of men, there is the hope of a perfected world or order of nature. There is the vision of the completed community or church, the perfected city which needs no temple because it is the scene of God's constant presence, of His immediate fellowship, and of the rewards of His redeemed.[3] And there is the vision of a new heaven and a new earth, in which there shall be no more sea, the sea being "the strange deep out of which the ungodly powers of the present are supposed to arise."[4]

There are certain peculiarities in its doctrine of the final destinies of men. It shows traces of the influence

[1] ii. 5, 16.
[2] *E.g.*, i. 7 (cf. Zech. xii. 10), xiv. (cf. Isa. xiii.), xvi. 16, xxii. 7, 11.
[3] xxi. 1–xxii. 5. [4] Beyschlag, *ut sup.* ii. p. 405.

of different readings of Old Testament prophecy, and different views of the last issues, which were current in Judaism. The figures which it employs are capable of more than one interpretation, especially those which speak of the penalties of the end. Hence it has seemed to some to be indeterminate on that subject, or to give expression to two distinct ideas which obtained a place in Jewish thought. "The representation wavers," it is said, "between eternal torment and complete annihilation."[1]

On the other hand, it is thought to express two conceptions of the final reward of the righteous. When it is said in the vision of the beast which rose up out of the sea and opened its mouth in blasphemy against God, that it was to blaspheme not only God's name and tabernacle, but "them that dwell in heaven," we seem to have the idea of an immediate entrance into the Divine glory after death.[2] When again the "souls of them that were slain for the word of God and the testimony which they held" are introduced as crying beneath the altar and resting for a little season, they appear to be represented as in the under-world, waiting for the time when they shall have the full vision of God, and the joy of His immediate presence.[3] It has to be noticed,

[1] So Beyschlag, who speaks of it as "clinging to a twofold issue for human life." He thinks that eternal retribution is affirmed in such passages as xiv. 9–11, xx. 10; but that when it is said that "not merely the devil and Antichrist, but also death and Hades, which are not persons, are cast into the lake of fire, that can only mean the abolition of death as a power, and the annihilation of his kingdom, as in 1 Cor. xv. 26" (*New Testament Theology*, *ut sup.* ii. pp. 404, 405).

[2] xiii. 6.

[3] vi. 9–11. See Cheyne's *Origin of the Psalter*, pp. 415, 443, 444; and Spitta's *Die Offenbarung des Johannes*, pp. 298, 372, as referred to there.

however, that in the latter instance it is the special case of the martyrs that is in view, and as regards both the penalties and the rewards the vivid imagery must be read as literature, not as dogma.

But there are other things in which the doctrine of the end which pervades the Apocalypse has features of its own. In the last issue it is God who appears as Judge, as we have found to be the case in the Epistle to the Hebrews.[1] In what it says of the final blessedness, the Apocalypse is also remarkable for the strong Jewish cast of its ideas. These are very different, however, from what we find in the ordinary Jewish books. In the latter, the Holy Land appears as the destined scene of the kingdom of God in its perfection; Jerusalem also is to be the centre of the kingdom; and extraordinary descriptions are given of the way in which the Jews dispersed in foreign lands are to be gathered again to their country, and to reach the renovated city by underground passages and otherwise. The *Fourth Book of Esdras* speaks of the ten tribes as coming from the further region called Azareth or Arzaph, and having the fountains of the Euphrates stayed for them by God in order that they may pass over.[2]

There is nothing of this in the Apocalypse of St.

[1] In the Apocalypse, however, it is only at that final stage. Beyschlag puts the case thus: "Although Christ is marked out and glorified in our book as Judge of the world, in the last act of judgment He retires in God's presence, who has reserved for Himself the last victory over Satan, and the final decision about the destiny of human souls" (*New Testament Theology*, *ut sup.* p. 404).

[2] xiii. 39–47. See Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, ii. 2, pp. 170, 171, Clark's trans.; and Drummond's *The Jewish Messiah*, pp. 333–336.

John. It speaks in one singular passage of "the beloved city" as the centre of the millennial kingdom.[1] As Isaiah[2] prophesied of the creation of new heavens and a new earth, and, along with that, of the "creation of Jerusalem a rejoicing," so the Apocalypse has the vision of a new Jerusalem, but one of a heavenly order, one that comes "down from God out of heaven."[3] Its last conception of the final blessedness, if it still looks to earth as the scene, is that of a tabernacle or fellowship of God Himself with men.

There is one section of the book that stands quite alone. That is the famous paragraph in the twentieth chapter, which has been the stronghold of the premillenarian dogma. It speaks of a period of a thousand years during which Satan is to be bound and Christ is to reign, in which also "the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus" are to live and reign with Him. The kingdom of Christ thus established on earth for a measured time, however, is to be followed by a last outbreak of Satanic power, and Christ is then to enter with the final judgment. The Day of the Lord is thus divided into two distinct parts. There is a double resurrection; there is also a double judgment. The first resurrection is one in which only the saints, and indeed only the martyred saints, share. The second resurrection is indicated as an inclusive resurrection, when it is said that "the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished." The first judgment takes the form of an overthrow and imprisonment of Satan. The second judgment is expressed in forensic terms.

[1] xx. 9. [2] lxv. 17–25. [3] xxi. 2, etc.

The throne is set, the dead of all classes stand before God, the books are opened, and men are judged out of these records. This judgment is preceded by the overthrow of the godless powers in earth's extremities, these powers being given in large, shadowy outline under the names of Gog and Magog. It results in the casting of death and Hades, along with the devil, into the lake of fire, the second death, from which is no deliverance.

The language of the passage is taken in part from the Old Testament pictures of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrha, and in part from Ezekiel's description of the judgment of the world-powers.[1] Is the passage a prophecy of a kingdom or reign of Christ which is distinct from His continuous reign in the Church, and from the sovereignty which is to be fully established at the end of the world? Is it that the earth itself is to be for a space of time, which is described by the symbolism of a millennium as at once lengthened and limited, the scene of a glorious visible kingdom of Christ, in which the power of Satan is to be curbed, Christ Himself is to be supreme, and His martyred saints, raised by a resurrection in which the rest of the dead do not share, are to reign with Him?

For a certain period the literal interpretation was largely accepted, and was often pressed to very extreme issues. This was the case especially during the latter part of the second century and the first half of the third, which marked the flourishing age of the Chiliastic ideas. It was not favoured, however, by the best of the Apostolic Fathers—Clement of Rome,

[1] Ezek. xxxviii., xxxix.

Polycarp of Smyrna, or Ignatius of Antioch. It is not found in writings like the Shepherd of Hermas, the Doctrine of Addai, or the Epistle to Diognetus. Nor, with one doubtful exception, does it appear in the works of the great Apologists and writers akin to these—Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Hegesippus, Dionysius of Corinth, Melito, and others. The doubtful exception is Justin Martyr, who seems to keep by the ordinary eschatology in all but a single passage. In the eightieth chapter of his Dialogue with Trypho, he speaks of himself and other right-minded Christians as "assured that there will be a resurrection of the dead, and a thousand years in Jerusalem, which will then be built and adorned and enlarged as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and others declare." In the eighty-first chapter, he refers expressly to the paragraph in this twentieth chapter of the Apocalypse, and to John as saying there that "those who believe in Christ would dwell a thousand years in Jerusalem, and that thereafter the general, and, in short, the eternal, resurrection and judgment of all men would likewise take place." This is the only passage, however, of the kind in Justin, and it may indicate perhaps that, while he held the ordinary doctrine of the Second Coming, he saw that John's words in this chapter were of a different import, and could be fairly read only as thus explained. The Epistle of Barnabas, again, speaks, it is true, of all things being finished in six days, or six thousand years; of the Son of God coming for judgment in the seventh day; and of an eighth day that is to follow as the beginning of a new world.[1] But

[1] Chap. xv.

the book makes no use of the Apocalypse, and the idea which it expresses under these numerical reckonings is that of a millennial Sabbath, not a millennial kingdom intercalated between two distinct resurrections.[1]

On the other hand, writers like Irenæus and Tertullian, following the crudities of Papias, who in his turn drew his fantastic millennial notions in all probability from the Apocalypse of Baruch, interpreted the section in the Revelation of St. John in the most literal way. The former speaks of the righteous rising and reigning in the inheritance promised by God to the fathers; of the judgment taking place after that; and of John seeing the new Jerusalem "descending upon the new earth . . . . after the times of the kingdom, when there will be a general resurrection and judgment of the dead, great and small."[2] The latter speaks of a kingdom promised upon earth, to be established after the resurrection, and to last for a thousand years in the divinely-built city of Jerusalem; of Ezekiel having knowledge of this, and of John beholding it; and of the thousand years as the period within which the resurrection of the saints is completed.[3] This literal interpretation, with the general millenarian doctrine, was also adopted more or less by Hippolytus, Commodian, and others.

Those who repudiated the millenarian doctrine were naturally driven to other methods of interpreting this intractable section of the Apocalypse. Cyprian,

[1] See Briggs' *Origin and History of Pre-Millenarianism*, pp. 10, 11.
[2] v. 32–35. [3] *Adv. Marc.* iii. 24.

for example, understood the first resurreetion to refer to the immediate ascent of the faithful dead out of afflictions and tribulations into the presence of God and Christ.[1] Vietorinus of Petau took the first resurreetion to be the spiritual resurrection of whieh Paul speaks in Colossians iii. 1, and the thousand years to be the "eompleting of the number of the perfeet."[2] By the influence of the Alexandrian sehool the figurative interpretation beeame current in aneient times, and it has survived in different forms till our own day. Some of these forms have the merit of ingenuity; as, for example, that whieh explains the first resurreetion to be the rising of the saints to a seeond life in the life of the heroes of the millennium. But the figurative interpretation, it must be owned, cannot be made exegetically good even in its most plausible applieations. At this point the Apoealypse of St. John attaehes itself to a view of the things of the end whieh we have seen expressed in some of the Jewish books, and which is different from that elsewhere found in the New Testament. Criticism has attempted to solve this diffieulty and to aeeount for other singular and perplexing passages in the book. It has addressed itself to the question of the integrity of the eomposition, endeavouring to show that the present is not the primary form of the Revelation of St. John. One acute critic propounds the theory that the book was originally a Jewish Apocalypse, written in Aramaie, rendered into Greek by a Christian hand, and worked up by some one belonging to the sehool of Paul, so as to be suitable for use by

[1] *Exh. ad Martyr*, xiii.

[2] See Briggs, *ut sup.* p. 28, etc.

Gentile Christians.[1] Another elaborates a subtle and somewhat far-fetched analysis of the composition, with the object of proving that, as we now have it, it is the result of a series of redactions, which added largely to its original contents. In its first form it was an Apocalypse belonging probably to Nero's time, to which form the disputed paragraph may have belonged. But it was much extended and in great measure made a new thing by a succession of recensions which took place in Trajan's time, about 130 A.D., and about 140 A.D.[2]

Thus far at least the explanations offered by criticism, though they have opened up some suggestive lines of inquiry, have not been more than tentative. However the circumstance is to be accounted for, and however it is to be related to the general teaching of the New Testament, it must be admitted that this remarkable paragraph in John's Apocalypse speaks of a real millennial reign of Christ on earth together with certain of His saints, which comes in between a first resurrection and the final judgment.

This peculiar anticipation of the end, however, has at the best only a subordinate place. The paragraph certainly speaks at least of two stages in Christ's Advent. But in what it says of the first it has in view only the case of the martyred saints. It speaks of a special recompense or privilege for that class, and from

[1] Eb. Vischer, whose theory is favoured also by his teacher, Professor Harnack.

[2] D. Völter, *Die Entstehung der Apocalypse*. The composite character of the book is advocated, with various modifications, by Fr. Spitta, K. Erbes, G. J. Weyland, A. Sabatier, H. Schoen, etc.

this the book passes quickly to its general theme—the anticipation of Christ's return to judge all and reward His own, and the vision of the perfected kingdom, in which God Himself shall dwell with His people in a renewed world.

CHAPTER III

THE DOCTRINE OF PETER AND JOHN

THE letters and discourses which are associated with the name of Peter have an unmistakable individuality. They bear the stamp of the strong, simple, eager, expectant character which the Gospels show Andrew's brother to have been. There are certain points of resemblance of a natural and intelligible kind between them and the words and writings of James, John, and Paul. There are some interesting links of connection, both in thought and in expression, in particular between Peter's First Epistle and the Epistle of James. There are still more interesting points of contact between Peter's great letter and the Epistles of Paul to the Romans and the Ephesians. These affinities are so remarkable that some have been misled into pronouncing Peter's Epistle in large part a compilation. But all that bears Peter's name has a style of its own, and belongs to a distinct circle of ideas. Peter has his own way of setting forth the contents of the "true grace of God," his own way of regarding the position of Christ his Lord, his own way of looking at the future. His teaching and preaching constantly reflect the thought, the language, the imagery of the Old Testament. To him the Christian people are the

"chosen generation," the "royal priesthood," and the Church of Christ is the Church of Israel emancipated and perfected. But while James and Paul dwell largely on the Old Testament law, Peter dwells more with the prophets.

Above all, his face is towards the future. With him Christ is the Christ of history, whom Peter loved, and whose words linger in his memory, giving colour to much of his speech and writing. But he is much more the Christ of glory, the risen, ascended, glorified Christ; the Christ who is to return. The Second Coming, the "appearing of Jesus Christ," fills his view. His mind tarries with the things of hope; he sees everything in the light of the end, and the end is at hand. The deep intuitions of John which read the future in the present are strange to Peter. The profound mysteries of sin and grace, the conflicts between good and evil in the broken life which now is, are the themes of Paul rather than of Peter. With the latter the present life of the Christian is seen rather in the light of what it is to be when Christ comes.

This is true of all Peter's words. It is especially true of the First Epistle, which Luther and all minds of larger and deeper order have felt to be one of the noblest and richest of all the Epistles of the New Testament. It is an eschatological letter; it is an epistle of hope, watching, and expectation. The present existence has only the value of the passing existence of strangers and pilgrims. The real magnitude is an inheritance of the future, which is subject to no decay, to no tarnish, to no withering.[1] The

[1] i. 4.

inheritance which Peter looks for is no longer the kingdom found on earth, to which the Jewish mind was content to turn, but one "reserved in heaven." The inspiration of life is the hope, the living hope, of this heavenly consummation.

All things are looked at in their relation to the future. *Glory, honour, life*, each in its prospective aspects, are the great words of the Epistle. The reward of Christ's servants is not any earthly blessedness, but a crown of glory, an amaranthine crown, which is to be received when the Chief Shepherd is manifested.[1] The end of God's call is "His eternal glory."[2] Judgment is within the horizon. God Himself is Judge.[3] Christ also is Judge, and His judgment, which is ready, is a universal, final judgment, embracing both living and dead.[4] It begins with the house of God; it makes itself known in the siftings, separations, and trials of this last stage of man's earthly history, and by these it gives token of the "end" which it reserves for "the ungodly and the sinner."[5] Christ's Return, His Revelation, His "Apocalypse," is the central theme. The expectation of that event gives colour to Peter's whole conception of Christian truth and Christian duty. Salvation is a thing essentially of the future, a thing that is "ready to be revealed at the last time."[6] The praise and honour and glory which are the rewards of tried faith, are to be found at "the appearing of Jesus Christ."[7] Grace itself is the object of constant, perfect hope, something which is being brought us, coming ever nearer as "the

[1] v. 4. [2] v. 10. [3] i. 17. [4] iv. 5.
[5] v. 17, 18. [6] i. 5. [7] i. 7.

revelation of Jesus Christ" draws nigh.[1] The Christian who is partaker of Christ's reproach and suffering looks to a glory of Christ which is yet to be revealed, in which he shall share and be "glad also with exceeding joy."[2]

So far Peter's teaching on the subject of the future, while it has a marked character of its own, both in the way in which it is expressed and in the proportions in which the things of the end are given, is in entire and obvious harmony with all that we have hitherto had in the New Testament. Has it, however, any peculiar elements? Does it disclose any truth or give any intimation on the subject of the intermediate state, the future of the world, or the destiny of the impenitent, that is not found elsewhere, or that goes beyond anything that is found elsewhere, in definiteness and doctrinal significance?

We have already referred to a passage in the Second Epistle which speaks of the doom of apostates in terms like those used by Jude,—terms which cannot be justly understood to point to less than a certain, perpetual, hopeless doom.[3] But, as in the New Testament Epistles generally, the judgment of the impenitent is only a subordinate and occasional theme with Peter. In his First Epistle it is touched on but once or twice, incidentally and in connection with other subjects.[4]

The Second Epistle, however, is remarkable for its doctrine of the conclusion that is to be put to the present system of things. Into the question of the authenticity of the Epistle and its claim to a place in

[1] i. 13. [2] iv. 14, v. 1. [3] 2 Pet. ii. 17.
[4] 1 Pet. iv. 5, v. 17, 18.

the canon, we cannot enter here. Whatever view is taken of its authorship, the paragraph in its third chapter deserves notice for the nature and the fulness of its statement on the destiny of the world; for its connection with the Old Testament doctrine; and for its relation to other passages of a similar tenor in the New Testament.

The subject of this paragraph is the promise of Christ's Coming. In the first chapter the writer has spoken of Christ's kingdom as an "eternal kingdom," a kingdom of the future into which "the entrance shall be richly supplied" to those who make diligent use of God's grace. He has spoken also of "the Power and Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,"[1] declaring it to be the last labour of his life to establish his readers in the expectation of it. Here he admonishes them that the hope of the Lord's Parousia will be assailed by the keen shafts of ridicule and mockery. "In the last days," that is, in the times immediately preceding the Advent and introducing the final Messianic age, scoffers will rise, pointing to the unchanged aspect of things, and asking with scornful incredulity, "Where is the promise of His coming?" Such questions can be put only in forgetfulness of the fate of the old world, which perished by water. "But the heavens that now are," he proceeds, "and the earth, by the same word have been stored up for fire, being reserved against the day of judgement and destruction of ungodly men."[2]

This statement is the largest and most detailed of its kind which the New Testament contains. In speak-

[1] 2 Pet. i. 11, 16. [2] 2 Pet. iii. 7, R.V.

ing of fire as the agent in the dissolution of the world, it founds upon the history of the cities of the plain as typical of the destruction of the end, and on the Old Testament conception of God as accompanied by fire when He comes forth to judge.[1] Other Old Testament passages speak in more general terms of the passing away of the existing system.[2] And as the earlier Scriptures connect that event with the judgment of Jehovah and the day of His recompense, Peter connects it with the day which he designates the "day of the Lord," or the Parousia of Christ.[3]

In the section that follows this,[4] the writer, reasserting the truth that the day of the Lord, although some deem it so late of appearing that it will never appear, will come certainly and suddenly, gives his doctrine of the consummation to which things are to be brought by that event. "But the day of the Lord will come," he says, "as a thief; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements (or *heavenly bodies*, as in the margin) shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein shall be burned up (or *dis-*

[1] Ps. l. 3, xcvii. 3; Isa. lxvi. 15, 16, 24; Dan. vii. 9, 10. The idea of a world-conflagration occurs also in the *Sibylline* books. See, *e.g.*, iii. 84–87.

[2] Ps. cii. 26, 27; Job xiv. 12; Isa. xxxiv. 4, lxvi. 22.

[3] "The present world," says Weiss, "is protected by God's word of promise (Gen. ix. 11) against any recurring flood, yet if it, too, is to perish, there remains now only *fire* as the element to bring about its destruction; and, as on the ground of Old Testament representations, the wrathful judgment of God is regarded as a consuming fire, it is easy to think that the destruction of the world resulting from the day of judgment will be brought about by fire in the special sense, for which the present form of the world is, so to speak, reserved" (*Biblical Theology, ut sup.* ii. pp. 246, 247).

[4] 2 Pet. iii. 10–14.

covered, as in the margin). Seeing that these things are thus all to be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in *all* holy living and godliness, looking for and earnestly desiring (or *hastening*, as in the margin) the coming (or *presence*) of the day of God, by reason of which the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements (or *heavenly bodies*) shall melt with fervent heat? But, according to His promise, we look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness" (R.V.).

This statement on the end of the world is given in a strain as tender as it is solemn and pointed. It is introduced not in a dogmatic interest, but with a view to certain practical duties which are closely connected with the Christian view of the end, and are here based in part on the terror of the catastrophe which comes in the train of Christ's Parousia, but also on the brighter aspect which the Coming presents to the Christian,—the new and holier system of things which shall then take the place of the present. The interpretation is not free from difficulty. It is not easy to determine whether by the στοιχεῖα we are to understand the *elements*, that is to say, the materials of which the world is made up, or the *heavenly bodies*, the things of which the heavens consist, as sun and moon and stars are introduced both into the Old Testament descriptions of the day of the Lord and into Christ's announcement of it.[1] The word may be taken perhaps in a large sense, cover-

[1] Isa. xiii. 9, 10, xxiv. 23, xxxiv. 4, etc.; Matt. xxiv. 29. Spitta understands the στοιχεῖα to mean not the material elements themselves that make the world, but the elemental spirits that were supposed to proceed from God and animate the dead matter. See his *Der zweite Brief des Petrus*, *sub loc.*

ing the whole framework of the existing system as conceived to be formed of earth and heaven. The σπεύδοντας, again, may mean either *earnestly desiring* or *hastening*. But there is much to favour the latter rendering, especially the congruity of the idea with the appeal made by Peter in Solomon's porch,[1] where the repentance of Israel is represented as a condition of the entrance of the "times of refreshing." The point, therefore, seems to be the accelerating of Christ's Advent, "causing it to come the more quickly," as it is put by Trench, "by helping to fulfil those conditions without which it cannot come—that day being no day inexorably fixed, but one the arrival of which it is free for the Church to help and hasten on by faith and prayer and through a more rapid accomplishing of the number of the elect."[2] That this idea, though seldom expressed in the New Testament, was not unfamiliar to the Jews, may perhaps be inferred from the occurrence of such Rabbinical sayings as this: "If thou keepest this precept, thou hastenest the day of Messiah." To other things that are doubtful or peculiar may be added the textual difficulty, the choice between the readings *burnt up* and *discovered*, in the tenth verse.

But these things do not affect the general sense of the paragraph. Its purport is that the consummation which is to take place at Christ's return is to embrace the reconstruction of the existing system of things. The present order is to be dissolved, and its place is to be taken by "new heavens and a new earth"—*fresh* heavens and a *fresh* earth (καινοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ γῆν καινήν),

[1] Acts iii. 19–21.

[2] *On the Authorised Version*, p. 131.

in contrast with the corrupt and exhausted condition that now is. This renovated world will be the abode of righteousness, and the seat of the perfected kingdom of God. According to Jewish ideas, this perfected kingdom, which was to have its centre in the Holy Land, was also to embrace the whole world; and the Old Testament prophets spoke of a new heavens and a new earth which Jehovah was to create.[1] What prophecy and Jewish idea had associated with the Advent of Messiah, this paragraph associates with the Second Coming. Beyond this it does not go. But it connects with the same event of the Parousia the final fate of the ungodly, of which this Epistle speaks throughout in the darkest and most absolute terms. The present heavens and earth are "reserved against the day of judgement and destruction of the ungodly" (R.V.). The doom of these "ungodly" is expressed as "destruction" or "perdition," the term being the nominal form of the verb rendered "perished" in the previous verse. In that verse it is obvious that the idea is not *annihilation*, but the breaking up of the order of the old world. In this verse there is as little reason to suppose that absolute extinction of being is intended.

The questions of most serious interest, however, regarding the teaching of Peter are these: Does it anywhere include the idea of a *Universal Restoration*? And does it affirm a *ministry of Christ in Hades*, with an extension of grace and opportunity beyond the present life? These are questions, especially the latter, on the decision of which theological

[1] Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 22; cf. also Ps. cii. 26, 27; Isa. li. 6; Job xiv. 12.

issues of the largest moment have been made to turn. They have been long and anxiously debated, and much that is connected with them is yet unsettled. The conclusions to which they have been brought have differed greatly at different periods. In the interpretation of Scripture, as in all things else, there is a fashion which is induced by the general thought of the time. The force of this has been felt in the exposition of the obscure passages which have been thought to bear upon these problems. At one time the general tendency has been to give a negative answer; at another, again, it has been in favour of an affirmative. These questions demand the most careful consideration.

The first may be quickly answered. Peter certainly speaks of a *restoration* or *restitution of all things*. What does he mean by it? The words occur in his discourse to the people who gathered round the two apostles in Solomon's porch, wondering at the cure of the lame man. "Repent ye therefore, and turn again," was Peter's address to the men of Israel on that occasion, "that your sins may be blotted out, so that there may come seasons of refreshing from the presence of the Lord; and that He may send the Christ who hath been appointed for you, *even* Jesus; whom the heavens must receive until the times of restoration of all things, whereof God spake by the mouth of His holy prophets which have been since the world began."[1] This has been taken by some to express, or at least to suggest, a final restoration of all men. Even when it is admitted that, as the words

[1] Acts iii. 19-21, R.V.

stand, nothing is said of an ultimate recovery of all the godless, it is sometimes urged that there are principles in the heart of the statement which furnish a basis for the hope of such a recovery.[1]

But all this is foreign to Peter's intention. The object of his discourse is to bring his Jewish hearers to repentance and to the acceptance of Jesus as their Messiah. He has only Israel's case in view. It was not, indeed, till a later stage, after he had received the special enlightenment of the vision which is recorded in the tenth chapter of the Book of Acts, that he looked beyond that. The "seasons of refreshing" (*καιροὶ ἀναψύξεως*), therefore, are the Messianic times, the times of rest and life which were promised Israel. These "seasons" are now in the "presence of the Lord," in the heavens which are Christ's present abode. They are connected with the Parousia, and are ready to be sent when Israel turns to God. So far all is sufficiently clear. But what is to be understood by the "times of restoration of all things" (*χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων*), which are to come when Christ leaves these heavens and revisits earth? The key to their interpretation is to be sought in the prophetic passage to which they carry us back,[2] and in our Lord's use of that passage on the occasion of His descent from the Mount of Transfiguration.[3]

[1] Dr. Otto Riemann, for example, acknowledges that the words themselves refer to another subject, but holds that the repentance and conversion which are stated as the conditions of the *ἀποκατάστασις* here in view are conditions applicable to restoration in the fullest sense, before or after Christ's return. *Die Lehre von der Apocatastasis*, pp. 23–26.

[2] Mal. iii. 5, 6.

[3] Matt. xvii. 9–13.

The prophecy of Malachi closes with the promise that Elias, the greatest of the prophets of the old dispensation, was to be sent before the "great and terrible day of the Lord." His mission was to be one of preparation for that day. The preparation was to be made in the way of a renewal of loyalty on the part of the people to the Divine law. Of this renewed loyalty an essential requirement and immediate token would be the restoration of piety and order in the homes of Israel, the turning of the "heart of the fathers unto the children and the heart of the children to their fathers." These were to be the moral conditions of the Lord's coming. On the ground of this word of the Lord in Malachi, the expectation of the appearance of Elijah before the Messiah became general among the Jews. It is found in the Jewish books.[1] There are repeated indications of it in the Gospels.[2] It was also a common, though not universal, opinion among the Jews that the coming of Messiah Himself was dependent on the repentance of Israel. In those reckonings of the course of the world which divided it into three periods of two thousand years each, the time for Messiah was held to have arrived already, and His coming was believed to be delayed by the unrepented transgressions of the Jewish people. "If all Israel," it was said, "would together repent

[1] Along with other references, an important passage from the Mishna is given by Schürer, *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, *ut sup.* ii. 2, pp. 156, 157. See also Weber, *System*, *ut sup.* pp. 337–339.

[2] Matt. xi. 14, xvi. 14, xvii. 10; Mark vi. 15, viii. 28; Luke ix. 8, 19; John i. 21. Professor Schürer (*ut sup.* p. 156) points out that it was "even transferred to the circle of Christian ideas," and that it appears in *Commodian* and the *Sibylline Oracles*.

for a whole day, the redemption of Messiah would come." [1]

This expectation was in the minds of our Lord's disciples when He bade them tell to no man the vision they had seen of Moses and Elias, till after His resurrection. "Why then say the scribes," they ask, "that Elias must first come?" If Christ forbids them to say anything of this appearance of Elias, are not the scribes in error in speaking of his coming? Is not this manifestation on the Mount the fulfilment of Malachi's word? If not, is it all a mistake as to a coming of Elias? Christ replies that Elias "indeed cometh, and shall restore all things," nay, that he has already come, although the scribes knew him not. Here the words "shall restore all things" (*ἀποκαταστήσει πάντα*) are those which the Septuagint employs in rendering the Hebrew of the prophet. They express the restoration of order in Israel, the recovery of the people to loyalty to the theocratic law, as the scribes understood it, and the moral restoration preached by John, in which Christ Himself saw the fulfilment of the prophecy.

In Peter's discourse, therefore, the "times of restoration of all things," read in the light of our Lord's words and Malachi's prophecy, can only mean one or other of two things. They may be "times" distinct from the "seasons of refreshing," and immediately preceding them—times which were to *condition* the advent of these "seasons." [2] Or they are "times" coincident

[1] Schürer, *ut sup.* ii. 2, p. 163; Weber, *System*, *ut sup.* pp. 334, etc.

[2] So Meyer, for the special reason that these "times" are represented here as having to come *before* Christ is sent from heaven.

with these "seasons," the final Messianic era in which the kingdom of God is to be brought to its consummation in a regenerated earth.[1]

The *restoration*, consequently, which is in view is either the moral renewal of Israel, the return of the people in penitence to their proper spiritual relations, or the renovation of the world, its return to a glory such as it had in the beginning. The idea of a universal recovery of sinful humanity, or of all evil beings, is not only alien to the whole scope of the passage, but is inconsistent with the application of the terms in question. For that Christ, when He refers to the words of prophecy which are also in Peter's mind, speaks of Elias as restoring "all *things*" (πάντα), is sufficient proof that the restoration which is here intended is a restoration not of *persons* but of *conditions*.

But if it is clear that Peter has no doctrine of a Universal Restoration, is it equally clear that he has no doctrine of a ministry of Christ in Hades? Three passages come into view here. One of these is in the Pentecostal Discourse. The application which Peter makes of the Sixteenth Psalm, when he says that David spoke of the resurrection of Christ, that "neither was He left in Hades, nor did His flesh see corruption,"[2] has been held, when read in connection with the passages immediately to be considered in the First Epistle, to imply a visit of Christ to Hades, and a consequent activity there. Of the meaning of the

[1] So, among others, Holtzmann, who connects the ὃν not with the χρόνων, but with the πάντων. *Handcommentar, sub loc.* Blass also refers the ὃν to the πάντων, but on the mistaken ground that the Greek would require οὕς, if the relative belonged to the χρόνων. *Acta Apostolorum, in loc.*

[2] Acts ii. 31 (R.V.).

various terms in the Psalm itself, the kind of confidence which it expresses toward the future, and the contribution which it makes to the faith in immortality, we have already spoken.[1] It is enough here to add that, in Peter's use of it on this occasion, the resurrection of Christ is the central thing, and that beyond the statement that at His death He passed into the world of the departed like other men, but passed thither only to rise again, nothing is said either about Hades itself, about Christ's abode in it, about any activity of His disembodied spirit, or about any ministry of grace there.

The famous passages, however, in the First Epistle, on the *preaching to the spirits in prison*, and the *preaching of the gospel to the dead*, cannot be so readily disposed of. They are both among the dark oracles of the New Testament, the unsolved if not insoluble problems of its interpretation. On the first of these a little library has been written, only to leave it almost as much the subject of debate as before. It has been taken as one of the primary proof-passages for the dogma of the Descent to Hell or Hades—a dogma to which a place of extraordinary importance is given in some systems of theology. Ideas involving theological issues of novel character and far-reaching moment have been found in it. Theories of the liberation and elevation of the saints of pre-Christian times, of a penal endurance of God's wrath by Christ as man's representative, of a purgatorial detention and purification of souls, of a judicial manifestation of the Redeemer to the impenitent dead, of opportunities of repentance

[1] Pp. 237–239.

and an offered gospel in the world of the dead, have all been thought to obtain some warrant from it. The most discordant constructions have been put upon its general drift and its particular terms. These are too many to enumerate, not to say to discuss, here. None, not even the best and most cautious of them, can be said to have been entirely successful. There are some scholars, indeed, who have ventured to speak of the difficulties of the passage as rather created by its interpreters than inherent in itself.[1] But the greatest exegetes and theologians have been precisely those who have felt these difficulties most acutely, and have been least positive in their expositions. To Luther, for example, it was so dark a saying that he confessed himself baffled by it, and inclined to different views of its meaning at different periods of his career. Those most versed in the history of its exegesis, and most competent to grapple with its grammatical problems, are the least certain about their conclusions, and the first to confess that it remains at the best a question of the proportion of difficulty that is left by competing interpretations.

In order to judge on which side the balance of probability lies, it is necessary to look with care into the connection in which the whole paragraph stands, the object with which it is introduced, the syntax of its several clauses, and the usage of its more remarkable terms. On none of these things has opinion been anything like uniform. The object immediately in hand, however, seems sufficiently obvious. The writer's purpose is to arm his readers with a Christlike endurance

[1] So Steiger in his *Exposition of 1 Peter*.

of wrongful suffering by motives drawn from Christ's own case. He reminds those believers in Asia, Cappadocia, and remoter territories that Christ suffered, and that theirs, therefore, is no singular lot; that Christ suffered[1] the just for the unjust with a view to a great good for them, and they, therefore, should be well content to bear any injurious ill; that, while He suffered unto death, His dying issued in a quickened life, and for that reason they ought to take heart to keep the good conscience in all persecution and wrong. So far there is very general agreement. But the agreement at once disappears when we come to the words which follow the statement about Christ suffering or dying "for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God" (R.V.). Having spoken of Christ as "being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit," Peter proceeds in this unexampled strain—"in which also He went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which aforetime were disobedient, when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved through water: which also after a true likeness doth now save you, *even* baptism, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the interrogation of a good conscience toward God, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ; who is on the right hand of God, having gone into heaven; angels and authorities and powers being made subject to Him."[2]

[1] Or *died*, as the R.V. gives it in the margin. The best critics prefer ἀπέθανεν to ἔπαθε.

[2] 1 Pet. iii. 18–22, R.V.

What is the point of those remarkable sentences? Is it to confirm these suffering Christians in patient endurance, and to deepen the encouragement drawn from Christ's suffering and death in a righteous cause, by reminding them that He preached to the dead in His disembodied state, and thereby gave proof that His true life was not impaired, His gracious activities neither interrupted nor impeded by His unjust death? Or is it to stimulate them to a Christlike attitude toward the evil and the persecuting, by the mention of an antecedent ministry of Christ, which bore witness to the doomed men of Noah's generation of the long-suffering of God, and revealed the constancy of His purpose to bear with the most unworthy and do good to the greatest wrong-doers? As the point of the paragraph is variously understood and one or other of its clauses is taken to be the central statement, different constructions are put upon its teaching. The chief questions are these: Does it speak of a ministry of Christ in any sense, a manifestation of Christ in the world of the dead, or an experience of Christ? If it gives any indication of a ministry of Christ, is it a ministry of grace or a ministry of judgment? To what period also is the ministry to be referred? Is it a ministry of the pre-incarnate Christ, the disembodied Christ, or the risen Christ? And as regards the men of Noah's generation, how are they introduced? Is it only as examples of a general class, or is it for themselves and in their proper historical position?

These questions are by no means easy to answer. There are, however, certain general considerations which will be allowed to have weight in the discussion.

There is nothing in the paragraph itself, obscure as it is, to suggest that it is only a digression. It has all the marks of being an integral portion of the larger statement. That interpretation, therefore, which makes most account of this, should be preferred to those which deal more loosely with the connection. Its title to be preferred will become still stronger, if it is found also to be most in accordance with the writer's immediate object, and to furnish the clearest motives for a Christlike endurance of wrong. It will be admitted, too, that the key to the obscurities of the passage should be sought first in Peter's own discourses or writings, and that the interpretation which succeeds in finding it there will have so far the advantage over others. Further, the section contains not only some obscure and disputable terms, but others which are more definite and more easily understood. There are certain references to historical matters,—the times of Noah, the building of the ark, the saving of some in the Flood. In point of fact, the most definite thing in the most disputed part of the paragraph is the mention of the "*days of Noah.*" It is simply to reject the guiding line which the section itself offers, when the exegesis starts with the doubtful phrase, "*the spirits in prison*," and allows that to rule its general view of the passage. The reference to Noah's age is the clearest and most unambiguous fact, the thing which is expanded and explained in the subsequent clauses. The introduction of the "*long-suffering of God*," the "*building of the ark*," and the "*saving of the few*," must also be kept fully in view; and any interpretation which gives an adequate account of these outstanding con-

ditions of the case, will have a special claim on our regard.

But besides these general considerations there are matters of syntax and linguistic usage on which much will depend. In the first place, the force of the terms, the reading, the balance of the two clauses, and the point of the antithesis in the sentence *being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit*, require to be noticed.[1] The term ζωοποιηθείς cannot have the sense "*kept* alive," which becomes necessary in certain interpretations of the passage. Being the well understood term which is used of raising the dead to life,[2] it must have the sense of "*made* alive" or "quickened." The definitions "in flesh" and "in spirit" (ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πνεύματι) are antithetical phrases, somewhat similar to others which are elsewhere applied to Christ, such as "according to the flesh" and "according to the spirit of holiness" (Rom. iii. 3); "manifest in the flesh," "justified in the spirit" (1 Tim. iii. 16). They express the distinct spheres, natures, or forms of existence to which the two things belonged; the one taking place *fleshly-wise*, or as regarded the conditioned, limited, earthly side of His being; the other taking place *spirit-wise*, or as regarded the unconditioned, spiritual side of His being; the death, in the perishable, corporeal life, or as regarded the earthly, dependent condition of existence; the quickening, in the incorporeal life, or as regarded the higher, independent, spiritual order of existence. And the two

[1] θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, documentary evidence being against the τῷ before the πνεύματι.

[2] John v. 21; Rom. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 22, etc.

are so balanced that the former is given as preliminary to the latter, and the attention is concentrated on the *quickening*. With respect to the one mode or order of existence, Christ did indeed cease to live it by being put to death; but the result with respect to the other was, that He continued to live it and to live it with new power, being quickened.

This being the point of the antithetical statement, the "in which" in the following verse can only mean "in which spiritual form of existence"—the nature or form of life which has been mentioned as the seat and subject of the quickening. It is this and not the *disembodied* soul or spirit that is in view. The "preaching" which is affirmed being expressed by the verb (ἐκήρυξε), which is regularly used of preaching the *gospel* or the *kingdom of God*, can only mean the preaching of grace. It cannot be taken in the vague sense of a *proclamation*, a mere *manifestation* of Himself, or a bearing witness of Himself, much less in the sense of an announcement of *judgment*, a *concio damnatoria*.[1] The persons to whom the preaching was addressed are designated "the spirits in prison"; in which phrase the term "prison" (φυλακή) must be taken in the definite sense which it has elsewhere,[2] and cannot be reduced to mean either "safe-keeping" or "the world of the dead" generally. The term "spirits" (πνεύμασιν) is used here, as in Heb. xii. 23, of the departed, designating them as they now are in the world of the bodiless dead. These are said to have been "disobedient," and the participle (ἀπειθήσασι), wanting the article as it

[1] So Schott, von Zezschwitz, Hollaz, etc.
[2] 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6; Rev. xx. 7.

does, means more than "who were disobedient." It may describe them according to the conduct which made them "spirits in prison," or as of the character of the disobedient. Or it may define the date of the preaching as coincident with the date of the disobedience. It was *when* they were disobedient that this preaching was addressed to them. The time of the disobedience is further explained to have been the days of Noah when the ark was building. Further, all through the two verses there is one and the same subject for the leading verbs. That subject is neither Noah, nor the *quickened* Christ, far less the *disembodied* Christ, but simply *Christ.* The Person who was *put to death* and *quickened* is the Person who *went and preached.* Not the *vivified* Christ, nor Christ in the *quickened* spirit, but the Christ who was put to death as regards one side of His being and quickened as regards the other, is the subject of the acts which are described as *going* and *preaching.* This is a point of the utmost importance, many interpreters dealing with the statement as if He who went and preached were the *Χριστὸς ζωοποιηθείς* or the *Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ ζωοποιηθέντι πνεύματι.*

Having regard to these considerations, both general and special, which belong to the essentials of the case, what shall be said of the leading views which have been taken of this great enigma of the New Testament? It is obvious that the line of interpretation which may be called the Patristic, must be set aside. Some of the Fathers, especially in the Western Church, adopted the view that, in the period between His death and His resurrection, Christ went and preached, or

manifested Himself, to the righteous dead of Old Testament times, or to the patriarchs and fathers of Israel in particular, in the intermediate place in which they were supposed to be detained; and that He did so in order to perfect their salvation and raise them to heaven. This interpretation has been connected by Roman Catholic theologians with their idea of a *Limbus Patrum* and with their dogma of a Purgatory. It has also been adopted in a very modified form and with a different interest by certain Protestant theologians of note, including Calvin, who have taken "the spirits in prison" to mean spirits "on the watch-tower in expectation of Christ." But against this there is the decisive fact that the word "prison" (φυλακή) cannot mean a place of happy detention, expectant waiting, gracious wardship, or safe-keeping for the good, but denotes a *prison* in the proper sense of the word, a place for the penal detention of the guilty or the condemned. With the exception that it is used occasionally to denote a *watch*, whether as the watch that is kept, the persons who keep it, or the division of the night, this is the only sense which it has in the New Testament. In the Book of Revelation it is the *prison* in which Satan himself is bound.[1]

The same must be said of the idea which has the sanction of a smaller number of names, including those of Grotius, Dr. John Brown, and (to some extent) Archbishop Leighton, namely, that the preaching in question is simply the preaching which was addressed by the risen Christ, through His apostles, to the men

[1] xx. 7.

of their own time, who were prisoners of the law or of sin. This overlooks the fact that Christ Himself, and neither the apostles nor Christ by the apostles, is the proper subject of whom the preaching is affirmed. It puts an extreme, metaphorical sense on the phrase "spirits in prison." It fails to account for the prominence given to the building of the ark, and it takes the disobedient of Noah's time simply as types of the disobedient of the apostles' time.

Another line of interpretation which discovers in the passage the statement of a triumphal or judicial manifestation of Christ in the world of the dead, is also wide of the question. This has assumed different forms, and has been favoured mainly by Lutheran theologians. With some it has amounted to the simple affirmation that, between His death and His resurrection, Christ presented Himself as the victorious Redeemer to the departed. Others have transferred the supposed manifestation of Christ to the dead from the period between His death and resurrection to some point in His risen life. Many distinguished Lutheran divines have given it a more precise form, holding that Christ went and proclaimed judgment, or made a judicial presentation of Himself, to the impenitent in the world of the dead; that those of Noah's time are instanced either as examples of all such or as the worst of the class; and that this *concio damnatoria* was the ministry not of Christ in the state of death, but of the revived Christ in the interval between His quickening and His accomplished resurrection. But not to speak of other objections to this interpretation, it is inconsistent with the usage of the

word "preached" (ἐκήρυξε), which expresses a message of grace, not one of judgment or condemnation. It is equally inconsistent with the whole purpose of the statement. For if that purpose is to recommend a Christlike endurance of wrong, it would surely be the strangest way of making it good, to refer the readers to Christ's own example in visiting the under-world in the character of victor, with the express object of triumph or judgment.

These interpretations, however, are now of subordinate interest. Though once largely discussed and widely accepted, they have given place to other two, between which the choice now lies. Of these the one that is at present in the ascendant is certainly that which finds in Peter's words the assertion of a ministry of grace on the part of Christ in the world of the dead. This construction of the passage has seldom wanted supporters, though at times it has been in the background. It has been advocated, too, in a variety of forms. With some it has meant the provision by Christ of a second grade of probation, open to all, righteous and unrighteous, in the intermediate state. With others its import has been taken to be, that after His death Christ descended to Hades as the herald of grace to the men of Noah's generation. Not to all, however, even of these, but only to such as had repented in the crisis of their death in the Deluge. Others, who find in the passage the same idea of a ministry of Christ to the men of Noah's time in Hades, understand it to be addressed to the whole generation, as one to which some compensation might be made in the other world for the shortening of their oppor-

tunity in this world. Bishop Horsley[1] thought it one of several passages in which we may observe "an anxiety, if the expression may be allowed, of the sacred writers to convey distinct intimations that the antediluvian race is not uninterested in the redemption and final retribution"; and he conceived that "the souls of those who died in that dreadful visitation might, from that circumstance, have peculiar apprehensions of themselves as the victims of the Divine vengeance, and might peculiarly need the consolation which the preaching of our Lord in the subterranean regions afforded to these 'prisoners of hope.'" Usually, however, those who adhere to this general interpretation of the passage give it a broader application. They understand it to mean that the ministry of grace is not limited to the present life, but extends into the after-existence; that Christ passed into Hades with a view to preach Himself and His truth there; and that in virtue of that event there is a real and continuous proclamation of the gospel in the world of the dead, conveying an offer of grace to those who had it not on earth, or a renewal of grace with continued opportunities of repentance and faith for all. So it is appealed to by many as an unmistakable warrant for cherishing "the larger hope." Men of high reputation for Biblical scholarship expound it in the interest of "wider and happier thoughts as to the state of the dead," and in support of the belief that beyond the grave "the love which does not will that

[1] See his discourse on *Christ's Descent into Hell, and the Intermediate State*, in the volume of Sermons published in 1826, or in the collected edition of his works.

any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, proclaims evermore to the spirits in prison, as during the hours of the descent into Hades, the glad tidings of reconciliation." [1]

In this the exegete has in many cases the support both of the student of Biblical theology and of the student of dogmatic theology. "From all the obscurities of this remarkable utterance the bright thought stands out," says one of the best representatives of the former class, "that the mercy of God revealed in Christ and Christ's death is not limited to the world of the living, but reaches beyond it into the quiet of that other world of the departed, and is made manifest in it by Christ Himself." [2] Masters in constructive theology recognise in it the decisive witness to the "universality of Christ's significance." Men like Strauss, looking to the fact that multitudes have passed away, and do still pass away, from earth without Christ being made known to them, have argued that the Christian revelation, lacking as it does the note of universality, cannot be necessary to salvation.[3] Their arguments are met by pointing to this preaching in the world of the dead as the agency by which Christ is made known to all, so that the judgment of all shall proceed righteously on the ground of their attitude to Him. This Hades ministry is made all important as a testimony to the fact that those "not laid hold of by Christ's historic manifestation in their earthly life, still must and may be brought

[1] Plumptre. See his sermon on *Christ's Preaching to the Spirits in Prison.*

[2] Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology, ut sup.* i. p. 416.

[3] *Dogmatik*, i. pp. 264–271 ; ii. 148.

into relation to Him, in order to be able to accept or reject Him." It is the article of Revelation to which the dogmatic theologian of recent times often turns, when he seeks to establish the "universal reference of Christianity to humanity and the absoluteness of the Christian religion."[1]

But with all that can be urged in its support, on exegetical or on dogmatic grounds, and with all the prepossession in its favour which is furnished by the present trend of religious thought, this interpretation is surrounded by difficulties—difficulties both more numerous and more serious than its advocates are accustomed to confess. It is not simply that it has little to support it elsewhere and runs singularly athwart the general teaching of Scripture, which attaches such moment to the present life as the theatre of human destinies and the scene of opportunity and grace. It is at fault in a number of things, contextual and grammatical. It dissociates the important relative "in which" (in verse 19) from its antecedent, giving it the enlarged sense of "in which *quickened* spirit," instead of its proper sense of "in which spirit," or "in which spiritual mode of being." It thus represents the Subject who preaches as the *quickened* or *disembodied* Christ, whereas in Peter's statement the Subject who preaches is Christ in a particular form of life and activity. It fails to explain why the *time* of the disobedience is given so specifically, or why the details of the building of the ark, the Divine long-suffering, and the salvation of the eight souls are introduced as they are. It gives no adequate account

[1] Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, iv. pp 130–132, Clark's trans.

of the remarkable fact that the men of Noah's day, and only these, are mentioned.

The definiteness of this statement and the central place which it has in the paragraph are hard to explain on any view which transfers the preaching to the period between Christ's death and resurrection. Some identify "the spirits in prison" with the single generation of Noah's time; others think that they are meant to comprehend all the dead, and that the men of the Flood are named as a particular instance of a class. Some say that the men of Noah's day are introduced as specially excusable and as deserving of some compensation in the other world for the limitation of their opportunities in this world. Others say that they are introduced as pre-eminently wicked. But on any construction of the passage which bears that these men are brought in simply as examples or types of larger classes, the difficulty remains. If the race is introduced as pre-eminently evil, what incentive to the Christian to live carefully in righteousness and endurance in this life would be furnished by reminding him that a second opportunity is provided in the future life for the most perverse? On the other hand, if the race is singled out for notice as in some sense peculiarly excusable, that must mean that their fate on earth was hard and their opportunity limited. But the thing that is set in the foreground in the paragraph itself is that God waited for these men with much long-suffering, giving them unmistakable tokens of His will by the agency of Noah and the spectacle of the ark, and ample opportunity of repentance

during the years the vessel of deliverance was a-building.

Further, if it is difficult to see the point of connection between the exhortation which Peter addresses to these tried Christians and the mention of a preaching to the dead of the generation of the Flood, and more difficult to understand what encouragement to a life of godliness and patience under injury can lie in the statement that the disobedient children of the Deluge, or men of kindred perversity, have the gospel proclaimed to them in Hades, the ministry itself remains one of which nothing is said beyond the simple fact that it took place at a certain time. No hint is given of its results. What effect it produced then, why it took place at that time, whether it continues now, and what its issues are to be—all this is left untold. The whole question, therefore, of a ministry of Christ in Hades remains as vague and indefinite in respect of the nature, the purpose, and the results of His action there, as it is burdened with difficulties in the matter of relevancy and grammatical probability.

There is, however, another construction of this dark saying which deserves consideration. It is the one that has commended itself as, on the whole, the most reasonable to a succession of interpreters extending from the early centuries on to the present day. It has been accepted in one form or other by men like Augustine, Aquinas, Hugo of St. Victor, Bede, Beza, Gerhard, Turretin, Besser, Hofmann, Schweitzer. We are indebted to the last two for giving it a more scientific form than it previously had. It refers the scene of the preaching to earth instead of Hades, and the time of

the preaching to Noah's day instead of the period between Christ's death and the resurrection. It takes the preacher to have been Christ Himself in His pre-incarnate activity, and the preaching to have been in the form of the Divine warnings of the time, the spectacle of the building of the ark, and the various tokens of God's long-suffering.

The strain of the paragraph so understood becomes this: "Be content to suffer. There is blessing in so doing, provided you suffer for well-doing and not for ill-doing. Look to your Lord's example—how He did good to the most unworthy and died for the unjust. Think what the issue of injurious suffering was to Him; if He suffered even unto death as regards the mortal side of His being, He was raised as regards the spiritual to a new life with new powers. Look back on the remote past, ere He had appeared in the flesh. Reflect how then, too, He acted in this gracious way, how He went and preached to the guilty generation of the Flood, making known to those grossest of wrong-doers, by the spectacle of the ark a-building, the word of His servant Noah, and the varied warnings of the time, His will to save them. And consider that He has still the same graciousness of will—of which baptism is the figure; that He can still save oppressed righteous ones as He saved the believing souls of Noah's house; that all the more can He now save such, seeing that in His exalted life He has all the powers of heaven subject to Him."

This interpretation has its own difficulties. It is objected to it that it makes the phrase "the spirits in prison" mean "the spirits *now* in prison." But if on

this view there is a difference between the time of the preaching and the time of the imprisonment, on the other view there is a difference between the time of the preaching and the time of the disobedience. It is also alleged that the word "went" (πορευθείς), which expresses local motion, misses its proper sense on this view. But the answer is found in the Old Testament way of speaking of Jehovah as *coming, going, ascending.* There is an analogous expression, too, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, where it is said of Christ that He "came and preached peace."[1] Besides, if the term "went" is in any way inappropriate to the pre-incarnate Christ, it is not less so to the disembodied Christ.

On the other hand, there is much to recommend this interpretation. It retains the natural sense for all the leading terms—*flesh, spirit, quickened, preached, prison,* etc. It gives us the same Subject all through, namely, *Christ* as the Subject put to death, Christ as the Subject quickened, Christ as the Subject preaching, and Christ as the Subject exalted. It accounts for the definite statement of the time of the disobedience. It starts not with what is obscure in the paragraph, but with what is clearest and least ambiguous, namely, the historical reference to the Flood. It seeks the key to the problem in Peter's own writings, particularly in what he says of an activity of the pre-incarnate Christ, or the Spirit of Christ, in the Old Testament prophets.[2] It gives a sufficient reason for the details about Noah's time, the building of the ark being mentioned as one of the means by which Christ preached and God's will

[1] ii. 17. [2] 1 Pet. i. 11.

was made known to the men of that generation. It helps us to understand why Peter proceeds to speak of Christ's present position of honour and power at God's right hand. And it bears most directly and clearly on the injunction to a Christlike behaviour under wrong. For it points these suffering Christians to the graciousness which has always been seen in the case of their Lord, and which has always been exhibited even to the worst of wrong-doers.

The unexampled character of the paragraph has led some to connect it with the obscure statement in the Book of Genesis [1] on the sin between the sons of God and the daughters of men, and to regard it as pointing to a judicial visitation which had its occasion in that unparalleled guilt. It has induced Baur among others to seek its explanation in the trespass of the angels referred to in the Second Epistle,[2] and understood to have been committed previous to the Deluge, or in the Jewish stories of the guilt and punishment of angels. Some have thought that it may be taken from lost portions of the Book of Enoch or some similar product of Judaism. It would be in some sense a relief if it could be shown to be a passage of the same order as those referring to the *Book of Enoch* and the *Assumption of Moses* in the Epistle of Jude. In that case it might have nothing more than the illustrative value of a quotation. It is possible that the key to it may yet be found in some recovered specimen of the pseudepigraphic literature of the Jews. But the terms are inconsistent with any explanation yet offered us which has recourse either to

[1] vi. 1–4. [2] ii. 4.

the Jewish literature or to the obscure passages in the Book of Genesis. The terms of the passage will not suit such a case as that of the fallen angels, or that of the *Nephilim* or *giants*.[1] The description of the sin of the "spirits in prison" as *disobedience*, and the idea of the *preaching* (which as here expressed can only be a preaching of *grace*), are obviously inappropriate to these instances. As things stand, therefore, the most that we can say is that, while the question remains one of the balance of probabilities, fewer difficulties attach to the interpretation which places the preaching in Noah's time, than to that which supposes a ministry of Christ in the world of the dead.

The second of the two Petrine passages[2] is little less of a puzzle than the first. Some have felt it so intractable that they have given it up in despair. Luther thought that some corruption must have crept into the text, and others have been inclined to regard it as the gloss of some scribe or annotator.[3] But documentary evidence provides no such method of relief. The passage occurs in a paragraph which completes a series of counsels bearing on the attitude of the Christian to heathen associates and heathen persecutors. Christ's example in suffering is the keynote to all these counsels. It has been used to point the blessedness of suffering for righteousness' sake. It is now used to enforce the duty of absolute separation from pagan vices—a separation as absolute as if one were dead to them. Christ has suffered as regards the flesh. He has done so with the *mind* or *purpose* of

[1] As advocated by Ewald, *Sieben Sendschreiben*, p. 47.
[2] 1 Pet. iv. 6.
[3] *E.g.*, Reiche, *Commentarius Criticus*.

doing good even to the worst of wrong-doers. Christians, therefore, should arm themselves with the same *mind*, and they should do so because thus to suffer according to the flesh is to cease from sin, to be brought to an end as regards sins.[1] By suffering and dying Christ has done with sin. And those who suffer with Him should recognise that their old relation to sin is at an end, that they themselves are done with sin. The heathen among whom they live will think it strange, it is true, that they stand aloof from "lasciviousness, lusts, wine-bibbings, revellings, carousings, and abominable idolatries," in which they once walked. They will speak evil of them when they refuse to "run with *them* into the same excess of riot." But if they have to suffer at the hands of these pagan slanderers, they know that there is a judgment for all, a judgment which is certain and near, the judgment of One who will give their rights to all, whether alive or dead, whether heathen persecutors or Christian sufferers.

It is in the train of this statement that the words in question are introduced: "For unto this end was the gospel preached even to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit."[2] The object which the writer has in view in the paragraph as a whole is clear. It is to encourage those tried Christians to keep themselves absolutely apart from pagan vices, and unmoved by the blasphemous slanders of their heathen neighbours. The precise way, however, in which the mention of a *preaching to the dead*

[1] 1 Pet. iv. [2] 1 Pet. iv. 6, R.V.

is linked on to this, is not so clear. It might be simply as a confirmation of Christ's *readiness* to judge, there being no other ministry but *judgment*, as Bengel suggests, when once the gospel is preached to the whole world. Or it might be in support of what is said of the *giving account*.[1] In which case the point would be this: "Fear not your blasphemers; they shall all be judged, even should they die before Christ's coming; the gospel was preached to those now dead as it is preached to all who are alive, with the object of bringing them to live according to God; and those who frustrate that object have to give account for it."

The connection, however, may also be understood to lie more immediately between the mention of the *dead* as the subjects of the judgment and the mention of the *dead* as the subjects of the preaching. In that case we have the idea that it is obviously just and reasonable that the *dead* should be judged as well as the living, because the gospel is preached to all, those who miss it in this world having it announced to them in the other world. Or it may be taken in a larger way, the reference being rather to the main idea in the fifth verse; the fact that dead and living alike shall have the judgment of righteousness pronounced upon them at Christ's coming being the Christian's encouragement to a life according to God's will now. The choice is between these last two constructions of the relation in which the verse in question stands to what is said of Christ being *ready to judge*, of heathen slanderers having to *give account*, and of Christians being *evil spoken of*.

[1] So Hofmann and others.

The passage, then, which is introduced in one or other of these connections, speaks of a *gospel preached*, of those to whom it is addressed as *dead*, and of its purpose as this—*that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit.* Is this a gospel addressed to the dead *when dead*? or is it a gospel once proclaimed to persons who are now dead? The *preaching* itself is expressed by the word εὐηγγελίσθη, which always means to "bring good news," to "publish the gospel," and can be understood here, therefore, only in the sense of an offer of grace. The main points in dispute are the *time*, the *scene*, and the *subjects* of this gospel-ministry. The question is, Do the statements of *time*, *scene*, and *subjects* permit us to understand Peter to refer to an offer of grace made to all men, or to certain men, in Hades; an offer made in extension or in supplement of the ministry of truth on earth, supplying defects or compensating for inequalities in the probationary arrangements of the present life? The answer turns to some extent on the idea which is formed of the general strain of the paragraph, but much more on the meaning of the more decisive words and the force of certain grammatical considerations.

It has to be observed that the leading verb *was preached* (εὐηγγελίσθη) is a distinct past. The ministry, consequently, is one already accomplished. Its time is in the past. It is neither a thing of the present nor a process that is to continue. The *dead* (νεκροῖς) who are the subjects of the preaching must be understood in the usual sense of the physically dead. No doubt

the statement would run easily if we could follow Augustine and some others in taking the word to mean here the *spiritually* dead; in defence of which they quote the different senses given to the same term by our Lord Himself in the saying, "Let the dead bury their dead."[1] But there is no proper analogy between the two cases, and the use of the word *dead* in the literal sense in the previous sentence which brings the two great classes of the *quick* and the *dead* together, is decisive for the sense here.

In the same way the meaning of the word *judged* (κριθῶσι) is determined by its obvious use in the previous mention of Christ as ready to *judge*. It cannot express mere *discipline* or *chastisement*, still less *mortification* or *penance*. It means literal judgment, judicial judgment, and seems best understood here of physical death as the judgment or penalty of sin. The fact that the word *dead* in both its occurrences wants the article is also of some importance. The statement in both cases is a general one, applying to classes. But, while the absence of the article does not exclude the idea of the totality of the dead being in view, it makes a more limited application possible. In neither case is it "*the* dead," but "dead persons" as contrasted with *living* persons that are the subjects of the statement, and the context must decide the extension which is given to the term. In the one case it is said that Christ's judgment embraces all men, dead and living alike. In the other case the preaching is said to have been addressed simply to dead persons, not necessarily to the dead universally.

[1] Matt. vii. 22.

The relation of the two clauses as marked by the "indeed" has also to be noticed. Expressed by the familiar μέν—δέ, it is a relation in which the one clause is qualified by the other. So that the sentence has this force—"that, although judged as regards the flesh, they might live as regards the spirit."

These are the main *data* of the exegesis. The view taken of the passage as a whole will also be influenced by the view which is taken of the previous section on preaching to the "spirits in prison." For it is difficult to resist the impression that the two paragraphs belong more or less to the same general idea. It is almost invariably the case, therefore, that those who find the disclosure of a Hades-ministry in the one find it in the other, and *vice versâ*. To reason, however, from the one to the other, is a thing to be done with caution. The general resemblance is modified by important differences. In the former passage the Person who preached is expressly stated to have been Christ Himself; in the latter the preacher is left unnamed, and the simple fact that preaching did take place is mentioned.[1] In the former the persons to whom the preaching was addressed are given specifically as "spirits in prison," and are connected with Noah's generation; in the latter they are simply *dead persons*, without explanation of their number or their date. In the former, too, the time of the preaching is defined—according to one view as the time between Christ's death and resurrection; accord-

[1] It is suggested indeed that εὐηγγελίσθη might be taken as a Middle Voice, and that thus a place might be found for the mention of the Preacher (εὐηγγελίσθη, *scil.* ὁ Χριστος). Weiss in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1872, p. 671. But this is against the New Testament usage.

ing to another as the time after Christ's resurrection; according to a third as the time when the disobedience took place, namely, in the days preceding the Deluge. But in the latter, the preaching is given simply as an event of the past, without further explanation. Hence some who think that the former passage affirms a Hades-ministry, confess that the latter must be understood in quite another way.[1]

These, then, being the main conditions of the exegesis, contextual, linguistic, and grammatical, there are two interpretations which seem to meet them better than any other. One takes the heathen revilers to be the parties more immediately in view, and the thing specially stated to be the certainty that they shall have to answer for their slanders. The force of the paragraph will then be this: "Be neither disturbed nor misled by your revilers; they have their account to give to Christ Himself, all of them, whether alive or dead, at His coming; for the gospel was preached to those now dead as it is preached to the living, with the purpose to bring them to live in accordance with God's will; and if this purpose is mocked, judgment awaits them." [2]

The other, and much preferable interpretation, takes the slandered Christians to be the persons first in view, and the thought of their ultimate vindication by the Judge of all to be the point of the encouragement. Thus understood the statement amounts to this: "Have done for ever with the coarse, pagan life; the heathen will persecute you, and

[1] So, *e.g.*, Usteri. See his *Hinabgefahren zur Hölle*, pp. 41–53.
[2] So Hofmann.

justify their persecution by reviling your character; but be not moved by that. Christ is Judge, and the cause of all is safe with Him, the cause of those who die, no less than that of those who survive. Your brethren have died; but their ease is secure with Him. For the very object with which the gospel was made known to them was that, although in their bodies (or, *fleshly-wise*) they met the doom of death which is common to men, yet in their spirits (or, as regards their higher nature) they might have a life like God's. And should you be called to suffer unto death, it will be with you as it is with them." This is on the whole the best construction of the paragraph. It fits in with the view of the preceding verse and with the tenor of the paragraph as a whole. It does justice to the "life according to God" as the great aim of the gospel. It retains for the various terms their natural sense. It also points to certain disquieting thoughts to which other passages[1] show those early Christians to have been subject—the perplexity caused by the fact that Christians were as little exempt as others from death, "the wages of sin," and the fear that those who died before Christ's coming might somehow suffer loss.

The interpretation, however, that is in the ascendant at present, is certainly the one which understands the passage to speak of an offer of grace made to men after they have passed into the world of the dead. This interpretation is favoured by many men of eminence as exegetes and theologians. Some are so certain of its truth that they think only dogmatic prepossession could lead any to the contrary opinion.

[1] 1 Thess. iv. 13–18; also Rom. viii. 10.

The influence of dogmatic prepossession certainly is not all on one side. But, apart from that, it must be admitted that this interpretation does meet at least some of the requirements of the exegesis very fairly. It also establishes an easy connection with the preceding statement. For it gives the paragraph this form: "Christ is ready to judge quick and dead; with justice will His judgment embrace both these classes; for His gospel is preached to all—in the other world, if not in this."

But with all these allowances, it must still be said of this view of the passage that great difficulties belong to it, greater difficulties indeed than those alleged against the interpretation which was last mentioned. On the one hand, if this supposed preaching is identified with that which is referred to in the other Petrine passage, it is open to the objections already taken to the idea of a presentation of the gospel by Christ in His disembodied or quickened state to the disobedient of Noah's times in the world of the dead. On the other hand, if it is supposed that Peter now states the general truth, of which the "preaching to the spirits in prison" was only a particular illustration, the passage is made to teach that, by Christ's visit to Hades, the gospel is made known to all, so that it becomes a just and righteous thing that all, whether living or dead, shall be judged by Him. But there is much to tell against this. It misses the definite statement of the *time* of the preaching. It treats the historical tense "*was* preached" as if it meant "*is* preached" or "*shall be* preached." It translates a gospel-ministry which is

distinctly declared to belong to the past into a present act or a continuous process. It assumes that the *dead* who are named here must mean *all* the dead, and that what is given as the statement of a fact belonging to the past is the statement of a general principle.

On this view an idea is introduced which is irrelevant to Peter's purpose here and to the whole series of counsels which are given in connection with the mention of the preaching "to the spirits in prison" and to the *dead*. The idea is that Christ shall judge all men, quick or dead, because His gospel shall first have been made known to all men, those who did not hear it on earth having it preached to them in the world of the dead. But in all that Peter says here is there anything to indicate that this was the idea that was specially before his mind? Is there anything to show that he is thinking of any such questions as these: What shall be the position in the future life of those who have not heard the gospel in the present life? How shall it stand with them in the judgment? On what principle of righteousness and reason can Christ at His return judge those to whom His truth has not been made known on earth?

What he deals with surely is no question of this kind, but a plain case—a case where the gospel is known, the case where Christian people are evil spoken of by their heathen neighbours for their fidelity to the gospel and their separation from all their old heathen vices. It is difficult to see, too, how the statement, if it is the statement of a ministry of grace in Hades, gives point to the exhortation in connection with which

it is introduced. How should the mention of a gospel preached to the dead in the under-world bear upon the position or duty of living Christians who are misrepresented and injuriously treated by living detractors in this world? What encouragement to a Christlike endurance of heathen slander and wrong should these tried Christians find in the information that their heathen persecutors are assured of a new period of favour in the other world? Or how should the mention of the continued grace shown to the unrighteous dead in Hades incite the righteous living to a persevering dissociation of themselves from heathen impurity?

The conclusion to which we are led by a careful consideration of the terms of these two paragraphs, the connections in which they stand, and the purposes with which they are introduced into this plain and practical Epistle, is that they give no sufficient ground for ascribing to Peter the doctrine of an extension of opportunity into the other world. In both paragraphs the interpretation which leaves most unaccounted for and does least justice to the best understood terms, is that which finds in them the disclosure of a ministry of grace in Hades.[1]

[1] For the questions connected with these difficult paragraphs the Commentaries by Huther, Usteri, Johnstone, Keil, and Holtzmann are of special value. Reference may also be made to the writer's exposition of the Epistles of Peter in Schaff's *Popular Commentary*, and to three articles in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* (July 1872, January and April 1873). For acute exegesis nothing surpasses Schweitzer's *Hinabgefahren zur Hölle*. On the history of these questions much curious and interesting matter will be found in Dietelmaier's *Historia dogmatis de Descensu Christi ad Inferos litteraria*; König's *Die Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt*; and Güder's *Die Lehre von der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter den Todten*. See also Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*.

It remains to say something of *John's* teaching. The Book of Revelation has already been examined. The peculiarities of that book, the fact that it is a distinctively eschatological writing, and the relation in which it stands to a special order of literature, the apocalyptic, make it convenient to deal with it separately. The Fourth Gospel has also come already under consideration as a record of Christ's teaching. We have still to look at John's own doctrine of the Future, especially as it appears in his Epistles. For our present purpose the three Epistles, notwithstanding the doubts attaching to the second and third from an early period, may safely be taken together. It is difficult to understand how the two smaller Epistles could have come to be accepted, or how they could have survived, except on the supposition that they had the great name of the beloved disciple on their side. Brief and incidental as they are, they appear to be of the same mint as the larger Epistle. The various writings, indeed, which are associated with the name of John—at least the Gospel and the Epistles—bear all the indications of spiritual kinship, and present Christian truth in a way which at once makes them a class by themselves, and invites us to take them together.

In form, in the habit of looking at things, in the proportions given to things, John's teaching differs as widely as may be from Peter's. The one is mystical and intuitional, where the other is direct and practical. With John the distinctions between past and present, outward and inward, fall away; or rather the inward is seen in the outward, the essential in the phenomenal, the ideal in the actual, the universal in the particular,

the eternal in the temporal. His teaching, therefore, is not eschatological as Peter's is. It is ideal and essential. Its genius is not to look away from the present to the future, but to bring the future into the present. Yet John has his eschatology as well as the other New Testament writers, and there is no real inconsistency between his teaching and theirs. He speaks of the principles rather than the externals of things. But he is not altogether silent on the forms in which these principles work or the issues to which they tend. "All the synoptic and primitive ideas about the consummation of all things are in John also, and no preconceived critical view of the Johannine system can remove it."[1] There are two orders of ideas in John's writings, of which the eschatological is the secondary and the more occasional. But the one does not exclude the other. They are to each other as the synoptical report of our Lord's teaching is to that given in the Fourth Gospel.

John's own teaching as it is seen in the Epistles follows Christ's teaching as it appears in the Gospel. The ideas and the characteristic forms of expression are the same in each. In each the central thought is *life*. In each this *life* is *life* in the largest sense, and is antithetical to *death* or to *perdition*. In each it is exhibited in essentially the same aspects and relations. In Christ's teaching the *life* has its source and its seat in the Father, and is given by the Father to the Son, so that it is *in* the Son and can be imparted by Him to men.[2] So in John's teaching the *life* is the reality that is

[1] Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, *ut sup.* ii. p. 472.
[2] John v. 26, vi. 57, xiv. 19, etc.

before all time and behind all phenomena. It is with the Father in the beginning, and is historically manifested in the Son, so that it has been seen and borne witness to.[1] In Christ's teaching the gift of *life* comes to us only through the Son, by belief in Him, by union with Him.[2] In John's teaching the possession of it is so essentially connected with our attitude to Christ, that "he that hath the Son hath the life; and he that hath not the Son of God hath not the life."[3] In neither is this *life* distinctly defined, but in each it is so exhibited that we get the same idea of what it is. In the Fourth Gospel it is given in relation to the knowledge of God; and Christ's words, "This is life eternal, that they should know Thee the only true God, and Him whom Thou didst send, *even* Jesus Christ,"[4] are thought by some to be a definition of its essence. They are rather a statement of the condition of its attainment or the way to its possession.[5] In the Epistles it is identified in the

[1] 1 John i. 1, 2. [2] John iii. 15, 16, vi. 35, 50–58, etc.

[3] 1 John iv. 12; also ii. 12, v. 11, etc. [4] John xvii. 3.

[5] Meyer understands Christ's words in John xvii. 3 to refer to the subjective principle of the life. Weiss and many other interpreters take the words as a definition which makes knowledge the essence of eternal life. But Beyschlag is right when he says "it is evident that the intercessory prayer would be the most unsuitable place for giving the definition of a concept, and especially of one that had already been used throughout the whole Gospel without needing such a definition." In his view, therefore, the words express "how and by what means Jesus has hitherto fulfilled His commission to give eternal life to all flesh, namely, by making them know the Father as the only true God and Himself as His ambassador; and so the τοῦτο ἐστίν stands here manifestly in the sense of rests upon, or is procured by,—it does not make eternal life mean simply the knowledge of God" (*New Testament Theology, ut sup.* i. p. 268). Wendt also understands our Lord as stating not "wherein eternal life consists as to its essence, but wherein lies the means of obtaining it" (*The Teaching of Jesus*, i. p. 244, Clark's trans.). See also Stevens, *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 314–322.

same way with the promise of God.[1] But in each it consists in fellowship with God as He is known in Jesus Christ. In each, therefore, it denotes the highest good of existence, and expresses the Christian completion of the Old Testament ideas of life and good, as things found only in God and the experience of His favour.

In John's teaching in the Epistles as in our Lord's in the Fourth Gospel, this *life* is usually exhibited as a present thing, and not only so but a thing which we may *know* to be ours now.[2] But in both it is also at times a thing of the future.[3] In both, too, the note of the *eternal* is attached to it. In Christ's teaching, as given in the Fourth Gospel, *eternal life* is one of the most prominent and characteristic ideas. In that Gospel it seems to take the place which is occupied by the idea of the *kingdom of God* in the Synoptical Gospels. Proportionately it is even a larger element in John's own teaching, the expression *eternal life* occurring some seventeen times in the Gospel and six times in the Epistles. In the Greek it appears in different forms, perhaps with regard to different aspects in which it is capable of being presented.[4] But the sense which this great term bears in the Johannine writings

[1] ii. 25.

[2] 1 John v. 12, 13; John iii. 36, v. 24, vi. 47, 54, xx. 31.

[3] 1 John ii. 25; John iv. 14, 36, v. 25, vi. 27, 54, xi. 25, xii. 25, xiv. 19.

[4] The most frequent form is the anarthrous, *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, "eternal life" (John iii. 15, 16, 36, iv. 14, 36, v. 24, 39, vi. 27, 40, 47, 54, 68, x. 28, xii. 25, 50, xvii. 2; 1 John iii. 15, v. 11, 13, 20). But we have also *ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή*, "the eternal life" (John xvii. 3) and *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος* (1 John i. 2, ii. 25). There is also the verbal form, *ζῆν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, "to live for ever" (John vi. 51, 58). Bishop Westcott thinks that the former, *ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή*, describes the "special Messianic gift brought by Christ (*the eternal life*)

admits of no dispute. The associations in which it appears, the statements which are given (as in John xvii. 3) of the conditions or means of its attainment, and the contrasts in which it is placed, make it clear that it is the note of a kind or order of life, not of a length or duration of life. The "eternal" is a qualitative term, not a quantitative; used not in order to add to the "life" the idea of *perpetuity*, but to express more fully the quality which belongs to the "life" itself. In John's writings "death" is an ethical condition, the condition of failure and evil in which men exist by nature, and out of which they are raised by Christ. The "life" is the new condition—the spiritual order of being, the existence of fellowship with God into which Christ brings men; and the "eternal life" is this "life" in its quality of the divine order of life, the life which fulfils the whole idea of life, the good of life, the perfection of life, the satisfaction of life in God.[1]

But this qualitative or ethical conception of "eternal life," which is characteristic of John, is not at variance with the eschatological conception in which it appears elsewhere. The quality of continuance or imperishableness is not excluded, but included. It lies in the nature of the "life" as *eternal*, a life

as distinguished from the general conception (*ζωὴ αἰώνιος, life eternal*)"; and that in the phrase *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος*, "*the life*, even *the life eternal*," the two elements in the idea are regarded separately. He also recognises a shade of difference between *ζωή* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* in John iii. 36. This is perhaps too precise. See his *Epistles of St. John* under 1 John i. 2.

[1] Bishop Westcott identifies the "eternal life" of John with Paul's *ἡ ὄντως ζωή*, "the life which is life indeed" (1 Tim. vi. 19), and *ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ θεοῦ*, "the life of God" (Eph. iv. 18), and defines it as "not an endless duration of being, but being of which time is not a measure" (*The Epistles of St. John*, p. 215).

of the divine order, that it is superior to change, decay, or extinction. The life of the believer is contrasted with all that is transitory as a life which endures for ever: "The world passeth away, and the lust thereof: but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever."[1] And while this *life* is a present possession, a life into which we have already passed by union with Christ, it also looks to a completer future. In Christ's teaching the "life" which the believer has at present is also an "eternal life" *unto* which he shall keep the life that is hated for Christ's sake now.[2] And in John's teaching there is a manifestation yet to be expected of what the children of God *shall* be.[3]

As it is with John's doctrine of "life," so is it with all the truths which in his writings have their centre in this. In each it is the inward, the essential, the present that is mainly in view, yet not to the exclusion of the prospective and the future.

John speaks of the "last hour,"[4] as Peter speaks of the "last time," or "end of all things." He has the doctrine of an "antichrist" that *cometh*, and "antichrists" that have already come.[5] Whether this is to be understood as the doctrine of a great anti-Christian principle, the personification of an anti-Christian spirit which is working in individual deceivers, or as the doctrine of a person who is to be the final embodiment of opposition to Christ, the presence of this power is the sign of the end which the Christian looks to.[6] John,

[1] 1 John ii. 17. [2] John xii. 25. [3] 1 John iii. 2.
[4] 1 John ii. 18. [5] 1 John ii. 18, 19, 22, iv. 3; 2 John 7.
[6] Bishop Westcott thinks the former view the more natural. (See his *Epistles of St. John, in loc.*) The analogy of Paul's Man of Sin, however, is in favour of the latter.

too, has the lofty word of hope, and the promise of a "full reward."[1] He, too, speaks of a supreme blessedness yet in the future, which is to consist in seeing Christ as He is and being made like Him.[2]

Nor is it otherwise with the great truths of the *Second Advent*, the *Resurrection*, and the *Judgment*. In John's writings the Lord's coming, it is true, is usually a spiritual return, an advent in acts of grace, a coming in the life of the believer, in the presence of the Comforter.[3] But, as we have seen, the idea of a literal, objective coming also has a place in our Lord's own teaching in the Fourth Gospel.[4] And the same is the case with John's teaching in the First Epistle. It speaks of an appearance or manifestation of Christ, which is yet to be made—a manifestation of such a kind that we shall *see* Him as He is.[5] And not only so, but this *manifestation* of Christ forms the subject of another statement, the import of which is unmistakable: "And now, my little children, abide in Him; that, if He shall be manifested, we may have boldness, and not be ashamed before Him at His coming."[6] In

[1] 1 John iii. 3; 2 John 8.

[2] 1 John iii. 2.

[3] John xiv. 18, 23, 28, xvi. 7, etc.

[4] Especially in xiv. 3. In these words some indeed recognise a series of *comings*, or the idea that Christ "is, in fact, from the moment of His resurrection, ever coming to the world, and to the Church, and to men as the risen Lord" (Westcott, *in loc.*); and others see only a spiritual advent, the descent of the Holy Ghost, or Christ's spiritual presence with His disciples. But the fact that this "coming again" is associated here with the *going* away to heaven and *preparing* a place, seems decisive in favour of the literal, objective advent at the end. The same appears to be the sense of the *coming* of which Christ speaks in John xxi. 22.

[5] 1 John iii. 2. It is a question, of course, whether the rendering should be "if *he* shall be manifested" or "if *it* shall be manifested." The former, however, is the more probable.

[6] ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ; 1 John ii. 28.

this instance John adopts the term which Paul is accustomed to use in a very definite sense. The introduction of this well-understood term, *Parousia*, puts it beyond question that John has in view Christ's objective advent at the end of things.

The doctrines of the *Resurrection* and the *Judgment* have also their place in John's teaching. In the other New Testament writings, as well as in the Synoptical record of Christ's words, these events are associated with the *Parousia*. In John's report of our Lord's teaching, the Resurrection and the Judgment are both in the main present conditions or spiritual processes. The hour when the dead "shall hear the voice of the Son of God" is an hour that "cometh, and now is."[1] When Martha speaks of her brother rising again "in the resurrection at the last day," Christ points her to a present resurrection and a present life in Himself, which death cannot touch: "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth on Me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth, and believeth on Me, shall never die."[2] The *judgment*, too, is one that takes place now. The light which comes with Christ into the world, the truth which He proclaims, the words which He speaks, are putting men at present to the test and subjecting them to judgment; so that "he that believeth not hath been judged already."[3]

Yet in John's report of Christ's teaching both Resurrection and Judgment are also events of the future, though more rarely. There is a "last day" at which it is God's will that the Son should raise up all that the Father has given Him, "every one

[1] John v. 25. [2] John xi. 24–26. [3] John iii. 18, 19.

that beholdeth the Son, and believeth on Him."[1] In the great discourse in which Christ speaks of the life that is in Him, and the power of that life both for present and for future issues, both for soul and for body, the two aspects of the resurrection are presented together. He speaks at once of an hour that "now is," when they that hear the voice of the Son of God shall live, and of an hour that "cometh, in which all that are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth."[2] So, too, there is a final judgment, of which He who declares that He "came not to judge the world," says, "the word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day."[3] As it is with these great truths in the Johannine report of our Lord's words, so it is with them in John's own teaching. The doctrine of the Resurrection, it is true, is not mentioned in express terms in John's Epistles. But it is implied in what is said of the future manifestation of the children of God and the judgment. And in two remarkable passages the judgment is certainly in view as an event of the future. It is so when John bids his children abide in Christ, in order that they may "have boldness, and not be ashamed before Him at His coming."[4] It is so still more explicitly when he says, "Herein is love made perfect with us, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment."[5]

Some tell us that John's doctrine and that of the other New Testament writers belong to entirely different planes; that those views of the future, which are prominent elements in the latter, are not to be

[1] John vi. 39, 40. [2] John v. 25–29. [3] John xii. 47, 48.
[4] 1 John ii. 28. [5] 1 John iv. 17.

recognised in the former; that, if they appear at all, it is incidentally, and not as belonging to the real thought or proper message of the apostle.[1] But it is not the case that the eschatology of the Synoptical Gospels, or of James and Peter, is strange to John. Though they occupy a smaller space in John's writings, and are subordinate to other truths, the Second Coming, the Resurrection, the Judgment, the Life Eternal appear in John's teaching, as they do in that of the New Testament generally. They appear as events of the end, final acts or conditions in which all previous manifestations of Christ, all previous acts and gifts of His, come to their climax. They appear, too, all in association with each other, with no note of an interval separating one from the other, with no hint of a first resurrection and a second.

[1] Reuss is of this number. "Of all the facts of eschatology," he says, "the only one of which passing mention is made (by John) is the resurrection of the dead." He thinks the First Epistle inferior to the Gospel, and characterised by imperfectly developed mysticism," of which its mention of Christ's *Parousia* is an evidence. (See his *History of Christian Theology*, ii. 498, 499, Eng. trans.) But if so, how comes it that it is precisely in the Epistle that the idea of a resurrection is left unexpressed?

BOOK FIFTH

The Pauline Doctrine

Strong as his instinct is to make the Christian faith a matter of thought, and many as are the hints towards a theology which appear in his writings, yet he never felt the need to express in rigid formulæ the peculiar but fluid conceptions with which he works, or to present in systematic doctrinal form the magnificent view of the world which he carries within him. He never gets beyond a struggle with his thoughts and words ; when forced by some practical necessity he indicates a train of thought, he does not pursue it, but when the occasion recurs he starts afresh. Strong, therefore, as the theological elements are which his system contains, the practical and moral aim is always dominant ; and so it is the speech, not of theology, but of religion, which we hear ; and we hear it with such power, fulness, and depth as, apart from Jesus' own preaching, was never heard in words before or afterwards. That which distinguishes it from the gospel of Jesus is evident, and lies in the nature of the case. Jesus uses the simple, sublime speech of revelation ; Paul in every tone utters the experience of salvation and of faith, of one praising and confessing, struggling and fighting, reflecting and speculating. —Beyschlag.

It must be clearly understood that Paul was no philosopher of the schools. The purpose or wish to construct a *system*, properly so called, was wholly foreign to his mind. He was a missionary, who brought everything to bear upon his work. He learned by teaching. In every crisis of his life he looked for guidance from God. The solution of difficult questions he sought in prayer ; and the answer came sometimes like a flash of light, sometimes as the result of profound meditation, but was always regarded by him as a Divine inspiration. He studied events, he reflected upon past experiences ; he profited by his travels and his reading. Everything, in short, furnished him with food for thought, and with opportunities of discovering the practical or theoretical issues of the faith that he incessantly preached.—Sabatier.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL STATEMENT

WE have seen that the writings which are understood to reflect the mind of the original apostolic circle have, with certain differences in method and proportion, substantially the same doctrine of the Future. We have also seen that that doctrine is in essential harmony with Christ's own words on the things of the end. But we have still to examine the teaching of one who, though neither belonging to the original Twelve nor a child of Galilee, had a special apostleship, the wide apostleship of the Gentile world, and has left us a larger number of writings than any of the immediate companions of our Lord. The deep and far-reaching influence of Paul of Tarsus on the statement of Christian truth and the history of the Christian Church is recognised by all. So high is the estimate which some form of this influence that they speak as if Christianity were simply Paulinism, and as if Paul had been the first to proclaim in clear and unmistakable terms the Christian religion as a religion not for the Jew only, but for the whole world of sinful men. This is an exaggeration which forgets the Master in magnifying the disciple. But the fact remains that in relation to our subject, as

to Christian doctrine generally, a place of the first importance belongs to Paul.

In him, too, we have a man so different from the other New Testament writers in intellectual make, mental training, and religious experience, that it is reasonable to expect from him a very distinct type of doctrine. In his natural genius, his dialectic faculty, and his peculiar education there is much to suggest that in his case we shall have a more definite and reasoned presentation of Christian truth. We have to ask, therefore, whether this is the case. What is that doctrine of the Future which makes the burden of many of the loftiest and profoundest passages in the writings of St. Paul? Has it those relations to the Old Testament hope and to Christ's own teaching which we have found in the General Apostolic Doctrine? Or is it of another type? Is it in general agreement with the teaching of the other New Testament writers? Or is it of a different character, distinctively Hellenic where theirs is distinctively Jewish? Is it a self-consistent doctrine? Or do its later forms differ materially from its earlier? Are there peculiar elements in it, and does it make any special contribution to the Christian doctrine of immortality as a whole?

These are questions of great interest, and men have been by no means at one in the answers which they have given to them. The materials which are at our disposal in investigating these subjects are considerable. They consist of numerous statements scattered over the Epistles which bear Paul's name and the discourses which the Book of Acts reports to have been spoken by him. They are neither so large

in number, however, nor so definite in tenor as we could wish. They include not only deliverances given in relief of difficulties of which Paul became aware in his churches, or in reply to questions addressed to him, but to no small extent also of sayings of a more incidental kind, prompted by his habit of following out the suggestions of particular words into directions beyond his main subject. While it is not always easy to interpret his more direct statements, it is often peculiarly difficult to determine the precise bearing of those more occasional sayings, and the use to which they may be legitimately put.

The discussion of these subjects is bound up to some extent with well-known questions of literary and historical criticism. How many of the Epistles which are ascribed to St. Paul can be made good historically as his, is still debated. Whether the integrity of the Epistles can be established at all points, is also held by many to be uncertain. It is still asserted that not a few of them have a character widely different from the genuine writings of the apostle, or betray ecclesiastical conditions and ideas which are of a later date. These questions cannot be disregarded. They have their interest in their own place. But fortunately they are of subordinate importance in relation to what we have immediately in hand. It is not only that the genuineness of these Epistles is being vindicated more and more, so that under the most rigid demands of scientific procedure we are entitled to use more of them than the great founder of the Tübingen school himself allowed. To the four primary Epistles, those to the churches of Galatia, Corinth, and Rome, most are

agreed now that at least three should be added—First Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon. Some of the acutest critics make important concessions even as regards Second Thessalonians, Ephesians, and Colossians. Others frankly admit that of the thirteen Pauline Epistles all but the three Pastorals may be taken conjointly in any construction of Paul's theology. Most allow that even those writings which they are unable to assign to Paul himself are at least trustworthy memorials of Pauline doctrine.

It is of consequence to see how the case now stands in this respect. But apart from all this, it will appear, as we proceed, that the question of the Pauline doctrine of the Future is little affected by these problems of criticism. It is precisely in the four primary Epistles that we have the largest and most varied disclosure of Paul's mind as regards the things of the end. If we were limited to these four Epistles, we should have all the essential points in Paul's eschatological teaching. If along with these we take the three now generally added to Baur's list, we shall have more detail on certain points. If we extend our investigation to the whole thirteen, we shall find only one or two things that can be called in any sense novel, and none that can be regarded as out of harmony with what we have in the four primary Epistles. This will become clear as we proceed. While we distinguish between the different groups of writings for the sake of scientific precision, it will be seen that no injustice would be done, though from the first we dealt with the whole thirteen Epistles and the discourses in the Book of Acts as one collection of genuine Pauline literature.

The question is also raised whether we have not to recognise a change of view in these writings. They fall easily into four distinct groups, and attention is called to certain differences between the groups, especially between the Thessalonian Epistles and those of later date. These differences are thought to indicate a difference in attitude towards the Last Things. Those who assign the later Epistles to other hands than Paul's, take these differences to be witnesses to an advance and a modification which naturally occurred in the course of years in the form of doctrine which passed from Paul to the Pauline school.[1] Others whose criticism is more moderate find in these differences the evidences of a growth in Paul's own mind, an advance from a relatively imperfect method of understanding and presenting Christian truth to a relatively mature conception, in which Christian doctrine was relieved of its original Jewish elements and exhibited more distinctly in its spiritual forms. Some who think that a change in Paul's view must be admitted, consider it to have been completed at an early period, before the Epistle to the Galatians was written.[2] Others are of opinion that an analysis of the Epistles reveals the fact that there was a growth in Paul's doctrine along the line of the successive groups into which the writings fall, and that, with respect to his doctrine of the Future, there was an important change in his view from the rudimentary eschatology of the Thessalonian Epistles to the broader and more spiritual ideas of the later Epistles.[3]

Of this it is enough to say at present that we see

[1] So Pfleiderer. [2] So Menegoz. [3] So Sabatier.

nothing to indicate that Paul's mind on the subject of the Future underwent any essential alteration between the time when he wrote his earlier Epistles and the time when he wrote his later. Some plausibility no doubt is given to the idea of such a change, if the Epistles are read simply as so many pieces of autobiographical writing or psychological analysis. It disappears so soon as they are read in the light of the occasions which called them forth and the audiences to which they were addressed. In what they say on the subject of the Future they do not speak all with precisely the same voice. They differ in so far as there are things which are more prominent in one group of Epistles than in another. They differ in the incidence of their statements, in the aspects of the doctrine of the Future which they severally present, in the more or less developed form in which the doctrine appears. They differ in the way in which Paul speaks of his own relation to Christ's Coming, and in the simpler or more reasoned account which they give of the perfecting of the kingdom of God, the more or less eschatological account which they give of the contents of the Christian hope. But these differences are sufficiently explained by the different circles of readers to whom he had to write from time to time, with their different modes of thought, their different anxieties, their different mistakes. It is unreasonable to suppose that he would write in the same way or set forth the same aspects of the truth touching the Future to churches differing so widely from each other in needs, ways of thinking, and stages of experience as those of Thessalonica, Rome, and Ephesus. It will be seen in

the course of our inquiry that, neither in the doctrine which he unfolds to his churches, nor in the expectations which he expresses regarding himself and the Parousia, is there any contradiction between his earlier words and his later, any change in the principle of his teaching. Development there may be, but not essential alteration.

The difficulties, however, which meet us in getting at the genesis of Paul's ideas and attempting a construction of his teaching are neither few nor small. Even in him we have nothing approaching a systematic statement of doctrine. His Epistles, though more numerous than those of other New Testament writers, are after all but a handful, and they are entirely occasional compositions. They never give us, not even in the case of the great letter to the Romans, anything like a didactic exposition of doctrine. In all their averments and explanations, they are ruled by the particular, limited occasion which called them forth. Nor have we any reason to believe that we have all the materials that might have been available for getting at Paul's mind in its whole compass on these great questions. We cannot say that we possess all the Epistles which he had to write to his many churches. On the contrary, there are indications here and there in his writings that he carried on a much larger correspondence with his converts, and that letters of his, even to churches of the importance of Corinth, are now lost.

It has to be observed further, that his doctrine of the Future is not his fundamental doctrine, and that there are other truths which occupy a larger place than

it in the compass of his teaching. It is connected, however, with other things which are more central in his order of thought, especially his doctrine of sin, his doctrine of Christ's work, and his doctrine of the Spirit; and it is subject consequently to all the difficulties which may be found to belong to these.

The peculiar character, too, which belongs to Paul's larger doctrine belongs to some extent to his teaching on the subject of the Future; and the difficulties attending the interpretation of the one meet us also in some measure in the interpretation of the other. The terms which he uses are drawn from different sources, and in some cases are used in senses other than that which they bear elsewhere. Their exact connotation, therefore, is sometimes hard to define. The same mixture of logical elements and mystical which is discovered in his teaching on sin and grace is also found in his doctrine of the end. It is this that gives their peculiar depth and magnificence to many of his statements, especially on the Resurrection. But it is this, too, that makes it peculiarly difficult to grasp all that his words imply.

To understand the Pauline doctrine in its origin, its connections, and the length and breadth of its significance, we should have a great deal more than we yet possess. We should have a larger acquaintance with the elements of his mental and religious education, with the ideas which made his mental and religious environment, with the system of doctrine and the theological vocabulary in which he was educated, and with his experiences under the law. If we had this we should appreciate better the new elements of

belief and thought which came in with his conversion, and should see more distinctly how the old order of ideas and the new were related to each other. But, while we have some information on these subjects, we have not enough. The impression which we gather from his own writings and from the accounts of him which are given in the Book of Acts is that his training had been mainly Jewish. There are indications also that he had some acquaintance with Greek thought. But how far that went, and to what extent it influenced his ways of looking at things and stating truth, is difficult to decide. The fact that he employs some of the ideas and forms of expression which were current in the Greek schools, suggests that he was not altogether a stranger to the popular Hellenic philosophy, as other things may suggest that he had some knowledge of Hellenic literature. And in a city like Tarsus, a great centre of culture, there were abundant facilities for instruction in the Hellenic learning.

Some make so much of these probabilities that they assert not only that Paul must have had a Greek education, but that Greek ideas form an essential element in his thought and have to be recognised in his theology. They attribute to him a considerable acquaintance with the mixed Hellenic and Jewish wisdom of Alexandria, and refer us to Greek thought for the origin of some of Paul's characteristic terms, such as *flesh* and *spirit*, and for the explanation of Paul's conception of immortality. Were this the case, it would materially modify our interpretation of his doctrine. But there is little to support so exaggerated a position in point of fact. There is but a formal resemblance

between Paul's terms and those of the Greek schools. If he employs some which are familiar to the Greek philosophy, he gives them a new sense. It remains a moot point whether he was acquainted with the writings of Philo and was in any way influenced by Philo's thought. It is almost equally doubtful whether his Epistles reflect in any measure the ideas of the Book of Wisdom. It may also be said that, if he had been trained in the Greek schools, his use of the Greek language would in all probability have been different. After all allowance is made for the effect which the rush and weight and passion of his thought must have had upon his language, his Greek remains least formed and most limited just at those points, especially the syntax, of which most was made in the Hellenic schools.

To seek the roots of Paul's doctrine of the Future, therefore, in Greek thought is entirely fallacious. Its connections are with Hebrew faith. But even as to these all is not so clear as one could wish. It is obvious that, as he was a pupil of Gamaliel, he must have been familiar with the Rabbinical methods and ideas of the time, especially those of the more moderate school. But it is less easy than might seem to be the case to measure the influence which the training of a Jewish scholar and scribe may have had upon his doctrine. While we know something of the Palestinian theology and the Rabbinical use of Scripture, our knowledge of what these were precisely in Paul's time is still far from complete.

Paul himself speaks of his gospel, with its characteristic message, as a thing which he did not learn from others, but received by revelation: "Neither did

I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it *came to me* through revelation of Jesus Christ."[1] That is the account he himself gives of it, and he connects it all with the historical fact of his own conversion. We shall not get far behind his own statement of the origin of his "gospel"; and all the distinctive lines of his teaching can be traced back to the impression which was made upon him by the revelation of Jesus Christ *to* him and *in* him at the time of his conversion. There we have the laboratory of all Paul's doctrine, and in a very special way of his doctrine of the resurrection.

But it may be shown at the same time that the most characteristic points in his teaching on the Last Things are in harmony with what we have found in the case of the other New Testament writers, and that his most developed statements are not only congruous with the broad principles of Christ's own teaching, but have their points of issue there.

Paul was certainly acquainted with the facts of Christ's life and with many of His words. How he came by his knowledge we are not distinctly told. He speaks of certain things as things which he himself "received."[2] He may have got much from Peter and the other apostles on the occasions on which he met them. His intercourse with Peter during his stay of fifteen days with him in Jerusalem three years after the events of Damascus, may have been of importance in this respect. He may also have learnt much by his own observation at an earlier period; for he was in Jerusalem soon after our Lord's death, if not before it.

[1] Gal. i. 12, R.V. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 3; cf. 1 Cor. xi. 23.

But, however he came to know the words of Christ, the fact remains that his writings show him to have been acquainted with them and to have referred to them as authoritative.[1]

It will also be seen that in Paul's doctrine of the Future there is nothing that may not be connected in principle with Christ's teaching, nothing in its most reasoned statements which may not be read as an exposition of some text furnished by those words of Paul's Master which are reported in the Gospels. This is the case even with the more occasional and peculiar points of his doctrine. We have already referred to certain instances of this. There are, for example, the doctrines of the resurrection-body, the transformation of those who are found alive at Christ's Coming, and the renewal of the world. On none of these subjects have we explicit statements in Christ's teaching. But we have the words in which He speaks of those of the resurrection being like the angels who neither marry nor are given in marriage; of the gathering of the elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other; and of the "regeneration" in which His apostles were to sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. In these words there are suggestions of large moment, with which Paul's doctrine may be connected. The same may be said of other parts of his teaching. The most remarkable points in his elaborated doctrine of the resurrection may be carried back to the brief but creative words of the Lord Himself which are found in the Fourth Gospel.

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 10, ix. 14; 1 Thess. iv. 15; cf. Acts xx. 35.

As in the case of the other New Testament writers, Paul's doctrine of the Future is intimately related to the doctrine of the kingdom of God. It is in Paul's Epistles indeed, not in those of Peter, James, Jude, or John, that the particular phrase "the kingdom of God" is found. In the Pauline writings this phrase occurs eight times.[1] In addition to this, the idea is also expressed in other forms, "the kingdom," "the kingdom of Christ and God," "the kingdom of the Son of His love," "His kingdom."[2] It appears, therefore, in all the four groups of Epistles bearing Paul's name. In some of these occurrences the kingdom is certainly a *present* kingdom, and one of ethical nature, a kingdom which "is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."[3] But usually it is a kingdom of the future, an inheritance yet to be looked for. His doctrine consequently is for the most part eschatological. The Christian salvation is a grace by which we "shall be saved from wrath," "delivered from the wrath to come."[4]

Though this great idea of the kingdom of God has not the prominence in Paul's writings which it has in the Synoptical Gospels, the consummation of that kingdom is the eschatological centre in Paul's teaching as elsewhere. The several truths which make up the General Apostolic Doctrine are also found in Paul, and are placed in the same relations to the large conception of

[1] Rom. xiv. 17; 1 Cor. iv. 20, vi. 9, 10, xv. 50; Gal. v. 21; Col. iv. 11; 2 Thess. i. 5.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 24; Eph. v. 5; Col. i. 13; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 2 Tim. iv. 1, 18.

[3] Rom. xiv. 7; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 20; Col. i. 13.

[4] Rom. v. 9; 1 Thess. i. 10.

the consummation. Nor can it be said that these are confined to any particular section of the Pauline writings, or that there is any radical difference in the way in which they are presented at one stage and at another.

The doctrine of Christ's *Second Coming*, for example, has a very large place in the Pauline writings. In word or in idea it appears in most of the Epistles, and is expressed by a remarkable variety of terms. In the primary Epistles it is the "revelation" (ἀποκάλυψις) of Jesus Christ, His "day."[1] In the Thessalonian Epistles it is His "coming," His "day," His "revelation," His "Parousia."[2] In the Epistles of the Captivity it is again His "day," and in the Pastorals it is His "Parousia," His "day," His "appearing," the "appearing of His glory."[3] It is the thought which underlies other statements in which it does not come to verbal expression; as when Paul speaks of salvation as "nearer to us than when we *first* believed,"[4] of the time as being "shortened,"[5] of the "heaven whence also we wait for a Saviour,"[6] of turning unto God from idols "to wait for His Son from heaven."[7]

It is sometimes said that by the Coming of Christ as we find it in the Pauline Epistles, we are to understand simply Christ's kingship over the heart, or a purely spiritual presence in which "He has come, is coming, and will come more and more." It is also sometimes asserted that in his earlier career Paul looked for an

[1] 1 Cor. i. 7, 8, v. 3.
[2] 1 Thess. ii. 19, iii. 13, iv. 15, v. 2, 23; 2 Thess. i. 7, ii. 1, 8, 9.
[3] Phil. i. 10; 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. i. 12, iv. 1, 8; Titus ii. 13.
[4] Rom. xiii. 11.
[5] 1 Cor. vii. 29.
[6] Phil. iii. 20.
[7] 1 Thess. i. 10.

outward, visible Coming, but that the later Epistles show him to have given up that expectation in favour of a more spiritual idea of the Future and of his Lord, thinking of Christ as within him and of himself as sitting in heavenly places now.[1] A comparison of the passages referred to will show at a glance how far this is from being the case, and in what accord Paul is with the other apostles in his doctrine of the *Parousia*.

As it is with this doctrine so is it with those of the Resurrection, the Judgment, and the Final Awards. Paul's teaching on the subject of the *Resurrection* is largest and most explicit in the primary Epistles. But it is given also elsewhere, and it is presupposed in much that he says on other subjects all through his Epistles.[2] The Divine *Judgment* is a prominent theme in his earlier letters and in the primary group. But it is equally prominent in the latest of all the Pauline writings. It is a future, final judgment, which comes with the day of wrath.[3] It is the judgment of God,[4] the judgment of Christ,[5] the judgment of God through Christ.[6] It is a universal judgment, embracing all, both quick and dead;[7] a righteous judgment, which shall lay bare the secrets of all hearts, and give to every man according to his works.[8] The *Final Awards* which are the issue of that judgment are a frequent theme. With what wealth of phrase and figure is the recompense of the righteous

[1] So, *e.g.*, J. Freeman Clarke, *The Ideas of the Apostle Paul.*

[2] See, *e.g.*, Rom. iv. 17, viii. 11; 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. i. 10, iv. 14, v. 1–5; Phil. iii. 11, 21.

[3] Rom. ii. 5; 1 Cor. iii. 13.

[4] Rom. ii. 3 (cf. iii. 19), xiv. 11.

[5] 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1.

[6] Rom. ii. 16.

[7] Acts xvii. 31; cf. Rom. xiv. 11; 2 Tim. iv. 1.

[8] Rom. ii. 5; 2 Thess. i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 8.

set forth! It is *salvation*, a salvation from wrath, "the salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory;[1] a *prize*, a *crown*, a "crown of righteousness," an *incorruptible* crown;[2] a *hope*, "the hope of righteousness," "the hope which is laid up in the heavens";[3] an *inheritance*, "the inheritance of the saints in light," an heirship of God;[4] the *manifestation* or *revealing* of the sons of God;[5] the *redemption of the body*;[6] a *glory*, a *reign*, a *liberty*, a *life* with Christ, eternal life,[7] "the life which is life indeed."[8]

The destiny of the unrighteous is a more occasional subject. In large measure it is left as a matter of awful inference rather than definitely announced. It is expressed, however, by such terms as *wrath*, a "wrath to come," "wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish";[9] *death*, *punishment*, *destruction*,[10] "eternal destruction from the face of the Lord."[11] In each case also the destiny determined by the judgment is a permanent destiny. The *life* of the righteous and the *destruction* of the unrighteous are both described as "eternal." And in the Pauline writings this term *αἰώνιος*, while like other terms of well understood sense it is subject to certain modifications of its proper meaning, is essentially a note of

[1] Rom. v. 9; 2 Tim. ii. 10.
[2] Phil. iii. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 25; 2 Tim. iv. 8.
[3] Gal. v. 5; Col. i. 4.
[4] Col. i. 12, iii. 24.
[5] Rom. viii. 19. [6] Rom. viii. 23.
[7] Rom. ii. 7, v. 21, vi. 8, 23; Gal. vi. 8; 1 Tim. i. 16, vi. 12, 16; 2 Tim. ii. 1; Titus i. 2.
[8] 1 Tim. vi. 19.
[9] Rom. ii. 5; 1 Thess. i. 10; Rom. ii. 8.
[10] Rom. vi. 21; 2 Thess. i. 9; Phil. iii. 19.
[11] 2 Thess. i. 9.

duration, expressing the *abiding*, the *unchangeable*, as contrasted with the *transitory*, the *mutable*.[1]

In its broad outlines, therefore, the Pauline doctrine is the doctrine which we have found elsewhere in the New Testament. Is this true of it, however, throughout? Or does it contain peculiar elements, and does it at any point separate itself from the general strain of New Testament teaching on the Last Things? These are questions which demand careful consideration.

[1] So, *e.g.*, the *eternal*, unchangeable God from whom Paul's gospel comes; which gospel, therefore, is no doubtful novelty (Rom. xvi. 26). So, too, the house *eternal* in the heavens, in contrast with the earthly house which dissolves (2 Cor. v. 1), etc.

CHAPTER II

PARTICULARS OF PAUL'S DOCTRINE

AMONG the things which are reckoned strange and exceptional are the statements on the *Rapture of the saints*[1] and the *Man of Sin*.[2] Much is made of them by some, as if they betrayed a departure from the general New Testament doctrine, or belonged to an imperfect and provisional stage in Paul's own view of the end. They have been numbered with the things which are supposed to tell against the Pauline authorship of the Epistles in which they occur. In a certain sense they are peculiar to Paul, but not in the sense that they have no points of contact with the teaching of the New Testament elsewhere. The former has a certain relation to John's prophecy regarding the two witnesses. In the picture of the death by which they seal their testimony and the resurrection which follows, the crowning reward is their assumption into heaven. In the apocalyptic vision "the breath of life from God" was seen to enter them "after three and a half days"; they "stood upon their feet"; they heard a voice inviting them to "come up hither"; "and they went up into heaven

[1] 1 Thess. iv. 17. [2] 2 Thess. ii. 3–10.

in the cloud."[1] The foundations for the apostle's prophecy may lie in Christ's word touching the sending of His angels with "the great sound of a trumpet" to "gather together His elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other,"[2] and in the report of His ascension, especially as it is given in the "second treatise" by Luke, the companion of Paul.[3] The latter passage, the prophecy of the revelation of "the lawless one," is akin to John's teaching on the subject of Antichrist,[4] and to Christ's own announcement of "false Christs and false prophets;[5] while it takes its particular form from Daniel's predictions of "the one that maketh desolate," "the king who shall exalt himself and magnify himself above every god," and the setting up of "the abomination that maketh desolate."[6]

Neither statement is made for its own sake or in a dogmatic interest, but with a practical purpose. The one is introduced in order to relieve certain Thessalonian converts, who were looking for Christ's immediate return, of the painful thought that their friends who died before the Parousia might suffer some loss, and its object is to assure them that deceased and surviving believers shall meet their returning Lord together. The latter is introduced to correct a precipitancy in the expectations of these Thessalonians which was disengaging them from common duty. It does this by reminding them, in accordance with the tenor of Old Testament prophecy

[1] Rev. xi. 11, 12, R.V. [2] Matt. xxiv. 31.
[3] Mark xvi. 19; Luke xxiv. 51; Acts i. 9, 10.
[4] 1 John ii. 18.
[5] Matt. xxiv. 24. [6] Dan. ix. 27, xi. 36, 37, xii. 11.

and Christ's own words, that, however near and certain the Parousia might be, it could not take effect until two prevenient events had occurred—a final manifestation and personal embodiment of the principle of lawlessness, and the removal of a restraining order and authority.

It is said again that Paul diverges from the general teaching of the New Testament and agrees with the exceptional doctrine of the Apocalypse on the subject of a *millennial* period. This turns on the interpretation of one passage of acknowledged difficulty, in which he speaks of the Son delivering up the kingdom to God. "For as in Adam all die," he says in the course of his argument on the resurrection, "so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; then they that are Christ's at His coming. Then cometh the end, when He shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father."[1] Here, it is thought, he has three distinct events in view, Christ's resurrection, the resurrection of those who are Christ's, and the resurrection of those who are not His. These events are supposed to be given in their order, and the "end" is understood to mean the end of the whole process of the resurrection in its three stages, or the end of a millennial interval between the last two stages.

But this idea of a millennial period interposed between two separate acts of resurrection, has no foundation either in the general strain of Paul's teaching on the Future, or in the terms of the passage in question. The resurrection of those that are Christ's is connected

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 22–24, R.V.

immediately with His Parousia, and nothing is said of another resurrection. In this great argument Paul looks to the case of those that are Christ's, and the position in which they would be placed were there no resurrection. He says nothing of others, and instead of going on to speak of a subsequent resurrection of another class, he passes at once to the *end*. His silence on the subject of this supposed later resurrection is a difficulty which is acutely felt. All the explanation offered is that the event is not referred to in terms because it is understood to be implied in the *end*. It is evident, too, that the interval supposed to separate the two resurrections is not quite congruous with the thousand years of the Apocalypse. For the millennium which results from this interpretation of Paul's words is one of which nothing else is said or hinted except that during it Christ is to subdue all hostile powers.

But in point of fact the idea in the passage does not refer to any question of chronological order, or to a succession of events, embracing Christ's rising, the rising of the just, and finally the resurrection of the unjust, divided from each other by certain spaces of time. The term "end" is most naturally understood here as elsewhere of the end of the world. To restrict it to the end of a millennial interval, or a resurrection-process, is not in harmony with its ordinary application. The word rendered "order"[1] is also difficult to adapt to the interpretation in question. It expresses *order* properly speaking, not in the sense of *succession*, but in that of *rank* or *division*; and there is an obvious

[1] τάγμα, not τάξις.

awkwardness in representing Christ as Himself forming the first of three great bands of the risen. It is probable, therefore, that the matter which Paul has in view here is not any question of stages in the resurrection, but a practical difficulty of which we have hints elsewhere.[1] As it was natural for those who expected Christ to return without delay to be haunted by the fear that Christian friends who passed away by death before that event might be put to disadvantage, it was also natural that the *condition* of the Christian dead should be to some minds the occasion of doubtful thoughts. Must those who die in Christ share the common doom of death? Is their resurrection not to follow immediately? Have they to lie like others for an unknown length of time under the power of death in Hades?

In relief of such difficulties Paul makes it known to these Corinthians among whom so many questions were rife, that it is God's purpose not to raise His servants singly, but as a triumphant, collective body. The individual is not to rise in his own separate and solitary individuality, but as a member of a great, redeemed company. First Christ rises in the character of first-fruits of a vast harvest, and then in the train and by the power of His resurrection all who die in Him shall be raised at the last, on the completion of His work, in one great muster of the living.

There are questions, however, of more serious moment than these. They relate to Paul's teaching

[1] *E.g.*, Rom. viii. 7, 10, 11.

on the condition between the two great events of death and the resurrection, and on the final issues. Has he any doctrine of the *Intermediate State*? Does he say anything of Christ's own descent to the world of the dead, or of any activity of His there? Are there things in his Epistles which favour the belief in a purgation of souls in the after-existence, or suggest that there is an extension of the gospel into the other world, a prolongation of the opportunities of repentance after death?

In early Christian theology much was made of the doctrine of a *Middle State*, with possibilities for the elevation of pious souls and for the purification of the imperfect. These ideas were at first of a simple kind, and the thought of a purgation was connected with the sifting decision of the Last Judgment. In course of time these ideas took other directions and larger forms. The fire of the Judgment became a fire in the Intermediate State, and the idea of a moral purification which was attached to it grew into the dogma of Purgatory. The Reformers struck at the roots of the superstitious doctrine which had developed out of these ideas. But of late there has been a disposition to go back from the position of the Reformers, to rehabilitate the dogma of an Intermediate State, and to advocate the theory of a modified purgatorial process. It is admitted by the more moderate that Scripture offers at the best nothing more than hints on these subjects. Dr. Newman Smyth, for example, concedes that any intimations which may be gathered from the New Testament are dim and uncertain, and in no degree calculated to "alter the fact that the burden of the

Scriptures is the utter urgency of a right moral decision now before the Cross," and that they "hold up no promise of the hereafter to any man who here and now determines himself against the Spirit of Christ." But he thinks also that there are "parts of the doctrine of the future" which "are left in obscurity, purposely left it may be in the shadow of revelation"; and that so long as we have such things in Scripture our theology ought not to be "over-confident that it has learned the whole mind of the Spirit concerning God's work and purpose in the interval—we know not how long it may be—between death and the final judgment." "I feel," he adds, "that I have a moral right—a right guaranteed by these Scriptures—to take refuge from the perplexities of the final issues of evil in my own ignorance and the silence of Scripture; to find peace, comfort, and hope in the merciful obscurities of revelation."[1]

Many of those who do not see their way to accept the doctrine of a final restoration for all, but admit that with the judgment there must be a conclusive determination of men's destinies, yet cling to the "larger hope," and seek a basis for it in the doctrine of the Intermediate State. They hold that the New Testament warrants us to say that the effect of Christ's appearance in the world of the dead was the institution of a new ministry of grace with continued opportunities of repentance, and an enlarged, if not universal, recovery of souls. Popular opinion is coloured by such speculations to an extent that is perhaps not

[1] *The Orthodox Theology of To-day*, pp. 115, 116, 125, 126.

sufficiently recognised. They are advanced in many of the publications which appear from year to year on the subject of the Future Life. They find much to favour them in the writings of theologians like Maurice, Dorner, Farrar, and many more. The ancient practice of prayers for the dead is often appealed to as a witness to the existence in earlier times of larger ideas of what is possible after death. With some the other world becomes almost an exact parallel to the present world, man's powers being supposed to be heightened, but his life being thought to proceed in the same order of development, with the same capacities for conversion from evil to good and from good to evil; and Christ being understood to realise a ministry of grace in the Intermediate State by personal communication or by means analogous to the ordinances of the Church on earth.[1]

The sanction of Paul's authority is sought for these speculations. It is strongly asserted that there are elements in Paul's system of doctrine which point to an affirmative reply to the questions referred to above. The passages on which all this is founded are few in number, but of great interest. One of them is the paragraph which has been the *locus classicus*, so far as the New Testament is concerned, for the dogma of a *purgatory*: "But if any man buildeth on the foundation gold, silver, costly stones, wood, hay, stubble; each man's work shall be made manifest: for the day shall declare it, because it is revealed in fire; and the fire itself shall prove each man's work of what sort it

[1] See, *e.g.*, Güder's position in his *Lehre der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter den Todten*, and in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*.

is. If any man's work shall abide which he hath built thereon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved; yet so as through fire."[1] Of this it is enough to say that what is in view is the particular case of teachers, who are compared here to workmen erecting a structure on the foundation laid by Christ the Master-builder. In their work they use different kinds of material. But the value of all will be tested, because the day of Christ's Parousia comes, and that is a day of judgment. The action in view is a *testing*, not a purgation. The "day" in question is not the day of death but, as elsewhere, the day of the Parousia; and it is described as "revealed in fire," in accordance with the usual Biblical way of associating fire with Theophanies and Divine judgment. The passage, therefore, has no relation to the Intermediate State or any process of purification for human souls in the other world.

The Epistle to the Romans, however, contains a paragraph that lies more directly to our subject. Speaking of Israel's ignorance of "God's righteousness," and of Christ as "the end of the law," Paul proceeds thus: "For Moses writeth that the man that doeth the righteousness which is of the law shall live thereby. But the righteousness which is of faith saith thus, Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down:) or, Who shall descend into the abyss? (that is, to bring Christ up from the dead). But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is,

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 12–15.

the word of faith, which we preach: because if thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus *as* Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved: for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."[1]

This is one of the passages in which Lutheran divines seek a foundation for the peculiar theological ideas which they connect with the doctrine of Christ's Descent to Hades. It is also made much of by those who think that Paul teaches an important and far-reaching doctrine of the Intermediate State. But it will easily be shown that there is nothing in this paragraph beyond the most general statement that Christ was in the world of the dead and was raised from it by God.

There is no difficulty with regard to the term *deep* or *abyss* (ἄβυσσος). It is used elsewhere, indeed, of the *bottomless pit*, the place of torment, the abode of demons.[2] But its connection here with the bringing up *from the dead* (ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν) shows clearly that it refers to the world of the dead generally. The purpose of the paragraph is also sufficiently clear. It is to show that the people of Israel miss salvation, notwithstanding their zeal for God, because they mistake God's righteousness, and go about to establish a righteousness of their own. The peculiarity of the section lies in the use which is made of the terms in which the Book of Deuteronomy represents Moses to have spoken of the commandment he delivered to Israel: "For

[1] Rom. x. 5–10, R.V.
[2] Luke viii. 31; Rev. ix. 1, 11, xi. 7, xviii. 8, xx. 1, 3.

this commandment which I command thee this day," he said, "it is not too hard for thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, and make us to hear it, that we may do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."[1] This description of the *commandment* of Moses is applied by Paul, with certain modifications of its terms, to the righteousness of faith. Of these modifications the most important is the substitution of "descend into the abyss" for "go over the sea," which is made with a view to the mention of Christ's resurrection.

Paul's reason for introducing this passage of Deuteronomy appears to be the fact that it expresses a certain characteristic of the "commandment" which suits his purpose here, namely, its *accessibility*. Under both dispensations God made known His gracious will by *word*. In the one, indeed, it was by a word of *command*, requiring certain *doings*; in the other it was by a word of *faith*, requiring simply to be believed. But in the one case as in the other, it was something near and intelligible, and it is Israel's fatal mistake to think of the righteousness of which that word speaks as if it were so remote and impracticable that they must seek out another of their own.

The questions, therefore, or *sayings in the heart—Who shall ascend into heaven?* and, *Who shall de-*

[1] Deut. xxx. 11–14, R.V.

scend into the abyss?—are shown to be inconsistent with the real nature of the righteousness of faith. The parenthetical clauses—"*that is, to bring Christ down*," and "*that is, to bring Christ up from the dead*"—refer to the two pillars of Paul's doctrine, the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ. The first bears simply on the fact that Christ has come from heaven; and it has nothing to do with His ascension (although Calvin among others favours that idea); and the second deals only with the fact that Christ has risen from the dead, and it has nothing to do with a descent to hell or Hades, beyond the general statement that Christ entered the world of the dead and was raised from it. The terms "heaven" and "the abyss" are antithetical simply to the "near thee." The questions are introduced only as examples of mistaken thoughts of God's righteousness. The first of the explanatory clauses explains the object of the ascent to be to *bring Christ down*, but says nothing of the locality. The second explains the purpose of the descent to be to *bring Christ up again from the dead*; but, while it mentions the companionship, it says nothing of the place from which He was to be raised. The object of the quotation from the Old Testament, and of the paragraph as a whole, is simply to exhibit the *nearness* and *attainability* of that righteousness of God which Israel misapprehended and missed. To engraft on the passage any doctrine of a localised Hades, an intermediate state, or an activity of Christ in the underworld, is justified neither by the particular terms, nor by Paul's immediate object. The meaning of the paragraph in brief is this: "Christ has come from

heaven; Christ has risen from the dead; the righteousness of God revealed in these facts and preached in the word of faith, is so intelligible, so near, and so attainable, that none need fail to understand it, none need fail to reach it; and it is Israel's sad mistake that, notwithstanding their zeal for God, they have failed to see it and seek it."

Another passage of which much use is made in the interest of the same ideas, is the paragraph on *gifts* in the Epistle to the Ephesians. "But unto each one of us was the grace given," it runs, "according to the measure of the gift of Christ. Wherefore he saith,

> When He ascended on high, He led captivity captive,
> And gave gifts unto men.

(Now this, He ascended, what is it but that He also descended into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended far above all heavens, that He might fill all things.")[1] Many of the Fathers, and indeed most interpreters up to Calvin's time, understood this to refer to Christ's descent to Hades. The great majority of Lutheran theologians (with some notable exceptions, however, including Harless) take the same view of it. Some think it implies a visit of Christ to Hades for the purpose of *liberating* souls.[2] Many English commentators understand it to bear more or less definitely on the doctrine of the Intermediate State and a presence of Christ there.

[1] Eph. iv. 7–10, R.V.

[2] So König, *Christi Höllenfahrt*, p. 26; cf. Delitzsch, *Bib. Psychologie*, p. 414; etc.

Dean Plumptre, for example, referring to Paul's citation of the term *ἀνέβη*, says "that word '*ascended*' leads him to pause abruptly. Men were not to think that the work of Christ in the unseen world was limited to that which followed His ascension. . . . Hades and the heaven of heavens had alike felt the glory and the blessedness of His presence."[1]

How does the case then stand? Paul's object is to inculcate a spirit of unity and brotherly Christian service. He reminds his readers that all their gifts have their origin in Christ; that each man receives in proportion to the measure in which Christ bestows; and that this should prompt the receivers to withdraw from all division, jealousy, and pride, and employ their several gifts in the spirit of meekness and brotherhood for the good of the whole Church. In illustration of this he appeals to the Sixty-Eighth Psalm, and in quoting it he dwells upon the one significant word "*ascended.*" In that Psalm Jehovah is addressed as the God of battles who in the times of Israel's depression went up in glorious triumph over their enemies, carrying with Him a train of prisoners taken from among their oppressors, and rich spoils to be used in setting up on Zion the house from which He should reign over the world. That triumph of the God of Israel has its analogue in the triumph of Christ, who has gone up as Conqueror, and has won spoils for the setting up of His spiritual house. In each case the triumph came in the same way. The God of Israel had to condescend to His people in the wilderness in order that He might rise as Victor over their enemies, and lead them gloriously to

[1] *The Spirits in Prison; a Sermon on the State of the Dead.*

Zion; and Christ had first to come down from heaven before He could rise to the seat of power and reign as the author of gifts, with an all-filling activity. The Old Testament passage, in being adapted to this purpose, undergoes certain changes; of which the most important is that the "*received gifts from* (*among*) *men*" becomes "*gave gifts unto men.*" In the Psalm the captives are the enemies of Israel, and the gifts are the spoils *taken from these conquered foes.* But in the Epistle the subjects in view are converts won for Himself by Christ, and the gifts in question are the spiritual gifts which proceed from Him.

Does the paragraph, then, refer to Christ's descent to Hades, or simply to His descent to earth? And if it refers to the former, what is the extent of its teaching on the subject? One of the chief arguments for the former view is that the term "the lower parts of the earth" (τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς) is equivalent to the Hebrew תַּחְתִּיּוֹת הָאָרֶץ, and denotes properly *the parts under the earth.* But, while it is true that the Hebrew phrase is usually, if not invariably, employed of Sheol,[1] the Greek equivalent in the Septuagint is τὰ κατώτατα, not τὰ κατώτερα, τῆς γῆς. It is also urged that the large expression "far above all heavens" can be fitly balanced only by a descent to the under-world, not by a descent simply to earth. But this phrase "far above all heavens" (ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν) is simply an expansion of the "on high" (εἰς ὕψος) of the Psalm, and there is no allusion there to Hades. It is also thought that the concluding clause "that He

[1] It has another sense in Ps. cxxxix. 15; perhaps also, as some good exegetes hold, in Isa. xliv. 23.

might fill all things" (ἵνα πληρώσῃ τὰ πάντα) points to a presence of Christ that includes heaven, earth, and the under-world. But in any case the words do not go beyond the general statement of the universal sovereignty, the all-ruling activity, on which Christ entered by His ascension.

Much may be said on the other hand in favour of the interpretation which understands the *descent* to refer to the incarnation. The phrase τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς may be taken as a genitive of apposition instead of a genitive of comparison, the sense being not the parts which are *lower than* the earth, but the lower parts which *are* the earth. The term "*descended*" (κατέβη) is certainly used elsewhere of the incarnation.[1] The antithesis in the Psalm which Paul quotes is between Jehovah's descent to *earth* simply, and His reascent to heaven. Further, it is to be observed that it is the *ascension*, not the resurrection, that is immediately in view, and the New Testament never speaks of Christ *ascending* from Hades or from the dead. Nor is it very obvious how Christ's power as the Dispenser of all gifts to His servants has any special connection with His descent to Hades.

Be it as it may with the claims of these two interpretations, the passage affirms nothing beyond the fact that Christ did descend. If the descent was into a region lower than earth, all that is stated is that He passed into the world of the dead, and nothing is said of any work of His there or of anything affecting the position of the dead.[2]

[1] *E.g.*, John iii. 13.

[2] The interpretation which takes the scene of the descent to be Hades

These passages, therefore, are wholly insufficient to show that the Pauline Epistles give an important place to the doctrine of the *Intermediate State*, or suggest an extended probation in the world of the dead. But a larger question still is raised. It is asserted by not a few that these Epistles support the widest hope—the hope of a *Universal Restoration* as the end of God's ways. In proof of this a special appeal is made to some remarkable statements in the First Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistles of the Captivity.

Two of these are found in the great chapter on the Resurrection, and of these something requires to be said. The first is the comparison between Adam and Christ, in respect of what results from them to mankind—"as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive."[1] Paul has spoken of Christ as raised from the dead, not for Himself only, but as "the first-fruits of them that are asleep." That His resurrection should have this power is only consistent, it is next said, with the unmistakable fact that in Adam death affected not himself only, but others. This is stated first in the abstract form, "Since by man is death, by man also is resurrection of dead persons"; and then in the concrete form, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive." The former presents man as the *instrument* (δι' ἀνθρώπου) both of death and of life to

is supported not only by many of the Fathers, but by Erasmus, Bengel, Rückert, Olshausen, Delitzsch, Lechler, Baur, Ewald, Meyer (in his later editions), etc. The other interpretation has the sanction of Calvin, Beza, Reiche, Grotius, Winer, Grimm, Harless, De Wette, Schenkel, etc. Holtzmann also takes the genitive as an appositive genitive, and expresses himself in these decided terms: "Die Deutung auf eine Hadesfahrt hat vollends keinen Sinn im Zusammenhang" (*Hand-Commentar, in loc.*).

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 22.

men. The latter furnishes a reason for this in the fact that men are generally or representatively *in* (ἐν) Adam and *in* Christ,—the historical Adam and the historical Christ (ἐν τῷ Ἀδάμ, ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ). So it is only consistent with the Divine ordinance, as it is also consistent with fact, that as by the one head death came, by the other Head life should come. The question, therefore, is as to the extension to be given to the word "all" in this connection. Some say that it must be taken absolutely, in the sense that all without exception shall at last be raised to blessedness of life.[1] But with most the choice is admitted to lie between two interpretations of another kind.

One of these takes the "all" in the universal sense, and understands the sense to be that as in Adam all die the physical death, so in Christ all shall be raised up out of it. The point of the statement is thus the idea of the general resurrection, not that of a universal restoration of the evil to good and to God. This is in accordance with the fact that Paul elsewhere speaks of a resurrection of the unjust as well as the just,[2] and also with the fact that in John's Gospel Christ Himself speaks not only of those who have done good, but of those who have done evil, coming forth from the tombs at the voice of the Son of Man, the one class "unto the resurrection of life," the other "unto the resurrection of judgement."[3] The other interpretation takes the "all" to be limited by the nature of the case to all those who are Christ's. In favour of this is the fact that Paul's argument seems to be concerned all through with the case of believers in Christ. It is also

[1] So De Wette, etc. [2] Acts xxiv. 15. [3] John v. 28, 29.

supported by a variety of considerations which have a strong cumulative force. There is the fact that the idea of spiritual life, heightened life, the blessed life, is so often associated with the verb which is used here for *making alive* (ζωοποιεῖσθαι).[1] There is the difficulty of construing the "in Christ" in the same sense as the "in Adam," without a limitation of the "all." For without such limitation we should have the idea that the unrighteous are raised, and raised to condemnation, in virtue of their being mystically or representatively in Christ as their Head,—surely an un-Pauline, not to say intolerable, idea. Further, it is definitely of them "that are asleep" that Christ has just been described as "the first-fruits." In the New Testament that is an expression which is applied only to the pious dead. It is of them and of them only that Christ is said to be the ἀπαρχή. Paul does not represent Him as having

[1] The fact that ζωοποιεῖσθαι is used here, and neither ἐγείρεσθαι nor ἀνίστασθαι, is not to be overlooked. The verb ζωοποιεῖσθαι, it is true, means simply to *quicken*, and is applied both to spiritual and to natural quickening. But it does not appear that it is ever used in the New Testament except in a good sense. It is important to notice, too, that in the passage in the Fourth Gospel which is regarded as analogous to this one, while Christ speaks of the Father *quickening* the dead and the Son *quickening* whom He will, He drops the ζωοποιεῖσθαι, and uses the phrase "shall come forth" when He proceeds to speak of the two kinds of resurrection—that of life and that of damnation (John v. 21, 28, 29). Ellicott and others, therefore, admit that the use of ζωοποιεῖσθαι itself suggests a limitation to those who are in Christ. Augustine, Grotius, and Bengel interpret it of the righteous. Reuss, Heinrici, Hofmann, Holsten, Rückert, Edwards, and others also agree in thinking that Paul refers here only to those that are Christ's. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Calvin were of another opinion, and are followed by De Wette, Olshausen, and others, as well as by Meyer, in including mankind as such in the πάντες in both cases. Godet also prefers the latter view, especially on the ground that the limited sense which might be admissible "if Paul were here treating of the means of resurrection" is less so when he is concerned only about the one point of "the certainty of the event."

that relation to any but those who are *in* Him. And the limitation in the ruling sentence of the paragraph is naturally taken to extend to these subsequent, explanatory, and dependent sentences. Nor must it be overlooked that elsewhere, most especially in the primary Epistles of St. Paul, the phrase "in Christ" expresses not a natural but a mystical relation, a relation of union with Christ by faith. Besides, the following statement, which speaks of a *subjugation*, not a conversion, of the hostile, is inconsistent with the idea of a universal restoration here.

Hence some who were at first disposed to found somewhat confidently on this passage as pointing to a universal restoration, have ultimately admitted that it refers only to the destiny of believers. Most interpreters, whatever their doctrinal proclivities, now take it so. Even those who insist on an equal extension of meaning in both the "all" clauses, seldom press it into the support of that dogma. Meyer's conclusion is that it expresses the doctrine of a universal bodily resurrection. He admits that it does not deal with aught else than this single question of a resurrection for all, and thinks that the idea of a universal restoration is contained neither in this passage nor in any other doctrinal statement of the New Testament.

Much the same is the case with the further declaration in the same chapter, on the delivering up of the kingdom, the subduing of all things under Christ's feet, the abolishing of death as the last enemy, and the final consummation in which God shall be all in all.[1] This passage has already been to some extent under con-

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 24–28.

sideration as one in which millenarian ideas, or ideas cognate to these, are supposed to be implied. But it is also cited by many as a witness to Paul's expectation of a restoration for all men, and this specially on the ground of the statement with which it concludes as to God being *all in all*. What is the real drift of the paragraph ?

Its subject is the completion of the purpose for which God committed to Christ His kingship (*βασιλεία*) or special Messianic rule, and the condition which is to follow when that consummation takes place. The purpose is fulfilled when all hostile powers, death being the last in the list, are brought into subjection. The fate of these hostile powers is expressed as a *subjugation* or a *destruction*. It is, therefore, neither a final loyal submission to the Divine rule, nor an annihilation that is in view, but a destroying (*καταργεῖσθαι*) of them in the sense of stripping them of their might, rendering them inoperative, reducing them to a condition of non-efficiency.[1] When this is accomplished then comes the *end*, and the Son gives back to the Father the Messianic rule, the mediatorial administration, or, as perhaps it may be, the special prerogative of Messianic judgment, and God becomes the only Sovereign. The subjects to be subdued are all "rule and all authority and power," all powers that are opposed to God, not men alienated from God and brought back to Him in the gracious way of conversion. And the final object is that "God may be

[1] For examples of the usual force of *καταργεῖν*, *καταργεῖσθαι*, see Luke xiii. 7 ; Rom. iii. 3, iv. 14, vi. 6, vii. 2 ; 1 Cor. i. 28, ii. 6 ; Gal. iii. 17, v. 4 ; etc.

all in all," that is, either that God may be all in *all things*,[1] or better, all in *them* all.[2] In the former case, the idea will be like that of the "new heavens and the new earth," or "the regeneration,"—a condition of things in which the world in all its parts answers to God's will and reflects His mind. In the latter, the meaning will be that God's will shall be recognised as the one authority by all in His kingdom.[3]

The passage would thus refer to the complete subjugation of every power outside the kingdom, and the complete recognition of God by all whom Christ shall have gathered into the kingdom. The thought of a restoration, if introduced here, would imply the ultimate conversion of all creatures, demons and Satan himself included,—a thought which has no foundation elsewhere in Paul or in the New Testament generally. The meaning of the passage is simply this, that the final object of Christ's mediatorial administration is the restoration of a condition of things in which God shall reign as unchallenged King. What that condition more precisely is to which Paul looks as the end of the whole economy of grace, may be either of two things, according to the breadth of sense given to the "all in all." If these words are understood to mean "all in *them* all," the condition in question will be the completion of the number of the redeemed, and the idea will be that the Son shall present to the Father a kingdom of souls won by Himself, in which

[1] So, *e.g.*, Hofmann. [2] So Meyer, etc.

[3] The best reading is πάντα, not τὰ πάντα, ἐν πᾶσιν. Heinrici, Edwards, and others take πᾶσιν as neuter; Godet and Weiss agree with Meyer in taking it as masculine. Ellicott thinks it is best understood as the generalising neuter, embracing all persons and all things.

God shall be honoured as sole and only Lord, with perfect loyalty and love by all. If, on the other hand, they are understood to mean "all in all *things*," the condition in question will be a world in which all beings and things shall bow, whether in love or by constraint, to the will of God as the sole and absolute authority, and the idea will be that at last the Son shall deliver back to the Father His mediatorial dominion in all its compass, or His judicial prerogative in particular, when His work of subjugation and judgment is finished, and God Himself shall be universally acknowledged as the only King. In neither case does this paragraph unveil an ultimate return of all living beings in loving submission to God as among the final issues.[1]

Another passage, which is much dwelt on in the same interest, is the one in which the object of Christ's

[1] Professor F. Godet, who agrees in the main with Meyer, understands the passage to mean that "the goal of history and the end of the existence of humanity are the formation of a society of intelligent and free beings, brought by Christ into perfect communion with God, and thereby rendered capable of exercising, like Jesus Himself when on earth, an unchangeably holy and beneficent activity." He takes the ἐν πᾶσιν in the sense of "*all* in *each*," so that "every member of this glorified society has no longer anything in him which is not penetrated by God, as the transparent crystal is all penetrated with light." It must be admitted that the interpretation of ἐν πᾶσιν as a masculine is strongly favoured by the parallel expression "Christ all in all" (πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός) in another Pauline Epistle (Col. iii. 11), and by the relation in which the entire statement stands to the "then shall the *Son also Himself* be subject" (αὐτὸς ὁ υἱός). Godet admits, at the same time, that the "in all" may be applied "even to the reprobate in the sense that in them too the Divine perfection will shine forth, in the twofold aspect of justice and power" (see his *Commentary*, *in loc.*). Bishop Ellicott, who gives the ἐν πᾶσιν the most inclusive sense, puts it thus: "God will be all in all, but He will be so in *all* His attributes, in His justice and His righteousness, as well as in His mercy and His love" (see his *St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians*, *in loc.*).

exaltation is declared. It is "that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of *things* in heaven, and *things* on earth, and *things* under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."[1] This gives the statement of a universal adoration which is to be paid to the exalted Christ. The name of Jesus, Jesus in the majesty of His manifestation, is to be the object of prayer on the part of three classes, which are obviously meant to be all-inclusive. The terms in which this worship is expressed recall certain words of Isaiah,[2] which Paul also quotes elsewhere.[3] The difficulty is in defining these classes. Are they the three great divisions of Christians, Jews, and heathen, as some strangely think? Are they angels, men, and devils? Or the souls of the blessed, the saints on earth, and souls in purgatory? Or angels, the living, and the dead? Or are the words a general designation of creation as such, in all its parts, animate and inanimate?

There is much to favour the last of these interpretations. There are passages in early Christian literature which point to the neuter sense—*things* in heaven, *things* in earth, *things* under the earth.[4] On this view the homage which is rendered to Jesus is one of a larger universality than is the case on any other view. And this is in harmony not only with the Old Testament picture of the universe praising God,[5] but with the statement of the honour offered to the Lamb in the visions of the Apocalypse,[6] and with what Paul himself

[1] Phil. ii. 10, 11.
[2] Isa. xlv. 23.
[3] Rom. xiv. 10, 11.
[4] Lightfoot refers to Ignat. *Trall.* 9, and Polycarp, *Phil.* 2.
[5] Ps. cxlviii.
[6] Rev. v. 13.

elsewhere says of creation as such.[1] Hence Lightfoot, among others, understands the whole universe, nature as such in all its parts, to be represented as offering its worship and homage. And this fits well with the broad generality and magnificent sweep of the statement.

The only interpretation which can compete with this is one which limits the adoration to living beings, and takes the three classes to embrace angels, men alive on earth, and the departed in the under-world. The expression which is rendered "things under the earth" (*καταχθονίων*) occurs only in this passage, so far as the New Testament is concerned. But as it is used in classical Greek to denote those who dwell in Hades, it is not unreasonable to conclude that it refers here to the dead in the world below.[2] But in what sense these come into view here is far from agreed. Roman Catholic interpreters naturally identify those "under the earth" with those who are in purgatory; but there is no suggestion of a fire or a purification here. Not a few are of opinion that the passage bears upon Christ's descent to Hades. They have to admit, however, that if that event is in the paragraph at all, it is only in the form of a presupposition, and without any hint of its meaning or result.[3] Others decline to narrow the universality of this homage by restricting it to dead men, and hold that *demons* are included in the three classes. In the Pauline writings, however, Satan and demons appear to have their abode not in Hades, but in the air, or in superterrestrial places.[4] The passage,

[1] Rom. viii. 21, 23.
[2] So Meyer, Alford, Ellicott, Holtzmann, and most.
[3] So Meyer.
[4] See Meyer on Eph. iv. 12.

therefore, is a broad and general statement of the honour which is to be given to the exalted Christ, describing it as a homage wide as universal nature, or as an acknowledgment of His sovereignty made by three great classes of living beings. Nothing is said of a universal conversion, nothing of a work of Christ among the dead, nothing of a restoration which shall bring back even demons in loyal submission to God. The living beings who shall bow the knee to Christ, if the homage is to be limited to them, must be those who do it willingly—angels in heaven, believers on earth, and the pious dead.

There remain two passages of somewhat analogous contents which are thought to be of signal importance in the same connection. They belong to two Epistles which have remarkable affinities. The one, the largest and longest of all, is the declaration in the Epistle to the Ephesians that God has "made known unto us the mystery of His will, according to His good pleasure, which He purposed in Him, unto a dispensation of the fulness of the times, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth."[1] From Origen's time there have been occasional interpreters who have used this passage in support of the doctrine of a universal restoration, and in our own day it is appealed to somewhat vaguely by theologians who include that doctrine in their system. Some who are less positive, and among them Bishop Martensen, think this one of the passages which bring us at least not far from the idea of a universal restoration. But the thought of the

[1] Eph. i. 9, 10.

passage does not lie in that direction. It speaks of a gracious design or purpose of God, but says nothing of the result of that purpose. What is purposed is a *summing up* in Christ. Whether the word expresses the idea of a gathering together of things remote and dispersed, or that of a gathering together *anew* of things once in union but no longer so, is immaterial.[1] The thought of a former condition of harmony which requires to be restored is in the context, if not in the particular term. The objects embraced in this act are described as "all things," their universality being further defined by the specification of "the things in heaven" and "the things upon the earth." The terms are too wide to be restricted to the two classes of angels and men, or even to living beings in general. They embrace all creation, all created beings and things.

The thought of the passage, therefore, is that it is God's purpose to restore creation to the unity which it had originally, but which has been broken by sin. He is to bring back all things into their normal condition through Christ, the Redeemer of sinful men. Christ is to be the point of unity, the reconciling bond for all things. The effect of His work is to extend beyond sinful man himself, so that in Him creation as such shall be re-established in the harmony

[1] The ἀνα in the ἀνακεφαλαίωσασθαι has the force of *again* in some of the ancient versions, and is held by Meyer and many others to point "back to a state in which no separation as yet existed." Lightfoot, however, thinks the ἀνα has the distributive force, and implies the "process of *going over* the separate elements for the purpose of uniting them." He examines the different senses which the verb has in Greek literature, and concludes that in none "does it involve the idea of bringing back to a former state" (see his *Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, pp. 321, 322).

in which it originally stood. The idea of bringing back all hostile beings, unbelieving men and even demons, to love and loyalty, is entirely foreign to the passage. The *re-collection* or *recapitulation* is meant, as Meyer recognises, not of "*every single individual*, but of the whole aggregate of heavenly and earthly things."[1]

The other passage is the one in the Epistle to the Colossians which speaks of Christ as the Head of the Church, destined in all things to "have the pre-eminence." This statement is confirmed, the reason for this pre-eminence is assigned, in the sentence in question. "For it was the good pleasure *of the Father*," it is said, "that in Him should all the fulness dwell; and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross; through Him, *I say*, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens."[2] While this passage resembles in some repects the former, there is yet a difference in the idea. In the Epistle to the Ephesians it is a *summing up*, a *re-collection*, or a recapitulation of things that is in view. Here it is a *reconciliation*. It is a reconciliation, moreover, to God; the reconciling Subject being God Himself, the Agent in effecting it being Christ. Further, it is a universal reconciliation. For the "all things," especially as defined to em-

[1] It is, as Professor Findlay expresses it, "the rectification and adjustment of the several parts of the great whole of things, bringing them into full accord with each other and with their Creator's will . . . in a word, the organisation of the universe upon a Christian basis." And in this the Christ is the "rallying point of the forces of peace and blessing . . . the organic principle, the organising Head" (*The Epistle to the Ephesians*, p. 47).

[2] Col. i. 19, 20.

brace both "things upon earth" and "things in the heavens," are naturally taken in the full sense of "all that exists."

Here, then, it is not a bringing back of the constituent parts of creation from a state of separation and disunion to which they had fallen a prey, into a new harmony and unity. It is a reconciliation of all things to God Himself. What is to be understood by this? Some say a gracious reconciliation of all sinful men, or even of all sinful beings, to God. But this is inconsistent both with the description of the subjects of the reconciliation here, and with the general teaching not only of the Pauline Epistles, but of the New Testament as a whole. It is rather the restoration of creation to its primal condition, the restoration of the aggregate of things to their proper relation to God. This is suggested by the term ἀποκαταλλάξαι itself, which is a term of *relation*. It is the cosmical renewal which is to take place at the *Parousia*, when the number of the redeemed shall be completed, all hostile powers subdued, the kingdom of God perfected, and the whole system of things transformed. As in the former passage, therefore, so here the work of Christ, which has for its first object the redemption of sinful men and the completion of the Church which is His body, is shown to have effects extending to man's world and to creation generally. "This and no less than this," remarks Bishop Ellicott, "it *does* say—that the eternal and incarnate Son is the *causa medians* by which the absolute totality of created things shall be restored into its primal harmony with its Creator—a declaration more specifically unfolded in the following clause: more

than this it does *not* say, and where God is silent it is not for man to speak."[1]

It has been said that these Epistles of the Captivity, which were written later in Paul's career, are freer, bolder, and more hopeful as to the results of Christ's work than the earlier letters. But this is an assertion which cannot be made good in point of fact. The Epistle to the Romans contains passages of as large import in relation to the effects of Christ's work as anything found in the Epistles of the Captivity; and Second Thessalonians, which is put so late by many critics, contains one of the strongest statements which are to be found in the New Testament on the final fate of the wicked. Of the series of passages which have been under review, it may be allowed that, if they could be taken by themselves, they might perhaps be construed to favour the doctrine of a General Restoration, at least in a large and vague way. Not only, however, does a proper exegesis present each of them in a different light, but they have to be read in connection with the whole system of Pauline teaching, and in that connection such a construction of them ceases to be possible.

[1] Holtzmann formerly agreed with those who think that this is an un-Pauline conception, due to an illegitimate extension of the real Pauline idea of reconciliation as expressed in 2 Cor. v. 18, 19. But, as Meyer rightly observes, there is enough even in the Epistles which are accepted by the Tübingen school (*e.g.* Rom. viii. 19–23) to show that the idea of cosmical effects of Christ's work is not un-Pauline. And in his recent *Handcommentar* Holtzmann admits that further study of the Pauline doctrine convinces him that there is nothing un-Pauline here.

CHAPTER III

PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION

PAUL'S whole teaching, however, on the subject of the Future Life centres in his doctrine of the Resurrection. Nowhere is that doctrine so magnified; nowhere is it presented with such definiteness, with such wealth of illustration, or in so many relations of large and profound import. It is in Paul's Epistles above all others that it is set forth as the specifically Christian doctrine. In this lies his special contribution to the Christian doctrine of Immortality. The thought of a resurrection had existed elsewhere only in imperfect and uncertain forms. So far as it had a place at all in Ethnic religion, it was a vague, inconstant conception, associated with crude and puerile ideas or with beliefs which gave terror to existence. Even in Hebrew faith it was a late element and one not well understood. It had become an article of Jewish belief in the period between the close of Old Testament prophecy and the Christian era, and in Judaism it assumed in course of time peculiar forms and limitations. It had become a principal point in Pharisaic faith by Christ's time, but it was repudiated by an influential party among the Jewish people. Paul took it over with him from his Pharisaic scheme of thought. But in taking it over he

made it a new thing, and gave it a place which it never had before in men's thoughts of immortality. In most respects Paul's doctrine of the Future Life is given only in occasional, discontinuous, undeveloped statements. It is on the subject of the Resurrection that he makes the nearest approach to connected, systematic teaching. The essential elements in his doctrine are not difficult to grasp, and they are of the deepest interest. What do they appear to be?

The most important and distinctive thing in Paul's doctrine of the Resurrection is the basis on which he places it. In one sense that basis is twofold. It consists of these two things — historical fact and personal experience. These, however, are but the objective and subjective aspects of one and the same thing. In their deepest truth the two are one, while in their unity they form a basis which is sufficient to bear all the weight that is put upon it, sufficient at once to make the hope an assured hope and to furnish the reason for all that is in the doctrine. All else that is in Paul's doctrine of the Resurrection comes at last to find its centre in one great event, the Resurrection of Christ; in one great conviction, the present life of Christ; in one great experience, the power of Christ, His resurrection-power, within the man. And so the first reason and the last for Paul's own faith, the first source and the last of Paul's teaching on the Resurrection, are in a single word *Christ* Himself. This is the pulse of Paul's living hope.

It is not meant that this is something entirely peculiar to Paul. Other apostles followed the same way. All were at one in making the death and resur-

rection of Christ the foundation of their own faith and the principle of their doctrine. To all the death of Christ was the basis for their proclamation of forgiveness and reconciliation, and the life of Christ was the final argument for their immortality. All found in the power of Christ within them here the assurance of their life with Christ hereafter. But in Paul this common faith and this common doctrine appear in dimensions, relations, and certitudes which make them almost new things.

It is true of Paul's teaching in all its parts that it has its basis not in reasoning, but in experience. It is especially true of his doctrine of the resurrection that it has its point of issue in his experience, and takes its form from that. There is much in it that seems to carry us back to Christ's own words, and find its explanation there. This is the case to an extent which is not sufficiently recognised. But there is much that bears the impress of the crisis of his life near Damascus, and that reads like a translation into words of the revolution which took place within him. The event which made the remorseless Jew the resolute Christian gave shape to all his thoughts. It became the fount of all his experience, the principle of all his teaching. In the Greek philosophies, where all was matter of speculation, no place was left for a conception of immortality in which body went with soul. In the Rabbinical schools and in the popular Jewish beliefs, the doctrine of a resurrection was based on traditional interpretations and theoretical arguments. Paul established it on the foundation of historical fact and personal experience, on the fact that

Christ had risen and had been seen by himself and others, and on the experience of what this risen, living Christ was within him. In this way Paul's doctrine began and ended with *Christ*,—the revelation of the living Christ *to* him and the revelation of the same Christ *in* him.

In this he broke with the customary Pharisaic and Rabbinical methods, and followed out the principles of the Old Testament revelation. The deep experiences of the saints of ancient Israel, the intuitions of the Psalmists and the Prophets, revive in him, but with a new glory and a more assured satisfaction. The Old Testament hope of immortality had its roots in the consciousness of a personal relation to God which could not be thought to break under the shock of death. Its enlargement came in various ways, but especially by its association with the expectation of Messiah and the consummation of the kingdom of God. The secret of Paul's hope was the consciousness of a personal relation to Christ, the Christ whose voice he had heard, whose power he had felt, who lives evermore. Hence the decision with which he stands upon the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and plants his personal hope and his doctrine in the first instance not upon instinct, not upon sentiment, not upon argument, but upon the broad foundation of historical fact.

Yet this is but in the first instance and never without something else. Paul always connects with this the deepest facts of the spiritual consciousness, the consciousness of the energy of a new life in him in which immortality is already incipient. It is not only that Christ rose from the dead, but that He who was

raised was the Son of God, the image of the invisible God, the Second Man, the Lord from heaven, who came from above and belonged to the heavenlies to which He reascended.[1] The rising of one man among many might not ensure the rising of others. It might be an exceptional event, with nothing in it to go beyond itself, a solitary privilege bestowed upon a perfect man. But in Christ Paul saw a Divine Person in fashion as a man,[2] descending to earth as the Second Head of humanity, carrying our nature to victory over death, no "living soul" merely as was the first Adam, but a "quickening spirit,"[3] having life in Himself which He could impart to others. The historical fact of the resurrection of Christ which makes the objective basis of Paul's doctrine, is essentially connected with the experimental fact which makes the subjective basis—the assured consciousness of a power within, the power of Christ's resurrection, which works to life and must ensure the final perfection of the man as such.

In so reading his experience Paul again attaches himself both to the Old Testament and to Christ's own teaching. In the Old Testament God was the fountain of life, and life in the sense of existence crowned by God's favour could not be conceived to suffer interruption or dissolution. Christ spoke of a life, given Him by His Father and bestowed by Him on others, which brings those who receive it out of death here, and makes them certain of life hereafter. And this life, of which Christ declared Himself to be

[1] Rom. i. 3; Col. i. 13; 1 Cor. xv. 47.
[2] Phil. ii. 8. [3] 1 Cor. xv. 45.

the source, and to the energy of which Paul's personal experience bore certain testimony, is shown to be imparted in two ways or to two great effects. It is given in order to quicken the spirit to newness of life; it is given also to quicken the spirit's instrument, the body, hereafter. The future quickening of the mortal body is the consequence of the present quickening of the living spirit. This is one of the chief notes in Paul's doctrine—this vital relation of the present gift of life to the future resurrection, the principle that the former is the pledge of the latter and that the latter is implied in the former, the principle that the life which we now live is a life hid with Christ in God, a life for the whole man, which must triumph over everything opposed to life, whether in the spiritual being of man or in the physical nature through which that being acts.

It is but another expression that is given to the same truth when Paul brings the future resurrection into relation to the present gift of the Holy Spirit. The new life quickens the whole man, because it is a Divine life, the life of the Divine Spirit within. The power that renews is variously characterised in respect of its Divine order and energy. It is *Christ* Himself, Christ that "liveth in me," [1] "Christ in you the hope of glory." [2] It is the *Spirit*, the Spirit who is "the earnest of our inheritance." [3] And these two aspects of the life are united in the statement of "the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" who sets us "free from the law of sin and death." [4] It is with his profound doctrine of the *inhabitation* of the

[1] Gal. ii. 20. [2] Col. i. 27. [3] Eph. i. 14. [4] Rom. viii. 2.

Spirit, however, that Paul specially connects the doctrine of the Resurrection. In Christ we are "builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit,"[1] and in this Divine inhabitation is the secret of an enduring life. This is the truth which is delivered in the profoundest terms in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. If Christ is in us the body indeed may be "dead because of sin," subject in the case of believers no less than others to the doom brought on it in the beginning by sin. But the Spirit is in us, and that "Spirit is life because of righteousness,"[2] and the power which raised up Christ will also set us free from the ancient law of death. "If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in you."[3] A profound declaration, in which every word has its own significance. He who was raised up is designated first *Jesus*, the fact that the man Jesus who died was raised to life by God's Spirit being the thing first in view. But when the event is referred to the second time, the Person is described by His official name *Christ*, the idea being now the result for others. The Jesus who was known in Galilee and Judæa was raised up not for Himself alone, but as the first-fruits of a coming harvest, the leader of a vast company. In His resurrection all was fulfilled which the *Christ* came to do. That which took place in the case of the Head will take place in the case of the members, and by the same Divine Agent. God who raised up Christ by His Spirit on the

[1] Eph. ii. 22. [2] Rom. viii. 10. [3] Rom. viii. 11.

completion of His work, will also by the same Spirit bring life again to the mortal bodies of those who are Christ's. That Spirit ever "dwelleth in us," and the body which He makes His residence cannot have death as the end of all its story. The inhabitation of the Spirit of life, which makes the body a holy thing, works in it to life.

But Paul carries his doctrine of the Resurrection up finally into his doctrine of the *mystical union*. The doctrine of a union with Christ by faith has so large a place in his Epistles that it is spoken of as a specifically Pauline point of theology, and one of the apostle's distinctively mystical ideas. But in this, too, Paul only follows his Master, and interprets the experience which he owed to his Lord. Nowhere is stronger or more repeated expression given to this than by Christ Himself, in the familiar allegory of the vine and the branches, and in the fathomless figurative words of the Fourth Gospel, in which He speaks of Himself as the living bread of which a man shall *eat* and "live for ever,"[1] and of "eternal life" coming by the eating of the flesh and the drinking of the blood of the Son of Man. The future resurrection is made dependent upon a present participation in Christ's life: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day."[2] The fellowship of God in which the Israelite found life, and life of a quality which he felt must endure as God endures, becomes a fellowship with Christ in which life cannot but be carried to its furthest issues.

[1] John vi. 58. [2] John vi. 53, 54.

With Paul, therefore, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead has its life-centre in the deep and varied witness of Christian experience. It is not only that it rests on the historical event of Christ's resurrection. It is vouched for by the living and most certain facts of the spiritual consciousness—the gift of life imparted now, the inhabitation of the quickening Spirit, the union with Christ in standing and in being. Rooted in the deep realities of the regenerate existence and the spiritual consciousness, and having essential associations with the inward things of grace, the resurrection is with Paul not simply an objective event, a destiny to be looked for, a new condition to be anticipated, but an *attainment*, an object of aspiration and strenuous moral endeavour, to be reached only by suffering loss, by being found in Christ, by knowing Him in the power which He has over us and in us in virtue of His resurrection, by partnership with Him in suffering, by becoming conformed unto His death and dying as He died unto sin.[1]

But Paul's doctrine reaches out into larger and further issues still. It looks to the ransom of creation itself, and to the transformation of the world. When the adoption for which man waits is completed by the resurrection of the body, creation itself shall be partner with him in his glory. This is the burden of the loftiest and profoundest of all those passages in the Pauline writings which give us visions of the far-reaching purpose of God with regard to objects other than man. Balancing the "sufferings of this present time" against the "glory which shall be

[1] Phil. iii. 8–11.

revealed," Paul gives this as his reason for reckoning the one "not worthy to be compared" with the other—"For the earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of Him who subjected it, in hope that the creation [1] itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." [2]

The subject of this sublime paragraph is creation itself, all that belongs to *nature* as distinguished from man; and all that is elsewhere said of the cosmical effects of Christ's work is here carried to its climax. The prospect of the restitution of all things, the promise of the new heavens and the new earth, the vision of the holy city, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven, the apocalyptic assurance, "Behold, I make all things new," kindle with a new significance in the light of these matchless words. The Hebrew Scriptures spoke in large and uplifting figures of the new beauty with which the whole face of the world shall one day be clothed, of the time when there shall be neither hurting nor destroying in all God's holy mountain, of the wilderness and the solitary place being made glad, and the desert blossoming and flourishing like the rose, of the new heavens and the new earth which the Lord shall create, beside which "the former things shall not be remembered, nor come into mind." [3]

[1] Or, *by reason of Him who subjected it in hope, because the creation*, etc., as in the margin of the R.V.

[2] Rom. viii. 19–22.

[3] Isa. xi. 6, lxv. 17; etc.

The loftiest words of the prophets of Israel are uttered again by Paul with a grander magnificence and a more universal sweep.

The fire that burns in the paragraph comes from the great thought that creation is linked with man, involved in the consequences of his failure, but sharer also with him in the glory that is to be revealed. Nature is in sympathy with man, one with him in the doom, but one with him also in the redemption. Man looks back upon a golden age which is lost, and yearns for a larger future and more perfect life. Man's world, too, carries in its constitution and on its face the intimation of its lapse from its original purpose, but also the token that this is not a condition to which it shall be bound for ever. The presage is in it of a return to its primal condition.

The doom which nature underlies is expressed by two terms, the most significant that could well be found. The creation is "subjected to vanity," and it is in "the bondage of corruption." As man himself is under the curse, the scene of his life is under the same. Creation is burdened with a purposelessness which cannot be original to it, with a decay and a limitation which cannot be its primal law. It is tied to blight and baffled endeavour, to abortive effort, to objectless, ineffectual action, to a strange inability to fulfil its end. The doom which is upon it for man's sake, however, is qualified by two things. The creation was not made subject to vanity "of its own will." If it is involved in man's sentence, it is not by its own act, but by the ordinance of God, who laid the burden upon nature with a view to

man's training and future. And the subjection was made "in hope." The attitude of creation is not that of final acquiescence, but that of waiting expectation. It has the light of better things on it, and points with prophetic finger to a change, a removal of the burden, a reversal of the doom, an abolition of the curse. The destiny to which it looks is *emancipation*. And this is no dim, uncertain, indefinite possibility. It is the goal to which all things are moving, an event linked with the great day of the manifestation of the children of God. When Christ returns and completes the adoption, the world itself shall step forth from its prison-house and share in the glorious freedom of the sons of God. The day of the revelation of the heirs of God and joint-heirs of Christ—that is the one divine, intelligible event for which all nature tarries.

This is Paul's "evangel of the creation." It is introduced not for its own sake, but to enhance the grandeur of the future which is in reserve for the sons of God, and to mitigate the pain and mystery of the present. So great is that future that not only is man himself interested in it, but all creation besides. The resurrection of the sons of God means also the renovation of the world, the glorification of nature. So vastly do the proportions of man's destiny expand.

Such is Paul's doctrine of the Resurrection in its broad outlines. There are some special questions, however, which demand notice in connection with it. It is to be observed that Paul's doctrine is almost exclusively a doctrine of the resurrection of those who are Christ's. He leaves the resurrection of the unjust almost unmentioned. There is but a single passage in

which he proclaims it in distinct and explicit terms, and that is not in his Epistles. It is in his discourse before Felix, when he declares his belief in the whole teaching of the law and the prophets, and speaks of himself as "having hope toward God, which these also themselves look for, that there shall be a resurrection both of the just and the unjust."[1] Even the great statement on the "judgement-seat of Christ," and the certainty that all shall be made manifest there in order "that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether *it be* good or bad,"[2] in Paul's immediate intention does not go beyond the case of Christians.

It is asked, therefore, whether the apostle does really teach the doctrine of a universal resurrection? The assertion is often made that in his Epistles there is no hint of the rising of any but the righteous. He thinks of the unrighteous dead, we are told, simply as surrendered to the inane existence of Hades for ever. But this is inconsistent with the definite statement of his belief on the occasion reported in the Book of Acts; and, as Professor Godet justly remarks, "Luke knew St. Paul sufficiently to avoid attributing to him on this point a declaration which would have been contrary to his view."[3] It is inconsistent, too, with the fact that Paul proclaims the truth of a general judgment;[4] for a general judgment presupposes a general resurrection. It is certainly the case that in the Pauline Epistles the doctrine of the resur-

[1] Acts xxiv. 15, R.V. [2] 2 Cor. v. 10.
[3] *Commentary on First Corinthians*, ii. p. 37, Clark's trans.
[4] Rom. ii. 6; 1 Cor. vi. 2.

rection of the unjust is not made the subject of explicit statement. But in this Paul only follows the usual way of the New Testament. In Christ's own teaching the resurrection of damnation is but once mentioned in express terms. Both in Christ's words and in Paul's the resurrection is usually connected with the gift of eternal life, and exhibited as the reward of the believing, while the dark side comes seldom into view. But in neither case does it follow that there is no place for the doctrine of a resurrection of all mankind, or that Hades is meant to be the final lot of the unrighteous.

It has also been made a question whether Paul's doctrine implies that the resurrection of the righteous and the resurrection of the unrighteous are two distinct events, separated from each other by a space of time. We have already touched upon this question in speaking of the *millenarian* ideas which have been ascribed to Paul. We have to look at it more particularly here. For the opinion that Paul taught the doctrine of two successive resurrections is widely favoured. Some hold it, however, only in a cautious and tentative way, admitting that nothing is said about the duration of the interval or about what happens within it.[1] The stronghold of this view is the great paragraph already referred to, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, on Christ as the first-fruits, every man in his own order, and the coming of the end.[2] Here Bishop Ellicott, while of opinion that the terms might seem to suggest

[1] So, *e.g.*, Mr. Teignmouth Shore in the *New Testament Commentary for English Readers*, *sub* 1 Cor. xv. 22, etc.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 20–28.

an interval, is not prepared to say that the interval, if it is in the words at all, need be more than would cover "all that may be immediately associated with the mighty τέλος which is specified in the succeeding verse." And on the general question he will not go further than say that "neither here nor in 1 Thess. iv. 16 does the apostle *preclude* the conception of a resurrection of the just—possibly gradual—prior to that of the general resurrection."[1]

But there are some who speak more positively. Among others Meyer throws the weight of his great name on the side of those who think that Paul regards the resurrection as a great process running out in three acts, the first taking effect in Christ's own triumph over death, the second in the raising of all Christians to be with Him when He returns to establish His kingdom, and the third and latest in the rising of all non-Christians, the "how soon, however, or how long after the Parousia" being left unsaid. But it is seldom that Meyer is so unlike himself as in his exegesis of this passage. The same must be said of another of our best interpreters, the venerable scholar of Neuchâtel. Professor Godet not only concludes that an interval must be supposed between the Coming of Christ and the "end," and that a distinct resurrection must be understood to be associated with each of these events. He is also convinced that this paragraph in Paul's majestic argument on the resurrection can be shown to be in entire harmony with the apocalyptic vision of a first resurrection at the beginning of the thousand years, and a subsequent judgment with an implied

[1] *St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians*, *sub* xv. 23.

resurrection of the rest of the dead at the end of the period.[1]

But there are objections to this interpretation which seem to us to be unanswerable. In the first place, it utterly fails to do justice to the sense of the word rendered "order,"[2] on which most depends. The idea which this word conveys, as we have seen, is neither that of order in *merit*, nor that of order or sequence in *time*, but that of *band* or *company*. The interpretation in question, therefore, as has been already shown, mistakes the real thought of the passage as it is suggested by the use of this exceptional term. It is not consistent with the fact that elsewhere the *Parousia* is associated with the end of all things and the final judgment. It overlooks the fact that there is nothing in the passage to define the length of time separating the events, and that in connection with the mention of the "end," and the delivering up of the

[1] According to Meyer, Godet, and others, the interval is filled up by Christ's conflict in putting down all hostile powers. Dr. Godet addresses himself to a great task, a task in which no one has succeeded, when he proposes to prove that Paul and the Apocalypse are quite at one, not only as to the doctrine of a *first* resurrection and a *second*, but as to the whole train of events which take place in connection with Christ's coming and after it,—the binding of Satan, the resurrection of believers, the millennial reign of Christ, the final outburst and judgment of Satan, the end of the thousand years, the last judgment, and the new heavens and earth with the tabernacle of God among men. Nor is he content even with this. He endeavours to show that this whole sweep of doctrine is implied in Christ's own words regarding His advent, and is discernible in other Pauline sayings. But how is the conclusion reached that Paul teaches a double resurrection? By taking it for granted, among other things, that when he tells the Thessalonians that the dead *in Christ* shall rise first (1 Thess. iv. 16), it is implied that the rest do not rise. But we have already seen how far Paul is from thinking of anything in that statement beyond the case of dead believers as contrasted with those who survive till Christ returns.

[2] τάγμα.

kingdom, nothing is *said* of a resurrection of those who are not Christ's. There is the further objection already referred to, that if Paul has in view a series of successive acts in a prolonged process of resurrection, Christ in His single person is incongruously represented in the character of a *rank*, the first of three ranks of the risen, of which the other two are *companies* in the proper sense of the term. We conclude, therefore, that there is no reason to ascribe to Paul the doctrine of a first resurrection for the just and a second resurrection for the unjust, divided by a real, though undefined interval of time.[1]

A further question has been raised with respect to the destiny of the righteous. It is asked whether Paul does not teach that in their case a new body is provided for the existence between death and the resurrection, in preparation for and distinct from the final glorified body? This is a question to which far too much importance is attached even by some theologians

[1] Principal Edwards, who also favours the idea of three separate stages in the drama of the resurrection, admits that there is no example of τάγμα with the sense of sequence in time. He lays much stress on the fact that death is said to be destroyed "as the last enemy," inferring that it is not destroyed at the *Parousia* when Christ's own are raised, and that there must be a second resurrection in connection with the "end" before it could be said, as it is said here, that death is destroyed as the *last* of all the hostile powers. But this surely is a matter of remote inference, and overlooks Paul's habit of "insulating" his thought, as it has been called. Principal Edwards thinks this doctrine of a double resurrection not inconsistent with Christ's words in Matt. xxiv. 28–31, in which he sees a transition from the resurrection of the saints to a later, general judgment. But he admits that the duration of the interval is not told. He also regards Paul's statement here as analogous to John's in the Apocalypse (xx. 4, 5). But the only argument he offers for extending the application of John's words beyond the case of the martyrs of Jesus, is that "the οἵτινες introduces others." He gives τάγμα the sense of *place*, the place belonging to each of several in a series.

and interpreters of high rank. It is based upon a single passage, and that passage is one of quite unusual difficulty. In opening his heart to the Corinthians on the straits which he had to endure for their profit and for Christ's sake, Paul speaks of the faith which kept him from fainting under the pressure of decaying strength and a daily dying. In lofty and moving language he then unfolds the hope which gives him courage and confidence in all things. "For we know," he proceeds, "that if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal, in the heavens. For verily in this we groan, longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For indeed we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed, but that we would be clothed upon, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life. Now He that wrought us for this very thing is God, who gave unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Being therefore always of good courage, and knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord (for we walk by faith, not by sight); we are of good courage, I say, and are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord."[1]

Much is made of this paragraph in various interests, vastly more than it can bear. It is supposed

[1] 2 Cor. v. 1–8, R.V. In the margin the revisers place the alternative rendering, "being burdened, in that we would not be unclothed, but would be clothed upon," in the fourth verse, and "appearance" for "sight" in the seventh.

by some to disclose elements in Paul's doctrine which are of essentially Hellenic character and in some measure akin to the conception of immortality found in the *Book of Wisdom*.[1] It is thought by others to mark a vital transformation of Paul's own view of the future. Hitherto he had confidently expected to survive till Christ's Coming. But now, it is said, he sees the prospect of death before him. Dark and painful experiences had come upon him at Ephesus and in Asia during the interval between the two Epistles to the church of Corinth. These things had driven him to look at the future with another eye, and to seek another kind of hope. At last, with the prospect of martyrdom at hand, he is carried beyond his former ideas of the Parousia and beyond all the limitations of his Jewish beliefs, to the more spiritual thought of an immediate reunion with his Lord in heaven itself.[2] Those who regard the passage in this way understand it to mean that the resurrection-body is to be received, not at an indefinite resurrection-day in the future, but immediately at death.[3] Others, taking the verb "we have" as a strict present, and putting a very literal meaning on the phrase "clothed

[1] So Pfleiderer; also Schmiedel, *Handcommentar*, *in loc.*, etc.

[2] So especially Sabatier. See his *Apostle Paul*, pp. 179–184, English trans. But this whole notion of a radical change in Paul's eschatology at this point proceeds very much upon a false idea of the condition in which the dead are represented to be when they are described as "asleep." It is inconsistent also with the fact that both in this Epistle and in later Epistles the conceptions of the resurrection and the judgment which are given in the earlier Epistles still appear; cf., *e.g.*, 2 Cor. iv. 14, v. 10; Phil. iii. 20, 21; etc.

[3] So Beyschlag thinks that the passage proves that Paul no longer "places the resurrection at the Parousia," but connects the possession of the glorified body at once with the event of death. *New Test. Theology*, ii. pp. 270, 271.

upon with our habitation which is from heaven," conclude that Paul speaks of an intermediate body with which the dying believer is at once invested at his death, a body distinct from the final resurrection body, and suited for the intermediate state. Even during the mysterious period between his death and his resurrection, existence for the regenerate is not a bodiless existence.

Among others, Bishop Martensen understands this to be the purpose of the paragraph. "We must necessarily suppose," he says, "that some hidden development of nature precedes and prepares the way for the future corporeity or the resurrection of the flesh; and the Apostle Paul expressly teaches that, though we do not possess the complete fulness and perfection of our being in the realm of the dead—because in death we are unclothed, and shall not be clothed again till the second coming of the Lord, yet that we are not entirely naked in the intermediate state, but are clothed upon." Referring to the verses in question, he adds: "We must, therefore, entertain the idea of some sort of *clothing* of the soul in the realm of the dead; in that cloister-like (we speak after the manner of men), that monastic or conventual world. But, although we are thus obliged to conceive, in a vague way, of some intermediate kind of corporeity in the realm of the dead, this must not exclude the fundamental idea of that realm as one of inwardness and spirit."[1]

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 460, 461, Clark's trans. Among others, Schneckenburger, Nitzsch, Göschel, Auberlen, Flatt take this view of the passage. Dr. Briggs also thinks that Paul now looks for a new body to be given at death, such a "heavenly body as the Messiah Himself has during His mediatorial reign," while "the body of the resurrection will be like the body of the glory of the Messiah at His Parousia" (*The Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 130).

But what is the confidence to which Paul gives expression in these remarkable words? From the burdened life of painful straits and heavy perils he looks out into the future. He longs to be with Christ; he is certain that he shall be with Him; but he thinks of two possibilities. To survive till Christ's return, and so to pass into the life of glory, not by the stroke of death but by the transformation of the body, that would be his highest joy. But he has to face the possibility of dying before the great event of the Parousia, and he is confident even in that prospect. For he knows that what is reserved for him in the event of death is something better than what he now has, and not less than what he should have if he lived to see Christ's return—not an unclothed, imperfect, naked condition such as nature recoils from, but the complete, substantial existence of the resurrection-glory, in which all that is mortal in him shall be swallowed up of life. He contrasts this with the bodily life of the present, and counts it great gain. He is assured that this is what the future means for him, and he finds in himself the reason for this certainty. The longing which is in him for a life which shall not be unclothed cannot be a deception. It gives the assurance of its own realisation.

It is the *body*, therefore, that is in view all through these verses, the body which belongs to the present existence, and the body which is in reserve for the future existence. For it is obvious that when he speaks of the "house which is *from heaven*," his thought is not the general thought of heaven as his future home, but the particular thought of the *body* as his

possession in the life of heaven. In speaking of the body in this connection he uses two figures, that of a *house* or *tabernacle*, and that of a *robe*—both simple figures, the latter not unfamiliar to the later Greek writers as well as to the Rabbinical literature.[1] The present body is but a tent-house, a temporary dwelling-place set up on earth (ἐπίγειος), ready to be pulled down. But its place is to be taken by another of abiding quality, a building which comes from God, which is eternal, which belongs not to earth, but to heaven. What can be in view here but the *resurrection-body* in the completeness of the superiority and the permanence in which it contrasts with the failing, transient body of earth? The idea of an *interim* body, with qualities intermediate between the earthly body and the glorified body, is, as Meyer justly observes, something entirely strange to the New Testament.

That it cannot be in view here is made plain by the simple fact that the body of which Paul speaks is described as *eternal*. If it is said that "we have" it, it is also said in the same breath that it is "in the heavens." So that what is meant is not that we assume it at once at death, but that it is our certain possession, an inheritance prepared for us. It is reserved for us in heaven now, and it will become ours in actual possession hereafter. But that *hereafter* is not identified either with the event of death or with the period of the intermediate state. When further the

[1] Dean Stanley suggested that the transition from the one to the other may be explained by "the image which both from his occupation and his birthplace would naturally occur to the apostle—the tent of Cilician hair-cloth, which might almost equally suggest the idea of a habitation and of a vesture."

longing, which is the inward witness to the certainty of the hope, is described as a longing "to be clothed *upon* (ἐπενδύσασθαι) with our habitation which is from heaven," and the new body is thus represented as a vesture to be put *on over* something else, this is due to the fact that Paul associates himself for the time with those who live on to Christ's Coming, and thinks of the change which shall then be made upon the living body, the *transformation* (ἀλλαγήσεσθαι) which he elsewhere declares for those who shall not "sleep."[1]

The one thing, therefore, which we find in the passage is Paul's assurance that, even if death overtakes him now, depriving him of the supreme joy of seeing Christ, and of being transformed at His Parousia, he shall not be left to the disadvantage of a naked, bodiless existence, absent from Christ. The resurrection-life and the presence of Christ are before him. With this knowledge he can look with confidence even to dissolution and to the defeat of his expectation of witnessing Christ's return. The passage may bear upon the hope of an immediate entrance into the joy of the Lord's presence after death. It says nothing of a special order of body for the intermediate state.[2]

Such questions about the *How* of the future life, whether about the conditions of existence between death

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 52.

[2] Speaking of the question whether Paul refers here to the "spiritual body" of the resurrection or to some mediate form of corporeal being, "such as poets have imagined and schoolmen theorised about," Dean Plumptre justly remarks that the answer is found "in the manifest fact that the intermediate state occupied but a subordinate position in St. Paul's thoughts. . . . He did not speculate accordingly about that state, but was content to rest in the belief that, when absent from the body he would in some more immediate sense be present with the Lord." See his exposition in the *New Testament Commentary for English Readers.*

and the resurrection, about the process of the resurrection itself, or about the nature of the resurrection body, have little or no place in Paul's doctrine. His concern is much more with the fact than with the mode of the resurrection. The little that he does say of the latter subject is limited almost entirely to the case of the righteous. He notices the questions put by some: "How are the dead raised? and with what manner of body do they come?"[1] But in his reply he does not go beyond a few broad statements, a few large, general principles. The very form into which he throws his reply: "Thou foolish one"—puts an arrest on the theoretical problems which theologians have been apt to raise and the speculations in which they have indulged. He uses one or two simple analogies, the seed-corn and the waving grain, the different forms of body provided for different kinds of creatures in the present order of existence, and the different "glories" belonging to sun, moon, and stars. He suggests that there may be continuance of substance or preservation of identity in the personal subject along with constant and far-reaching change in form. But beyond this he does not go. Theologians have thought to penetrate further. They have asked, What is it that makes identity? How is the new body to be provided? Out of what material shall it grow? What shall be its relation to the present body? How shall it preserve its sameness with the body which we now have together with a difference which seems essential?

They have pointed to the fact that the body which

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 35, R.V.

we know is like a mass of loose, moving particles in perpetual flow, in which there is an unceasing passing away of the old, and an equally unceasing acquisition of the new, while the sameness of the subject continues. They have reasoned rightly that the identity must depend upon something else than the persistence of the self-same matter or the same stream of corporeal particles, and they have speculated on what that something else may be. They have imagined that through all the stages of existence, and in all that befalls the body, some invisible germ of life remains, some indistinguishable point of elemental matter, which contains all the potentialities of the future; that some organific principle of being is lodged in the body at its first formation which continues, preserving the identity of the body and securing its future. They have held that the spiritual body which is to be exists already within the visible body of the present, and needs only to show itself at death. They have imagined that the soul has the capacity of weaving for itself out of its environment a body suited to the circumstances of its existence for the time,—a sensuous body for a sensuous mode of existence, a spiritual body for a spiritual range of existence. They have thought that the soul may obtain the power of making an embodiment for itself by drawing to it the elements of the higher world. Or, retreating from all these explanations, they have come to the conclusion that the body of the future is wholly a new creation, that at death soul and body alike perish, and are brought anew into being at the end.

But Paul neither furnishes any answer to such

questions, nor lends them any countenance. He gives us to understand that the new body will be *our* body, and yet will be different from that of which we have experience, superior to it in incorruptibility, in honour, and in power, in freedom from waste, decay, and death, in the glory of perfection, in ability to discharge its function. It shall cease to be a natural or sensuous body, fit only for earthly, dependent conditions, and it shall become a "spiritual body," the congruous instrument of a higher order of life for which the limitations of sense and time no more subsist. Or as he elsewhere expresses it, it will be a body like that of the Risen Christ Himself, "conformed to the body of His glory,"[1] answering to new laws, the perfect organ for a heavenly life. It is to be related to the former body, and yet is to be different from it and superior to it, as the golden grain with its rich increase is related to the buried seed, yet different from it and superior to it. But how the present body which is committed to its kindred earth is to find itself again in the future body; how the resurrection body is to come from the earthly body; how the identity is to be preserved; how the new corporeality is to be constructed; whether some formative activity is put forth by the soul or some organific principle is retained by the body, on these and all like questions he has nothing to say. He is content with those simple analogies of nature which serve so far to relieve the idea of a bodily resurrection of the antecedent incredibility or irrationality which may seem to attach to it. He states the broad and fruitful principle that "God

[1] Phil. iii. 21.

gives to each its own body." And for his last answer he refers us to his great word "in Christ." Our union with Christ, the union of our entire self with the Second Adam, the Lord from heaven—that is his final solution of all difficulties, his final reason for the certain hope of a resurrection.

Lastly, the doctrine of the resurrection being the crown of Paul's teaching on the subject of the Future, the immortality to which he looks is an immortality for the living man as such. It is in essential harmony with Hebrew faith and Hebrew hope, and in essential distinction from Greek thought and Greek surmise. It rises on the foundation of the Old Testament belief, and carries to its ultimate height the consentient doctrine of man's nature on which the hope of Hebrew historian, psalmist, and prophet, the teaching of Christian evangelist and apostle, from first to last proceed. It is in the Pauline writings that the Biblical doctrine of a future life is seen in its sharpest contrasts with the Hellenic. That doctrine provides a continuity and permanence of life for man as a whole, in the unity and integrity of his nature and personality. It holds the golden mean between the old heroic ideas of man which made the warm, corporeal life of earth the true and substantial life, and the later philosophical ideas which regarded the life of mind as the only real life and made man himself ultimately only a soul. It agrees with the best products of ancient Hellenic wisdom in all that they said of man as a spiritual existence, in all that they did in establishing the truth and unfolding the contents of his distinctive personal being. But in other respects it stands

absolutely apart both from the speculations of the great Greek sages and from the teaching of thinkers like Philo, in whom Hebrew thought was sunk in the wisdom of the Greek schools.

There is more of a seeming psychology in Paul than in any other New Testament writer. But even Paul never bases the hope of a hereafter for man on psychological considerations. He never contemplates a simple immortality of soul; he never argues for man's survival merely on the ground that there is a mind or spirit in him. He proceeds upon the Old Testament view of man as a being made in God's image, a free personality in the likeness of God's own nature, destined for life because thus it is with him. This is essentially different from the Hellenic idea which ruled the scholastic theology, and has exercised a deep and unfortunate influence on modern systems of doctrine. Those of the Greek sages who taught the immortality of man attached that immortality to one side of his compound nature. Most of them did so because they regarded the intellectual constituent of man's being as of the nature of the gods, a part of the divine essence, an emanation from the Soul of the world. The Stoics believed the universe to be pervaded by a breath, a fire, a reason, or a consciousness which was divine, of which the soul of man was a derivation. They thought that at the end of each great world-period the system of things which had slowly been evolved was dissolved by a general conflagration, and became reabsorbed in Deity; and that the soul of man, though it could outlive the body, was yet incapable of retaining its individuality beyond the

cosmical period to which it belonged, at the end of which it was merged again in the Deity of which it was a portion.

According to Greek thought, therefore, man was a dualism, in one part essentially divine, in another wholly animal and of earth; in one part subject to decay and final extinction, in another superior to these laws; in one part perishing of necessity for ever, in another capable of a certain continuance of being. Working out this distinction, the Greek thought of immortality as a quality possible only to the soul, and repudiated the idea of a new existence for the body or a resurrection for the substantial man. The Hellenic sage looked to the soul as in a state of weakness and loss so long as it was connected with the body, and associated his entire conception of the perfection of life with the idea of a bodiless existence. Plato taught that, while the soul is of the nature of the gods, the body is an encumbrance which is to be cast off that it may perish for ever, a thing from which all the evils, imperfections, and impurities of man arise, a hindrance, not a help to knowledge. It is for the philosopher to disown and dishonour the body, for with it the purification of the man and the vision of perfect justice, beauty, and goodness are impossible. To Plato and the Platonists blessedness was attainable only in an existence separate from the body, and thinkers like Plotinus thanked God that they were not created with an imperishable body.

But the Pauline hope is not the Platonist hope of a release from the shackle and sepulchre of the body, not the hope of the survival of an immortal principle

in man, but the hope of the endurance of the man himself. It links itself with higher and more assured thoughts than those of the philosopher. Its kinship is with the Old Testament doctrine of the unity of man's nature, the royalty of his being, his affinity with God. It reveals a consummation which is to be realised in the redemption of the whole man, and in his elevation to a condition of existence in which he shall live in the full integrity of his being, and his body, transformed and glorified, shall be the perfect instrument of a perfect life.

BOOK SIXTH

Conclusions

In Greece, beyond the brilliant fantasies of the popular imagination, we have met with the opinions of the sages. These sages have rendered immortal service to the human mind; they have proved some of the titles of our noble origin; they have demonstrated the spiritual nature of the principle of thought; but, in the presence of a precise affirmation of our personal and conscious immortality, they have hesitated, and have kept as a last resource the idea that life is of so little value, that should it give place to annihilation it would be sweet to die. Socrates himself speaks thus, and this has always astonished me. When I picture to myself the life of the philosopher of Athens, an existence so full, so animated, passed under the fair skies of Greece, charmed by the noblest discourse and intercourse, I am astonished to find the possessor of so much good count life of so little value. But nevertheless it is Socrates who declares that few even of our best days are equal to a night's repose. Jesus Christ appeared, and at His voice a profound and vital faith in an immortal future took possession of the hearts of *His* disciples.—NAVILLE.

Man is, properly speaking, based upon Hope, he has no other possession but Hope; this world of his is emphatically the place of Hope.—CARLYLE.

Now, the necessary mansions of our restored selves are those two contrary and incompatible places we call *Heaven* and *Hell*. To define them, or strictly to determine what and where these are, surpasseth my divinity. That elegant apostle, which seemed to have a glimpse of heaven, hath left but a negative description thereof; *which neither eye hath seen, nor ear hath heard, nor can enter into the heart of man*: he was translated out of himself to behold it; but, being returned into himself, could not express it. . . . Briefly, therefore, where the soul hath the full measure and complement of happiness; where the boundless appetite of that spirit remains compleatly satisfied that it can neither desire addition nor alteration, that, I think, is truly heaven; and this can onely be in the injoyment of that essence, whose infinite goodness is able to terminate the desires of itself and the unsatiable wishes of ours; wherever God will thus manifest Himself, there is heaven, though within the circle of this sensible world.—SIR THOMAS BROWNE.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY

WE have completed the survey of the Christian doctrine of Immortality as it lies in the Scriptures themselves. We have seen how its foundations are laid in Hebrew faith, in the experiences of Israel's saints and the messages of Israel's prophets. We have seen, too, how it comes to its magnitude in the New Testament, and how the words of Christ Himself contain the elements of all that is given, in various forms and connections and in different degrees of developed statement, in the writings of apostles and evangelists. It remains to notice the nature and measure of the contribution which is made by the Christian doctrine to man's faith in a future life, and to state the theological conclusions on the final questions.

We have found that so far back as we can penetrate there is evidence of the fact that it has been natural to man to believe in some sort of existence after death. "Looking at the religion of the lower races as a whole," says Dr. Tylor, "we shall at least not be ill-advised in taking as one of its general and principal elements the doctrine of the soul's future life."[1] If any race might

[1] *Primitive Culture*, 3rd ed. vol. ii. p. 21.

have been expected to be destitute of such a belief, it is the natives of the New Hebrides. Yet Dr. Paton tells us how different the case proved to be from what he had expected. He found these rude people believing in the existence of the spirits of their ancestors and heroes, possessed of the thought of an invisible world, speaking of a heaven under the symbol of the best bit of earth they knew, and interested above all things in the mention of a resurrection.[1] The case of the New Hebrideans is but a typical instance of what closer acquaintance with the lowest races is every day discovering. In this sense, therefore, belief in a future life is both a primary and a primitive belief of humanity. In most cases it has gone beyond the mere idea of some sort of after existence. It has imagined a seat for that existence, sometimes on earth, sometimes beneath earth, sometimes above earth. Many savage races have pictured a special land of souls somewhere in this world itself. Others, both of lower and higher culture, have placed the residence of the departed in an underworld Hades. Others still have looked for it in a heaven resting upon the firmament or planted in the upper air.

From the very earliest times, too, and among the very rudest peoples, there has been an attempt to conceive the state of the dead in these new homes. There have been two ruling conceptions. There has been the idea of the future life as a reflection of the present life, the forms and conditions of earth being retained. There has been also the idea of the future

[1] *John G. Paton, Missionary to the New Hebrides: An Autobiography*, vol. i. p. 119, etc.

life as a compensation for the present, men's conditions being readjusted hereafter according to the good and evil of their earthly life. But the belief in the future, so far as it has been the creature of instinct and imagination, has remained comparatively crude, uncertain, and ethically inoperative, whether in the continuance-theory, as it has been called, or in the more advanced retribution-theory.

But from the earliest period of the awakening of man's intellectual life, the belief in a future existence has also been the subject of reasoned thought. The speculation of all the ages has been at work upon it. It has done its best to establish it. It has also done its worst to disprove it. New philosophical methods have been applied to it from generation to generation, new styles of reasoning, new scientific ideas, the historical and comparative study of beliefs, new influences and new criteria. What has been the result? At this date the belief has still to confront ways of thinking which proclaim death to be the destruction of the man; and others which rob the individual of his immortality in order to enrich the abstraction called humanity; and others still which set aside a personal immortality for an intellectual immortality, consisting in the realisation of our identity with the divine thought or the divine substance. Professor Huxley, in one of his latest deliverances, showed us how much we should have had if we had been dependent on the uncertainties of speculation. "Relatively to myself," he said, "I am quite sure that the region of uncertainty—the nebulous country in which words play the part of realities—is far more extensive than I could wish. Materialism

and Idealism, Theism and Atheism, the doctrine of the soul and its mortality or immortality appear in the history of philosophy like the shades of Scandinavian heroes, eternally slaying one another, and eternally coming to life again in a metaphysical 'Nifelheim.' It is getting on for twenty-five centuries at least since mankind began seriously to give their minds to these topics. Generation after generation, philosophy has been doomed to roll the stone uphill, and, just as all the world swore it was at the top, down it has rolled to the bottom again." [1]

What, then, has Christianity done for the hope of immortality? It has translated a guess, a dream, a longing, a probability into a certainty. It has done this by interpreting us to ourselves, and confirming the voice of prophecy within us. That there is a witness in man himself, in his heart, his intellect, his conscience, is what the Ethnic faiths attest. That there is a witness in the constitution of things, is what is meant by the philosophies of the educated races. The arguments of natural religion take up this double witness. But none of these arguments, nor all of them together, are logically valid. The very highest to which they can carry us is a probability, perhaps a "sublime probability," that there is a future for us. But Christianity has brought out this witness in ourselves and in nature into light and clearness as nothing else has done.

There is all the difference in the matter of certainty. What makes the difference is that Christianity gives what philosophy cannot give—the consciousness of a personal relation to One who is akin to us, and who

[1] *Science and Christian Tradition*, pp. 312, 313.

has carried our nature in victory over death—the consciousness of a personal relation to a Risen Lord. Because Christianity has found a new basis for the hope of immortality in the fact of Christ's resurrection, and a new centre for it in the personal experience of a new life which is prophetic of its own immortality, there is a certainty in the Christian hope which distinguishes it from every other hope.

This is the first and most obvious thing in the contribution made by Christianity to man's faith in immortality. But it is not the only thing. The words of Christ and His apostles have brought us light upon much that was dim and vague in man's previous ideas of the nature of that immortality. By them we understand, as neither sage nor poet ever understood before, the conditions of the future life, its activities, its essential connection with the present life. They have endowed the hope with a grace, a constancy, an intelligibility, a majesty previously unknown. They have transformed it with all its new qualities from the doubtful possession of the select few into the common and enduring heritage of the many. They have given a new meaning to the whole conception of an after-existence, by the disclosures which they have made of the final judgment, the appointed Arbiter of man's future, the standard of the judgment, the order of the awards, the association of the universe with the destiny of man, and the Divine consummation toward which man himself and man's world are together moving.

The Christian doctrine has also made the contribution of reserve where reserve has been most needful

and most salutary, the contribution of silence where the conjectures of men have been least restrained and of smallest profit for the practical conduct of life. It has vitalised and moralised the whole thought of immortality. It has translated a remote surmise or ineffectual opinion into an ethical influence, imperial in its range, touching and stimulating the conscience, working mightily for righteousness. It has raised the neutral, theoretical belief of other religions to the splendour of an inspiration of goodness, a consolation in sorrow, a stay in change and loss, an illumination of the mystery of existence. It has given the *individual* an importance to which he never attained in other faiths, liberating his responsibility from that of the mass, and disentangling his destiny from those deeps of impersonal deity and those chains of becomings and ceasings to be, in which other religions sank the personal self.

It has crowned its service to faith by giving humanity the living hope of the resurrection in place of the philosophic idea of a bare immortality of soul or the penurious belief in a continuance of existence in an under-world of shades. Other religions have included in their creeds some sort of faith in a future for the body. But in most it has been a confused and feeble faith, far removed from that of the New Testament. The Persians had the definite idea of a resurrection. But even in their case much remains doubtful both as to the precise nature of the belief and as to the date to which it can be carried back. It appears in the Vendidad, as we have seen, but its presence in the Avesta is disputed, and is at the best little more than

discernible. There was a time when scholars thought they discovered the full doctrine of a general bodily resurrection in the ancient Zoroastrian system.[1] But the subsequent inquiries of other students[2] threw a different light upon the case. It became a question with some, whether the resurrection of which the Persians spoke was really a bodily resurrection, and with others whether the doctrine, so far as it was known to Zoroastrianism, was native to that system, or borrowed from Judaism. These doubts have been revived in our own day, and scholars of acknowledged authority assign the documents to a date so late that the Zoroastrian doctrine becomes the derived doctrine and the Christian its original. It is probably still nearest the truth to say with Spiegel that the belief in a bodily resurrection is not in the Avesta, the text in its present condition being referred to a period later than Alexander the Great, but that it existed in some form previous to that date. This seems most in harmony with the broad facts of the case, and with the statement on the doctrine of the Magi which has come down to us from Theopompus. Be this as it may, the Persian idea is the highest form which Ethnic thought reached on the subject, and we have already seen how far short it came of the Christian doctrine.

The belief has been ascribed to other peoples, to the Peruvians, to some inferior tribes in America, to races in Central Africa, the South Sea Islands, and elsewhere, but in each case on wholly mistaken grounds. "To the philosophy of the lower races," says Dr.

[1] Du Perron, G. Möller, etc. [2] Burnouf, Roth, etc.

Tylor, "it is by no means necessary that the surviving soul should be provided with a new body, for it seems itself to be of a filmy or vaporous corporeal nature, capable of carrying on an independent existence like other corporeal creatures."[1] Among these races there was at least one belief which in some measure was a substitute for the doctrine of a bodily resurrection. That was the idea of the migration of souls into other bodies, the reappearance of the soul of a dead kinsman in the body of an infant. This idea of a return of ancestral souls in the bodies of descendants had a great fascination for the human mind in the infancy of thought. It is found diffused among the North American Indians, the Lapps, the Esquimaux, the Ahts of Vancouver's Island, the New Zealanders, the Mexicans, the Khonds of Orissa, the tribes of Old Calabar, New Caledonia, and other remote regions. In the higher races, apart from the special case of the people of ancient Iran, the nearest approach to the doctrine was made by the Egyptian notion of the justified one's recovery of the different constituents of his being, and by the various forms of the dogma of metempsychosis, Indian, Orphic, Pythagorean, and Platonic, with its conception of cycles of purifying and punitive re-embodiments of souls. Elsewhere, therefore, there were dim adumbrations, distant approaches, some of them of great significance and prophetic of what was to come. But the completeness of life to which other religions pointed is given in the Christian doctrine of a perfection of being embracing body and soul, the Christian goal of a full

[1] *Primitive Culture*, 3rd ed. vol. ii. p. 19.

substantial life for man in the integrity of all that makes him man here.

Christianity has its answer also to the last and gravest of all the questions of the future existence—the final issues of man's life. On all the other topics which belong to the doctrine of immortality, the New Testament speaks with one voice. No essential difference can be established between Christ's teaching and that of the apostles, nor any variation in principle between different stages in the teaching of the same apostle. On the subjects of Christ's Return, the Resurrection, and the Judgment, there is essential unity. Is it so also with the great question of the last results of life? On this subject, what is the conclusion to which we are led by the different voices which speak to us in the New Testament?

There can be no questions of more solemn moment than these. There are none that have urged themselves with more persistence upon the mind of man. What is the end of God's ways with human lives? When the veil between the visible world and the invisible is rent by death, what opens for the individual? Is it a fresh scene of probation, in which the past repeats itself, or is it a condition morally fixed? If there is a life of permanent grace and blessedness for the righteous, is there also a life of continuous retribution for the unrighteous? Is each man to eat the fruit of his doings for ever, the righteous man reaping in mercy what he has sown in faith; the wicked man holden by the cords of his iniquities? Beyond the great judgment is all possibility of change in character and in condition at an end?

Is there in any of the æons of an unmeasured Hereafter a spot bright with the prospect of the triumph of Love over all perverse wills? Or are the retributive processes which we see in operation here to follow men into the other world and work themselves out there, so that for some the issue may be a continued choice of moral evil, bringing with it the blackness of darkness for ever?

These are questions which refuse to be silenced. The last of them speaks of possibilities of such awful moment that to give it an affirmative answer may well demand the most convincing evidence. The Church of Christ in all its branches has been constrained to give that answer, and the vast majority of those who have been most honoured as theologians and as saints in all the Christian ages have felt themselves shut up to the same conclusion, often with trembling and against acutest natural inclination. Yet after every period of quiescence the question has risen again for fresh discussion. In our own time, not a few of those who have just claim to rank among the leaders of Christian thought, urge a change in the Church's attitude, and in our whole way of construing the words of our Lord and His apostles on the destinies of men beyond the grave. Some reach final unity in the history of God's ways with man by asserting the ultimate elimination of all evil from God's universe by the rough and ready process of destruction. Others come at the same goal by overleaping the realities of a Divine judgment and the untold capacities of resistance in the human will, and affirming a final conversion of all evil to good. There are those, too, who limit their speculations to the

period which elapses between death and the judgment, and seek relief in the supposition of a ministry of grace continued into the world of the departed. And there are those who take refuge in a restrained Christian agnosticism, deeming the disclosures made by the New Testament too figurative to be entirely intelligible, too fragmentary to furnish the materials for any definite doctrine on the subject of the moral issues of man's life.

It is not only Christian faith that has had to grapple with these grave questions. They have filled a large space in the history of Ethnic thought. Even in the rude beginnings of religions, men's ideas of a continuance of being after death have been burdened with the awe of alternative conditions. That awe has not become less heavy as the religions have grown older. Rather is it the case that in proportion as the belief in a future existence has become purer, more reflective, more ethical, the foreboding of retributive contingencies has taken the more definite shape, and the anticipation has risen in larger and more distinct form of a shadow side as well as a light side, a hell of some sort, no less than a heaven, in the after existence.

With how pathetic an insistence the mind of man has given itself to this perennial problem of the final destination of souls! What has it left untried in its painful endeavour to adjust the fond wish of the heart to the stern suggestions of the recognised action of moral law? The answers by which it has sought to satisfy itself are so many and so various that they may be said to have made the full circle of speculative possibility. We have seen in some measure what they

have been. Sometimes, though with the few rather than with the many, the only conclusion has seemed to be the one that is prompted by the first aspect of the mystery of death — extinction as the end of all, extinction of being for all or for the evil only, annihilation resulting at once on death or taking effect later after judgment. Through long stretches of time and among some of the greatest peoples of the ancient world, the accepted solution has been the simple one of transference—the translation of men into a Hades with diminished conditions of existence for all, with perchance an Elysium for the favoured few and a Tartarus for the exceptionally wicked. From the early dawn of Eastern speculation down to the imposing philosophies of modern days, minds of more subtle faculty have turned for relief to the idea of absorption, thinking at least to cut the knot of the problem by assuring themselves that the fate of the individual life is to be lost at last, with all that has grown up around it, in the universal life of nature from which it emanated. Vast masses of men have found a strange mental contentment in the awful thought of perpetual transmigrations—the intolerable thought of souls entangled in the iron chain of existence, passing incessantly into different forms of being, into higher and lower grades of life, into measureless heavens and hells, in the painful quest for deliverance by surrender of the personal being. And the refuge of others at once from the mystery of the moral issues of life and from the thought of the ceaseless creation of souls, has been the belief in the recurrence of souls, the belief that there is a fixed number of human souls,

and that ancestral souls are reborn in the bodies of later individuals, to pursue new careers, unconscious of the past, but with the imprint of former deeds.

In these and other ways the mind of man has wrestled with the great questions of the far future of human lives and the final action of those retributive laws which pursue men here. Of all the answers which have been given in the long history of religious thought, only three are possible in the light of New Testament teaching. These are the doctrines of Annihilation, Restoration, and continuous Retribution. Looking at the results of our examination of the disclosures and intimations given in the words of Christ and His apostles, we have now to review these competing Christian solutions of the problems of the end.

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINES OF ANNIHILATION AND CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY

THE doctrine of Annihilation is a doctrine of ancient date, which is more germane to philosophic than to religious thought. It had a large and well-understood place in pre-Christian speculation. It assumed different shapes and was taught in different interests in the faiths and philosophies of the old world. It has also been adopted by occasional Christian thinkers, and has received more than one form at their hands. In the sense that the incorrigibly wicked and impenitent are destined to pass finally out of existence at death, or shall cease to be after a certain period of penal endurance in the other world, it has been taught now and again by individual Christian theologians at least from the beginning of the fourth century onwards.

Arnobius, the African apologist, professor of rhetoric at Sicca and teacher of Lactantius, whose conversion to Christianity is placed somewhere between 303 and 313 A.D., is the first writer of note certainly known to us to have been of this way of thinking. To him it seemed that the human soul, with its imperfection and sin, could neither come direct from God, nor

be itself immortal. It might outlast the body, but it could be immortal only by the special gift of God. For unrighteous souls, he thought, there must remain after death a second death, a Gehenna of unquenchable fire, which gradually consumes them, and at last extinguishes them.[1]

It has been attempted, indeed, to connect this theory with the oldest Christian writings, and with the teaching of the earliest and most authoritative of the Fathers. The Epistle of Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, the Shepherd of Hermas, Polycarp, the Epistle to Diognetus, the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, are marshalled as witnesses to the primitive belief in annihilation or conditional immortality. It is admitted that after Athanasius the case is different. The doctrine "was drowned," we are told, "in the rising tide of the Platonic theory which was made to triumph in the Church by the false Clementines, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Cyprian, Jerome, and especially Augustine."[2] Echoes of the original faith, however, continued to be heard, it is said, in the writings of Lactantius, Nemesius, and others of later date.

But the attempt to prove it to have been the primitive Christian doctrine, that immortality is not an original gift of man, and that the wicked finally cease to exist, must be pronounced a failure. In most cases, if not all, the witnesses speak with another voice. The statements relied on are either incidental

[1] *Disputationes contra Gentes*, ii. 15–54.

[2] Petavel, *The Problem of Immortality*, Freer's translation, p. 242.

statements which have to be balanced by others that are at once more definite and more continuous; or they are popular statements and simple repetitions of the terms of Scripture; or they mean that the soul is not absolutely self-subsistent, but depends for its existence and its survival on God; or they have in view only the sensitive soul as distinguished from the rational soul or responsible spirit.

Most of the writers referred to, while they may describe the ungodly as *perishing* or being *destroyed*, speak also of the "unquenchable" fire (Ignatius), "the perpetual torment of eternal fire" (Polycarp), "the way of eternal death with punishment" (μετὰ τιμωρίας, Barnabas), "eternal punishments" (Theophilus), or some equivalent doom. In some cases, as in that of Tatian, the terms employed are too vague and mixed to found on. In others they are too brief or too general for the purpose. The Didaché, for example, speaks simply of the race of men coming into "the fire of trial," and many being offended and perishing; and of the resurrection of the dead, which, however, is not of all men, but of the saints. But it does not explain in what sense the many are to "perish"; nor does it make it clear whether it refers to a resurrection of some and a destruction of others, or to a first resurrection and a second. In the same way Hermas says of those who "do not repent, but abide in their deeds," that they shall "utterly perish"; the Epistle to Diognetus speaks simply of a punishment that must "endure unto the end"; and Clement of Rome speaks generally of life in immortality as a gift of God, and of the "struggle to obtain immortality." Irenæus declares

of unbelievers that they shall not "inherit incorruptibility," and speaks of all souls and spirits as created by God, and dependent on God for their duration. But he speaks also of "immortal souls" and of the "eternal" duration of punishments. Athanasius, too, however he may express himself at times, deals with the unpardonableness of the sin against the Holy Ghost, and declares that there are "none to deliver those who in Hades are taken in their sins."

Much is made of certain words of Justin Martyr in which he speaks of souls as "not naturally immortal";[1] of the soul not being "for ever conjoined with the body";[2] and of God delaying "the confusion and destruction of the whole world, by which the wicked angels, and demons, and men shall cease to exist."[3] Above all, great importance is attached to this paragraph: "I do not, however, say that all souls shall die, for that would be too much to the advantage[4] of the wicked. I say that the souls of the righteous remain in a better place, but the evil in a worse, awaiting the time of judgment . . . . The righteous . . . shall not die any more, but the wicked shall be punished so long as it shall please God that they exist and be punished."[5]

Justin's words are not entirely consistent, and they are popular rather than exact. But the inference drawn from them in favour of Annihilation is beyond the mark. When he speaks of the souls of men as "not naturally immortal," he refers simply to the

[1] *Dial. cum Tryph.* v.
[2] *Ibid.* vi.
[3] μηκέτι ὦσι, *Second Apol.* vii.
[4] ἔρμαιον, a happy chance, or stroke of luck.
[5] *Dial. cum Tryph.* v.

fact that they are created and not self-existent. When he speaks of the wicked as punished, "so long as it shall please God that they exist and be punished," he says nothing of its being God's will that they *shall* cease to exist at some late period in the future. On the other hand, he speaks of "the eternal punishment through fire"; he describes demons and men as "sent to the judgment and condemnation of fire, to be punished unceasingly"; and he sets the punishment which is *eternal* over against that which is but for a thousand years.[1]

From the time of Arnobius, though sparsely and at great intervals, there have been adherents of this doctrine. Those who have held it in its full eschatological import have not been many. But there have been others who have accepted its fundamental principle, and made partial or peculiar applications of it. The early Socinians, limiting the image of God in man to the prerogative of dominion over the creatures, denied that immortality was an original possession of man, and spoke of Christ as the author of life and immortality. Faustus Socinus himself taught that man was mortal by nature, and capable

[1] On this see especially Donaldson's *History of Christian Literature and Doctrine*, ii. pp. 316–322. This is his conclusion: "Justin believed in the eternity of the punishment of the wicked. He has not applied the word ἀΐδιος to punishment; but he has so frequently used the word αἰώνιος, and at the same time varied it by equivalents, that there is scarcely room to doubt his opinion. There are two or three passages which have been adduced to show that he supposed the punishment would come to an end; but they prove no such thing. Thus the statement of the old man, in the Dialogue with Trypho, that the wicked were punished only so long as God wished them to be punished, is intended simply to affirm that punishment is dependent on God's will, but it is not intended to declare what God's will is."

of attaining immortality only by a special act of grace. John Locke interpreted the *death* which Scripture makes the penalty of sin in the sense of a literal loss of life.[1] In his *Leviathan*, Hobbes also propounded the theory of final annihilation after temporary punishments. One of the *Questions* put by Dr. Isaac Watts in his book on the *Ruin and Recovery of Mankind* was "whether the word *death* might not be fairly construed to extend to the utter destruction of the life of the soul as well as of the body." Among the writers belonging to the eighteenth century who denied man's constitutional immortality, the most curious position perhaps was occupied by Dr. Henry Dodwell, a high non-juring Churchman, who not only taught that the soul "is a mortal principle," which "becomes immortalised by the pleasure of God to punishment, or to reward by its union with the divine baptismal spirit," but claimed further that it belonged to the bishops as the true successors of the apostles to immortalise the naturally mortal soul.

It is in our own day, however, that this way of interpreting man's nature and reading the mystery of his end has found its flourishing period. Under the name of Conditional Immortality the old idea of annihilation has been revived, restated, and made a chief point in the programme of an earnest and aggressive school of theology. The writings of Dr. Edward White and Mr. J. B. Heard in this country, of Dr. C. F. Hudson and Dr. W. R. Huntington in America, of Dr. E. Petavel in Switzerland, and Richard

[1] *Reasonableness of Christianity*, § 1.

Rothe in Germany, have raised it to a theological importance, and secured for it a popular acceptance, such as it never enjoyed before. A numerous band of disciples, embracing men like the Rev. S. Minton-Stenhouse and Prebendaries Constable and Row in England, the Revs. L. C. Baker, L. W. Bacon, J. H. Pettingell in America, Professors Secrétan and Bruston and others on the Continent of Europe,[1] have contributed largely to the restoration of the doctrine and to its completer theological statement. Its hold upon the public mind has also been materially helped by the occasional utterances or partial support of men like Archbishop Whately, Bishop Hampden, Sir George G. Stokes, Dr. Dale of Birmingham, Dr. Lyman Abbott, Professor Sabatier, and other writers and preachers of importance on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is not put in the same form by these writers. But they are at one in the fundamental principle that man is not immortal in virtue of his original constitution, but is made immortal by a special act or gift of grace. The general position of the coryphæus of the school is that redemption concerns man's *being* as well as his blessedness; that man's nature must be studied in its psychological and physical conditions, if man's destiny is to be rightly understood, as it is spoken to either by reason or by revelation; that the dogma of the natural immortality of the soul is destitute of all evidence from nature or from revelation; and that this idea, borrowed from the Greek philosophy, is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος which prevents us from understanding the Incarnation and the glory

[1] Most recently Kabisch, *Die Eschatologie des Paulus.*

of Christ as the life-giving Spirit. He asserts it, therefore, to be the doctrine of the Bible that man was created corruptible, but with the possibility and the purpose of rising into incorruptibility of existence by eating of the tree of life, and into nobility of existence by union with God; that when man fell, God intervened with a great act of mercy, restoring the possibility and continuing the purpose; that this necessitated the Divine Incarnation and the gift of the Spirit on the side of God, and a new birth on the side of man; and that those who now become united with Christ have the element of immortality communicated to them by the indwelling of His Spirit, while those who reject Him survive but a certain time, sufficient to ensure their judgment, and then become extinct.

He explains the prevailing theology to mean that man is "naturally mortal in the bodily part of his constitution, and naturally immortal in the spiritual part"; that his sin is the "sin of a will destined to endless duration"; that redemption "contemplates no change in the quality of his nature or in its durability"; that "the 'resurrection of the body' in glory is a secondary and accidental accompaniment of salvation"; that "the true humanity is found in 'the soul'" . . . and that "redemption delivers it from a 'wrath coming' for ever, on a nature destined to live for ever." These notions he characterises as "anti-scriptural, and part of the 'mystery of iniquity.'"[1]

He admits that the term "death," like the term "life," has secondary associations, but affirms that its true idea is that of the "breaking up of the human

[1] *Life in Christ*, pp. 127, 128, 2nd ed.

monad." He rejects the idea of annihilation of substance, and prefers to speak of the destruction of life. But "*when the complex man is dissolved he is dead*," he tells us, "no matter what may become of the component elements of his being; just as *water* is put an end to when the combining oxygen and hydrogen are separated."[1] He discusses the question whether every man has *spirit* as well as soul, or whether *spirit* is "the production of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, and therefore peculiar to the saved." He is of opinion that the idea of "the non-possession of the πνεῦμα" seems to be favoured by some important statements of the New Testament, and that it accords well with the doctrine of man's natural mortality. But he sees great difficulty in the way of this view; he dissents from the position adopted on this question by men like Prebendary Constable, who teach that "the spirit which is part of a Christian man's ὁλοκληρία, or constitution, is the Holy Spirit"; and concludes that the "most considerable alleviation of the difficulty" is the suggestion that "by *spirit* as produced in the twice-born man by the Spirit of God, our Lord intended the spiritual and eternal *life* evolved by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, not the addition of a wholly new faculty to the humanity."[2]

His argument proceeds at some points on an extreme and mistaken reading of what the ordinary doctrine in reality is. It is mixed up, too, with a number of doubtful statements and curious speculations, the relevancy of which is somewhat remote, on mind in animals, sensibility in God, the serpent in Eden, the activity of evil

[1] *Life in Christ*, p. 106. [2] *Ibid.* pp. 298–303.

spirits, the four modes of justification, and other subjects. But the central points of his system are sufficiently clear, and they give an entirely new version of the teaching of Scripture. They amount to this: that "the very object of redemption is to change our nature not only from sin to holiness, but from mortality to immortality"; that this "stupendous change," the bestowal of an incorruptible life instead of a corruptible, is "conveyed to mankind only through the channel of the Incarnation"; that "God still further unites the Divine essence with man's mortal nature in the Regeneration of the Individual, by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit"; that the sentence of death on the first man, which would have meant, if executed on the day of his sin, that "the human race would never have been born," was suspended by an act of Divine mercy, the existence of mankind now being "a boon beyond the limits of law"; that the existence of redemption "brought in also new responsibilities upon mankind, involving fresh penalties"; that there will therefore be a resurrection and a judgment of the unjust, and consequently that the spirits of the unjust will be preserved from dissipation at death, while those of the just will be "upheld in individual being (in '*Sheol*' or '*Hades*' under the old law, 'with Christ' under the new), with a view to the reconstitution of humanity in the resurrection of glory." This survival is declared to be due only to the "operation of redemption, with its graces and corresponding penalties." Finally, it is stated that Christ is to come shortly to receive the righteous into His eternal kingdom, but to consign the "aerial"

spirits of evil to their tremendous doom in the "everlasting fire," and to cast impenitent men into hell, there to suffer according to their deeds, and at last to pass for ever out of being.[1] With all this Dr. White thinks at the same time that "it is reasonable to entertain hopeful views of the final salvation of millions whom we denominate 'heathens,' but whom God loves, and has visited in His grace in every land," reserving to Himself in all ages "a people who have 'feared Him' and 'wrought righteousness' under a secret Divine inspiration."[2]

Mr. Heard, again, proceeds upon a peculiar theory of man's constitution as consisting of the union of three natures — body or sense-consciousness, soul or self-consciousness, and spirit or God-consciousness. Two tendencies, the flesh and the spirit, resulted, he says, from the union of these three natures in one person; the soul or self-consciousness, "as the union point between body and spirit," having been created "free to choose to which of these two opposite poles it would be attracted." The Fall, therefore, was "not a solitary act of disobedience, but an inclination given to the whole nature of Adam in the direction of the flesh, by which the spirit or image of God was deadened in him." The descendants of Adam inherit this bias, and are spiritually dead. The spirit is dormant in them. Yet it remains in germ, and the new birth is the quickening of this deadened or dormant pneuma by the Divine Spirit. The arguments offered by reason for an existence after death "are either fallacious or prove too much." The immortality of the

[1] *Life in Christ*, pp. 129–133. [2] *Ibid.* p. 296.

soul is a fiction, a natural and honourable fiction, of the Greek genius. "Of the soul or the seat of self-consciousness we cannot say either that it is mortal or immortal . . . it can only exist through its union with the spirit or God-consciousness." Hence our hope of an existence after death must rest not on any "natural immortality of the psyche, but on the gift of eternal life to the pneuma, when quickened and renewed in the image of God."[1]

Mr. Heard does not claim that Christian psychology as he construes it explains Christian eschatology, but he thinks it "raises at least a higher issue than the old one." For it means that man's immortality lay in his receiving a *spirit* made in the Divine image; that, this being lost, he is under the law of the mortality of the lower animals; that "the penalty on Adam's sin was death, or gradual and entire extinction, as life was withdrawn successively from spirit, soul, and body"; that all life, whether of weal or of woe, beyond the grave comes from Christ; that "heaven and hell and the fearful alternative awaiting every human being, in the one or in the other, are both the result of Christ's work"; and that there are three degrees of sin, bodily, psychical, and spiritual, all at last entailing extinction of being, but punished first with degrees and durations of penalty proportioned to their guilt.[2]

Prebendary Constable, again, speaks strongly of the mistake and mischief of the idea that the soul is the true man,—an idea "brought in a mutilated shape into theology from the philosophy of Plato."

[1] *The Tripartite Nature of Man*, pp. 351-353.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 247–260.

He tells us indeed that "no dogma whatever can be named which has been productive of one half the evil consequences that the dogma of man's inalienable mortality has produced." He admits that man was made in God's image; that no small part of this image consisted in freedom from the subjection to death by which the lower creatures were bound; and that "immortality *was* given to man at his creation." But he holds that this was an *alienable* gift, and that man lost it when he sinned; that *sinful* man is now mortal like the brutes, and that if immortality is to be his again it is only by a provision of grace, the gospel of Christ, which "reinstates him in the place he lost"; that "life" in Scripture means simply existence; and that the existence of the wicked "after their resurrection to judgment will but resemble their existence now; it will be temporary and pass away."[1]

Dr. Huntingdon's position is much the same. He holds that a "never-ending existence is not the common heritage of all men in virtue of their having been born into this world, but is rather to be regarded as a gift bestowed on those who seek it from the Eternal Himself"; that "through the life-imparting power of the Son of God . . . eternal life becomes rooted, as it were, in those who, in St. Paul's phrase, 'by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, honour, and immortality'"; that being thus "made a partaker of the Divine nature, man ceases to be what he was before, a perishable creature, and becomes superior to the touch of death"; and that it is "more in consonance with the Divine methods that the lost

[1] *Duration and Nature of Future Punishment*, pp. ii. 21, 29.

soul should simply die out, and, with more or less retributive suffering, gradually perish, just as a plant might do if carried into an uncongenial climate, or as a fountain would waver and sink and finally cease as the water in the reservoir above became exhausted."[1]

Prebendary Row, on the other hand, while agreeing generally with Dr. Edward White, remarks on the small part given to the moral argument in his reasonings, and on the objectionable nature of certain theories with which he burdens his main position. He presses the distinction between the survival of man after death and the endless duration of that survival. He holds that in order that God may be "all in all," evil beings must have ceased to exist; but that there is also "reason to believe that a state of things must await man beyond the grave, in which those whose probation here has been passed under unfavourable conditions will enter on one hereafter where the conditions will be favourable."[2]

It is, however, in the writings of Richard Rothe of Heidelberg that this doctrine obtains, perhaps, its clearest and most scientific exposition. He is its principal advocate among the theologians of Germany, and it is a singular circumstance that a thinker of such rare insight as Rothe could have committed himself to a dogma which we should have judged *à priori* so little likely to satisfy him. He admits the awful force of our Lord's words on the subject of the destiny of the impenitent, but thinks that in most cases He speaks

[1] *Conditional Immortality*, pp. 81, 82.
[2] *Future Retribution*, pp. 408, 418, 420.

only of the condition preceding the judgment. He is of opinion that all those passages in which *Gehenna* occurs belong to this class; that the few passages which refer to the final state, such as Matt. x. 28 and Luke xii. 5, do not mean more than that the impenitent will be gradually deprived of sense and being; and that the same is the case with the most important passages in the apostolic writings, such as Gal. vi. 8; 1 John iii. 15, v. 16, 17; Heb. x. 39, etc. He admits, indeed, that the possibility of final impenitence cannot be denied, and that on the supposition of such conclusive sin, eternal punishment is suited to the guilt. He also concedes that reformation is not the only end of the Divine penalties, and that punishment, therefore, need not cease although the recovery of the sinner is no longer in view. But he adds that there is no apparent reason why the hopelessly obdurate should be kept in being. He denies that either in Christ's own words or in the writings of Paul and John is the doctrine of everlasting punishment expressed. He understands the passages pertinent to the question to indicate rather the ultimate extinction of the condemned.

He attaches great importance to the doctrine of an Intermediate State, on grounds both of Scripture and of reason. In this Middle Condition the grace of God continues to reign, he thinks, so that those who pass into Hades not united with Christ have there the opportunity of entering into His fellowship and into life by it. Death is not indeed the cessation of existence. Not that the human soul is naturally imperishable, but that it is of the nature and original

idea of man to acquire immortality. This imperishable being becomes his, however, only in virtue of a moral process, creating in him true and actual *spirit*. In Hades conversion remains a possibility, but only a possibility. Even there a man may persist in sin till he becomes demonised. When the kingdom of God has passed through all its stages and Christ returns, the possibility of conversion is at an end, and the unreconciled, destitute of the *spirit* in which is life, are given over to the decay and dissolution which are the law of all material existence. The only satisfactory solution of the problem of the destiny of those who finally resist the Spirit seems to Rothe, therefore, to lie in the anticipation of a gradual waste and wearing out of their existence.[1]

These are some of the forms in which this doctrine is elaborated. It claims to give the most reasonable and most scriptural answer to the questions of the final issues. Does it fulfil the promise which it makes its boast ?

We must say of it in all its forms, in the *first* place, that it has history against it. If it is what its advocates assert, we should expect it to be the very earliest of all ideas of the future. It lies apparently so near to hand; it corresponds so fitly with the most obvious phenomena of life and death; it offers so short and simple a solution of the gravest of all problems. But this is far from being its historical position. It has as little claim to be the original belief of mankind, or even one of very early origin, as it has to have been at any period part of the general faith of humanity. The

[1] *Dogmatik*, iii. 133-169, 291-336.

idea that man's life is extinguished by death is not the normal thought of the race. History and records which go behind history show us how natural it is to man to think of himself as continuing to be after death. Even in his lowest and least developed condition, however vague his notions of the future, and however incapable he may be of the definite conception of an immortal life, he looks for a survival after death. As far as his imagination carries him, he thinks of himself as continuing to exist.

It is not the higher and more civilised races alone who are found to possess this belief or to feel the idea of annihilation intolerable. The reverse is rather the case. The natural sentiment and reflection of man have always been on the side of a continuity of existence. So much so that the belief in a future existence of some sort has been peculiarly strong and spontaneous in the most primitive peoples, while the idea of a cessation of existence has been rather the product of the thought of the more developed races. The place of the latter has been with the philosophic observer or with peoples who have come to the stage of philosophic thought. Even with a people of the rich civilisation and speculative capacity of the Greeks, it has been the theory of the few rather than the faith of the many. "The idea of annihilation," says Plutarch, "was intolerable to the Greek mind. If they had no choice left them between entire extinction and an eternity of torment in Hades, they would have chosen the latter; almost all, men and women both, would have surrendered themselves to the teeth of Cerberus, or the buckets of the Danaïdæ,

rather than to nonentity."[1] The doctrine of annihilation, therefore, must be pronounced "logically the earliest, historically the latest, view."[2] This is a consideration that tells heavily against its pretensions.

But with this it has against it, in the *second* place, the whole force of those ineradicable sentiments, quenchless convictions, profound cravings, large previsions, and persistent reasonings which have made it natural for man, as history shows, in all the ages and in every part of the world to overleap in thought the incident of death and anticipate a *hereafter*. All that within us which speaks of the superiority of the life that beats in man to its present environment, the ideal world which makes man's peculiar kingdom, the intellectual capacities which have too limited an opportunity here, the emotions which have too narrow a range, the moral sense which demands completer moral adjustments than are witnessed in the present existence,—these things are not in us in mockery or for nought.

The advocates of conditional immortality are not unaware of the difficulty in which these facts of catholic human nature place their theory. Dr. Edward White admits that the force of certain of the arguments of reason for a future life cannot be withstood "if they are taken only for what they are really worth, as morally probable evidence of *survival* or *revival*."[3] Prebendary Row, who regards science as equally impotent to say Yes or No to the question of

[1] *Non pos. suav. viv. sec. Epic.*, pp. 1104, 1105. See also Döllinger, *The Gentile and the Jew*, ii. pp. 142–146 (Darnell's trans.).

[2] Alger, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, p. 54.

[3] *Life in Christ*, pp. 81, 82.

man's existence after death, and reckons all metaphysical arguments inept because of our complete ignorance of the ontology of man, confesses on the other hand that "reason furnishes strong grounds for believing, on the assumption that a God exists, who is all-powerful and all-wise, that such survival is in the highest degree probable; and on the further assumption that He is the moral governor of the world, renders such survival a moral certainty."[1] How is this difficulty met? By urging that reason for believing that man will survive the dissolution of the body is one thing, and reason for believing that he will live for ever another thing. "This probable evidence of survival," says Dr. White, "is far from carrying with it an equal probability of eternal survival."[2]

But granting this true as a matter of logic, it still fails to meet the case. It overlooks the fact that the existence which these mystic voices bid man anticipate is not one to which he puts any limit. It is confessed by the best exponents of the doctrine of conditional immortality, that there are moral and rational considerations which make it impossible to think of man as ceasing to exist at the moment of death. But do these considerations make it possible to conceive of him as ceasing to exist at any point thereafter? "The notion of a soul immortal enough to live through death, but not immortal enough to live on for ever," says an acute thinker, "is too childish to be entertained beyond the little school of literalists

[1] *Future Retribution*, pp. 407, 408.
[2] *Life in Christ, loc. cit.*; cf. Row's *Future Retribution*, p. 408.

who delight in it. The world outside will be content to believe that that which proves its powers to live though death claims its immortality."[1] The dissolution of death is the shock that seems to dash the crown from man's head. The evidence for his survival of that is evidence for much more. The recoil of his being from the idea of extinction, the inability to think of himself as non-existent, the stir of powers within him too vast for earth's small scene and little hour, and all the deep instincts of his soul, set him apart from the brutes, not by a temporary and adventitious difference, but by one which is essential, and speak of a future to which no bounds can be set. If they are valid for the belief that man shall live after death, they are valid for the belief that he shall live on.

But if this doctrine does injustice to the probable evidence furnished by reason, it does greater injustice to the testimony of Scripture to what man is. The Bible proceeds from first to last on the view that man, the creature of God, is the finite copy of his Maker's nature, different in origin and in destination from the beasts put under his dominion, made like God and for fellowship with Him, the bearer of a free, personal life, and meant to live. This is its view of man as such, not of a particular order of men; of man as he was created and continued to be, not of man at one particular stage of his history, or in one particular condition. Nowhere does it speak of immortality as a gift added to nature, or as a later

[1] Baldwin Brown, *The Doctrine of Annihilation in the Light of the Gospel of Love*, p. 64.

bestowment of grace. Nowhere does it say of man that he lost the Divine image which made his peculiar nature, and incorruptibility with it. Nowhere does it place the brute on the same plane with man, or speak of the former as a creature made in God's image and likeness. Everywhere it gives us to understand that man is a being specifically distinct from the beasts that perish, a creature made a little lower than the angels, whose affinities are with God. The doctrine in question takes his royalty from man, and reduces him to a creature whose affinities are with the brutes, the heir of a constitution by original make or present condition as perishable as theirs.

It ignores or mistakes at the same time the whole conception of an after-world that lies at the basis of the revelation recorded in Scripture. They to whom the revelation was addressed did not think of man as ceasing to be when he dies. The deeds and words which make the revelation neither presuppose nor indicate that death is an end to man. The dead man does not pass out of existence; he passes into another existence. The popular belief on which the experience of psalmist and the message of prophet worked was that the dead went down into Sheol, not to become extinct there, but to continue in a reduced condition of being. It was the man himself that was conceived to descend to Sheol, and in that under-world he was understood to be still himself. It was not one class of men that went down thither, but all men, rich and poor, good and evil, freeman and slave. All preserved their identity there; no end was set to their existence there. The progress of Divine teaching lay not in the

way of denying the continuance of being which these popular ideas asserted, but in the way of elevating the thought of the existence, attaching moral meaning and colour to it, instructing men that fellowship with God meant a higher being, unveiling the better future, and giving at last the assurance of the resurreetion. But the resurrection was for all Israel, for some to life and for others to shame. Nowhere does the Old Testament declare or suggest that the victory over Sheol, which meant life for the righteous, meant extinction for the unrighteous. Nor does the completer teaching of the New Testament break away in principle from that of the Old Testament. It does not disavow its presuppositions. It does not pronounce the popular faith to have been wrong in its assumption of existence for all men after death. The later revelation pursues the same line as the earlier, completing and confirming it, establishing its doctrine of a resurrection, and enlarging it into the doctrine of a resurrection, not for all Israel, but for all mankind. As little in the New Testament as in the Old is the annihilation of the wicked the correlative of the resurrection of the good.

The doctrine under discussion misunderstands not less fatally the ideas of *life* and *death* on which the Bible proceeds all through. Life is nowhere represented as one and the same thing to man and beast. The Old Testament ascribes a sacredness to life in man which it does not ascribe to life in the beast. It speaks of man as dependent for life on God. But in man's case the dependence is not a merely physical dependence; it is primarily a moral dependence, and

life in man is primarily a moral thing. Nothing that lacks the specific note of God's fellowship and favour is "life" in the Old Testament sense. "Life," therefore, is never identified with mere existence, not even with existence under the conditions of physical well-being and material prosperity. It is the good of existence. And "death" is the opposite of this, not extinction of being, but existence apart from God and His favour, removal from the fellowship of God, as well as from the fellowship of the living on earth. These views of "life" and "death," which are distinctive of the earlier revelation and essential to the understanding of the Old Testament, are not negatived, but reaffirmed and completed in the later revelation. "Life" as the good of being, the content of a moral relation, a condition of existence realised in conscious union with the Divine Fountain of life, and "death" as the opposite of this, are made known in their deepest nature and final meaning in the revelation of God in Christ, and in the New Testament mystery of Christ in man and man in Christ.

Hence the doctrine in question is nowhere weaker than where it is most confident. It entrenches itself in the fact that the Bible uses the terms *death*, *destruction*, *perdition*, and their cognates to describe the fate of the unrighteous. It insists on taking these literally, whether the destiny of the body be in view, or that of the soul, or that of the man. It admits that these terms have secondary senses, that the idea of blessedness is often connoted with the idea of existence in the word "life," and the idea of penalty or misery with that of non-existence in the word "death." But

it asserts that even then the primary meaning is the proper meaning, and it has much to say of the reasonableness of holding by the original sense wherever it is possible. This possibility, however, is the point in question, and the answer is that neither the word "death" and its cognates, nor the word "life" and its cognates, can be confined within the limits of such literalism, except by subjecting them to linguistic thumbscrews. The process followed in this matter by the literalists of the various forms of Annihilationism or Conditionalism, if applied to the teaching of other books, would at once be seen to end in a *reductio ad absurdum.* Under the pressure of their theory men forget that in the history of all words the etymological sense soon ceases to be the actual sense, and that terms used for the expression of mental and spiritual phenomena are first the notes of things sensible. They forget that a new order of thought and faith like Christianity has to fill old words with a new meaning for the expression of new ideas. They forget that the terms must have a sense commensurate with the objects to which they are applied. If they are used of objects whose nature it is to cease to be, they will have the literal sense. But if they are employed of objects whose nature is the opposite, they will have a larger meaning.

In many of the passages which bear most directly on the question, the terms "life," "death," and their cognates are so obviously qualitative and not quantitative terms, that to argue the matter should be superfluous. The connections and contrasts in which they are placed put it beyond question. When the

Book of Daniel says of some that they shall rise to everlasting *life*, and of others that they shall rise to *shame and everlasting contempt*,[1] the antithesis shows at once that *life* is not mere *existence*. When Christ says, "He that heareth My word, and believeth Him that sent Me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgement, but hath passed out of death into life,"[2] the contrast again shows that *life* and *death* are not mere existence and non-existence, but spiritual or essential states. So is it when He sets the "resurrection of life" over against the "resurrection of judgement,"[3] and associates the not *seeing of life* with the *abiding of the wrath of God* on men.[4]

Can it be seriously held that the primary sense of the words, as understood by this school, is in any measure adequate to our Lord's intention when He says to Martha, "He that believeth on Me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth on Me shall never die";[5] when He declares of him "that believeth" that he "hath eternal life," and speaks of Himself as "the living bread," whereof if a man eat he "shall never die";[6] when He announces that if a man keep His word "he shall never see death";[7] when He says of the corn of wheat, that "except it *die*, it abideth alone; but if it *die*, it bringeth forth much fruit";[8] when He defines "life eternal" to be this, "that they should know Thee the only true God, and Him whom Thou didst send, *even* Jesus Christ"?[9] Is it otherwise with similar contrasts and connotations in the

[1] xii. 2. [2] John v. 24, R.V. [3] John v. 29, R.V.
[4] John iii. 36, R.V. [5] John xi. 25, 26, R.V.
[6] John vi. 47, 51, R.V. [7] John viii. 51, R.V. [8] John xii. 24.
[9] John xvii. 3, R.V.

teaching of the apostles, as when John says of the Word that "in Him was life; and the life was the light of men";[1] or speaks of the love of the brethren as the sign that "we have passed out of death into life," so that he who loveth not "abideth in death"?[2] And what is to be made of Paul's idea of "life" and "death" as it appears in his most characteristic and recurrent phrases? There are his great theological terms, *dead* unto sin, *dead* unto the law, *dead* through trespasses and sins, *alive* unto God, and others. There are his great conceptions of a death which means a "life hid with Christ in God"; a moral condition in which one is "dead while she liveth"; a death which is one with the "mind of the flesh," and a life which is one with the "mind of the Spirit"; a "life" which is the correlate of "righteousness." How are these expressions and others of kindred nature to be adjusted to the narrow literalism of the Conditionalists?[3]

The restriction of the sense of "life" and "death" to mere *existence* and *non-existence* is the stronghold of the dogma of Conditional Immortality. But it is the weakest of all defences, and its advocates betray at times an uneasy sense of the fact. They have to admit that in a large number of occurrences, especially in John's writings, the words have the intensive sense. They make a painful effort to neutralise the adverse testimony of the many passages which speak of a *present* life or a *present* death by taking them in a proleptic

[1] John i. 4. [2] 1 John iii. 14, 15, R.V.

[3] Eph. ii. 1–6; Col. ii. 13, iii. 3; 1 Tim. v. 6; Rom. vi. 1–11, 19, vii. 9, viii. 6, 10, etc.

sense. When Paul, for example, describes the woman who lives in pleasure as being "dead while she liveth," he only means, they tell us, that death will one day be the end of her ways. They are met by the fact that the New Testament does not announce the "whole condition and destiny of the good by such terms as happiness, blessedness, felicity." Of this they can only say that it "was enough for Christ to talk about *life*." But if the word "life" is used rather than any other for this purpose, is it not because "life" means more than they allow, so much more that no other word could be so suitable?[1]

As it is with these great terms, so is it with others on which the Annihilationist and the Conditionalist rely. There are the various expressions for *destroying, abolishing*, being *lost, perishing, perdition, destruction*. These represent different originals, φθείρω, ἀπόλλυμι, καταργέομαι, with their cognates. But none of them bear out the Conditionalist contention. The idea conveyed by καταργέομαι is not that of *annihilating* or reducing to non-existence, but that of making *inactive, null and void, inoperative*; as when death is declared to be the last enemy *destroyed* or *abolished*,[2] that is, utterly subdued and rendered inefficient, when Christ has put all enemies under His feet; or as when it is said of Christ that by death He was to *destroy* or *bring to nought* "him that had the power of death, that is, the devil."[3] The terms φθείρω and ἀπόλλυμι also have the sense not only of physical dissolution, but of ruin, the

[1] See Dr. Bartlet's Essay in *The Future Life: a Defence of the Orthodox View, by the most Eminent American Scholars*, p. 2.

[2] Cor. xv. 26. [3] Heb. ii. 14.

being undone, the deprivation of that which makes not mere existence, but well-being, or life in the full sense of the word. So in the Old Testament the people are described as "*destroyed* for lack of knowledge," and Israel is said to have *destroyed* herself.[1] And in the New Testament we have these words applied to objects and persons that certainly *exist* though they are in a state of ruin or loss,—the *lost* sheep, the *lost* coin, the *lost* son, the *lost* soul, and the like. These terms are also to be read in the light of antithetical terms, which show that they express a destruction or ruin consisting in the loss of life worthy of the name; in exclusion from the kingdom of God; in missing salvation, the good of life, the possession of the soul (*περιποίησις τῆς ψυχῆς*).[2] When Paul contrasts the eternal life which God will render to them "that by patience in well-doing seek glory and honour and incorruption" with the "wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish" which are for them "that obey unrighteousness," he gives us to understand with sufficient certainty what he means by the *perishing* of which he proceeds to speak.[3]

But beyond this whole range of things there are declarations which, both in their terms and in the principles underlying them, are in irreconcilable conflict with the Conditionalist doctrine. Of this order are those which speak of an "eternal punishment," of an "eternal sin," of a condition in which one "shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him," of

[1] Hos. iv. 6, xii. 9.

[2] Cf., *e.g.*, Phil. i. 28, iii. 19; 2 Pet. iii. 16; Rev. xiii. 8, 11, xix. 20, etc.

[3] Rom. ii. 7–12.

Judas going to "his own place."[1] How serious a difficulty words like these are felt to be, appears from the way in which they are treated. "I must admit," says one pronounced adherent of the Annihilationist doctrine, speaking of the apocalyptic "lake of fire" and the torment of the beast and the false prophet "day and night for ever and ever," "that *no* amount of manuscript, or other evidence, would suffice to convince me of the genuineness of this text, as it stands at present."[2] Prebendary Row, too, confronted by our Lord's mention of "an eternal sin," ignores the documentary evidence, and suggests that the word *sin* may have been "inadvertently substituted" for another in the apostolic autograph.[3] He feels the solemn announcement, "these shall go away into eternal punishment," so embarrassing that he snatches at the possibility of the original rendering having been "eternal fire." "Inasmuch as the New Testament," he says, "passed through more than fourteen centuries of transcription before it was committed to the safe custody of the printing-press, it is impossible to be certain that an isolated expression was the word actually employed by the sacred writer. It is true that all our existing Greek manuscripts read the word κόλασιν, punishment; but it is a singular fact that the two most ancient, and several more modern manuscripts, of the Italic or ancient Latin version of the New Testament, which dates as early as the second century, and constituted the

[1] Matt. xxv. 46; Mark iii. 29; John iii. 36; Acts i. 25.

[2] Barlow's *Eternal Punishment and Eternal Death*, p. 70, with reference to Rev. xx. 10.

[3] *Future Retribution*, p. 254.

New Testament of the churches which spoke Latin, in place of punishment read 'fire,' *ignis*."[1] Nor is Dr. Edward White entirely superior to the desire to obtain relief from this great difficulty by doubting the text. He admits indeed that there is "absolutely no various reading of any account in the most ancient surviving Greek manuscripts," and for that reason he will "found no argument on conjectural criticism of the text respecting the genuineness of the word *κόλασιν*." But he appends a long note on these manuscripts of the *Italic*, and makes this remarkable statement: "It is seldom right even to hint bad faith in the early copyists, but it is certain that the influence of the ever-growing opinion of eternal suffering would unconsciously operate on all copyists to aggravate Scripture language whenever it was possible to do so."[2]

But apart from the argument from particular terms and texts, the doctrine in question is burdened with many difficulties. It divides mankind into two distinct orders of beings, differing not merely in character but in constitution. It makes the regenerate man a new creature, not in the sense merely of a holy or renewed man, but in the sense of a different species of creature in the essential elements of his being. It assumes that it is the tendency of evil natures to wear themselves out and at last cease to be. But does experience favour the idea that the result of evil passion is the waste of the passion or the extinction of the evil, passionate self? Is sin a physical thing, a poisonous virus affecting the soul as disease affects the body? Persistent indulgence in sin certainly deadens feeling and

[1] *Future Retribution*, p. 268. [2] *Life in Christ*, 2nd ed. pp. 427–429.

weakens the will. But in deadening the moral feeling, does it also deaden the immoral impulses? In making the will feeble in the choice of good, does it render it inoperative also in the choice of evil? Do pride, hatred, envy, wrath tend to become extinct as they have the rein given them. If it is the nature of sin and passion to waste and wear out, what is it that they do waste and wear out? Is it the evil will, the evil affection, the evil consciousness? These make up the evil self or the evil nature. But have we reason to suppose that these tend to obliteration under pressure of indulgence? In the present life at least the evil habit, the evil desire, the evil self do not tend to extinction as they are the more indulged.

The Conditionalist doctrine involves conceptions both of man's nature and of Christ's work which are inadequate and unreasonable. Its idea of man is singularly poor. How inglorious it is appears from the analogies used to explain the extinction to which it dooms him. As water is compounded of oxygen and hydrogen, it is argued, and the separation of the two elements means that the water ceases to be, so man is a compound of body and soul, and the disjunction of these constituents means that the man ceases to be. And how inconsistent all this is! For what manner of being is man on this theory? A creature with a constitution capable not only of change, but of a complete reversal of its conditions, as deficient of life as the brutes, perishable in soul as in body, and yet possessed of the sovereignty of freedom of will, animal and inherently mortal, yet conscious, moral, responsible. And on this theory how much is left in vagueness or confusion! What place is

preserved for the continuance of man's personality? What becomes of his identity? At death man is at end. He disappears and ceases to be as completely as water is at end when the oxygen and hydrogen which make it are separated. But *something* is supposed to remain in order that man may be judged. What is this something that remains of man? In the analogy the *elements* of the water remain, but only these. The water exists no more. When man dies the constituents of his being exist apart each in its own separate nature, but the man himself no longer exists. How is the personal identity preserved in the interval, and where is the assurance that it is the same self that is seen in the resurrection, that it is the self who sinned here that is judged hereafter?

Not less unsatisfactory and incongruous is the aspect given to Christ's work. How is the Incarnation to be attuned to a human nature set on so low a plane. It is natural to ask, as it has been asked, whether it is reasonable to suppose that the Divine could have entered into union with a nature of this measure, incapable even of continuous existence, except by the introduction of an element constitutionally strange to it. How could the Son of God have identified Himself with a creature of this rank, and suffered for him in order to impart to him the foreign constituent of immortality? The whole conception of redemption which lies at the heart of this doctrine seems essentially faulty and mistaken. It attributes to grace an efficiency which is essentially physical. It makes the primary object of Christ's mission to be to change the structure of man, and immortalise the inherently perish-

able. It involves at the same time an undue draft on the supernatural. It reduces man, so that he is left incapable of immortality save by a special Divine intervention. The existence which he now possesses, and the existence which may be perpetuated to him, can be his only contrary to nature. They come to him only by the supernatural means of the Incarnation and the Spirit.

As it is usually expounded, this doctrine further assumes an aspect of the terrible and the unreasonable which is altogether its own. If man is not inherently immortal, why should the sinful man subsist at all after death? If all the constituents of his being are equally perishable, why should there be a separate state for his soul or for any undefined something of him? If the doom of extinction is the natural and inevitable doom of the unrighteous, why should they not sink at once into death, into the nothingness which is their proper destiny? Dr. Edward White and his followers tell us that both reason and Scripture speak so certainly to the fact of a future judgment and a Divine retribution for all men, that the unrighteous must be supposed to survive for a time and be raised to receive the verdict of the great Arbiter on their deeds. Here is the terror of the doctrine. Here, too, its awful and appalling incongruity. If beings who are inherently mortal are thus made to survive for a time contrary to their nature, that they may be raised and judged, it is because a plan of redemption has intervened which puts the gift of immortality within their reach, bringing with it also new responsibilities and new penalties. Hence the

misery of the condemned, their enhanced though measured penalty, is referred direct to the mediation of Christ. He becomes on this theory its very Author. Had there been no Incarnation, sinful men, after a brief life of limited responsibility here, would have passed at once into the non-existence which is of their nature. But now that God's love has spoken and Christ has come, the souls of sinful men are made to survive by a special exercise of the Divine power, and this not with a view to their reformation, but simply that they may bear a certain punishment, and then sink into their native nothingness. The justice of God is supposed in this way to be honoured. But is it so clear that this is the case? If the sin which is done on earth is bounded by the earthly existence, would not the dissolution which ends that existence seem a sufficient penalty? And if the sin which is done on earth passes beyond earth, at what period should the penalty righteously cease? Does not the sin of which man is guilty here belong to the sinful subject? Does it not pass with him into the after-existence, and continue with him as long as he continues to be? If it does not so continue, the sin is conquered, and the demand of righteousness would be freedom from penalty, not the second death. If it does so continue, how can it be consistent with the Divine justice to suspend penalty at any point in the after-existence any more than to suspend it in the present life? And where is the equity of the retributive action of God on this theory? There are all possible differences of degree in the demerit of sins. But on this view all sinners have, besides the earthly

retribution of sin, the same penalty of perpetuated existence between death and the judgment, and all at last have one common doom of extinction, a doom with no differing measures, meted out to them.

With all the improbabilities and incongruities which are peculiar to itself, with its poor estimate of man and its awful view of the relation of the Redeemer to the penal suffering of the sinner, it fails utterly in the relief which it professes to give. The issue of things which it presents is not one worthier of God or more satisfactory to reason than the competing doctrines offer. It does not even touch the real heart of the problem. It has nothing to allege against the retributive action of God and the continuance of sin and penalty hereafter, which may not be equally well alleged against the existence of sin and penalty here. In the days when his mind was grappling with the great questions of human destiny, the late Mr. Froude said some strong things on this subject, the logic of which he seemed not to see. "I believe," he wrote in one of the remarkable letters in his *Nemesis of Faith*,[1] "that fallen creatures perish, perish for ever; for only good can live, and good has not been theirs. But how durst we forge our Saviour's words 'eternal *death*' into so horrible a meaning?" The idea that penalty should *last* was so repugnant that annihilation must be the end, and Christ's words, he thought, could only be *forged* into any other meaning. But he had previously written this sentence: "Alas! then, if Omnipotence could not bring but wild grapes there, why was the poor vineyard planted?" That is

[1] P. 16.

the question of questions. Sin and sinners are here. Their *existence* is the real problem, a far greater problem than their *continuance*, and one which is left untouched. All that Conditionalism says in favour of the annihilation of the wicked may be said with greater justice in favour of their never having been brought into being.

It does not meet the immediate difficulty, not to speak of the further mystery which is left under all theories. It means that in some cases the victory of sin over man and God is so absolute that nothing remains for God but to get rid of it by a *coup de main*. It has been characterised as the "most wretched and cowardly of all theories"—a theory which surrenders man's true nobility "in panic at an objection, and like all cowardice fails in securing its object."[1] The judgment is strong, but not without its justification. Surely it is more reasonable, more scriptural, more reverent, either to hope that God will find some better way of using sinful souls than to extinguish them, or else to believe that man is so great a work of God, a being endowed with capacities so vast, that no limit can be put to the possibilities of his resistance of the Divine will, and, therefore, none to the continuance of the penalties of resistance.

[1] Quarry, *Donellan Lectures*, p. 31.

CHAPTER III

RESTORATIONISM AND ALLIED DOCTRINES

THE dogma of Annihilation or Conditional Immortality is an artificial and makeshift answer to the questions of the end, which is not likely to commend itself permanently to many minds. Neither in the court of reason, nor in the sanctuary of feeling, can it compete with another theory, which resolves the moral problems of life in a final unity consistent at least with the triumph of a Divine plan and the victory of the Divine Love. This is the theory of Universalism or Restorationism, the dreamland, the enchanted land of theology, "the cloudland looming with rose-tinted peaks in the far 'æonian' future."[1] It takes us back to the third century. But it has never been more than the fond speculation of individual thinkers, some of them, however, of great importance. It has been ascribed to Clement of Alexandria. But he does not express himself clearly on the subject; neither does he seem to be quite consistent. He speaks strongly of the *corrective* purpose of punishment, the perfect love of God, which is clear of all hate, and the power of moral freedom, which he would not deny even to Satan. He thinks that if there be many ways of

[1] *British Quarterly Review*, July 1878, p. 135.

repentance and purification in this world, there may be such also in the other world. He is supposed therefore to favour the idea of a probation extending into the other life, to which he would assign no limit; and his doctrine of the disciplinary purpose of all punishment would point to a final recovery of all. But, on the other hand, he speaks of an "unavailing remorse with punishment" in the other world; and a fragment preserved from a lost work on the *Soul* runs thus: "Immortal are all souls, even those of the wicked, for whom it had been better not to have been incorruptible; for, punished by a limitless infliction of unquenchable fire, and dying not, they obtain no end of their misery." [1]

But with Origen it is different. He taught in distinct terms the possible restoration of every rational creature. His doctrines of God, punishment, and free will led to this. He did not recognise in God any properly punitive justice. He held all punishment to be remedial, and freedom of will to be an inalienable possession which made it possible for every rational being, Satan and demons not excluded, at any time to change themselves and turn to God. His doctrine of the consummation of things was mixed up, however, with certain peculiar speculations, on the pre-existence of souls, the baptism of fire in the other world, the ministry of spirits in the after-life, and the persistence of something in all rational beings, even in wicked spirits, that is superior to evil. His idea of liberty of will was so abstract and absolute that it

[1] Neander, *History of Christian Dogmas*, p. 254, Bohn's trans. Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 153, 154.

appeared to provide no place for a final, fixed determination to good, but left it always possible for the righteous even in the world of blessedness to choose evil. Hence his theory is to be taken "not as the theory of a universal, *irreversible* restoration, but the theory of a universal restoration which is probably to be followed by new falls and new restorations." [1]

Towards the end of the fourth century Origen's doctrine was repeated by Gregory of Nyssa, in whose hands it also received a simpler, completer, and more positive form. While he affirmed the ultimate abolition of evil and the restoration of all beings endowed with reason, and held this to be necessary in order that God might be "all in all," he seems not to have committed himself to any idea of free will which would involve the probability of future falls on the part of the recovered.[2] Similar views appear in some measure in the writings of Didymus of Alexandria, Diodorus of Tarsus, and Theodore of Mopsuestia, and less distinctly in those of Gregory of Nazianzum, and other less known theologians of the Eastern Church. But although Augustine refers to some who held the Restorationist doctrine in his day, no prominent divine of the Western Church (not even Ambrose, who has been misinterpreted in this matter) seems to have accepted it.

Nor do we come across any certain traces of it again till we reach Bar Sudaili in the sixth century, and more particularly John Scotus Erigena in the

[1] See, *e.g.*, *De Princip.* i. p. 6; and Sheldon, *History of Christian Doctrine*, i. pp. 154, 155.

[2] See especially his *Sermo Catecheticus Magnus*, c. 8 and 35.

ninth. Even in Erigena's case it was not unqualified. He came to it by the way of his doctrine of Predestination, affirming that there is only a predestination of good, and neither a foreordination nor even a prescience of evil. He connected it also with the theory that evil has no substantive existence, but is simply a deception of the individual will. He taught that only the Divine goodness is eternal and infinite; that only *well*-being has *real* being; and that by slow stages of remedial punishment, sinful men and evil spirits shall all be brought at last to the goal of resumption into the infinite essence of God. But he also held that while all wickedness shall finally disappear, the imaginations of wickedness may remain for ever. "It is one thing," he said, "that all wickedness generally in all human nature should be thoroughly abolished; it is another thing that its fantasies (*φαντασίας*), in the consciences of those whom it has vitiated in this life, should always be preserved, and in this way always punished."[1] This is taken to mean that he made future punishment consist in "the disturbing fantasies of objects or ends which the worldly have illicitly pursued in this life, and for the acquisition of which the future life offers no opportunity."[2] He seems indeed to have held in some way both the ordinary view of the eternity of future punishments and a particular form of Restorationism.

Neither in the Middle Ages nor in the century of the Reformation did the idea of a universal restoration

[1] *De Divis. Nat.* v. 31. See Sheldon, *ut sup.* i. p. 408, and Neander, *ut sup.* pp. 453, 454.

[2] Sheldon, *ut sup.* i. p. 408.

take any large place in religious thought. In the thirteenth century the Brethren of the Free Spirit naturally made it part of their pantheistic scheme of theology. But mediæval eschatology, as a whole, retained the severe and terrible aspect in which it appears in Dante. In the sixteenth century the dogma was preached in a very extreme form by John Denk and other Anabaptists; and at a later date it was elaborately expounded by Johann Wilhelm Petersen in connection with his millenarian ideas. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it found some able advocates in South Germany, of whom the most important were the Würtemburg pietist and theosophist, F. C. Oetinger, and the devout and scholarly Bengel. Among the English theologians of these centuries there were also some who wrote in favour of it or exhibited leanings to it. Peter Sterry and Jeremiah White, both of Cambridge, Bishop Newton of Bristol, and William Law were of these, and in less pronounced or less consistent terms, Thomas Burnet, Whichcote, Cudworth, Henry More, Jeremy Taylor, Tillotson, Barrow, and others.[1]

But in our own century it has again risen into prominence, and has obtained the adhesion of some eminent names. It had an attraction for Olshausen, to whom we owe so much for the revival of scientific exegisis. He felt it, however, to be so far from clearly taught in the New Testament that he questioned the propriety of making it the subject of public instruction. In America it had obtained some footing towards the end of last century, under the

[1] See Plumptre's *The Spirits in Prison*, pp. 193–204.

influence of John Murray, who taught it in the form of a doctrine of terminable punishment; and in the beginning of the present century it received a great impetus from Hosea Ballou, since whose time a large Universalist Church has sprung up. It has been held, mainly on broad, general grounds, by many modern Unitarians. James Freeman Clarke, for example, puts it so: "The power of the human will to resist God is indeed indefinite, but the power of love is infinite. Sooner or later, then, in the economy of the ages, all sinners must come back in penitence and shame to their Father's house."[1] Schleiermacher lent it the weight of his great name, to the extent at least of deeming it probable that all shall ultimately be restored. He based his opinion partly on the word of Scripture, especially on Paul's statements regarding the end, the subjugation of all things, and the delivering up of the kingdom; but more on psychological and moral considerations. He urged the difficulty of supposing an activity of conscience to continue which should be always and altogether without moral effect; the kindred difficulty of imagining the condemned to be capable of conceiving the blessedness of the redeemed and for ever incapable of entering into it; and the further difficulty of understanding how the righteous in heaven can think of any of their fellowmen as involved in hopeless doom, and retain their own felicity undisturbed.

In our own country the Restorationist doctrine has found strenuous advocates in the late Dr. Samuel Cox, Professor S. B. Mayor, Mr. Andrew Jukes, and others.

[1] See his *Orthodoxy; its Truths and its Errors*, chap. xiv.

It appears in different forms in these men's writings. Dr. Cox, for example, found in the New Testament an "under-current of deeper teaching . . . which points to the ultimate recovery of all souls." He made his argument "spring from the conviction that the Son of God must 'see of the travail of His soul and be satisfied'; and that He who came to seek and save the lost cannot be 'satisfied' until He has recovered every lost soul wandering in the wilderness of disobedience to His will, or wrapt in dark mists of ignorance and unbelief which prevent it from seeing what that will is." He thought that the very extent and guilt of our sin only "magnify the redemption which embraces the whole race, atones for every sin, and transforms the very punishments which wait on sin into a saving discipline by which the power of sin is for ever broken and overcome." He asked whether it may not be that "the very pains of hell will prove to be the fire by which men must be 'salted,' *i.e.* recovered from corruption to incorruption, turned from death to life, delivered from the power of Satan into the saving and recreating hands of God." [1]

Mr. Jukes connects the doctrine with a peculiar theory of his own, which he states thus: "The truth which solves the riddle is to be found in those same Scriptures which seem to raise the difficulty, and lies in the mystery of the will of our ever blessed God as to the process and stages of redemption: (1) First, His will by some to bless and save others; by a first-born seed, 'the first-born from the dead,' to save and bless the later born; (2) His will therefore to work out the

[1] *Salvator Mundi*, 12th ed. pp. 229, 244.

redemption of the lost by successive ages or dispensations, or, to use the language of St. Paul, 'according to the purpose of the ages'; and lastly, His will (thus meeting the nature of our fall) to make death, judgment, and destruction the means and way to life, acquittal, and salvation."[1] The "elect" therefore are instruments for the salvation of others; the whole creation is to be saved by Christ and His Church; and the "ages" of which the New Testament speaks, are the periods, the "æonial times," during which God works towards His own rest and the complete remedy of all that resulted from the fall.

Others, like Frederick Denison Maurice and Dean Farrar, cling to the hope, while they refuse to commit themselves to any dogmatic statement. Maurice himself neither disallowed the retributive character of the Divine punishments, though he strongly affirmed their reformatory purpose, nor allowed himself to be classed with Universalists. But he affirmed at the same time that God might use His penalties "at any time or anywhere for the reformation of His creatures," and that it was possible for souls suffering the Divine punishment in the other world to turn to God.[2] Dean Farrar, not denying that men may harden themselves against all repentance, and, therefore, not denying the eternity of punishment, expresses, nevertheless, his belief that "in the depths of the Divine compassion there may be opportunity to win faith in the future state," and that God's mercy "may reach many who, to all earthly appearance, might seem to us to die in a lost and

[1] *The Restitution of all Things*, 13th ed. pp. 28, 57, etc.
[2] See his *Life*, ii. p. 18.

unregenerate state."[1] A remarkable letter on the *Final Salvation of All* shows how Thomas Erskine of Linlathen came to be in sympathy with the Restorationist doctrine. Reasoning from the revelation of the Fatherhood of God, he concluded that man was made not to be on probation, but to be under education; and this education, he thought, cannot terminate with the present life, but must continue until each individual human being fills the "particular place in the great body of Jesus Christ" for which he was created. "I cannot believe," he wrote, "that any human being can be beyond the reach of God's grace and the sanctifying power of His Spirit. And if all are within His reach, is it possible to suppose that He will allow any to remain unsanctified? Is not the love revealed in Jesus Christ a love unlimited, unbounded, which will not leave undone anything which love could desire?"[2]

There are others whose answer to these questions is that both the Restorationist doctrine and its opposite appear in Scripture. This answer is given in two ways. Some say that there is a progress of doctrine on the subject of the final issues in the New Testament. They think that in the earlier Pauline Epistles, those to the Thessalonians, there is a simpler and more Jewish view of the future, in the form of a rapture of the saints into final fellowship with Christ, and an everlasting destruction of those who obey not His gospel; but that in the later Epistles we get the more developed doctrine of a perfected kingdom of God upon earth

[1] *Mercy and Judgment*, pp. 1, 483.
[2] *Letters of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen*, pp. 237–244.

and an ultimate restitution of all. Neander among others held that it might have been with Paul on the subject of the final issues as it was with Peter on the question of the position of the Gentiles; that he might have had an enlargement of illumination by the Holy Spirit, carrying him beyond his earlier understanding and opening up to him "in the last stage of his Christian development" the "magnificent prospect . . . of the final triumph of the work of redemption." And the "doctrine of such a universal restitution," he adds, "would not stand in contradiction to the doctrine of eternal punishment, as it appears in the Gospels; for although those who are hardened in wickedness, left to the consequences of their conduct, their merited fate, have to expect endless unhappiness, yet a secret decree of the Divine compassion is not necessarily excluded, by virtue of which, through the wisdom of God revealing itself in the discipline of free agents, they will be led to a free appropriation of redemption."[1]

There are some again, and they are a growing number, who find two distinct trains of teaching in Scripture, one in the direction of universal salvation and another in that of eternal retribution, and regard them as belonging, like the twofold assertion of the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man, to the *antinomies* of Scripture, the apparent contradictions which are due to the inability of our limited faculties to reach the higher unity. Thus Bishop Martensen finds certain passages of the New Testament, 1 Cor. xv. 22, 25–28, Eph. i. 10, and others, which seem to contain the idea of a final restoration of all. He finds

[1] *History of the Planting of Christianity*, ii. p. 531, Bohn's trans.

others—those in particular which speak of the everlasting fire, the worm that never dieth and the fire that is not quenched, the sin unto death, the sin that shall never be forgiven—which when taken by themselves appear to him certainly to teach eternal punishment. There is, therefore, an antinomy, he thinks, in the New Testament. And there is the same antinomy in reason. For on the one hand the teleology of the Divine love suggests the idea of restoration; while, on the other hand, anthropological, psychological, ethical considerations, the facts of life and the liberty of man, point with equal force to "the dark goal of eternal damnation." The theological idea leads to Restorationism, and that view was most congenial to the Eastern Church. The anthropological idea leads to the opposite doctrine, and that has been most congruous to the Western Church. We cannot see the point of harmony. But each side of the contrast "finds a point of correspondence answering thereto in the Christian consciousness," and the word of God cannot contradict itself. There must be a solution "in the depth of God's word," and if it is not given us now "while we are still in the stream of time and in the course of development," we should "recognise Divine wisdom in the fact."[1]

Thus the doctrine of a Universal Restoration is again proclaimed with great urgency by thinkers of different schools. The heart cries out for it, and longs to make the word of God, the experience of life, and the deep things of reason and the moral nature confirm it. The propension to find in it, not a cloud castle, but the sure fortress of our hope, is so

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 474-484, Clark's trans.

natural and so constraining, that it becomes all the more necessary to look narrowly at the foundations on which it rests. Its strength is understood to lie more in certain broad theological ideas, and in the inferences of the moral consciousness, than in the definite teaching of Scripture. But it makes use of all these witnesses, and it is with the last of the three that we are more immediately concerned.

As regards the argument from Scripture, it is difficult to conceal its weakness and uncertainty. So much is this the case that even those who fall back upon the idea of an antinomy or difficulty of thought which cannot be solved, and was not meant to be solved, by our present faculties, practically make very little of the Biblical proof. This is the position to which Bishop Martensen finally comes. And it is significant. "We teach with Lutheranism," he says, "an ἀποκατάστασις, *a parte ante*, *i.e.* the universal purpose of God for the salvation of all; but as we hold that this purpose is conditioned by the free will of man and its development in time, we can teach an ἀποκάτασταsις, *a parte post*, only so far as is compatible with the doctrine of the *possibility* of eternal condemnation."[1] The Biblical argument includes two things — the force of certain special announcements made by the New Testament on the subject, and the conclusions suggested by the general scope of its teaching. Of the two the latter is more relied on than the former.

There are certain words of Christ which the advocates of the Restorationist doctrine struggle

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, *ut sup.* p. 483.

hard to bring within the sweep of their argument. They are such as those which speak of the "many stripes" and the "few stripes" with which different offenders shall be beaten; the sin that shall not be forgiven, "neither in this world nor in that which is to come"; and the "last farthing" which must be paid before the man can come out of prison. But it is not pretended that these words can be made to express more, even under the most strained interpretation, than the idea of a terminable penalty, and it is only by a *tour de force* that they can be driven even that length. The first is irrelevant, dealing as it does with the *degree* of penalty, not with its duration, and far less with the possibility of all penalty working itself out finally in the recovery of all perverse wills. The others are in reality exclusive declarations, the very point of which is the awful moment of this life, the finality of the destiny which it shapes for us.[1]

The positive proofs drawn from the New Testament, however, in support of the Restorationist doctrine are mainly those which follow. There are *first* certain words of Christ which have an obviously universal reference of some kind. Above most of this class our Lord's declaration on the occasion of the visit of the Greeks is appealed to with a curious confidence. This saying, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me," is one of the plainest of His words. Yet it receives the strangest treatment. Notwithstanding the analogous statement on the Son of Man being lifted up as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness;[2] notwithstanding, too, the explana-

[1] See above, pp. 377–383. [2] John iii.

tion, "This He said signifying what death He should die," expressly attached to the saying, there are some who, wiser than the evangelist, tell us that it refers to Christ's exaltation. And there are others who, disregarding the nature of the principal term and the scope of the context in which all is set, tell us that Christ gives here the assurance of a universal salvation. But the universality of the saying is limited by the general New Testament doctrine that the actual effects of Christ's work are conditioned by the spiritual attitudes of men. It is limited by the occasion, which suggests a ministry confined no more to the Jews, but extending to all without distinction of nationality. For this visit of the Greeks, the first-fruits of a mighty harvest, opened up to our Lord's view the destined turning of the Gentile world to Himself. And there is the further limitation which lies in the nature of the action here ascribed to Himself by Christ. It is a *drawing*, not necessarily a *bringing in*, not an irresistible attraction. The words, in short, mean that by His death upon the cross He will exert over Jew and Gentile alike an influence which will draw men to Him and, so far as men yield to it, will gather them within His kingdom.

There are, in the *second* place, certain statements in the Epistles which are thought to have the same universal extension. One of these is the representation given of God our Saviour, "who willeth that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth";[1] where, however, nothing more is in view than the fact that the redeeming purpose of God applies to all. Nothing is said of the extent to which it will

[1] 1 Tim. ii. 4.

be acquiesced in by men. The same is the case with another of the general declarations which are given in the Pastoral Epistles—"the grace of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men."[1] Nor is it different with a third saying of the same kind—"the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe";[2] where the idea is that God's purpose and desire are that all men should be saved, while it is in them that believe that the purpose and desire come to actual effect.[3]

Our Lord's mention of a future "regeneration"[4] and Peter's reference to the "times of the restitution of all things"[5] are also interpreted in the same interest. But the "regeneration" of which Christ spoke was the renovation promised by the prophets, the restoration of the world to its original perfection; and the "restitution" to which Peter pointed his Jewish brethren was, as we have seen, either this final renewal of earth, or the conversion of Israel which was to prepare for the consummation of the kingdom of God.

The stress of the argument from particular statements of the New Testament, however, is made to rest rather on the cluster of Pauline passages which run in the largest and most universal terms. These have been considered at length, and have been found

[1] Tit. ii. 10. [2] 1 Tim. iv. 10.

[3] The idea in the first clause is like that in ii. 4; "facultativ zu erklären, nach ii. 4" (Von Soden, *Handcommentar*, *in loc.*). The μάλισα "gives suitable expression," says Huther, "to the thought that God is, and continues to be, the σωτήρ for all, whether they desire the σωτηρία or not; but in the proper and special sense the σωτηρία is only for believers who really desire it" (*Commentary*, *in loc.*). Alford takes it as an argument from the greater to the less—"if God be thus willing for all to be saved, how much more shall He save them that put their trust in Him."

[4] Matt. xix. 28. [5] Acts iii. 21.

to be of another tenor. When Paul speaks of *all* being made alive in Christ,[1] the course of his argument, which concerns the resurrection of the righteous, and the context, which defines the persons in view as those who "are Christ's at His coming," have satisfied most interpreters, even those predisposed to think differently,[2] that the passage has nothing more within its scope than the destiny of the Christian. Even those who insist that the "all" who shall be "made alive" must be coextensive with the "all" who "die," acknowledge that the statement does not go beyond the idea of a universal bodily resurrection.[3] When Paul speaks, again, of the subduing of all things under Christ's feet, and the delivering up of the kingdom that God may be "all in all,"[4] he looks not to the ultimate restoration of all men in penitence and love, but to the completion of the purpose for which the kingdom was committed to the Son by the Father, in the subjugation of all hostile powers, and the confession of the absolute sovereignty of God. The subjects to be subdued are not specifically men alienated from God and brought back to Him in penitence, but all powers and influences opposed to God; and their future is neither loyal acquiescence nor annihilation, but reduction to the condition of non-efficiency. The issue of the Son's mediatorial administration is to be the presentation of a kingdom in which all opposition shall become null, and God Himself shall be universally recognised as sole and absolute Sovereign.[5]

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 22.
[2] *E.g.* Neander.
[3] *E.g.* Meyer.
[4] 1 Cor. xv. 24–28.
[5] "A bringing back of the world of spirits hostile to God . . . is as far away from the Biblical view as is also a need of redemption on the part of

There remain those remarkable passages which speak of "*things* in heaven, and *things* in earth, and *things* under the earth" bowing the knee "in the name of Jesus"; of the purpose of God to "gather together," or "sum up," all things in Christ; and of the pleasure of the Father by Him "to reconcile all things unto Himself."[1] But the first of these passages declares the homage which all creation shall yet render to the exalted Christ. The other two express, each in its own way, the one in terms of a *heading up* or *recapitulation*, the other in terms of a *reconciliation*, the same truth that through Christ, who is the bond of unity and the reconciling principle, all nature, the whole system of things as affected by man's fall, is destined to be brought back to its normal condition, re-established in its primal harmony and beauty. What gives these passages their singular magnificence and unique interest is the fact that they are disclosures of the cosmic relations and effects of Christ's work. But the idea of bringing back all rebellious beings, men and demons, in loyalty and love to God, is neither in these passages nor in the Pauline thought generally. Nothing short of the most strained ingenuity, careless of the whole sweep of Paul's doctrine, can make him speak with the voice of the modern Universalist. The best theologians of all schools give up the attempt. They admit that the Pauline doctrine

the angel world, and, therefore, the author felt no need to guard his expressions against either of these thoughts. . . . Enough that they by their subjection to Christ are stripped of any power which can hurt the absolute dominion of Christ" (Weiss, *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, ii. p. 137; Clark's trans.).

[1] Phil. ii. 10, 11; Eph. i. 10; Col. i. 20.

of predestination, if nothing else, forbids it. Interpreters like Meyer confess that any seeming Universalism in the Pauline writings leaves "the constant teaching of the New Testament concerning everlasting perdition entirely untouched."[1] Many of those to whom neither the words of the apostles nor those of Christ Himself are authoritative, and whose sympathies are with other views of man's future, recognise that the New Testament is not on the side of a certain recovery of all souls.

Hence serious and intelligent adherents of the Restorationist doctrine look rather to broader lines of proof in moral considerations and in the general message of the New Testament. Many build largely on the unexpressed possibilities of the mysterious space between death and the judgment. The doctrine of the Intermediate State is spoken of as one of the forgotten doctrines of Christianity, which it has been given to our time to recover. A breadth and a certainty of meaning far beyond what can be claimed for them are given to the few passages of the New Testament which bear upon that state. Large speculations are hazarded on what takes place within it. Processes of grace are supposed to be active in it; equivalents to the earthly ministry and Church are imagined to exist within it; and these are thought by different theorists to work to different results. Some are content to say that opportunity will be given there to those who had it not on earth or had it in insufficient measure. Others extend the probation and the grace of the Intermediate State to all souls. Some speak simply of the possibility

[1] *Commentary on Ephesians and Philemon*, p. 54; Clark's trans.

that many who knew not God's love in Christ on earth may come to know Him and have forgiveness and life through Him there. Others contend with greater confidence that God's love and Christ's grace must continue to follow men after death until the most hardened are won back.

But we have already seen how little of a doctrine of the Intermediate State is given either in Christ's words or in those of the apostles; how disputable the import of the two Petrine passages from which so much is inferred; how precarious the foundation furnished by certain confessed obscurities of Revelation for a structure of doctrine of far-reaching moment, and out of obvious relation to the general teaching of Scripture. The New Testament says little of the circumstances of disembodied souls. Theologians of one school have wrung from its few simple statements some dubious support for theories of after-death repentance. Theologians of another school have drawn from them inferences of large consequence regarding the existence, the unconscious, dream-like existence, that is reserved for souls. But with small warrant in either case. The New Testament speaks of the condition of the righteous dead under the figure of *sleep*, but in a way that suggests only the simplest of ideas, those of *rest* and *awakening*. Its apocalyptic pictures represent the dead who die in the Lord both as resting from their labours and as in active service. But its general habit is to pass over the interval between death and resurrection or judgment; and when it speaks more definitely of the righteous dead it does so in terms implying an immediate entrance

into the Divine fellowship and the Divine glory.[1] On the condition of the impenitent dead it maintains a still greater reserve. Not even in the case of Christ's great Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus is that reserve broken. Hades is indeed the subject of that parable, and the veil is lifted for the moment from the hidden abode of souls. It is not, however, to reveal its secrets, but to give point to the proper lesson of the discourse by showing how the penalties of a selfish life and wasted opportunity pursue one beyond death.

Conscious, therefore, that a better basis must be found for their doctrine than is furnished either by the particular averments of Scripture, or by inferences drawn from the untold possibilities of the Intermediate State, the advocates of Restorationism make their final and most confident appeal to the broader teaching of the New Testament and the distinctive message of the gospel. They urge that the God who is made known to us in Christ is a philanthropic God,[2] a God of essential love; that the message of the gospel is a message of grace and mercy for all; that the Divine Fatherhood is the very heart of Christ's revelation of God. They bid us think how inconceivable it is that the Divine Father should turn away finally from any of His children, that the strivings of the Divine Spirit should for ever be ineffectual, and the Divine will be defeated at last by any hard or perverse soul. They say much, and it is impossible for them to say too much, of those words of Christ which assure us that it is not the will of our Father in heaven that one of His little ones should perish, and of those parables of Christ which

[1] Luke xxiii. 43; 2 Cor. v. 8; Phil i. 23. [2] Tit. iii. 5.

reveal to us a heavenly love that cannot tarry till the one coin missing from the ten is found, the one sheep recovered that is needed to complete the hundred. Is it not meant, we are asked, that this Divine love can never cease to follow us? And can it follow us for ever and never obtain its victory? Can it be thought to come to nought at last with any?

The answers which these questions expect might be given, but for two things. One is the majesty of love. Love is imperial in its claim. In all love there is a fire, and the Divine love is a just, holy, absolute love. A God incapable of the energy of wrath were a God incapable of the sovereignty of love. The other is the nature of the human subject — the limitless potentialities of mind and will in a being made in God's image. These make that possible which such questions are meant to negative. The awe of Christ's words and the urgency of all the appeals of His gospel to men lie precisely in this possibility that a love so absolute in its claims, so patient in its endeavours, so boundless in its resources, may be withstood to the end.

In the positive proof which it presents from Scripture the Restorationist doctrine is weak at every point. It is equally weak in its answer to the many things which gainsay it. It has to change the *primâ facie* aspect which the New Testament presents, and persuade us that the impression which its teaching as a whole naturally makes upon us is not the impression which it is meant to make. It has to remove out of the way some of the most solemn declarations and most characteristic terms of the New Testament. The task is too much for it. Men like Theodore Parker,

who reject the view of man's future which these declarations and terms convey, have seen, nevertheless, that it is in the New Testament, and cannot be eliminated from it.

Among other intractable terms the word "eternal," which is applied both in gospel and in epistle to the future of the impenitent, has to be relieved of its obvious meaning. But it cannot be thus disposed of. The New Testament *αἰώνιος* and its cognate forms are ordinarily used to convey the idea of the *permanent* and *changeless*. They are found in relations in which other terms, strongly and unquestionably expressive of perpetuity, are elsewhere used.[1] They are placed in direct antithesis to terms which denote the *temporal*.[2] They occur, in short, so frequently in connections which at once suggest the idea of the *lasting*, or make that sense more certain by explanation or by contrast with the *transitory*, that we should require overwhelming reason for dealing in any exceptional way with the particular series of passages in which the terms are applied to the destiny of the wicked. These passages are remarkable for their solemnity, their precision, and their variety. In one it is the *fire* that is described as "eternal," in another the "punishment," in a third the "destruction," in a fourth the "sin."[3] In none is there any qualification of the language or any hint of a modified sense. The terms which are regularly chosen to express the perpetuity or immortality belonging to God and to divine things,

[1] Compare, *e.g.*, the *αἰώνιος* in 2 Cor. v. 1 with the *ἄφθάρτος* in 1 Pet. i. 23 and the *ἀκατάλυτος* in Heb. vii. 16.

[2] *E.g.* 2 Cor. iv. 18.

[3] Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41; 2 Thess. i. 9; Mark iii. 29.

to His glory, His kingdom, His Son, His Spirit, and the permanence of the blessedness He assures to His servants, are also the terms which are selected to describe the final lot of the impenitent. Is it reasonable to say that the language which conveys the ideas of the changeless and lasting in the former and most numerous class of occurrences, expresses something essentially different in the latter and smaller class?

Behind the New Testament words, however, there are certain Old Testament terms. The Hebrew Scriptures have a remarkable variety of expressions for indefinite or unlimited duration, of which the most important is the familiar עוֹלָם, a word of extremely frequent occurrence and well-understood meaning. That it denotes *duration* admits of no question. It is not even pretended that out of its four or five hundred occurrences in the Old Testament there are more than a passage or two[1] in which this is not its idea. It is often used indeed, as is the way with other terms, in a modified sense where the duration in view may be said to be indefinite rather than perpetual.[2] But there is a large number of occurrences in which there can be no question that it has the proper sense of the *changeless* or *everlasting*. It is a solemn designation of God, His life, his dominion, His prerogative.[3] It is the note of a doom that is fixed and irreversible, as in the "*everlasting* contempt" of which Daniel speaks.[4] In

[1] Ps. lxxiii. 12; Eccles. iii. 11.

[2] *E.g.* in the phrases "days of old," "days of ancient time," etc.; in the case of the "priesthood of Levi's house" (Ex. xxix. 9), the covenant with Noah (Gen. vi. 12), the Sabbath (Ex. xxxi. 16), etc.

[3] *E.g.* Ps. xc. 2; Isa. xl. 28; Gen. xxi. 33; Ex. xv. 18, etc.

[4] xii. 2.

many passages the idea of the *endless* or *changeless* is made still more certain by the addition of amplifying and explanatory clauses.[1] The New Testament terms are the lineal descendants of these Old Testament expressions. The former come from the latter through the medium of the Septuagint. The "eternal" of the New Testament inherits the whole fulness of meaning belonging to the "eternal" of the Old Testament, and adds to it.

It is said by some that the *αἰώνιος* of the New Testament with its cognates has nothing to do with *time*. It is said by others that it has only to do with *time* and cannot get beyond it. It was the well-known contention of Mr. Maurice that *αἰώνιος* is not a quantitative term, but a qualitative, having regard to what is purely timeless, spiritual, essential, something beyond our present categories of thought. This is no doubt so far a just contention. In the writings of St. John the term is usually, if not always, qualitative and ethical, expressing a *kind* rather than a measure or length of being. The "eternal life" of which he speaks is a life of a divine order, essential life, life realising the perfect idea of life.[2] But Maurice's mistake was in taking the ethical sense to be the primary and proper sense, and in denying that the idea of perpetuity is in the word, except as a secondary sense or in "so far as the qualities themselves which characterise that life are vital, progressive, enduring." This is to read the history of the origin and use of the term backwards. It is the quantitative sense that is the primary

[1] *E.g.* Gen. iii. 22; Dan. vii. 14.

[2] John vi. 40, 47, 58, xvii. 3; 1 John ii. 24, 25, iii. 15, etc.

sense. The idea of duration is the original idea. It is also the proper idea, and will be found to underlie most of the passages in which the ethical sense appears.[1]

It is impossible indeed to carry the qualitative sense through the New Testament. There are many passages which it will not fit.[2] It is only when we take the quantitative sense as the fundamental sense that the different uses of the term explain themselves naturally. It is with the Greek words just as it is with the English *eternal, everlasting, eternity.* In both languages they express continuous duration, although in certain connections they also convey other ideas. When the future life is in view, the idea of its nature associates itself with that of its measure, and the term comes to express the good as well as the permanence of the existence. What Maurice forgot was that in such cases the adjective takes its heightened sense from the object to which it is attached. It is the "life" that gives its profound ethical sense to the "eternal"; it is not the adjective that raises the "life" to that power. These terms only follow the fortunes of other terms which rise through special associations into higher meanings than the primary. But the greater includes the less. If God's eternal life is a *kind* of life, an essential, perfect life, it is also a

[1] When Christ speaks, for example, of the man who eats His flesh as having "eternal life" (John vi. 54), it is evident that whatever other quality He intends to ascribe to that life, He means it to be an *enduring* life. For in ver. 58 He says of the same man that he "shall live for ever." That the "eternal" life of which He speaks in John x. 28 is also meant to be a *permanent* life is made clear by the addition of the "shall never perish."

[2] *E.g.* 2 Cor. v. 1, xiv. 17, etc.

life superior to change. If the life of the blessed is *eternal* in the sense of being a divine order of life, security against loss, change, or termination is surely one of the things which make its divine quality. And if "eternal" death, punishment, or destruction means a *kind* of future, it is also a future that abides.

Those, therefore, are in the right who say in reply to Mr. Maurice that the word is bound up with the idea of duration. But does it follow that it is tied to this in all its applications? It is argued that, because this word is used, as all words are, in a restricted or rhetorical sense, and in many occurrences expresses something far short of the *everlasting*, we are not at liberty to say that, when it is used of future destiny, it means more than an "age-long" destiny, a destiny realised in an age or a series of ages, a lot lasting through a terminable period. But are we to say that because the English "for ever" is often used in a rhetorical or reduced sense, it cannot express the really endless? When Paul speaks of God as "blessed for ever,"[1] is it only a long, but not changeless or eternal blessedness that is implied in the ascription?

It is said by some that the New Testament terms for the *eternal* are notes of a particular doctrine of æons, time-cycles, or dispensational periods, in which God's purpose was conceived by the Jews to work. The "eternal Spirit" becomes the Spirit working in the age or æon; "eternal life" is life in the æon; and "eternal punishment" is a punishment lasting through its æon, and therefore terminable. This is a pious imagination. The popular terms of the

[1] Rom. ix. 5.

Bible are far removed from speculations of that kind, which have their home rather in the Rabbinical schools. Even were it proved that the Hebrews thought of futurity as an indefinite succession of æons, nothing would result from that. Men in all languages strive to express the idea of the *everlasting* much in the same way. They try to picture it to the imagination by thinking of it as period added to period in measureless succession, and by using a multitude of heaped and reduplicated expressions, "unto the æon of the æons," "for ever and ever," and the like. But this is due to the travail of mind and language in the effort to understand and express what is beyond them.

The linguistic argument has an interest of its own. Yet it is little relevant and might be spared. It is nothing to point us to the fact that the hills, the Davidic house, the earthly priesthood, and other things of limited duration are described as *everlasting* or *eternal*. These uses do not prove that the word means less than it seems to mean. They have their reason in the fact that for the moment the imagination of the speaker or writer gives to the things the quality of the eternal. We call the things eternal because for the time we *think* of them as such.

Operations upon the terms will not efface from the New Testament the truth of the finality of human fate.[1] Those who wish to succeed in this must have

[1] It is sometimes said that some less ambiguous word than αἰώνιος would have been used had it been intended to express the idea of the perpetuity of future retribution. But in point of fact there is no word, whether in English or in Greek, neither ἀΐδιος, ἀπέραντος, nor any other, that is not subject to the same variations or ambiguities, and liable to be dealt with as αἰώνιος is dealt with.

recourse to philosophy. We come at last in all such matters to the theory of mind and the theory of language. The ultimate questions are these — Can the mind form any idea of the *eternal*, and can language express it? But these are questions not for the doctrine of future retribution only, but for all our thoughts of what is above sense. They are questions which will apply with equal force to our thoughts of *time* itself, and the terms by which we express them. Whether it speaks of *time* or of *eternity*, the Bible uses the free, vivid language of common life. Its popular terms give us a better representation of unseen realities than the severe terminology of the schools. They mean what they bear upon their face, nor can any analysis of philologist or metaphysician make them else than they seem.

But the New Testament view of man's future is not dependent on any one term or series of terms. Even were the Restorationist doctrine more successful in impoverishing or effacing the word "eternal," it would be but at the beginning of its task. It would still have to grapple with the general tenor of the Christian revelation, and the immediate impression produced by it. The things of grace which make the message of the New Testament, its offers, its warnings, its appeals, are all addressed to this life. It speaks of utter loss, of absolute exclusion from the kingdom of God, as a possibility lying in time. It tells of a punishment which shall never end, a great gulf that is fixed, an outer darkness, a *Too Late*, a night in which no man can work, an accepted time which is now, a Divine Spirit who is sent for the conviction of this world, whose

ministry "in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgement,"[1] is never said to be for another existence than this, whose word is of a *To-day* in which He calls men not to harden their hearts. It sets the present life so definitely before us as the crisis of our fate, and gives the aspect of decision so consistently to the spiritual choices of earth, that many who disown the doctrine of eternal retribution, confess that gospel and epistle alike leave the future of the persistent sinner dark with unrelieved gloom. Christ's own words are the most absolute of all on this grave subject, so absolute that, if He taught the doctrine of an ultimate reconciliation of all, or that of a new probation in the after-world, He would seem to have done it in terms so obscure that His immediate disciples and those whom He patiently instructed for the purpose of continuing His message to mankind, failed utterly to understand Him.

The words of Scripture are too definite, its general sense is too obvious, to admit of easy adaptation to the belief in a universal restoration. The last that can be said of this aspect of the question is that the most absolute of the declarations of the New Testament, its strongest averments of the judgment and perdition of ungodly men, the "tribulation and anguish" which are reserved for "every soul of man that worketh evil,"[2] may at least be not inconsistent with the ultimate recovery of all perverse souls after the fires of the Divine wrath, and the long pains of the Divine retribution have done their work. But this is to push out into the uncertain sea of speculation. The New Testament itself gives no disclosure of any such result.

[1] John xvi. 8. [2] Rom. ii. 9.

Are there, then, reasons outside this province which are essential to the question, and give it another aspect? There are considerations of another kind which are strongly urged, and to which regard must be had. But they are neither of sufficient certainty nor of sufficient weight to materially alter the conditions of the case, or counterbalance the poverty of the argument drawn from the Christian records. The hypothetical character of the Restorationist doctrine becomes the clearer the more closely these considerations are studied.

The witness of history is not on its side. It has no claim to belong to the primitive faith of the Christian people. It comes first into view perhaps a century and a half after the apostles received their great commission, and it emerges then not as the belief of the Church, but as a Christian opinion, the speculation of a great thinker which found very limited acceptance. Neither can it pretend to any superiority over the competing doctrines in moral leverage, in the seriousness which it gives to life, or in restraining and elevating influence upon conduct. The moral effect which it is calculated to have upon the mass of men has seemed so doubtful to some of its most eminent supporters, that they have been reluctant to have it preached to all and sundry, and have preferred to see it treated as an esoteric doctrine. It has all the weakness, too, of the partial and one-sided. It concentrates attention on one half of the case—on its Divine aspect, on the might of the Divine purpose, the power and patience of the Divine love, the limitless resource and inventiveness of the Divine grace. But it looks less frankly at the meaning

of man's personal life, the prerogative of liberty, the untold power of will, the awful significance of Christ's "ye would not."

It is of its nature to proceed on diminished or mistaken estimates of all the elements of the case on man's side. It regards sin as mainly or essentially a corrosive which may be counteracted, a malady which may wear itself out or be conquered. It makes punishment a means of grace, a healing remedy, a fire which must work out the renewal of character. It puts the moral conditions of salvation into the background, and gives it the aspect of a certain thing, an inevitable, however remote, result. The idea at its heart is that in some way and at some period, when sin and pain have run their sufficient course, God will find the means to overcome the one and dispense with the other. It fails to show how this can be done, even with the infinite resource of Divine love and Divine power, except at the cost of man's freedom, or how a submission which is not spontaneous can have moral value. It may be urged indeed in its behalf that the means which it supposes God to have in reserve for the subjugation of rebellious wills in the future life need not be of the nature of force, but may be moral means, new motives, stronger persuasives, unknown operations of the Spirit. But this, again, is to pronounce the provision of grace which is made in this life, with all the inducements and appeals which are furnished by the supreme revelation of the love of God in Christ, insufficient.

In order to establish its truth, the Restorationist doctrine has to prove that the conditions of the after-life will be more favourable to good than those of the

present life. But it can do this as little on the basis of reason as on that of revelation. Scripture certainly gives no hint that either in ourselves or in our circumstances we shall be in a better position for good in the other world than in this. Christ's word in His great parable on the after-existence, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded if one rose from the dead,"[1] speaks to the opposite effect. Nor is the testimony of experience less clear. Reasoning from man's moral constitution, from the nature of sin, from the facts of providence and the order of life in which we are placed here, it may rather be concluded that the conditions of existence in the other world will be less favourable to repentance, and that a second probation there would be less accordant with the mercy of God than a single probation completed here.

The ideas at the root of the doctrine in question have nothing to sustain them in actual fact. They mean that suffering will somehow effect in the other world what neither pain nor grace can effect in this world, and that men's hearts and minds will be somehow more amenable there than here to the persuasions of the Divine Love. But have we any reason to suppose that suffering will be more certain there to change a perverse nature into a loyal than is the case with it here, or that it will ever become in itself a renewing grace? If we see it in many cases only hardening men here, are we entitled to say that it will certainly soften and sanctify all impenitent and obstinate souls there? Is it not the tendency of sin to grow stronger here? Do we not see the evil disposition stiffening in evil; act

[1] Luke xvi. 31, R.V.

hardening into habit and habit into settled character; sin feeding on sin; each downward step making return more difficult; each defiant assertion of will making restoration more hopeless? And is it reasonable to suppose that all this will be reversed there? The witness of experience, and the whole weight of the analogy of the present order of existence, are against it.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE

THE doctrine of Restorationism fails, though not with the same measure of failure, as the dogma of Conditional Immortality fails. What remains but to recognise that the voice of Scripture and the judgment of reason are, each with its own measure of clearness, on the side of the last of the three possible Christian answers to the great question of the final issues of man's life?

The doctrine that man's immortality is determined by the spiritual attitude to which he commits himself here, that the moral decision made in the brief opportunity of this life is final, and that the condition consequent on it in the other world is one of eternal blessedness or the opposite, is a doctrine of almost overwhelming grandeur. It gives so incalculable a value to the short opportunity of the earthly existence, so measureless a dignity, so vast a power for good or for evil to man's nature, so limitless a sweep to the prerogative of will which makes his sovereignty. There is at least nothing small or fallacious in it. It is almost appalling in its magnitude. It answers best to the teaching of Scripture. With all its solemn import it is also truest to reason and to experience. To

an extent which can be claimed for no other view of man's future, it grapples with the real problems of God's providence, the dark enigmas of life, and the mysteries of man's moral nature.

Much depends, however, on how it is stated. There are unbalanced and misunderstood ways of regarding it, from which it suffers grave injustice. There are also alleviations of its awe which cannot be overlooked. They belong to the essence of its meaning.

The doctrine of the finality of life's spiritual decisions has no necessary connection with ideas of punishment which were once current, or with those realistic pictures of hell and crude conceptions of the retributive awards of Divine justice with which it has been burdened. The harrowing, materialistic ideas of the pains of the lost which were natural to times in which life was rougher and more cruel, are a witness to the deep sense of the perils and terrors of sin. But they form no part of the doctrine itself. It has to be relieved of all such accessories. It has to get the benefit of that finer moral sense, those higher and purer ideas of judgment and punishment, those humaner feelings, that deeper insight into the intrinsic nature of things, which are the results of the gradual informing of men's minds with the spirit of Christianity.

It is not to be associated, again, with metaphysical ideas of eternity. What eternity is it is impossible for us who live under the conditions of time to understand. We cannot do else than think of it in terms of time, and it is easy to see that any conception of it which we thus form issues speedily in logical contra-

diction. But it does not follow that our ordinary ideas of eternity are wholly misleading because they are inadequate, or that eternal punishment and eternal blessedness must be something entirely different from what they are naturally conceived to be. It is enough for us to know that "eternity" is existence and continuous existence, a future in which life goes on, a new condition of being into which all that makes us what we are here, affections, beliefs, dispositions, characters, will go with us and abide with us. The New Testament never pauses to define and analyse the words "eternal" and "everlasting," or to reason about them as the philosopher does. It uses them in the sense which they convey to the common mind of man, and stamps that sense as substantially true. The great disclosures of "eternal life" and "eternal punishment" are not to be emptied of their meaning by metaphysical puzzles. They are not to be measured by the ideas which the philosopher attaches to time, eternity, or duration. They are intended to impress us with the magnitude of the moral issues of the present existence, and to convey to our minds the best and most practical conception they are capable of forming of the realities to which they point.

It is obvious, too, that much depends on the relations of things in this view of the final destinies of human souls. An entirely fallacious aspect is given it when the essential thing is taken to be the future well-being of men, the decree of a certain measure of happiness or a certain measure of misery and evil, instead of their future graciousness. The case at issue is the probability or certainty of a change of life in

the other world, the question whether the human will retains the ability of determining itself to good under all circumstances and at any moment of its history, whether man's freedom is something incompatible with any ultimate arrival at fixed moral disposition, whether the life of souls is to be always an inconstant quantity, on the one hand reaching at no period a position superior to the risk of lapse, and on the other hand never settling into certain preference of evil. Thinkers like Mr. Maurice, with all their intense craving for the triumph of God's love and grace over all obstacles, have seen clearly where the real incidence of the problem is placed. To him the ultimate difficulty was how to reconcile the "two great discoveries" which are made to us in an apparently "boundless power of resistance in ourselves, and in God a Love and Power which are Almighty." On this he saw nothing but darkness. Whether that Love and Power would triumph over all evil, he would not undertake either to affirm or to deny. But he perceived that the primary question is not the assignment of pain and punishment by God, but the possibility of a persistent evil will making a vitiated character which bears its own retribution in its bosom.

It is essential again to the just consideration of these great questions that we bring to them adequate ideas of *sin* and *penalty*. Imperfect or mistaken views of these primary elements of the case have much to do with the difficulties of belief in eternal retribution, and with the prepossession in favour of other views. They are at the basis of much of the reasoning in support of the doctrine of a universal restoration. This is felt

by its most discerning advocates, who endeavour to place it on a better foundation and to give it a less superficial aspect, by so stating it as to make the real question at issue not the permanence of punishment, but the permanence of sin. The perpetuity of moral evil, they tell us, is the thing that is inconsistent with the love and power of God. The cessation of punishment while sin continues, would be loss. It is through the punishment that the sin is to be overcome; everlasting punishment and final restoration are not incompatible. It may be by the former that the latter is to be effected. So far the theory of Restorationism is greatly superior to that of Conditionalism. Yet all this does not clear it of its essential weakness. It means that punishment is converted into penance, and the sinner changed into the penitent. But this merely brings us back to the old question, whether it is reasonable to suppose that punishment there will be essentially different from what it is here, whether it will be in the other world the certain and efficacious grace which it obviously is not in this world. Some, who regard the triumph of the Divine love as necessary, but to whom the ingathering of all erring souls seems too great a hope, take refuge in the idea that the final position of the condemned will be one of acquiescence in their own condemnation.[1]

These are confessions of the difficulty felt to attach to the doctrine of a final restoration, and partial approaches to the other view. But apart from this the propensity to think of sin as an act or series of acts, and of penalty as a pain imposed from without,

[1] Birks, *The Victory of the Divine Goodness.*

leads naturally to mistaken conceptions of the doctrine of the finality of this life. Were this the intrinsic nature of sin and penalty, it might seem strange that a God of infinite justice and goodness should connect such consequences with man's offences as the doctrine in question supposes. But these are superficial and erroneous ideas. Sin is not merely an act or series of acts. It is a disposition, a character, a nature. Beneath all sinful acts there is the sinful bent or principle, which gives colour to each and makes the essence of the question. And penalty is more than a pain decreed and inflicted *ab extra*. It may be that there are positive rewards for good and positive penalties for evil ordained by God. But the place which these occupy in Scripture, if they have a place at all, is secondary. That there are such is thought to be implied in the terms in which at times Christ describes the awards of the Judge; as when in certain parables He speaks of the profitable servant as set over many things. But these parables speak also of the joy of the Lord as the recompense of the faithful, and unquestionably the general idea which the New Testament gives of the reward of good is that it is in the good itself, and of the penalty of evil that it is in the evil itself,—the harvest of corruption, the receiving the things done in the body, the reaping of what one sows, the eating of the fruit of one's deeds. The question is not what God imposes on us in the other life, but what we take with us into it. We carry *ourselves* into it: we can take nothing else with us there. The penalty is inherent in the pride, envy, selfishness, and all evil passion which continue in the surviving self.

Just ideas of human *responsibility* in a world of moral order are no less necessary than adequate conceptions of sin and penalty. Limited views of probation mean mistaken views both of the seriousness of existence and of the basis of the final arbitrament of men's lives. The case of the heathen, it is sometimes argued, is of itself sufficient refutation of the doctrine of the moral decisiveness of the present existence. It is impossible, it is said, to bring it into relation to that doctrine. Some other explanation is required. It is so obviously inconsistent with the justice of God that the future of the heathen, or that of those in Christian lands and times whose circumstances are essentially similar, should turn on the meagre opportunity and vast disadvantage of the present life. It is urged, too, that the *universality* of the gospel demands some larger solution of the question. The Christian doctrine is that God is to judge the world by Jesus Christ, and this is thought to mean that no man can be finally judged until Christ has been made known to him, and His grace so presented to him as to bring him to conscious acceptance or rejection. Christianity is universal in its nature and its demands. It is intended for all men. It is to be the ground of the judgment of all. And from this it follows that the present life cannot be decisive of the future life in the case of any but those who have had full opportunity of knowing Christ.

The problem of the heathen is a problem in providence. It is also, though only in the second place, a problem of revelation and theology. It seems to be the inference from the evangelical doctrine of salvation

through Christ alone that the heathen, as they are known to us in this world, are beyond the pale of salvation. It is the first inference from the goodness and justice of God that none should miss salvation without an opportunity of grace. The reconciliation of these two positions, so as neither to make the heathen unconditionally unsalvable nor to represent salvation as possible apart from Christ, is a theological question which has been met in more than one way. The answer of some has been that the heathen who have lived in good conscience may be exempt from all the retributive inflictions of the future save a *pœna damni*, a penalty of loss proportioned to the defects in their efforts to walk according to the light of nature, and that on the ground of Christ's work they shall have a felicity only short of the Beatific Vision. Reasoning from the case of Israel, who were made heirs of grace through faith in a Redeemer who was yet to come, others have affirmed the possibility of a redemption for many of the heathen in virtue of the *implicit faith* seen in their feeling after God, if haply they might find Him. Many more have sought a solution of the problem in the opportunities of the Intermediate State. Clement of Alexandria found a reason for the judgment of the heathen in the partial revelation which God gave them in philosophy and in a proclamation of the gospel made to them in Hades. Origen, Gregory, and others speculated largely in the latter direction. In the Middle Ages thinkers like Abelard arose now and again who spoke of hope for such as Plato. The Jesuit Salmero regarded a ministry of grace in the world of the dead as the necessary supple-

ment to the opportunities of the heathen in this world. Melanchthon brooded at times over the question, and was inclined to say that in a Hades ministry Christ may have instructed men like Scipio; and Zwingli had large ideas of the future which God might have for the nobler spirits of heathendom.

Those theologies which hold by the great principles of an activity of the pre-incarnate Logos, a ministry of the Holy Spirit working where and when He wills, and a salvation ordinarily, but not absolutely, identified with the Church, have in these enough to relieve, if not wholly to remove, the difficulty created by the position of the heathen in providence and by the New Testament doctrine of a redemption in and through Christ alone. But, apart from that, much that is said of the case of the heathen proceeds on inadequate ideas both of the judgment of God and of the probation which precedes it. The judgment is to be according to men's works, but according to what a man hath, not according to what he hath not. It is the judgment of One who judges not by the externalities of the deed, but by the principle in its heart, and according to law where law is, but without law where law is not. And the probation on which the judgment proceeds is not necessarily of one kind or measure. The probation which lies in opportunities of conscious acceptance or rejection of the revelation of God's grace in Christ may be the highest form. But it need not be the only form. Probation, the testing of life and disposition, exists wherever moral law exists. It is inherent in a system of moral government, and in such a system it may have many forms and measures, as law is variously revealed and variously applied.

We need nothing beyond Paul's broad statement that those who have law shall be judged by law, and that those who are without law shall be judged without law.[1]

Further, the principle of *degrees* in reward and punishment must be taken in all its breadth as an essential and qualifying element in the doctrine in question. The idea of reward proportioned to the measure of service and penalty proportioned to the measure of failure, occupies a much larger place in Christ's teaching and in the New Testament generally than is usually recognised. If anything deserves to be described as a lost theological principle which it concerns us to recover, it is this. It is often alleged against the doctrine of Eternal Judgment that, while sins differ through all possible grades of difference, it seems in the end at least to represent them as all punished alike. But it is the very burden of a large part of Christ's teaching and that of the apostles, that this final retribution will not be the same to all; that each shall receive according to what he has done; that it shall be more tolerable for some than for others in the day of judgment; that the servant shall be beaten with many stripes or with few, according to the measure of unfaithfulness; that the issue to each will be in equitable accordance with possession, talent, opportunity, knowledge.

It is of the nature of things that there are vast differences in the guilt of sins. The fact that in this world we see all varieties of character and all possible gradations of good and evil in men's lives, has been made a reason for denying that in the other world

[1] Rom. ii. 12.

there can be any absolute line of demarcation or any final division of souls into two classes of saved and lost.[1] But conscience itself is a witness that beneath all these varieties and gradations there is something deeper, a drift of disposition which parts men into righteous and unrighteous, into lovers of God and the opposite. Yet this essential and final distinction in kind is not inconsistent with infinite differences in the measure of good and evil, and consequently in the reward and the penalty. The New Testament recognises this and makes provision for it. The judgment of which it speaks is a judgment which shall be with perfect knowledge, perfect equity, perfect sympathy, the judgment of a Father who knows our frame and remembers that we are dust, the judgment of a Son who by experience understands man and man's life. The doctrine of degrees is the relief given us by Christ Himself in thinking of the maladjustments of the present existence, the mystery of unequal circumstance, and the lot of the lost. It provides for all possible gradations in the punitive awards of the future. It does more to lighten the problem than is done by the Roman Catholic theories of a *pœna damni* and a variety of localities in the other world, or by the idea of a Protestant purgatory, and it does it more simply and reasonably. It is the proper corrective to the dogmas of a second probation and a universal restoration. It gives all the alleviation which other views of the future profess to give, and it gives it without doing violence either to the power of man's will or to the sufficiency of grace here.

[1] Greg, *Creed of Christendom*, p. 262.

If to this we add the principle of *progress* according to character in the other world, which also may be described as a lost theological principle crying out for recall, we have the last relief that is needed. The finality of life does not mean that the future existence is a stereotyped or merely passive condition. The fact that death marks the transition from the probation to the judgment and seals the spiritual decisions on which the future turns, does not mean that we are to be simply what we have been. Life must live, and men must act and grow, and character must deepen. The future will be an existence in which we shall go on and grow either in knowledge, love, and power of service, or in their opposites. But if so, the decisive matter is the trend of life with which we enter that future. The mercy of God extends to the last hour of life. The grace of God may be efficacious with many as it was with the robber on the cross. Death itself may be their purgatory. In multitudes of human beings, where we see only ignorance, sin, or defiance, there may be in the crisis of death, or in the valley of the shadow, the faint workings of a change in the principle of their life, and what may thus begin shall grow. If there be at the decisive point of life, however late it may come, the tremulous inclination of the soul to God, the feeblest presence of that which makes for righteousness and faith in heathen or in Christian, it will be recognised of the Judge, and under the conditions of the new life it will grow to more in the power and the blessedness of good.

Finally, let it be said that a true theology will confess its own limitations, and will not presume to

give an answer to every difficulty. It will recognise that the Christian Revelation is given, not to utter all the secrets of another world, but to make God known to us and bring Him near. It will seek to be positive up to Christ's word. It will not be ambitious to be wise beyond it. It will be satisfied to be silent where Christ's voice has not spoken, and it will leave much that is dark in man's life, here and hereafter, to the Eternal Wisdom that keeps so much in reserve. It will be content to see that all is in the hand of a God of grace, and its assurance will be that the farthest future can discover nothing that will not be consistent with the perfect Love and Righteousness which are revealed in Christ.

APPENDIX

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Note A, p. 38.—Nirvâna and Arahatship

On the question of the nature of Nirvâna, of which Buddha himself does not appear to have given any definite explanation, opinion continues to be divided. It is still in debate whether the Buddhist conception of Nirvâna is the negative conception of annihilation, or the positive conception of eternal blessedness and perfection. The term itself, like the term Arahâ, was borrowed by the Buddhists from the Brahmans. It occurs in the Mahâbhârata, as Professor Max Müller points out, among other passages in xiv. 543—"leaving behind in thought all bodily and mental desires, he slowly obtains Nirvâna, like a fire without wood." It occurs also in the Maitreyopanishad, where it means "absorption in the highest being, beyond which is neither being nor not-being" (*Physical Religion*, pp. 382, 383, and *Sacred Books of the East*, xv. p. xlvi, etc.). Professor Max Müller is one of those who have contended most strenuously, although not always quite consistently, that it means not the extinction of life, but the completion of life; the result of his examination of a large number of passages in which the term occurs being that in none is annihilation the necessary sense, while in many it is an impracticable sense. He renders Nibbâna as "annihilation of human passion" (*Physical Religion*, p. 381), and in his preface to *Buddhaghosa's Parables* he regards the popular view, rather than any other, as representing the original idea. Nirvâna may mean, he thinks, the extinction of many things—of selfishness, desire, and sin,

without going so far as the extinction of personal consciousness. "It may express the entrance of the soul into rest, a subduing of all wishes and desires, indifference to joy and pain, to good and evil, an absorption of the soul in itself and a freedom from the circle of existences from birth to death and from death to a new birth."

Professor Paul Carus also supports the more positive view. "The difficulty to a modern mind in the comprehension of the term Nirvâna," he says, "lies mainly in our habit of conceiving the nature of the soul in the old Brahmanical sense of an ego-entity as the doer of our acts, the perceiver of our sensations, and the thinker of our thoughts. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, he who denies the existence of that metaphysical being is understood by people educated in our present modes of thought as denying the existence of our soul itself." So he says, "Nirvâna is not death, but eternal life, not annihilation but immortality, not destruction but indestructibility. Were truth and morality negative, Nirvâna would be negative also; as they are positive, Nirvâna is positive. The soul of every man continues in what Buddhists call his Karma, and he who attains Buddhahood becomes thereby identical with truth itself, which is everlasting and omnipresent, pervading not only this world system, but all other worlds that are to be in the future" (*The Monist*, April 1894, pp. 438, 439). Professor Childers notices the fact that "many expressions are used of Nirvâna which seem to imply annihilation," while "other equally numerous and equally forcible expressions are used which clearly point to blissful existence," and concludes that the word is "applied to two different things—first, that annihilation of being which is the goal of Buddhism, and secondly, the state of blissful sanctification called *arahatta* or Arhatship, which terminates in annihilation" (*Pali Dictionary, sub voce Nibbâna*). Dr. T. S. Berry explains the two different sets of expressions which seem to be used of Nirvâna in the Buddhist books as referring to two different things, the one to the con-

dition of the saint who in this life has attained to freedom from the fetters which make blessedness impossible, the other to the final goal, the real *summum bonum*, when freedom from existence itself is reached. Looking to passages which speak, for example, of those who have "perfectly conceived the state" and are "free from passion" as "being completely extinguished," he concludes that absolute annihilation was the original idea attached to the term Nirvâna. (*Christianity and Buddhism*, pp. 88–90.)

Professor Oldenberg, again, believes that Buddha said nothing positive on the subject of an after-life, because knowledge on such a subject could not advance a saint's holiness, and is of opinion that "orthodox teaching in the ancient order of Buddhists inculcated expressly on its converts to forego the knowledge of the being or non-being of the perfected saint." He adds, however, that on the question whether the path led into a new existence or into Nothing, "the Buddhist creed rests in delicate equipoise between the two. The longing of the heart that craves the eternal has not nothing, and yet the thought has not a something which it might firmly grasp. Farther off the idea of the endless, the eternal could not withdraw itself from belief than it has done here, where, like a gentle flutter on the point of merging in the Nothing, it threatens to evade the gaze" (*Buddha*, pp. 276, 284).

As to Arahatship and the connection between it and Nirvâna, Professor Childers thinks the two related to each other as cause and effect. The latter is the goal and is not attainable but by the former. Further, the individual existence of the Arahat ceases when he reaches Nirvâna. "The doctrine of Buddha on the subject," he says, "is perfectly explicit; he even predicted his own death. Now to be the ultimate goal of Buddhism, Arhatship must be an eternal state, for if it is not eternal, it must sooner or later terminate, either in annihilation or in a state which is not blissful; in either case it is not the goal of Buddhism. But since Arhats die the Arhatship is not an eternal state, and

therefore it is not the goal of Buddhism. It is almost superfluous to add that not only is there no trace in the Buddhist Scriptures of the Arhats continuing to exist after death, but it is deliberately stated in innumerable passages, with all the clearness and emphasis of which language is capable, that the Arhat does not live again after death, but ceases to exist" (*Pali Dictionary, sub voce Nibbâna*). With this Professor Paul Carus, who gives the passage in full, agrees. (*The Monist*, April 1894, pp. 430, 431.) Professor Oldenberg, again, says that "if we are to indicate the precise point at which the goal is reached for the Buddhist, we must not look to the entry of the dying Perfect One into the range of the everlasting—be this either everlasting being or everlasting nothing—but to that moment of his earthly life when he has attained the status of sinlessness or painlessness; this is the true Nirvâna. If the Buddhist faith really makes the saint's state of being disembody itself into nothingness . . . . still entry into nothingness for nothingness' sake is not at all the object of aspiration which has been set before the Buddhist. The goal to which he pressed was—we must constantly repeat this—solely deliverance from the sorrowful world of origination and decease. Religious aspiration did not purposely and expressly demand that this deliverance should transport to nothingness, but when this was taught at all, expression was merely given thereby to the indifferent accidental consequences of metaphysical reflections, which prevent the assumption of an everlasting, immutable happy existence. In the religious life, in the tone which prevailed in the ancient Buddhist order, the thought of annihilation has had no influence" (*Buddha*, p. 265).

Note B, p. 43.—The Buddhist View of Identity

Students of the Indian religions differ in the views which they take of the Buddhistic doctrine of *Identity*. The more negative interpretation is favoured by Pro-

fesssor Rhys Davids. "Strange is it and instructive," he says, "that all this should have seemed not unattractive these 2300 years and more to many despairing and earnest hearts—that they should have trusted themselves to the so seeming stately bridge which Buddhism has tried to build over the river of the mysteries and sorrows of life. They have been charmed and awed, perhaps, by the delicate or noble beauty of some of the several stories of which the arch is built; they have seen that the whole rests on a more or less solid foundation of fact; that on one side of the keystone is the necessity of justice; on the other, the law of causality. But they have failed to see that the very keystone itself, the link between one life and another, is a mere word—this wonderful hypothesis, this airy nothing, this imaginary cause beyond the reach of reason—the individualised and individualising force of Karma" (*Buddhism*, pp. 104–106). Others think that this fails to do justice to the Buddhistic idea, and give a more positive construction of it.

The question turns, it is obvious, on the sense of the terms *soul*, *self*, *consciousness*, and upon the Buddhistic conception of what makes the *being* of man. Man's being, says the Buddhist, consists of *samskáras*, a term which Professor Oldenberg thinks may be rendered "actions," if we understand it "in the wide sense in which it includes also, at the same time, the internal actions, the will and the wish" (*Buddha*, Eng. trans., p. 242). Professor Paul Carus, who explains a man's *samskáras* as "certain forms and formative faculties, which, according to the law of Karma, preserve his existence in the whirl of constant change," criticises the ordinary view as expressed by Professor Rhys Davids. He recalls the opening verse of the *Dhamapada*—"all that we are is the result of what we have thought, it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts." In the light of such definitions, Buddhism, he contends, may be said to have a very real place for *soul* and *self*, if by these we mean not a metaphysical *substratum* to our acts, or a meta-

physical agent of our acts, but the totality of our thoughts. He grants that, according to the Buddhistic view of man and things, we remain only as the accumulated result of our actions; but he holds that this is really *we*, the only real self, and that what Buddhism has done is simply to tear down "the imaginary fence which separates man's self from other selves." So he concludes that, while Buddhism denies the existence of a *soul* in the sense of an entity distinct from and behind our mental acts, it believes in "the existence of mind, and the continuance of man's spiritual existence after death." The transmigration which Buddhism teaches is not a transmigration of *soul* in our sense, it is true, but a transmigration of *character*. Yet as these "future incarnations of our Karma inherit our character, together with all its blessings and its curses, in the same way as 'I' of to-day am benefited or hampered by my actions from the days of my childhood, it matters little," he says, "whether I choose to recognise the identity of myself or not." The identity is, in his view, a real identity, and one that obtains whether it be recognised or not. See his article on "Karma and Nirvâna" in *The Monist*, April 1894.

Note C, p. 67.—Opinion on the Question of Egyptian Belief in Transmigration

Bunsen regards the Egyptian doctrine of animal metempsychosis as the basis of the Egyptian zoolatry. "This community between the human and the animal soul once admitted," he says, "one can understand how the Egyptians at last arrived at the idea of worshipping in animals a living manifestation of the divinity" (*Egypt's Place in Universal History*, vol. iv. p. 641). Canon Mozley remarks that Bunsen "could hardly have given a greater proof of the degrading character of the doctrine, than that it involved the principle of a 'community between the human and animal soul,' and laid the basis for the revolting animal worship of Egypt." But he ascribes the doctrine in its worst forms to

Egypt, and makes it the groundwork of his most adverse criticism of the Egyptian religion. He argues that the doctrine of metempsychosis "was less in conflict indeed with the truth of human personality, when it employed the brutes as its instruments, and represented the souls of men as passing upon death into the bodies of animals; for the man prevailed over the lower personality or impersonality of the brute, and was safer from a rival self." But he holds this doctrine to have been the bad element in the Egyptian system, which dragged down the good. "Animal metempsychosis," he says, "filled the whole foreground of the Egyptian doctrine—it was the strong, coarse material which came in contact with the popular mind, and made the impression; the eternal world was in the remote horizon of the system." See *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, by J. B. Mozley, D.D., pp. 301–303.

Professor Sayce, in the Essay on Egypt which he appends to his edition of *Herodotos*, i.–iii. (p. 345), says of the condemned soul, that "it was sentenced to the various torments of hell, or to wander like a vampire between heaven and earth, scourged and buffeted by the tempests, or else doomed to transmigrate into the bodies of animals, and permitted to regain its original body and undergo a fresh trial; there were cases even in which it might be annihilated." Maspero speaks of "the sinful soul as being handed over to the cyno-cephalous ape-assessors of the infernal tribunal who hunted and scourged it, after first changing it into a soul, or some other impure animal" (*Egyptian Archæology*, p. 159). Erman thinks that the ideas of the Egyptians varied from time to time on the subject of the *where* and the *how* of that future existence of man by which they held so firmly. "In some periods of their history," he says, "they believed that it was his special privilege to appear sometimes in one form, sometimes in another—one day as a heron, another as a cockchafer, and yet another as a lotus-flower in the water" (*Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 306). Tiele also speaks with some reserve.

Recognising that the metamorphoses with which the *Book of the Dead* deals all take place "in the kingdom of the dead, not on earth," he still thinks that "perhaps, too, at a later period there may have arisen among the inhabitants of the Nile Valley a dogma of the soul's incarnation evolved from the ancient eschatology" (*History of the Egyptian Religion*, pp. 70, 71). Renouf agrees with those who think that the Egyptians have been credited with a belief in metempsychosis only by "a confusion between Egyptian notions and either Pythagorean or Hindu notions." See his *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 182, 183.

Note D, p. 74.—The *Apology of Aristides* on the Egyptian Religion

"Now the Egyptians, because they are more evil and ignorant than all peoples upon the earth, have erred more than all men. For the worship of the Barbarians and the Greeks did not suffice them, but they introduced also the nature of beasts, and said concerning it that they were gods; and also of the creeping things which are found on the dry land and in the waters, and of the plants and herbs, they have said that some of them are gods, and they have become corrupt in all madness and impurity, more than all peoples that are upon the earth. . . . Now because the Egyptians are more ignorant than the rest of the peoples, these and the like gods [*i.e.* Isis, Osiris, etc.] did not suffice them, but they also put the name of gods on the beasts which are merely soulless. For some men among them worship the sheep, and others the calf; and some of them the pig, and others the shad-fish; and some of them the crocodile, and the hawk, and the cormorant, and the kite, and the vulture, and the eagle, and the crow; some of them worship the cat, and others the fish Shibbutá; some of them the dog, and some of them the serpent, and some the asp, and others the lion, and others garlic and onions and thorns, and others the leopard and the like. And the poor wretches do not

perceive with regard to all these things that they are nought; while every day they look upon their gods, who are eaten and destroyed by man, yea, even by their own fellows; and some of them being burned, and some of them dying and putrefying, and becoming refuse; and they do not understand that they are destroyed in many ways" (*Texts and Studies, etc.*, edited by J. Armitage Robinson, M.A. vol. 1. No. 1, pp. 45, 46). For the Greek and Roman estimate of the Egyptian religion, see, *e.g.*, Athenæus, *Deipnos.* vii. p. 299, and Juvenal, *Sat.* xv. 1.

Note E, p. 106.—Persian Ideas on the Fate of Souls

Yast xxii. describes how it fares with the soul of the pious and with the soul of the wicked after death. The first three nights are spent in enjoyments or in pains. Ahura-mazda is asked, "When one of the faithful departs this life, where does his soul abide on that night?" He replies that on that night, and on the second, and on the third, "his soul tastes as much of pleasure as the whole of the living world can taste." Then at the end of the third night, when the dawn appears, the soul of the pious seems to be brought "amid plants and scents" and to inhale a "wind blowing from the region of the south" and "sweeter-scented than any other wind in the world" . . . "and it seems to him as if his own conscience were advancing to him in that wind, in the shape of a maiden fair, bright, white-armed, strong, tall-formed, high-standing, thick-breasted, beautiful of body, noble, of a glorious seed, of the size of a maid in her fifteenth year, as fair as the fairest things in the world." The maid being questioned answers, "O thou youth of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, of good religion, I am thine own conscience." Then it is added that "the first step which the soul of the good man made placed him in the Good-Thought Paradise"; the second, "in the Good-Word Paradise"; the third, "in

the Good-Deed Paradise"; the fourth, "in the Endless Lights."

Of the soul of the wicked man, on the other hand, it is said that it "rushes, and sits near the skull"; that it tastes for three nights "as much of suffering as the whole living world can taste"; that at the end of the third night, it seems "to be brought amidst snow and stench" and "to inhale a wind from the north," the "foulest scented of all the winds in the world." In the Ardâ Vîrâf and the Minokhired, though not in this Yast, the soul of the wicked is represented as seeing in that wind his own religion and deeds, "as a profligate woman, naked, decayed, gaping, bandy-legged, lean-hipped, and unlimitedly spotted, so that spot was joined to spot, like the most hideous noxious creatures, most filthy and most stinking." The first step taken by the soul of the wicked lays him in the Evil-Thought Hell; the second, in the Evil-Word Hell; the third, in the Evil-Deed Hell; the fourth, in the Endless Darkness." See *Sacred Books of the East*, xxiii. pp. 314–323.

Note F, p. 116.—The Question of Foreign Influences traceable in Greek Religious Thought

The tendency to limit or negative the influence of Egypt upon the philosophy and religion of Greece, is seen in an extreme form in M. Renouf. Not only does he declare the travels of Pythagoras and other sages to be "fabulous inventions," not only does he hold that "every step in the history of Greek philosophy can be accounted for and explained from native sources," but he scouts the idea that Alexandria was a seat of Oriental philosophy or anything like the medium of an alliance between Eastern and Western thought. He declares this to be "as unhistorical as the reign of Jupiter in Crete." See his *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 246–248. The positions of older scholars like Matter who claimed so much for Alexandria, have given way before the criticism of Zeller and others. On the other

hand, Mr. Gladstone is of opinion that "the researches of the last generation have supplied materials for proving that Homer was acquainted with Egyptian and Phœnician ideas and has largely dealt with them"; and further that "yet more recently we have had similar evidence produced with respect to Babylonian and Assyrian records." See his *Landmarks of Homeric Study*, pp. 84, 85; and for the grounds on which he makes his statement, cf. pp. 127–160.

Welcker's *Griechische Götterlehre* is one of the best representatives of that way of construing the Greek religion, which looks back to a monotheism more primitive than the nature-worship. Döllinger also is of opinion that in the prehistoric and properly pre-Hellenic period polytheism had arisen out of a degradation of an original monotheism; that when men's consciousness of God became darkened they deified the powers of nature; that an example of this is seen in the case of the Cabiri; that those old formless Pelasgian gods gave way to the gods of the Homeric period, who are gods with human feeling; and that thus there arose the figure of Zeus with a monotheistic supremacy, but with a multitude of gods associated with him who had been taken over from the old nature-worship. (*The Gentile and the Jew*, i. p. 65, etc.) De la Saussaye takes the opposite view. (*Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, ii. p. 76.) Among those who speak most decidedly of the great superiority of the Greek religion over all the kindred religions in the advance made from mere nature-worship, Tiele may be specially named. He attributes this superiority mainly to "the many-sided intercourse of the several tribes both among themselves and with the representatives of an older and very rich culture." In the Greek religion he recognises the first fair fruits of the fusion of the Indo-Germanic and Aryan with the Semitic and Hamitic elements,—the dawn of a new area. Again, he speaks of the history of religion in Greece as "one of the most striking examples of the great law, that the richness and elevation of religious development are proportional to

the opportunities of intercourse on the part of one nation with others, and the completeness of the fusion of races" (*Outlines of the History of the Ancient Religions*, pp. 205 and 207).

NOTE G, p. 181.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL'S PRE-EXISTENCE AS FOUND IN THE *Wisdom of Solomon*

The interesting passage in chap. viii. 19, 20 has been otherwise interpreted by some. Bruno Bauer took the idea expressed in it to be that of a pre-established harmony between the soul and the body, and others have attempted to explain it in a way more consistent with Christian doctrine. But the speaker appears to regard the soul as the true *self*, and the point is that he came into a pure body because he was himself good. The goodness, therefore, which is the condition of his union with an undefiled body is to be understood as a goodness possessed in a state of existence previous to that union. In some respects, however, the idea of pre-existence as it is put in the *Book of Wisdom* differs both from the Platonic doctrine and from the Philonic. On this see Grimm's note *in loc.* in the *Kurzg. Exeget. Handbuch zu den Apocryphen des Alten Testamentes*. The import of the qualifying sentence, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγνὸς ὢν ἦλθον εἰς σῶμα ἀμίαντον, is well given by Dr. Drummond. "Saying that 'I obtained a good soul' is not inconsistent," he remarks, "with the doctrine of pre-existence; strictly construed, it would rather seem to imply it. But the writer here speaks as though his personality were distinct from the soul, and belonged only to the compound human organism. This is the point of view which he wishes to alter. The body is no part of the personality, but only a temporary dwelling which the soul, the real person, enters and quits. It is not correct, therefore, to say that I *obtained* a soul; I *am* a soul, and came into a body without any change of my identity. But, though its connection with the body is thus only a transient phase of the soul's existence, yet the dwelling

ought to be worthy of the tenant. It is implied by the statement before us that souls, prior to their entrance upon their earthly life, might be divided into good and bad, and that the equality of the bodies which they obtained was dependent on their moral condition. If an undefiled body, one not swayed by brutal passions, was assigned to a good soul, by parity of reasoning a corrupt soul must have obtained a body fitted to express and intensify its worst proclivities" (*Philo Judæus, or the Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy*, i. pp. 200, 201).

Note H, p. 253.—The Interpretation of Job xix. 23–27

Though it may be said that there has been at least an approach to agreement among the best scholars of our day in the interpretation of this memorable passage, opinion still differs as regards both the sense of particular terms and the range of the hope which is expressed. The difficulties of the text are so great that some give it up in despair. "The words are so unusual," says Dr. Hermann Schultz, "that we must either admit an inextricable corruption of the text, or allow a less strict observance of the laws of ordinary Hebrew linguistic use" (*Alttest. Theol.*, p. 706). Siegfried removes verses 25, 26 from his text and transfers them to the foot of the page. (*The Sacred Books of the Old Testament: A Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text*, etc., edited by Paul Haupt. *The Book of Job*, etc., by C. Siegfried, p. 12.) Strenuous attempts, indeed, have been made to amend the text, but they have been too violent to win much assent. Professor Bickell, for instance, by an ingenious reconstruction of the Hebrew, gets the following sense out of it :—

"Ich weiss, es lebt mein Retter,
Wird noch auf meinem Staub stehn ;
Zuletzt wird Gott mein Zeuge,
Lässt meine Unschuld schauen,
Die ich allein jetzt schauen kann,
Mein Auge und kein andres."

Thus he entirely alters the point of verses 26, 27.

The terms, however, with all their difficulty and strangeness, suit the broken utterance of one in the agitation and ecstasy of the speaker's position. Intractable, too, as some of them are, they leave the broad idea plain enough. It is the hope of a sight of God and an adjustment. The points in dispute are the nature, time, and scene of the vision and the vindication.

At one extreme stand those who empty the passage of all reference to an after-life. Not to mention the eccentric opinion, favoured by a very few, which sees nothing more in these sublime verses than Job's expectation of a restoration to his former health and prosperity, there is the view that the words express only the hope that when he is at the last extremity, reduced to a skeleton by his wasting disease, he shall then see God appear for the manifestation of his rectitude before he dies. Scholars of the eminence of Knobel, Hitzig, von Hofmann, Reuss, and Renan support this interpretation. Renan, for instance, renders it thus :—

> "Car je le sais, mon vengeur existe,
> Et il apparaitra enfin sur la terre.
>
> "Quand cette peau sera tombée en lambeaux,
> Privé de ma chair, je verrai Dieu.
>
> "Je le verrai pour moi-même ;
> Mes yeux le contempleront, non ceux d'un autre ;
> Mes reins se consument d'attente au-dedans de moi."

What is thus meant is a Theophany, or a descent of God to earth, for the honour of Job and the confusion of his accusers. But, however true this is to Old Testament ideas, the words in question seem clearly to go beyond it. It involves a distinction between the term "skin" and the term "flesh" which is not valid. It is scarcely in harmony with the position indicated in passages like xxii. 3 ; and it sacrifices the art of the poem, for it virtually brings on the *denoûment* when the drama is but half enacted.

In a different way, and less decidedly, Professor Cheyne confines the hope within earthly limits, thinking that in the main the passage is a repetition of what has been already said in xvi. 18, 19. He takes it to be the

hope that "God will avenge his blood, and make reparation, as it were, for his death by testifying to his innocence," without the thought of a "conscious renewal of communion with God after death" (*Job and Solomon*, pp. 33, 34). He speaks at the same time (p. 104) of Job's "idea of a supra-mundane justice, which will one day manifest itself in favour of the righteous sufferer, not only in this world (xvi. 18, 19, xix. 25, xlii.), so that all men may recognise their innocence, but also beyond the grave, the sufferers themselves being in some undefined manner brought back to life in the conscious enjoyment of God's favour (xiv. 13–15, xix. 26, 27)." Dr. Hermann Schultz also denies any reference to a future life in the passage, and translates it thus: "Doch ich weiss, mein Rächer lebt—und ein Bluträcher wird aufstehen über dem Staub—und, nachdem meine Haut zernagt ist diese, und ich entblösst bin vom Fleische —seh' ich Gott (nämlich als Bluträcher auf dem Staub stehend),—ihn den ich schaue 'fur mich' (streitend), und meine Augen sehn ihn—nicht mehr feindlich" (*Voraussetzungen*, pp. 219–223, and *Altt. Theol.*, pp. 705–707). According to this, Job sees *now*, with the eye of his spirit, God standing up as his Avenger after his death, and with this prospect calls upon his persecutors to be afraid themselves of the sword (ver. 29). But, apart from other objections, this turns on the question whether אֶחֱזֶה can possibly be taken in the present sense.

At the opposite extreme are those who find in the passage not only the idea of an after-life, but the definite hope of a resurrection. This interpretation goes back as far as Clement of Rome and Origen. Through the influence of Jerome and Augustine, it became the prevailing view in the Western Church. It also obtained a new lease of life at the Reformation through Luther's version. It can scarcely be said to exist now, although Pusey and some scholars of strong conservative leanings have done battle for it. It gives the מִבְּשָׂרִי the legitimate rendering of "*from* my flesh," but imports into the phrase the idea of the *revived*

flesh or the risen body. It makes what is said of the "skin" and the "flesh" the main thought of the whole passage; and it establishes a distinction or an antithesis between these two terms, where the genius of Hebrew poetry points to their being parallel terms belonging to one and the same thought.

The intermediate interpretation, which recognises in the passage the simple idea of an after-life, but not the precise conception of a bodily resurrection, is most in harmony with the force of the characteristic terms, "redeemer," "liveth," "he who cometh after"; with the future "I shall see"; and with the relation of the words "skin" and "flesh," these belonging both to the expression of the one thought of waste and dissolution by disease. It gives the main idea, the *seeing God*, its proper place. It does justice to the art of the drama, bringing the previous intimations of hope to their appropriate climax. And what is almost sufficient of itself to decide the question, this interpretation is the only one which fully accords with the fact that Job nowhere looks for any restoration to health and prosperity in this life, but regards all that is said to that effect as mockery, and speaks consistently of himself as dying with his righteousness unrecognised. It is true that this interpretation goes beyond the obvious force of verses 23, 24, which point only to a subsequent vindication on earth, though one which Job himself shall not see. It is also true that it is not on a level with the dark conception of Sheol, to which expression is given elsewhere in the book. But in this respect it is only in harmony with what is found in the Psalter, and it belongs to the art of the poem that, as the piety of the hero wrestles with the enigma of conscious rectitude suffering from the wrath of God and the calumnies of man, he should rise at times above the whole circle of inherited ideas of death, and struggle to at least momentary glimpses of higher things.

To say, as some strangely do, that this interpretation makes the *denoûment*, which shows the suffering

saint compensated in this life, pointless and mistaken, is to misapprehend the nature of the drama. For the poem is not meant to break away from the ordinary Old Testament view of retribution. This is no theoretical discussion, but a "fragment of Old Testament life," as it has been well described, moving within the circle of usual Old Testament ideas. It states a religious problem, the peculiar pressure of which is due to the fact that that circle of ideas is not finally transcended, and it offers glimpses of a larger solution. But it seeks its own solution for the time being within that circle.

The temptation, nevertheless, is to make the hope which is here expressed larger and more definite than in reality it is. Even Ewald, to whose splendid insight we owe so much in restoring the higher interpretation when the drift of scholarship was toward a restriction of the hope to an earthly future, yields to this temptation. He admits, indeed, that the hope of immortality which is here expressed is only "in its first fresh germination," more like a "germinating surmise and anticipation" than a complete development But he speaks of Job as "becoming clearly conscious for the first time of the immortality of the soul, and of the indestructibility of innocence before God"; as triumphing "over death and life, and all the vicissitudes of time in a pure intuition of the future"; and as looking "joyfully beyond physical death into the immortality of the soul" (*Job*, pp. 174, 210, 211, Eng. trans.). To attribute to Job, however, this assured faith in the immortality of the *soul* in particular, is to ascribe to him a definiteness and a precision of ideas which are foreign to the book and to the Old Testament generally. It is of *himself*, not of his *soul* that he speaks, and his words point less to the *condition* in which he shall see God than to the *certainty that* he shall see Him, and in a measure also to the *time* when he shall behold Him. "We should be wrong to say," as it is justly put by Dr. A. B. Davidson, "that he contemplates a purely spiritual vision of God,

and further wrong to say that he contemplates being invested with a new body when he shall see God. Neither thought is present to his mind, which is entirely absorbed in the idea of seeing God. The ideas of Old Testament saints regarding the condition of man after death were too obscure to permit of any such formal and precise conception as that which we call a spiritual sight of God. Besides, as the kind of half-ecstasy under which Job here speaks has fallen on him when a living man, it is probable that, like all persons in such conditions, he carries over with him his present circumstances into his vision after death, and seems to himself to be such a man as he is now when he sees God" (*The Book of Job*, pp. 295, 296).

Mr. E. J. Dillon, following Professor Bickell in his reconstruction of the text on the basis of the recently discovered Sahidic version, translates it thus :—

> "But I know that my avenger liveth,
> Though it be at the end upon my dust ;
> My witness will avenge these things,
> And a curse alight upon mine enemies."

The passage thus becomes the expression of Job's conviction that justice will yet be done him, though it will be too late for him to see it. "His conscience tells him that inasmuch as there is such a thing as eternal justice, a time will come when the truth will be proclaimed, and his honour fully vindicated ; Shaddai will then yearn for the work of His hands, but it will be too late." It may be added that Mr. Dillon also gets rid of the interrogative in chap. xiv. 14 as an interpolation, and renders the strophe in verses 13, 14 thus :—

> "Oh that Thou wouldest hide me in the grave !
> That Thou wouldest secrete me till Thy wrath be passed !
> That Thou wouldest appoint me a set time and remember me !
> If so be man could die and yet live on."

See *The Sceptics of the Old Testament*, pp. 18, 51, 52, 54.

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